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 i 
ABSTRACT 
  
 
Parties who contract at armÕs length are bound 
by the terms of their contracts, provided the contracts 
do not contravene a rule of law or public policy. The 
commencement of formal insolvency proceedings 
may however limit the ability of a debtor to perform 
its pre-petition contractual obligations, resulting to 
liabilities to creditors. Accordingly, a formal 
insolvency procedure ensures an orderly and efficient 
resolution of the debtorÕs affairs -- maximising 
realisations to creditors or rescuing the corporate 
debtor as a going concern. To achieve this purpose, 
unilateral contract enforcement efforts and rights are 
replaced by a mandatory regime characterised by 
collectivity and equality in treatment of similarly 
situated creditors.   
 
This thesis comparatively evaluates the impact 
of the commencement of formal insolvency 
proceedings on corporate contracts in the UK and US. 
It examines the extent to which pre-petition 
contractual bargains are suspended, adjusted or 
avoided by the supervening insolvency law regime in 
the jurisdictions. The thesis adopts a thematic 
approach to examine how the legal frameworks in the 
jurisdictions manage the inevitable conflict between 
the policy considerations of contract law and those of 
insolvency law.  
  
 ii 
The extent to which insolvency law should 
interfere with pre-insolvency contractual 
arrangements and entitlements has always been a 
contentious and keenly debated issue. No doubt, 
insolvency law has a greater number of interests to 
protect outside the interests of pre-petition contracting 
parties. These include the general body of creditors, 
employees, post-petition creditors etc. Nevertheless, 
in the absence of compelling and well-articulated 
policy justification, formal insolvency ought not to be 
a forum for the stripping of property rights or the 
pursuit of redistributional goals. 
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 vii 
INTRODUCTION 
    
 
i.    Background 
 
Companies play a significant role in market and 
mixed economies. They are the primary wheels of 
investment in economies and the major drivers of 
economic growth. Companies generate direct and 
indirect revenues for their host countries through their 
business operations, payment of various taxes and 
royalties, and undertaking diverse corporate social 
responsibilities. Companies also generate employment 
opportunities that positively influence other standard-
of-living metrics in the country such as the poverty 
rate, personal disposable income, foreclosure rates 
and the overall quality and affordability of housing, 
healthcare and education. 
 
Corporate failures are inevitable in market or 
mixed economies. Insolvency may be due to reasons 
ranging from adverse market conditions, human error 
or negligence to incompetence or outright 
recklessness of managers. Accordingly, the nature of 
a jurisdictionÕs corporate insolvency law regime as 
well as the effectiveness of the collective debt 
resolution and value-maximisation regime will have 
significant influence on investment decisions. An 
inefficient and unpredictable corporate insolvency 
regime will have negative consequences on 
 viii 
investment decisions.1 Such a regime will constitute a 
disincentive to prospective investors and will 
adversely affect lending decisions by banks and other 
financial institutions.2  
 
Generally, a company is deemed to be insolvent 
when it is either unable to pay its debts as they fall 
due or the value of its debts is greater than the value 
of its assets. 3  The commencement of formal 
insolvency will have a number of consequences on the 
debtor company, its subsisting and future contracts 
and its creditors and counterparties. Insolvency often 
limits the ability of the debtor company to fulfill all its 
contractual and financial obligations. Creditors will 
understandably be desperate to unilaterally extract as 
much as they can from the company in order to 
minimise or avoid their individual losses.  
 
Accordingly, a primary objective of corporate 
insolvency law is to ensure an orderly resolution of 
the companyÕs debt crisis. Insolvency law discourages 
individual enforcement efforts and imposes a 
mandatory collective regime on all stakeholders. This 
enhances the achievement of insolvency lawÕs goals 
of efficiency and equity in treatment of claims and 
maximisation of realisations. 4  Against this 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Philippe Froute, ÒTheoretical foundation of a debtor-friendly bankruptcy law in 
favour of CreditorsÓ (2007) E.J.L. & E. 201, 204. 
2 ibid. 
3 s. 123 Insolvency Act; s. 101(32)(A) Bankruptcy Code; BNY Corporate Trustee 
Services Ltd v Eurosail-UK [2013] 1 W.L.R. 1408. 
4 Elizabeth Warren, ÒBankruptcy PolicyÓ (1987) 54 Univ. of Chicago L. Rev. 
775, 785: ÒIn bankruptcy, with an inadequate pie to divide and the looming 
discharge of unpaid debts, the disputes center on who is entitled to shares of the 
debtorÕs assets and how these shares are to be divided.Ó 
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background, the debtorÕs pre-petition contracts are 
often interfered with by the supervening insolvency 
regime. This is inevitable considering the inability of 
the debtor to fulfill all its pre-petition obligations to 
the letter. 
  
In the contract law regime, parties are bound by the 
terms of contracts they have entered into at armÕs 
length. Contract law favours certainty of contracts as 
well as autonomy of parties. 5  Accordingly, settled 
contracts can only be modified or terminated in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of the 
contract or as provided for by legislation. The law 
does not set out specific and detailed contractual 
terms for contracting parties. The law merely sets out 
regulatory frameworks within which parties can 
contract. 6  In consequence, contract law sanctions 
freedom of contract so long as contracts are not 
against public policy or in breach of a rule of law.7  
 
The commencement of formal insolvency 
significantly alters the above position. 8  The 
insolvency regime takes prime position in the debtorÕs 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Seana Shiffrin, ÒThe Divergence of Contract and PromiseÓ (2007) 120 Harvard 
L. Rev. 708, 709. 
6 John Smith, The Law of Contract (4h edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2002) 2: ÒThe 
distinguishing feature of contractual obligations is that they are not imposed by 
law but undertaken by the contracting parties.Ó 
7 Benjamin Hermalin, ÒThe Law and Economics of Contracts,Ó Columbia Law 
and Economics Working Paper No 296 http://ssrn.com/abstract=907678 
(accessed on 22 February 2011). 
8 Hindcastle v Barbara Attenborough Associates [1997] AC 70, 86: ÒDisclaimer 
will inevitably have an adverse impact on others; those with whom the contract 
was made and those who have rights and liabilities in respect of the property.Ó 
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affairs, displacing the applicable non-insolvency law.9 
Rajak sums up this position as follows: 
ÒThe phenomenon of insolvency may render nugatory 
the clearest and most cast-iron of legal rights ... A 
contract giving undeniable rights to one party in a 
jurisdiction with the most efficient system of 
enforcement of rights may be worthless where the other 
party is insolvent.Ó10 
 
Hence at the commencement of formal insolvency, 
hitherto valid and binding contracts of the debtor may 
be modified, suspended or terminated by the new 
regime.11 The insolvency law framework will dictate 
the capacity and ability of the debtor to engage in 
post-insolvency contracts. 
 
Notwithstanding RajakÕs assertion above, it is 
imperative for a balance to be struck between the 
policy objectives of contract law and those of 
insolvency law. An approach which is overly 
protective of debtors will be detrimental to trade and 
commerce. In recognition of this point, the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
Working Group V has rightly proposed in its draft 
legislative guide on insolvency law that, 
ÒAlthough insolvency law generally forms a distinctive 
regime, it ought not to produce results that are 
fundamentally in conflict with the premises upon which 
the general law is based. Where the insolvency law does 
seek to achieve a result that defers or fundamentally 
departs from the general law (e.g. with respect to 
treatment of contracts, avoidance of antecedent acts and 
transactions or treatment of the rights of secured 
creditors) it is highly desirable that that result be the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Fontainebleau Hotel Corporation v Simon 508 F.2d 1056, 1059 (5 Circuit 
1975): ÒThe purpose of Bankruptcy Code is to suspend the normal operation of 
rights and obligations between the debtor and his creditors.Ó 
10 Harry Rajack, Insolvency Law Theory and Practice (Sweet & Maxwell 1993) 
4. 
11 In the Matter of Whitcomb & Keller Mortgage Co. 715 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 
1983): ÒIn the first place, it may be noted that general principles governing 
contractual benefits and burdens do not always apply in the bankruptcy context.Ó 
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product of careful consideration and conscious policy in 
that direction.Ó12 
 
The above point is highly imperative especially in 
the treatment of property rights of creditors. In this 
regard, insolvency law ought not to be used as a 
platform to pursue redistributional goals. The status of 
parties at insolvency ought to be determined by 
reference to their pre-petition positions and the 
applicable non-insolvency law. Accordingly, there 
should only be a deviation where there is a clear and 
justifiable insolvency law policy which necessitates 
same so as to fulfill specific goals of insolvency law 
e.g. the statutory moratorium and avoidance of certain 
vulnerable pre-petition contracts which are both 
evaluated in this thesis. 
! !
! !
ii.     Objectives 
    
The objective of this thesis is to develop a sound 
and in-depth understanding of the impact of 
insolvency on a corporate debtorÕs contracts. This 
thesis evaluates how insolvency affects the pre and 
post-petition contractual rights and obligations of a 
corporate debtor, as well as those of its creditors. It 
examines the conflict that often arises between the 
policy objectives of contract law and those of 
insolvency law after the commencement of the formal 
procedure. It also evaluates the mechanisms for 
managing these conflicts in the jurisdictions.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12  United Nations Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2004) 9.  
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The above is carried out through a thematic and 
comparative study of the corporate insolvency law 
systems of the US and the UK (England and Wales). 
The themes of corporate insolvency law analysed in 
this thesis are the anti-divestiture rules, the statutory 
moratorium, the disclaimer provisions, rules against 
contracts at an undervalue and post-petition finance 
contracts. 
 
Against this background, this thesis is designed to 
develop a sound insight into this area of corporate 
insolvency law. Significantly there is a dearth of 
academic work which deal extensively with the 
impact of insolvency on corporate contracts, let alone, 
from a comparative perspective. This thesis therefore 
seeks to make original and substantial contributions to 
legal knowledge in the areas it has covered. 
  
 
iii.    Methodology 
 
This thesis is predominantly a comparative study. 
Generally, comparative legal research proceeds from 
doctrinal research perspectives. This thesis therefore 
heavily relies on primary sources of law from the 
three jurisdictions such as case law, statutes and other 
statutory instruments in addition to secondary sources 
of law: mainly academic literature. The doctrinal 
approach aids in the description and analysis of the 
domestic laws of the jurisdictions. 
  
 xiii 
Comparative law is the study of the relationship of 
a national legal system with one or more other 
national systems. 13  It includes the analysis of the 
nature of such a relationship, the reasons for the 
similarities and/or differences and the significance of 
such similarities and/or differences. 14  This thesis 
utilises the functional approach, which is the standard 
research method of comparative law.15 Functionality 
is premised on the notion that legal systems face 
essentially the same problems and solve these 
problems by quite different means, though very often 
with similar results.  
 
Having this principle in mind will aid in avoiding 
any legal transplanting of the rules of one jurisdiction 
to another without due consideration of the peculiar 
socio-political and economic climate of that 
jurisdiction. Functionality is also hinged on the notion 
that incomparables cannot be usefully compared and 
that in law the only things that are comparable are 
those which fulfil the same function.16 Accordingly 
this thesis focuses on the corporate insolvency law 
systems of two jurisdictions; these systems have the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Mary Glendon, Paolo Carozza, Comparative Legal Traditions, Texts, Materials 
and Cases (2nd end, West 1994) 6. 
14 ibid. 
15  Christopher Whytock, ÒLegal Origins, Functionalism and the Future of 
Comparative LawÓ (2009) Brigham Young University L Rev: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1596271 (accessed on 22 February 2011); Ralph 
Michaels, ÒThe Functional Method of Comparative LawÓ (2006) Duke Law 
Faculty Scholarship Paper 1249: 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2033&context=facult
y_scholarship (accessed on 9 July 2013); Mathias Reimann, ÒThe Progress and 
Failure of Comparative Law in the second half of the 20th CenturyÓ (2003) 50 
Am J Comp L 671, 679. Antonios Platsas, ÒThe Functional and the Dysfunctional 
in the Comparative Method of Law: Some Critical RemarksÓ EJCL 
http://www.ejcl.org/123/art123-3.pdf (accessed on 9 July 2013). 
16 Konrad Zweigert, Hein Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Clarendon 
Press 1998) 34. 
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same central objective i.e. a collective and orderly 
resolution of insolvency. 
 
The choice of the corporate insolvency law 
systems of UK and US for this comparative analysis 
is premised on very cogent reasons. As previously 
noted, comparative law often involves the study of 
relationships between national systems of law. 
Subsequently, where there is no relationship between 
the legal systems compared, there can be no 
comparative law and any comparison drawn between 
rules will be arbitrary and worthless.17 UKÕs corporate 
insolvency law shares a common heritage with the US 
legal regimes in US. The two insolvency law regimes 
belong to the same legal family with the English 
regime being the parent system.  
 
The first US bankruptcy law enacted in 1800 
substantially adopted the English Bankruptcy law of 
1782.18 In addition, the relationship between the UK 
and US insolvency law regimes can be traced back 
further to the 15th century. In Bay Plastics Inc. v BT 
Commercial Corporation, 19  it was noted that the 
modern US fraudulent provisions under the US 
bankruptcy law owe their origin to the Statute of 
Elizabeth (the Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances).20  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Mary Glendon, Paolo Carozza, Comparative Legal Traditions, Texts, Materials 
and Cases (fn. 13). 
18  David Epstein, Steve Nickles, Bankruptcy (West 1993) 1. Charles Tabb, 
ÒHistory of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States of AmericaÓ (1995) 3 Am. 
Bankr. Ins. L. Rev. 5, 6. 
19 187 B.R. 315 (CD. Cal. 1995). 
20 13 Eliz. Ch. 7 (1570). 
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The UK corporate insolvency law system has since 
maintained its so-called Òcreditor-friendlyÓ approach. 
In addition, the UK regime has undergone a number 
of revisions over the years, developing certain 
distinctive features. Despite sharing a common 
heritage with the UK system, the US corporate 
bankruptcy law regime has been revised and 
developed in a distinctive manner. These revisions 
have transformed the regime into the leading debtor-
oriented corporate bankruptcy system in the world 
today.21!
! ! ! !
! !  
iv.    Chapter outline 
 
Chapter one of this thesis comparatively evaluates 
the anti-divestiture rules under UK and US corporate 
insolvency regimes. The chapter examines the policy 
objectives of the common law anti-deprivation rule 
and the Bankruptcy CodeÕs anti-ipso facto rules. It 
critically evaluates the efficacy of the rules in 
fulfilling their objectives as well as their effect on pre-
petition contractual arrangements. 
 
Chapter two comparatively evaluates UK 
insolvency law moratorium regime and the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 The Chapter 11 reorganisation procedure where after the commencement of the 
insolvency procedure, the company is left under the control of the existing 
directors or management, known as the debtor-in-possession. Nathalie Martin, 
ÒCommon-Law Bankruptcy Systems: Similarities and DifferencesÓ (2003) 11 
Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 367, 367-368: ÒDespite large-scale transplantation of 
English law into the US, long after the revolutionary war, the US diverged from 
England in the area of bankruptcy, for economic and philosophical reasons. The 
US never adopted the English's unforgiving and highly administrative bankruptcy 
process.Ó 
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corresponding automatic stay regime under US 
bankruptcy law. The chapter identifies and evaluates 
the policy objectives of the statutory moratorium in 
the jurisdictions and their impact on enforcement of 
pre-petition contractual rights and remedies. The 
chapter also examines the efficacy of the relief 
provisions as a mechanism for striking a balance 
between contending interests in the insolvency forum. 
 
Chapter three evaluates the purpose and effect of 
the disclaimer or rejection of pre-petition executory 
contracts in the jurisdictions. The chapter also 
evaluates the two principal tests for determining the 
burdensome nature of contracts in the US regime Ð 
against the background of the objectives of the 
disclaimer/rejection mechanism.  
 
Chapter four of this thesis comparatively evaluates 
the rules against transactions at an undervalue and 
fraudulent contracts under UK and US insolvency 
regimes respectively. The chapter explores the 
measures adopted by the jurisdictions to safeguard 
genuine contracts from the avoidance rules. The 
chapter also specifically explores the application of 
these rules on two notable contracts which often raises 
undervalue concerns, namely leveraged buyouts and 
intra-group guarantee agreements. 
 
Chapter five analyses post-petition contracts in UK 
and US insolvency law. The chapter highlights the 
imperative of post-petition financing arrangements 
 xvii 
and proceeds to evaluate the legal frameworks for 
post-petition financing contracts in the jurisdictions. It 
assesses the approaches of the jurisdictions towards 
incentivising and compensating prospective post-
petition lenders and their effect on the contractual and 
property interests of other creditors. 
  
1 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE ANTI DIVESTITURE RULES 
 
 
1.0.    Introduction 
 
Companies engage in multiple contractual 
arrangements in the course of their business 
operations. The commencement of a formal 
insolvency procedure may limit the ability of 
companies to perform some of their contractual 
obligations. Accordingly, contracting parties often 
adopt a variety of measures to evade or minimise the 
potential losses that insolvency may inflict on solvent 
parties. A common means of minimising or avoiding 
the harsh consequences of insolvency is adopting 
contractual clauses for the modification or termination 
of contracts once formal insolvency proceedings 
commence. In other instances, parties may agree for a 
transfer or retransfer of assets to the solvent party at 
the commencement of formal insolvency or the 
occurrence of an insolvency-related event such as 
default in the performance of an obligation or a very 
high debt-to-equity ratio. 
  
Although some of these armÕs length contracts 
are valid prior to insolvency, they may be incapable 
of achieving the objectives of the parties in the 
insolvency regime. This will be the case if they offend 
certain mandatory rules of insolvency law. Primarily, 
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they may constitute an attempt at contracting out of 
the mandatory insolvency law scheme. This has two 
consequences; firstly the debtorÕs estate is deprived of 
the benefits of the terminated contract or transferred 
asset. Secondly, some of such arrangements may be 
contrary to insolvency lawÕs pari passu regime which 
favours the equal treatment of similarly ranked 
creditors. 
 
A significant introduction to the 
US Bankruptcy Reform Act1 was the anti-divestiture 
provisions, commonly referred to as the anti-ipso 
facto rules. 2  Ipso facto clauses permit contracting 
parties to either modify contractual rights or terminate 
the contract upon insolvency. 3  The Bankruptcy 
CodeÕs anti-ipso facto rules render such clauses 
invalid and unenforceable at insolvency.4 Under UK 
corporate insolvency law, the 200-year-old common 
law anti-deprivation rule performs a similar (but not 
identical) role. The rule invalidates agreements for 
transfer of assets of the debtor to a third party at the 
commencement of formal insolvency proceedings.5
   
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Bankruptcy Code 1978. 
2 H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Congress 1st Session 347-348 (1997); s.365 (e), (b), (c) 
and 541(c) of the Code; In re Lafayette Radio Electronics 7 B.R. 189, 191 
(Bankr. ED N.Y. 1980); In re Sapolin Paints Inc. 5 B.R. 412, 417 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. 1980). 
3 Dumont v Ford Motor Credit Co. 581 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2009); In re 
Suncruz Casinos 342 B.R. 370, 376 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006); In re Texaco Inc. 73 
B.R. 960, 964, 965 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
4 s. 365(e) and s. 541(c) of the Code. 
5  Yates Development Inc. v Old Kings Interchange Inc. 241 B.R. 247, 253 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999). 
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Over the years, there have been varying (and 
sometimes conflicting) judicial attitudes and academic 
opinions in the UK and the US in relation to 
insolvency-related contractual forfeiture clauses. Prior 
to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act,6 ipso 
facto clauses were valid and enforceable. 7  This 
notwithstanding, some bankruptcy courts deviated 
from this general rule.8 This was often the case where 
such forfeiture caused substantial injustice or 
frustrated a debtorÕs reorganisation process.9 With the 
introduction of provisions that invalidate all ipso facto 
clauses, the 1978 insolvency law reform has ensured 
consistency in judicial decision-making in this regard. 
 
The scope and application of the common law 
anti-deprivation rule has remained uncertain. The 
conflicting decisions of English courts and the 
numerous exceptions to the rule clearly illustrate this 
point. In Lomas v JFB Firth Rixson,10 Briggs J. rightly 
noted that although the rule is a useful public policy 
principle, it had been characterised and disfigured by 
the several distinctions that have eroded its efficacy 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Bankruptcy Code 1978.  
7 Bankruptcy Acts 1898, 1938 and 1970; Days Inn of America Inc. v 161 Hotel 
Group Inc. 55 Conn. App. 118, 124-125 (739 A.2d 280 1999); In re B. Siegel 
Company 51 B.R. 159, 164 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985); Kopelman v Halvajian 
663 F.2d 463, 466 (3d Cir. 1981); John Harry Trigg v The U.S.A 630 F.2d 1370, 
1374 (10th Cir. 1980); In re Great Scott Food Market 1 B.R. 223, 224  (Bankr. 
D.R.I. 1979); Smith v Hoboken R.R. Warehouse 328 U.S. 123 (1946). 
8 Holtsinger Inc. v Cordaro 20 B.R. 814, 816 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1982); In re Great 
Scott Food Market (fn. 7) 225; In the Matter of Queens Boulevard Wine and 
Liquor Corporation 503 F.2d 202, 204 (2nd. Cir. 1974); B.J.M Reality 
Corporation v Joseph Ruggieri 326 F.2d 281, 282 (2 Cir. 1963); Finn v Meighan 
325 U.S. 300 (1945); Model Dairy Company v Foltis Fischer Inc. 67 F.2d 704, 
706 (2 Cir. 1933). 
9  Dicello v USA 133 B.R. 578, 582 (Bankr. D. Del. 1991); In re Traders 
Compress Corp. 381 F. Supp 789, 794 (1973); In re Rosenbaum Grain Corp. 13 
F.Supp 601, 604 (1935); Environmental Properties Corporation v Allied 
Supermarket Inc. 20 B.R. 897, 899. 
10 [2010] EWHC 3372 (94). 
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and efficiency. 11   Also in Money Markets 
International Stockbrokers Ltd v London Stock 
Exchange,12 Neuberger J. observed that, 
ÒIt is not possible to discern a coherent rule, or even an 
entirely coherent set of rules, to enable one to assess in 
any particular case whether such a provision (a 
Ôdeprivation provisionÕ) falls foul of the principle...it is 
not entirely easy to reconcile the conclusions, and 
indeed the reasoning, in some of the cases.Ò13 
 
Similar sentiments have been expressed by a number 
of courts that have applied the rule.14 Accordingly, 
this chapter attempts to explore ways of possibly 
achieving coherence in the application of the rule.  
 
This chapter also critically evaluates the 
underlying policy objectives of the anti-divestiture 
rules in both jurisdictions and their effect on contracts 
at the commencement of formal insolvency 
proceedings. The chapter evaluates the approaches of 
the two legal systems in resolving the conflicts 
between the policy considerations of contract law, 
which favour freedom and enforceability of contracts 
and those of insolvency law, embodied in the anti-
divestiture rules, which favour a collective procedure 
and equality of similarly ranked creditors. 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 ibid. at (95). 
12 [2002] 1 W.L.R. 1150, 1182. 
13 ibid. at 1182. He also noted that ÒIt is equally clear from the authorities that 
there are occasions where a provision which, at least on its face, appears to 
offend the principle has been upheld. I do not find it easy to discern any 
consistent approach in the authorities as to the application of the principle.Ó 
(1173). 
14 Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd and ors v BNY Corporate Trustee Services 
Ltd [2011] 3 W.L.R. 521, 539; Butters and ors v BBC Worldwide Ltd and ors 
[2010] 3 W.L.R. 87, 118 (Neuberger J.): Ò...it is difficult to define precisely what 
sort of deprivation provisions are caught by the rule.Ó  
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1.1.   Scope and policy objectives 
 
1.1.1.     Bankruptcy CodeÕs anti-ipso facto rules 
    
a.   The statutory provisions 
 
The two primary anti-ipso facto rules are 
contained in s. 365(e) and s. 541(c) of the Bankruptcy 
Code. Section 365(e) invalidates contractual 
provisions that modify or terminate executory 
contracts or unexpired leases at the commencement of 
insolvency.15 For a contractual clause to be vulnerable 
under s. 365(e), the termination must be conditioned 
upon any of the following insolvency events: 16 
i. the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor 
at any time before the closing of the insolvency 
case; 17 
ii. the commencement of the insolvency case;18 
iii. the appointment of or taking possession by a 
trustee in the bankruptcy case or a custodian 
before the commencement of the case.19 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15  Mims v Fidelity Funding Inc. 307 B.R. 849, 858 (N.D.Tex. 2002); In re 
Schwegmann Gaint Supermarkets 287 B.R. 649, 657-658 (Bankr.E.D.La. 2001); 
Forlini v North East Savings 200 B.R. 9, 12; In re Warren Siegal 190 B.R. 639, 
643-644 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1996); Broyhill v Deluca 194 B.R. 65, 75 (Bankr. E.D. 
Va. 1996); In re Bernie Grablowsky 180 B.R. 134, 137 (1995); In re Child World 
Inc. 161 B.R. 349, 354, 355 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993); Hawai Leasing v Sergio 
Inc. 16 B.R. 898, 910 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 1981); Phillips v First City Texas-Tyler 
966 F.2d 926, 935 (5th Cir. 1992); In re Rittenhouse Carpet Inc. 56 B.R. 131, 
133 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985).  
16 In re United Airline Ltd Corp. 346 B.R. 456, 467 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006); In re 
Howard Margulis 323 B.R. 130, 136-137 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); Summit 
Investment and Development Corporation v Leroux 69 F.3d 608, 611; Prime 
Motor Inns Inc. v First Fidelity Bank 123 B.R. 104, 108 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990).  
17 s. 365(e)(1)(A) of the Code. 
18 s. 365(e)(1)(B). 
19 s. 365(e)(1)(C). 
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These provisions ensure that clauses for termination 
of contracts that are not conditioned on the insolvency 
of the debtor but merely coincide with the 
commencement of the case, are not unfairly 
invalidated by the rule. 20 
 
Similarly, s. 541(c) invalidates ipso facto 
clauses that have the effect of transferring the debtorÕs 
assets to other parties at the commencement of 
insolvency. 21  Under the Bankruptcy Code, a 
Òbankruptcy estateÓ is automatically created once an 
insolvency petition is filed.22 This bankruptcy estate 
comprises all legal or equitable interests of the debtor 
in property.23 Accordingly, s. 541(c) ensures that the 
debtorÕs pre-petition interests in any property fall into 
the bankruptcy estate at the commencement of the 
bankruptcy case.24  
 
The wide nature of the s. 541(c) anti-ipso facto 
provision clearly indicates a manifest Congressional 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Spieker Properties LP v Southern Pacific Funding Corp. 268 F.3d 712, 717 
(9th Cir. 2001). 
21 In re Robert Helms Construction Corp. 139 F.3d 702, 705 (9th Cir. 1998); In 
the Matter of GP Express Airlines Inc. 200 B.R. 222, 233  (Bankr. D. Neb. 
1996); In re Jones Truck Lines Inc. 172 B.R. 602, 611-612 
(Bankr.W.D.Ark.1994); In re Olympia Holding Corp. 188 B.R. 287, 294, 295 
(M.D. Fla. 1994); Tambay Trustee Inc. v Florida Progress Corp. 67 B.R. 94, 96 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986). 
22 s. 541(a) of the Code. 
23 s. 541(a); In the Matter of Daugherty 188 B.R. 607, 611 (Bankr. D. Neb. 
1995); In re Tudor Motor Lodge Ltd 102 B.R. 936, 949 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989); 
Counties Contracting & Construction Co. v Constitution Life Insurance 
Company 855 F.2d 1054 (3d Cir. 1988); In re Wegner Farms Corp. 49 B.R. 440, 
442-443 (Bankr. N. D. Iowa 1985); H.R. Rep 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 367 
(1977), U.S.C.C.A.N. 1978, 5787, 6323. The legislative history of the section 
describes the estate as consisting of Òall kinds of propertyÉtangible or 
intangible.Ó 
24 s. 541(c) of the Code; In re Forth Worth Osteopathic Hospital Inc. 387 B.R. 
706, 712-713 (Bkrtcy N.D. Tex. 2008); In re Gregory Ehmann 319 B.R. 200, 206 
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005); In re Garrison Ashburn 253 B.R. 700, 709 (Bankr. E.D. 
Va. 2000); Forlini v NorthEast Savings 200 B.R. 9, 12 (D.R.I. 1996); In re 
Cutler 165 B.R. 275, 280 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994); In re Winters 69 B.R. 145, 146 
(Bankr. D. Or. 1986); In re Gaslight Village Inc. 6 B.R. 871, 875 (Bkrtcy. D. 
Conn.1980). 
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intention to transfer all property interests of the debtor 
to the bankruptcy estate, regardless of any pre-
existing agreement to the contrary. 25  Hence it 
specifically frustrates any form of dissipation of the 
assets in the bankruptcy estate by invalidating any 
stipulation, agreement, transfer instrument or 
applicable non-bankruptcy law which at the 
commencement of insolvency: 
i. is conditioned on the typical ipso facto events 
under s. 365(e)(1)(A),(B) and (C);26 and 
ii. effects or gives an option to effect forfeiture, 
modification, or termination of the debtorÕs 
interest in property.27 
 
 
        b.     Policy objectives 
 
The policy objective for the anti-ipso facto 
rules is well explained in the CodeÕs legislative 
statement. The legislative history of s. 365 (e) 
describes the policy rationale of the rule as being to 
enable trustees to assume or assign useful executory 
contracts or leases that will aid the companyÕs 
rehabilitation or liquidation.28 Hence in the case of 
Yates Development Inc. v Old Kings Interchange,29 
the rationale for invalidating ipso facto clauses was 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Brock v American Security Bank 23 B.R. 998, 1002; In re Probulk Inc. 407 
B.R. 56, 61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
26  In re Government Securities Corp. 101 B.R. 343, 350 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
1989) where a termination was held not to infringe s. 541(c)(1)(B) as the 
termination clause and the termination were not conditioned upon any insolvency 
event. 
27 Prime Motor Inns Inc. v First Fidelity Bank (n 16) 108; American Druggists 
Insurance v Jeanes Mechanical Contractors 32 B.R. 657, 
659  (Bankr.W.D.Ky.1983). 
28 Senate Report No. 989, 95th Congress 2nd Session 59, (1978). 
29 241 B.R. 247, 253 (1999). 
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given as being that, 
ÒThey deprive the Chapter 11 estate of valuable property 
rights, such as the opportunity to receive the benefits of 
a contract, at the very time the debtor and the estate may 
need these rights the most in order to further 
rehabilitation efforts.Ó30 
 
Accordingly, contractual or statutory provisions 
for the termination or modification of contracts or 
contractual rights upon a companyÕs insolvency are 
invalidated with the aim of giving the debtor the 
opportunity to perform them and utilise the benefits 
for the general body of creditors.31  
 
Notwithstanding that executory contracts 
consist of unperformed obligations, it would seem 
that the US lawmakers view these unperformed 
obligations as contingent assets which have the 
potential of yielding value for creditors. This aligns 
with one of insolvency lawÕs principal goals namely, 
the maximisation of realisations for the creditors. 
Priority is given to what would benefit the general 
body of creditors as against the risk that an individual 
creditor would avoid by terminating an executory 
contract with an insolvent counterparty. It can be 
argued that this approach furthers corporate 
insolvency lawÕs policy towards a collectivised 
system of administration, asset distribution and risk 
sharing. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 ibid. at 253, per Proctor J. 
31  Spieker Properties LP v The SPFC Liquidating Trust (fn. 20) 716; Yates 
Development Inc. v Old Kings Interchange 241 B.R. 247, 253 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
1999); Summit Inv. & Development Corp v. Leroux (fn. 16) 610; In re Seven 
Hills Inc. 403 B.R. 327, 335 (Bankr.D.N.J. 2009); Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 
v Greenwich Insurance Co. 417 F.3d 193, 198  (1st Cir. 2005); McGlockling v 
Chrysler Financing Co. 296 B.R. 884, 889  (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2003); Andrea 
Coles-Bjerre, ÒIpso Facto: The Pattern of Assumable Contracts in BankruptcyÓ 
(2010) 40 N.M.L.R. 77, 87, 88. 
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  1.1.2.      Common law anti-deprivation rule 
   
       a.      The rule 
 
As a matter of general principle, assets that are 
vested in a debtor at the commencement of insolvency 
proceedings fall into the insolvent estate for the 
benefit of the general body of creditors. The anti-
deprivation rule invalidates contracts that provide for 
a transfer of such assets to creditors or non-creditors 
upon insolvency. 32  Accordingly, in Whitmore v 
Mason,33 one of the early cases where the rule was 
applied, Page Wood V-C expressed the rule as being 
that, 
ÒNo person possessed of property can reserve that 
property to himself until he shall become bankrupt, and 
then provide that in the event of his becoming bankrupt, 
it shall pass to another, and not to his creditors...Ó 34 
 
The anti-deprivation rule is part of insolvency 
lawÕs rules against contracting out. Its purpose is to 
frustrate unjust withdrawal of assets from the 
insolvent estate; hence its ultimate goal is the 
maximisation of realisations. As will be explained, it 
operates on insolvency and not prior to insolvency. 
This is significant, given that the contrary would 
result in an overlap of the anti-deprivation rule and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd. v BNY Corporate Trustees Trustee Services [2010] 
3 W.L.R. 87, 122; Higinbotham v Holme (1812) 19 Ves 88; Ex parte Barter 
(1884) L.R. 26 Ch.D. 510, 519-520; Borlands Trustees v Steel Brothers & Co. 
[1901] 1 Ch. 279, 290; Ex parte Mackay (1872Ð73) L.R. 8 Ch. App 643, 647, 
648. 
33 (1861) 2 J & H 204. 
34 ibid. at 212-213; cited with approval in Ex parte Williams (1877-78) L.R. Ch.D 
138, 143; Ex parte Jay (1880) L.R. 14 Ch.D. 19, 25. 
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the well-established avoidance provisions.35 Thus the 
suggestion by the presiding Judge in Fraser & Ors v 
Oystertec Plc. 36  that the anti-deprivation rule can 
apply even when no bankruptcy or winding up order 
has been made 37  was overruled by the Court of 
Appeal in Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd. and another v 
BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd.38 
 
The nature and scope of the anti-deprivation 
rule has been rightly described as Òeasy to state, but 
difficult to apply in particular in relation to 
sophisticated dealings between modern financial and 
commercial entities.Ó39  The foregoing situation has 
been made worse by a consistent lack of coherence in 
the application of the rule over the years. 40  The 
consequence of this is that it is often difficult to 
ascertain the types of contracts and contractual 
clauses that will be in breach of the anti-deprivation 
rule.41  
 
In Perpetual Trustees Company Ltd v BNY 
Corporate Trustee Services,42 Neuberger L.J. rightly 
observed the above point, noting that: 
ÒIt is not entirely easy to identify the ruleÕs precise 
limits, or even its precise nature from these cases, as the 
reasoning in the various judgements in which the rule 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 e.g. s. 238 and s. 239 IA.  
36 [2004] B.C.C. 233. 
37 ibid. at 253-254. 
38 [2010] 3 W.L.R. 87, 113 (per Neuberger L.J.) and 127 (per Patten L.J.). 
39 Lomas v JFB Firth Rixson (fn. 10) (94). 
40 Money Markets IntÕl Stockbrokers Ltd v LSE   [2002] 1 W.L.R. 1150, 1182. 
41 Butters and Ors v BBC Worldwide Ltd (fn 14) 118 (per Neuberger J.): Òit is 
difficult to define precisely what sort of deprivation provisions are caught by the 
rule.Ó Fidelis Oditah, ÒAssets and the Treatment of Claims in InsolvencyÓ (1992) 
108 L.Q.R. 459, 476. 
42 [2010] 3 W.L.R. 87. 
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has been considered is often a little opaque, and some of 
the judgements are hard to reconcile.Ó43 
 
This notorious fact will be illustrated and evaluated in 
detail throughout this chapter.  
       
The anti-deprivation rule operates in a similar 
manner as s. 541(c) given that both provisions 
invalidate contracts which have the effect of clawing 
back assets from the insolvent estate at insolvency. 
English insolvency law has no equivalent of the s. 
365(e) ipso facto rule. This means that contractual 
clauses for the termination or modification of ordinary 
executory contracts are unobjectionable in English 
law. The Supreme Court has recently affirmed this 
position in the Belmont case, where Lord Mance 
noted that, 
ÒThere is in my opinion no basis for any such rule. 
Where a contract provides for the performance in the 
future of reciprocal obligations, the performance of each 
of which is the quid pro quo of the other, I see nothing 
objectionable or evasive about a provision entitling one 
party to terminate if the other becomes bankrupt.Ó 44 
 
In contrast to the US regime, English 
insolvency law adopts a different approach to 
executory contracts of insolvent companies. This is 
notwithstanding the prospective benefits which may 
be derived from such contracts, especially where the 
liquidator is able and willing to perform.  
 
English insolvency law often gives effect to 
the pre-insolvency contractual intention of parties -- 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 ibid. at 102; BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Belmont Park Investments 
Pty Ltd (fn. 14) 539; Butters & Ors v BBC (fn. 14) 118.  
44  BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd 
[2011] B.C.C. 734, 780. 
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which is for the solvent party to have the right of 
termination at insolvency. The general principle is 
that the liquidator stands exactly in the same position 
as the debtor itself stands in.45 Given that there has not 
been any performance from either of the parties but 
mere unfulfilled obligations, it can hardly be argued 
that assets have been removed from the insolvent 
estate.  
 
This can be contrasted with a case where the 
debtor has utilised its assets in performing and has not 
received any performance before its insolvency. 
Hence in the Belmont case, Lord Walker had 
observed thus, 
ÒI would accept that the forfeiture of contractual rights 
on the bankruptcy of the party enjoying them is in some 
circumstances capable of constituting a deprivation of 
property within the principle precluding evasion of the 
bankruptcy law. This is so not only with accrued rights, 
but may also be the case with other rights, as, for 
example, where the bankrupt has performed his part 
before going bankrupt or the right can fairly be treated 
as independent of any as yet unperformed obligation.Ó46 
 
Furthermore, as would be seen in the course of 
this chapter, giving effect to pre-insolvency 
contractual intentions of the parties with reference to 
the applicable non-insolvency law, also accords with 
what ought to be the touchstone of the regime in 
applying the anti-deprivation rule. 
 
 
 
                  b.        Policy objectives 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 In re Scheibler (1874) L.R. 9 Ch. 722, 727. 
46 ibid at 780. 
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Over the years, two broad policy justifications 
have been proffered for the common law anti-
deprivation rule. One school of thought views the 
policy objective of the rule as being to promote or 
protect the pari passu principle of asset distribution.47 
In line with this reasoning, in Lomas v JFB Firth 
Rixson,48 Briggs J. noted that, 
ÒThe part of the insolvency legislation which the anti-
deprivation rule exists mainly to protect is what is 
generally called the principle of pari passu distribution, 
namely that all the property owned by the company as at 
the commencement of its relevant insolvency process 
should, subject to the prior payment of preferential 
liabilities and expenses, be applied in satisfaction of its 
liabilities in proportion to the size of those liabilities.Ó49 
 
The pari passu rule reflects the principle that 
statutory provisions for pro rata distribution may not 
be excluded by a contract that gives one creditor more 
than its proper share. It ensures a pro rata distribution 
of assets to unsecured creditors subject to the interests 
of floating charge-holders and preferential creditors.50  
 
It is admitted that the anti-deprivation rule 
supports the pari passu principle, to the extent that it 
maximises realisations for distribution.51  However, 
the proposition that the anti-deprivation rule is 
premised on the pari passu rule or exists mainly to 
protect it, is doubtful. This position is supported by 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47  Perpetual Trustees Co Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustees (fn. 32) 125-126 (118)-
1(23); Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (3rd edn, Sweet and 
Maxwell 2005) 186; Richard Calnan, Proprietary rights and Insolvency (OUP 
2010) 4-15. 
48 [2010] EWHC 3372 (Ch.). 
49 ibid at (97). 
50 The pari passu provisions can be found in ss.107 and 328(3) of the Insolvency 
Act 1986, Rules 2.69 and 4.181 of the Insolvency Rules. 
51 Lomas v JFB Firth Rixson Inc [2012] 1 C.L.C. 713, 750: ÒThe anti-deprivation 
principle therefore protects the value of the estate from attempts to evade the 
insolvency laws and, as a consequence, facilitates the application of the pari 
passu rule.Ó 
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the observation of the Court of Appeal in Lomas v 
JFB Firth Rixson Inc.52 where Longmore L.J. stated 
that, 
ÒThe relationship between the anti-deprivation principle 
and the pari passu rule is both dependent and 
autonomous. The former is concerned with contractual 
arrangements which have the effect of depriving the 
bankrupt estate of property which would otherwise have 
formed part of it. The pari passu rule governs the 
distribution of assets within the estate following the 
event of bankruptcy.Ó53  
 
First, given that the pari passu principle is a 
principle of asset distribution in insolvency, and the 
rule has no relevance in the absence of a 
distribution,54 the implication of this is that the anti-
deprivation rule will not apply in insolvency 
proceedings where there is no distribution to 
creditors.55 This runs counter to the settled position 
that the rule applies equally in administration Ð and 
this is regardless of whether there is distribution or 
not.56  
 
Secondly, in some cases, assets that have been 
recouped by virtue of the application of the anti-
deprivation rule may not necessarily be subject to the 
pari passu distribution principle. This will be the case 
where there are floating charge holders and even 
preferential creditors, who will all have priority over 
unsecured creditors. In consequence, the pari passu 
principle may actually have nothing to bite on, as 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 [2012] 1 C.L.C. 713. 
53 ibid. at 750. 
54 Commissioner For Her MajestyÕs Revenue & Customs v The Football league 
Ltd [2013] B.C.C. 60, 80 (87). 
55 Lomas and ors v JFB Firth Rixson Inc. (n 10) 750 (96); John Amour, ÒThe 
uncertain flight of British EagleÓ (2003) 62 Cambridge Law Journal 39, 40. 
56 Commissioners For Her MajestyÕs Revenue & Customs v The Football League 
Ltd (fn. 54) 78, 80; Butters v BBC Worldwide Ltd [2010] B.C.C. 59. 
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there may not be dividends to be shared among 
unsecured creditors to whom the pari passu principle 
applies. 
 
The argument that the pari passu principle is 
the basis for the anti-deprivation rule can also be 
attacked on the ground that not every deprivation 
which the rule aims at is in favour of creditors. As 
will be seen in this chapter, the rule also targets 
transfers made to non-creditors, for example senior 
creditors in subordination agreements, co-
shareholders in pre-emption agreements etc. In cases 
of this nature, it is the size of the pie which is affected 
by the deprivation and not necessarily the pro rata 
distribution of the pie among creditors. 
 
A second school of thought views the policy 
objective of the anti-deprivation rule as being to 
protect the size and value of a debtorÕs assets at 
insolvency. 57 Given that the rule frustrates attempts to 
withdraw assets that would otherwise fall into the 
insolvent estate, its primary focus is seen as being that 
of asset preservation and the maximisation of 
realisations for creditors. Against the background of 
the previous evaluation of the views of the first school 
of thought, as well as the analysis below, this view is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd (fn 
44) 739; Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (4th edn, Sweet 
and Maxwell 2011) 217; Sarah Worthington, ÒInsolvency Deprivation, Public 
Policy and Priority Flip ClausesÓ (2010) I.C.R. 28-39; Roy Goode in ÒPerpetual 
Trustee and Flip Clauses in Swap TransactionsÓ (2011) 127 L.Q.R. 1, 3Ð4. 
However, see an earlier contrary position by Professor Roy Goode stating that 
the pari passu rule was the basis of the application of the anti-deprivation rule in: 
Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (3rd edn. 2005) 175, 177-
180. Professor Ritz Mokal had rightly disagreed with this position in ÒPriority as 
Pathology; The Pari Passu MythÓ (2001) C.L.J. 581, 595-596, 598-600. 
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more persuasive. 
 
In BorlandÕs Trustee v Steel Brothers & co.,58 
the anti-deprivation rule was expressed as being that, 
"A simple stipulation that upon a man's becoming 
bankrupt that which was his property up to the date of 
the bankruptcy should go over to some one else and be 
taken away from his creditors, is void as being a 
violation of the policy of the bankruptcy law."59 
 
The anti-deprivation rule focuses on attempts 
to withdraw assets on insolvency, thereby reducing 
the value of the insolvent estate to the detriment of 
creditors.  It is not concerned with the pro rata 
distribution of assets among equally ranked creditors. 
Hence it has been rightly observed that while the anti-
deprivation rule ensures that the size of the pie 
available for division is not improperly reduced, the 
pari passu rule focuses on the appropriate division or 
distribution of the pie.60 The primary objective of the 
rule is asset preservation and the maximisation of 
realisations for the general body of creditors.61 
    
It is suggested that the argument about the 
anti-deprivation rule being premised on the pari passu 
rule is due to the fact that the two principles are sub-
rules of the general principle against contracting out 
of the insolvency law,62 and may sometimes overlap.63  
This will be the case where a party in whose favour 
the deprivation is effected is a creditor.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58  [1901] 1 Ch. 279. 
59  ibid at 290. 
60 Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (fn. 57) 61. 
61 Commissioners For Her MajestyÕs Revenue & Customs v The Football League 
Ltd (fn. 54) 75 
62 ibid. at 739. Lord Collins endorsed the view of Professor Roy Goode in 
ÒPerpetual Trustee and Flip Clauses in Swap TransactionsÓ (fn. 57) 3Ð4. 
63 Lomas and Ors v JFB Firth Rixson Inc. (fn. 51) 750 (96), (97). 
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In addition, a close look into some cases in the 
past will reveal that where some courts applied the 
anti-deprivation rule, they actually used descriptions 
which would suit the pari passu rule. For example in 
Ex parte Mackay, 64  James L.J., held that the 
vulnerable contract,  
ÒProvide(d) for a different distribution of his effects in 
the event of bankruptcy from that which the law 
provides.Ó65  
 
Prima facie, this statement expresses the pari 
passu principle. The facts of the case also showed that 
the pari passu rule had been breached. This is in view 
of the fact that the estate was clearly deprived of an 
asset (the royalties) but at the same time an unsecured 
creditor was effectively elevated in terms of recovery 
over all creditors. 
  
In addition to the fact that the anti-deprivation 
rule is not concerned with distribution, the rule differs 
from the pari passu rule in other respects. As will be 
seen in this chapter, the anti-deprivation rule applies 
only if a deprivation is triggered by the 
commencement of formal insolvency.66 On the other 
hand, the pari passu rule will apply regardless of 
whether insolvency is the trigger of the deprivation or 
asset transfer.67  A detailed evaluation of this issue is 
dealt with in paragraph 1.2.3. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 (1872Ð73) L.R. 8 Ch. App 643. 
65 ibid. at 647. 
66 Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd (fn. 
44) 734, 742. 
67 Commissioner For Her MajestyÕs Revenue & Customs v The Football league 
Ltd (fn. 54) 76 (65). 
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Lastly a further distinction between the two 
rules, which flows from the fact that the pari passu 
principle is restricted to asset distribution, is that the 
pari passu rule does not apply to deprivations in 
favour of non-creditors. This is necessarily so, given 
that non-creditors are not part of insolvency lawÕs 
distribution scheme to which the rule is restricted. An 
example of a deprivation to a non-creditor will be the 
case of debt subordination where the subordinated 
creditor (i.e. the junior creditor) is not necessarily a 
creditor or debtor of the senior creditor. As a corollary, 
it can also be argued that the pari passu rule will not 
apply in the case of a fully secured creditor who 
receives an asset which ought to fall into the insolvent 
estate, such receipt being above his entitlement as a 
secured creditor. 
 
Significantly and flowing from the above, 
Goode has argued that the anti-deprivation rule is 
restricted to non-creditors and does not apply when 
deprivations are in favour of creditors. Goode argues 
that, 
"Unfair preference of one creditor over the general body 
of creditors merely disturbs the statutory order of 
distribution; it has no impact on the net asset value of 
the company. This is because the amount lost to the 
company through a payment or transfer to a particular 
creditor in or towards repayment of the company's debt 
to him is precisely matched by a corresponding 
diminution in the company's liabilities, leaving its 
balance sheet unchanged.Ó68 
 
Goode further argues that a transfer to a 
creditor will only be in breach of the anti-deprivation 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (fn. 57) 218-219. 
  
19 
rule if he is paid more than he was owed. The 
deprivation will be to the extent of the excess he 
would not receive as a creditor Ð given that there will 
be a reduction in the companyÕs net asset value in 
breach of the anti-deprivation rule. 69  Goode thus 
concludes that the two rules are mutually exclusive in 
relation to any particular payment or transfer.70 
    
The wider implication of GoodeÕs proposition 
would be that most previous authorities which were 
premised on the anti-deprivation rule would have to 
be viewed as pari passu authorities, given that the 
parties who received the assets were in one way or the 
other creditors of the insolvent parties.71   
 
Again, his proposition can be disputed on the 
ground that although a preferential payment to a 
creditor does not amount to a withdrawal in favour of 
an external party Ð in which case the liabilities of the 
company are not correspondingly reduced. It 
nevertheless constitutes a withdrawal of assets which 
ought to be available to the general body of creditors. 
First, in a winding up procedure, reduction of a 
debtorÕs liabilities due to the preferential payment to 
an unsecured creditor, practically gives no benefit to 
other unsecured creditors. Secondly, the withdrawal 
will reduce the pro rata receipts of creditors generally. 
Thus it can be argued that this ultimately has the same 
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69 ibid. at 218, 219 
70 ibid.  
71 e.g. Ex p Mackay (1872-73) L.R. 8 Ch. App 643; Ex parte Williams (1877) 7 
Ch. App 138; Worrell v Johns [1928] Ch. 737; In re Appex Suply Company 
[1942] Ch. 108; Carreras Rothmans Ltd v Freeman Matthews Treasure Ltd 
[1983] 1 Ch. 207. 
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effect as a withdrawal by a non-creditor.  
Nevertheless, from another perspective 
GoodeÕs proposition may be considered as a good 
effort towards delineating the limits of two principles. 
This has the potential of ensuring clarity in their 
application and avoiding some of the inconsistencies 
that plague the application of the anti-deprivation 
rule. 72  In addition, it is arguable that GoodeÕs 
proposition will not result in any transaction that 
would have otherwise been colourable being validated. 
On the contrary, it will ensure that the rules are in fact 
mutually exclusive. This will in turn ensure clarity in 
their scope and application. 
    
 
1.2.  Primary elements of the rules 
 
1.2.1.    Executory contracts 
 
Section 365(e) of the Bankruptcy Code is 
confined to executory contracts, while s. 541(c) 
applies to both executory and executed contracts.73 
This point is well illustrated in the case of General 
Motors Acceptance Corporation v Thomas Bell 74 
where s. 365(e) was held to be inapplicable because 
the contract was executed but s. 541(c) was held to 
apply.75  
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72 For example in Money Markets International v LSE  (fn.12) 290 where Lord 
Neugberger stated that the decision British Eagle v Air France [1975] 1 W.L.R. 
758 (where the pari passu principle was applied) had modified the ways in which 
the anti-deprivation rule was to be applied. 
73 In re Perry 25 B.R. 817, 820 (Bankr. D. Md. 1982); Brock v American Security 
Bank 23 B.R. 998, 1002 (1982). 
74 8 B.R. 549 (Bkrtcy E.D. Mich. 1981). 
75 Ibid. at 551. 
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As previously noted, s. 365(e) has no 
equivalent in English insolvency law. 76  The anti-
deprivation rule focuses on the divestment of property 
at insolvency and not termination of executory 
contracts.77 In English commercial law, it is common 
practice for contracting parties to include clauses that 
enable a solvent party to either withhold performance 
or terminate the contract if the counterparty becomes 
insolvent.  
 
In Belmont Park Investment Pty Ltd v BNY 
Corporate Trustee Services, 78  the Supreme Court 
upheld the validity of such ipso facto clauses in 
English law. The court rejected a proposition that 
clauses stipulating for the termination of contracts at 
insolvency breached the anti-deprivation rule given 
that the liquidator is deprived of the potential benefits 
of continuing the contract. The court reasoned that 
where a contract provides for the performance in the 
future of reciprocal obligations, the performance of 
each of which is the quid pro quo of the other, a 
termination-at-insolvency clause was 
unobjectionable.79 
  
Much can be said about English lawÕs 
approach to ipso facto clauses in executory contracts. 
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76 Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustees Services [2011] 3 
W.L.R. 521, 573 (174). 
77  ibid. Although where the Ôtermination-at-insolvencyÕ contractual clause 
involves the divestment of property, the application of the anti-deprivation rule 
will inevitably terminate the contract too. 
78 [2011] B.C.C. 734. 
79 ibid. at 780 (per Lord Mance). 
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First, there is no doubt that some executory contracts 
may be beneficial to an insolvent companyÕs 
successful rehabilitation or smooth winding up. 
Where the officeholder is able and willing to perform 
the debtorÕs obligations under the contract, the 
counterparty hardly stands to lose anything. On the 
contrary, such will potentially result in the 
maximisation of realisations for the general body of 
creditors. 
 
Again, even if direct performance by the 
debtor or officeholder is not feasible, if such 
executory contracts are assignable, ipso facto 
terminations will have the effect of depriving the 
insolvent estate of the potential benefits that will 
accrue from possible assignment of the contracts. 
Hence it is arguable that permitting the termination of 
executory contracts upon insolvency denies the debtor 
the opportunity to maximise realisations. It may also 
have the effect of denying a faltering but potentially 
viable business the crucial advantage in attempting to 
reorganise. 
 
It is suggested that the s. 365(e) ipso facto 
provision represents a strong Congressional intention 
favouring maximisation of the size of the insolvent 
estate to enable creditors to be paid as much as 
possible on their claims. From the perspective of the 
CodeÕs distribution and asset maximisation 
perspectives, each executory contract is viewed as a 
contingent opportunity. Accordingly, a counterpartyÕs 
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obligation to perform an existing contract also 
represents potential value that can be collected or 
assigned to maximise realisations to creditors. 
    
However, the merits and case for invalidating 
ipso facto clauses in executory contracts at insolvency 
may only be plausible where the insolvent party is 
able and willing to perform. The contrary would 
amount to dragging an unwilling counterparty into 
further risky dealings with an already insolvent 
company with no assurance of reciprocal performance.  
 
Regardless of the above, a possible argument 
in support of the anti-ipso facto regime may be that 
counterparties in executory contracts with insolvent 
companies ought to stand on the same footing with 
other unsecured creditors who were ÒunluckyÓ to have 
performed the obligations in their pre-insolvency 
contracts without receiving any performance before 
the commencement of the formal insolvency 
proceedings. 
 
Take an example, On December 21, B enters 
into separate contracts with S1 Ltd and S2 Ltd. The 
contract with S1 is for the immediate supply of goods 
for payment on December 31. While the contract with 
S2 is for the supply of goods on December 25 for 
payment on December 31. If B Ltd files for 
liquidation on December 24, the argument is that S2 
Ltd ought to be compelled to perform its obligation 
and thereafter claim as an unsecured creditor Ð given 
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that S2 Ltd, a contingent unsecured creditor, ought to 
stand in the same position as S1 Ltd by performing 
and subsequently claiming for dividends as an 
unsecured creditor. Note that this (extreme) scenario 
has only been avoided under the Code by the 
preconditions for the assumption of pre-insolvency 
contracts.80  
 
However, the prospect of being forced into 
such a one-sided transaction will raise serious issues 
of fairness and equity, given that the solvent partyÕs 
position would be altered even before performance. 
More significantly, there is the problem of the ipso 
facto clause. It is doubtful if a creditor who has 
promptly exercised a termination-at-insolvency clause 
in an executory contract should in fact be considered 
to be on the same footing with unsecured creditors 
who were ÒunluckyÓ to have performed their 
contractual obligations prior to insolvency. 
 
The recognition of the right of a solvent party 
to terminate an executory contract accords with 
English insolvency lawÕs inclination to party 
autonomy and giving effect to the terms of contracts 
of parties in the absence of an insolvency rule 
justifying a deviation. The assets-maximisation 
objective of insolvency law is opposed to creditors 
having fewer assets than should be available to them 
at insolvency. As a corollary, it is also arguable that 
creditors should not be able to recover more assets 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
80 This is discussed in detail in chapter 3.  
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and acquire more contractual rights inside insolvency 
than they would outside Ð solely because of the 
happenstance of insolvency. Such a result will 
encourage forum shopping and recourse to insolvency 
proceedings without any real justification for 
maintaining a case. 
 
Accordingly, English insolvency law respects 
the non-insolvency entitlements of parties. This point 
was well emphasised by Neuberger J. in Perpetual 
Trustee Co Ltd and anor v BNY Corporate Trustee 
Services Ltd,81 when his Lordship noted that, 
ÒIt is important that, so far as possible, judicial decisions 
in the insolvency field ensure that the law is clear and 
consistent. That has always been true, but the need for 
consistency and clarity is all the greater now that 
commercial contracts are becoming increasingly 
complex both in their underlying nature and in their 
detailed provisions ... It is also desirable that, if possible, 
the courts give effect to contractual terms which parties 
have agreed.Ó82 
 
Lord Collins also expressed similar sentiments 
in the Supreme Court. 83  English insolvency lawÕs 
approach is reinforced by the fact that what is actually 
in issue are mere unperformed or contingent 
obligations Ð as opposed to accrued rights.  
    
      
1.2.2.    Assets and divestiture 
 
As a matter of principle, assets of a debtor 
must be available for the general body of creditors at 
insolvency. For the anti-deprivation rule to be 
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81 [2010] 3 W.L.R. 87, 107. 
82 ibid. at 107.  
83  Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd (fn. 
44) 760. 
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applicable, it must be shown that an asset that was 
vested in the debtor in a way that it ought to be 
available to the general body of creditors, has been 
removed from the insolvent estate.84 Another principle 
of English insolvency law is that only the assets of the 
company are available for distribution to creditors. 
English law respects security interests and property 
rights of third parties. Hence at insolvency, subject to 
few exceptions,85 such parties are not impeded from 
enforcing their security rights or taking their 
properties. 
 
It has been rightly suggested that the primary 
questions in the application of the anti-deprivation 
rule is to what extent insolvency law should follow 
the general lawÕs characterisation of pre-insolvency 
claims of creditors as proprietary, quasi-proprietary 
and personal. Such characterisation will in turn 
determine other relevant questions such as what 
constitutes an asset, ownership of asset and 
deprivation.  
 
It is suggested that in English law, a possible 
touchstone for resolving these questions is for courts 
to take an objective view of the contractual intentions 
of parties at the time of contracting as indicated in the 
terms of their agreement, with a view to ascertaining 
the rights and obligations that the parties had 
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84 Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd (n 
76) 555; Carreras Rothmans Ltd v Freeman Mathews Treasure Ltd [1985] Ch. 
207, 217. 
85 E.g. the transaction avoidance rules, moratorium and floating charges. 
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conferred on themselves. 86  These rights and 
obligations must accord with the applicable non-
insolvency law governing such transactions. Hence 
where the denomination given to the contract by the 
parties does not represent the actual contracts entered 
into, courts should be able to re-characterise such 
contracts to bring them in accord with their 
recognised effect. The diverse contracts and 
contractual clauses evaluated under this section 
clearly illustrate this process. 
 
Just like the anti-deprivation rule, s. 541(c) of 
the Bankruptcy Code frustrates bankruptcy-
termination clauses that purport to terminate or forfeit 
a debtorÕs assets upon the filing of a bankruptcy 
petition. The effect of this provision is that such assets 
will fall into the estate notwithstanding the existence 
of a termination clause. However, in contrast to the 
anti-deprivation rule, s. 541(1) does not necessarily 
respect the proprietary or security interests of other 
parties in an asset. Accordingly, in the case of In re 
Forth Worth Osteopathic Hospital Inc.87 it was held 
that for s. 541(a) and (c) to be operative, the debtor 
must have either a legal or equitable interest in the 
asset as of the commencement of the case.88 On the 
other hand, the provisions will not be applicable if the 
debtor had ceased to hold any legal or equitable 
interest in the property prior to the commencement of 
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86 This is the approach taken to the recharacterisation of a charge as fixed or 
floating in National Westminster Bank plc. v. Spectrum Plus Ltd. [2005] B.C.C. 
694. 
87 387 B.R. 706 (Bkrtcy N.D. Tex. 2008). 
88 ibid. at 714. 
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formal insolvency proceeding.89 This position accords 
with that of the anti-deprivation rule where interest in 
property is imperative to establish deprivation. 
 
The anti-ipso factor rule under s. 365(e) does 
not focus on invalidating contracts for the withdrawal 
of assets from the insolvent estate at insolvency. It 
invalidates clauses in executory contracts for the 
termination or modification of the contractual rights 
of the debtor. A divestiture of property interest is 
therefore not a prerequisite for the provision to be 
engaged. As previously noted, this provision has no 
equivalent in English law and is one of the primary 
distinctions between the two regimes.  Again, this 
also explains the differences in the treatment of 
executory contracts by the two regimes previously 
analysed above.  
 
Against this background, the anti-ipso facto 
rules do not respect the security or proprietary 
interests of creditors. This is not to suggest that the 
Bankruptcy Code engages on an asset confiscation 
spree at insolvency. The practical implication of the 
foregoing is that clauses that limit, modify or 
terminate any contractual, possessory or limited 
proprietary interests of the debtor in agreements or 
assets will be invalidated. Accordingly, the 
officeholder will be able to continue with such 
contracts on the same footing as the debtor. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89 Chrysler Credit Corp. v Schweitzer 19 B.R. 860, 867 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1982). 
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At this point it is pertinent to evaluate English 
lawÕs approach to insolvency-termination clauses in 
diverse contracts. These examples will illustrate the 
regimeÕs possible approach in determining the 
questions as to what constitutes an asset, ownership of 
assets and what constitutes deprivation of assets. In 
addition to illustrating the complexity in determining 
when the anti-deprivation rule has been engaged, 
these examples also show the readiness of English 
courts to give effect to the pre-insolvency contractual 
intentions of parties as shown in the terms of their 
contracts Ð with reference to the applicable pre-
insolvency law or rule. 
 
 
a. Conditional sale contracts 
 
A conditional sale agreement is an agreement 
for the sale of goods under which the purchase price 
or part of it is payable by instalments, and the 
property in the goods remains in the seller 
(notwithstanding that the buyer is to be in possession 
of the goods) until such conditions as to the payment 
of instalments or otherwise as may be specified in the 
agreement are fulfilled.90 
 
A seller who acts on an ipso facto clause in a 
conditional sale agreement by repossessing his goods 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
90 s. 1(1) Hire-purchase Act 1965 or 29(1) Hire-purchase Act 1964; s. 1(2), (3) 
Sale of Goods Act; In Re Anchor Line Ltd [1937] Ch. 1, 11. A conditional sale 
agreement qualifies as an Òagreement to sellÓ under the Sale of Goods Act. It 
only becomes a contract of sale when the time elapses of the conditions are 
fulfilled subject to which property in the goods is to be transferred. s. 2(4) and s. 
2(5) SGA respectively. 
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will not be in breach of the anti-deprivation rule.91 
This is on account of the fact that title to the goods 
remains in the seller, the debtor will not be deprived 
of any assets which ought to be available to its 
creditors at insolvency. 
  
Goode has argued that termination clauses in 
conditional sale agreements may be objectionable 
where the insolvent buyer has already given 
substantially complete payment or other 
performance. 92  Assuming (without conceding) that 
GoodeÕs position is plausible, it is suggested that what 
would pass to the insolvent estate would be the 
contract or goods subject to the precondition of 
completing payments-- not just the goods. However, it 
is difficult to envision how an argument for a 
deprivation will be sustained in the absence of 
complete payment, given that title remains in the 
seller, until the completion of payment.  
 
GoodeÕs position is appealing given the fact 
that allowing a seller to repossess the goods and also 
keep sums paid already will grant the seller a windfall. 
This can be contrasted with the harsh effect it will 
have on the buyerÕs creditors. However, it is 
suggested that the pertinent question is this; can the 
sums paid under the conditional sale agreement be 
considered as assets that ought to be available to the 
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91 Roy Goode, ÒFlip Clauses: The End Of The Affair?Ó (2012) L.Q.R. 171, 177. 
92 ibid. For example in Folgate London Market Ltd v Chaucer Insurance Co Plc 
[2011] EWCA Civ 328, where the insolvent company had paid for a right of 
indemnity and had almost no continuing obligations, a provision for termination 
of that right on the company's liquidation was held to constitute a breach of the 
anti-deprivation rule. 
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buyerÕs creditors at insolvency? Going by the terms of 
a typical conditional sale, the answer would be Ôno.Õ 
Property only passes after the completion of payment. 
 
By way of mitigating the hardship the 
foregoing will inflict on the insolvent estate, previous 
payments can be recovered on the ground of total 
failure of consideration. 93  This will be based on the 
ground that the goods that were the primary aim of 
the contract are no more available. This will however 
be subject to any agreement in the contract to the 
contrary.  
     
    
b. Hire-purchase agreements 
        
A hire-purchase agreement is an agreement 
where goods are bailed or hired in return for payment 
of instalments by the person to whom they are bailed 
or hired (the hirer) with an option to purchase at the 
end of the bailment.94 Property in the goods remains 
in the owner,95 usually a finance company, and only 
passes to the hirer if he exercises the option to 
purchase.96  
 
It is common practice for contracting parties to 
insert an insolvency-termination clause in hire-
purchase agreements for the benefit of the finance 
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93 Dies v British and Int'l Mining [1939] 1 KB 724, 743. 
94 Helby v Matthews (1895) A.C. 471, Belsize Motor Supply Company v Cox 
[1914] 1 K.B. 244, 251. 
95 In McEntire v Crossley Bros Ltd (1895) A.C. 457, 469. 
96 s. 29(1) Hire-purchase Act 1964. 
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company.97 Such terminations are capable of giving 
rise to diverse considerations. This section will focus 
on three specific issues vis--vis the anti-deprivation 
rule namely, the interest of the hirer in the agreement, 
the validity of the termination and the availability or 
otherwise of equitable relief from forfeiture. 
 
The character of the hirerÕs interest is 
important for two reasons. First, in determining if the 
anti-deprivation rule has been breached. If the interest 
of the hirer in the goods, by reason of the option to 
purchase, is not an interest in property, then the loss 
of that interest on insolvency does not offend the rule. 
The mere contractual (and contingent) right to have 
the option exercised is subject to the "flaw" that in 
certain events that right is not to arise.98 Secondly for 
the purposes of equitable relief from forfeiture. 
 
There is a division in judicial and academic 
opinion as to what interest a hirer has in a hire-
purchase agreement. The debate centres on whether 
the hirerÕs instalment payments and/or his option to 
purchase confer a limited proprietary interest in the 
goods on him Ð as opposed to a mere contractual 
possessory right.99 
   
Guest and Oditah have both offered separate 
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97 Re Apex Supply Co. [1942] 1 Ch. 108; McEntire v Crossley Bros Ltd (fn. 95); 
Re Gelder (1881) 50 L.J. Ch. 293, Re Yarow (1889) 61 L.T. 642. 
98 Anthony Zacaroli, Fidelis Oditah, "Chattel Leases and Insolvency" (1997) 1 
C.F. Insol. Rev. 1, 29, 35.  
99 Goode argues that Carey JÕs decision was incorrectly decided as it runs directly 
counter to the then highest authority (i.e. Re Appex Supply Co. (fn. 97); McEntire 
v Crossley Bros Ltd (fn. 95)) - Roy Goode, Hire-Purchase Law and Practice 
(2nd edn, London Butterworths 1970) 578. 
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extensive analyses on the above issue with special 
focus on the judgment of Judge Evans Carey in Re 
Piggin, Dicker v Lombank100 in which the learned 
county court Judge examined the validity of a 
bankruptcy termination clause in a hire-purchase 
agreement. In giving judgment for the bankruptcy 
trustee on behalf of the hirer, Judge Carey based his 
decision on two grounds. First he concluded that 
under the terms of the hire-purchase agreement and 
prior to its bankruptcy, the insolvent hirer had the 
right to retain possession as well as the right to 
exercise the option to purchase Ð both contractual 
advantages acquired for valuable consideration. 
Relying on the rule in Ex parte Mackay,101 Judge 
Carey concluded that these rights ought to pass to the 
bankruptcy trustee for the benefit of the hirerÕs 
creditors.  
 
Secondly, Judge Carey noted that the court 
could invoke its equitable jurisdiction against 
penalties to prevent the insolvent hirer or an assignee 
of his right from forfeiting the benefit of the hire-
purchase agreement. The possibility or otherwise of 
equitable intervention is considered at the concluding 
part of this section. The next paragraphs will evaluate 
the validity of an insolvency-triggered termination of 
a hire purchase agreement. 
 
Guest and Oditah have rightly noted that 
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100 [1962] 112 L.J. 424. 
101 (1873) L.R. 8 Ch. App. 643. 
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whatever interest the hirer has in the hire-purchase 
agreement (i.e. a right to retain possession and to 
exercise the purchase option) is limited or 
determinable in nature. Given the fact that as a 
general rule, insolvency law respects non-insolvency 
entitlements, the rights which pass to the hirerÕs 
trustee in bankruptcy are only those which would 
remain in the hirer when insolvent, not those he 
would have had if solvent.102  
 
In addition, Oditah has argued that Judge 
CareyÕs decision can be supported on grounds 
analogous to the ones the learned Judge relied on.103 
Oditah argues that, contrary to the widely held 
assumption that a hirerÕs rights are purely 
contractual;104 the hirerÕs option is a valuable asset for 
which he pays instalments. He submits that this is 
evident from the fact that the hirer is usually entitled 
to recover all sums paid for total failure of 
consideration in cases where a person claiming a 
superior title displaces his possession,105 and this is 
inconsistent with the theory that a hirerÕs only rights 
are to use and which can be terminated by agreement. 
 
With respect, it is doubtful if the decision in 
Warman v Southern Counties Car Finance Corp106 
supports the notion that the hirer has a proprietary 
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102 Fidelis Oditah, ÒAssets and the treatment of claims in insolvency,Ó (1992) 108 
L.Q.R. 459, 483-4; A.G. Guest, The Law of Hire-purchase (Sweet & Maxwell 
1966) 381. 
103 Oditah (fn. 102) 484. 
104 i.e. a right to use the bailed goods until the option to purchase is exercised or 
the agreement is terminated. 
105 Warman v Southern Counties Car Finance Corp [1949] 2 KB 576. 
106 [1949] 2 K.B. 576. 
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interest. On the contrary, it can be viewed as authority 
for the proposition that failure of consideration, due to 
a purported ownerÕs lack of title to the goods and 
consequent inability to offer the hirer the option to 
purchase will constitute total failure of consideration 
Ð entitling the hirer to a full refund of his instalments. 
This long excerpt from the judgement of Finnemore J. 
supports this position:  
ÒThis car was not, at any time, the property of the 
defendants. I do not think that the plaintiff in any 
circumstances could be called on to pay to the 
defendants hiring money for a car which belonged to 
somebody else. I should have thought it was quite plain 
that if A. purports to hire a car to B., and in fact delivers 
to B. a car which belonged not to himself but to C., to 
which he had no right whatever in law, and during the 
currency of the agreement C. intervenes and asserts his 
right to the car, and if, in those circumstances, B. does 
not pay the hiring charges, A. would have no possible 
claim for them É I do not see here how the defendants, 
because they delivered to the plaintiff somebody else's 
car, can claim any kind of money from him for the use 
of that car.Ó 107 
 
Although this signals the importance of the 
option in the agreement, it does not suggest that an 
unexercised option confers a proprietary interest on 
the hirer. This position is also consistent with and can 
be contrasted with the reasoning of Lord Denning L.J. 
in Kelly v Lombard Banking Co. Ltd108  where his 
Lordship dismissed an argument by the hirer to the 
effect that there was total failure of consideration 
because a hire-purchase agreement was terminated 
before he could exercise the option to purchase.109 
 
In furtherance of his argument, Oditah also 
argues that the approach of the courts in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
107 Warman v Southern Counties Car Finance Corp (fn. 105) 582-583. 
108 [1959] 1 W.L.R. 41. 
109 ibid. per Lord Denning. 
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assessment of damages where the hirer has 
irreversibly converted the goods shows that the hirer 
has more than merely contractual rights. 110  The 
general principle for assessment of damages is that 
where goods have been irreversibly converted, the 
measure of damages is the value of the goods at the 
time of conversion, but where the defendant has an 
interest in the goods the measure of damages is 
limited to the plaintiff's interest in the goods. 111  
 
Oditah posits that judicial authorities suggest 
that in actions for irreversible conversion of goods 
bailed, the owner can only recover his interest in the 
goods, not the full value of the goods at the time of 
conversion - an indication of the sums outstanding 
under the hire purchase agreement.112 He concludes 
that this approach is not consistent with the absence of 
any proprietary interest in the goods inhering in the 
hirer.113   
 
With respect, this position is also doubtful. It 
is pertinent to briefly consider the authorities cited. In 
Whitely Ltd v Hill114 the decision was based on the 
ground that in the absence of a no-assignment clause, 
the hirer had validly assigned his possessory interest 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
110 Fidelis Oditah, ÒAssets and the treatment of claims in insolvency,Ó (1992) 108 
L.Q.R. 459, 485.  
111 Solloway v Mclaughlin [1938] A.C. 247; BBMB Finance Ltd v Eda Holdings 
Ltd [1990] 1 W.L.R. 409. 
112 Belvoir Finance Co. Ltd v Stapleton [1971] 1 Q.B. 210; Belsize Motor Supply 
Co. v Cox [1914] 1 K.B. 244.  
113 Oditah however admits the possibility of disputations to the effect that this 
approach does not necessarily show that the hirer has a proprietary interest in the 
goods but only that the bailor has not lost the full value of the goods.  
114 [1918] 2 K.B. 808. Bridge has also cited this case as an authority for the 
argument that the option to purchase contains a proprietary element. Michael 
Bridge, Louise Gullifer  et. al, The Law of Personal Property (Sweet & Maxwell 
2013) 121. 
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under the hire-purchase agreement to the third party. 
In consequence, the third party was held to have 
acquired all the rights and obligations of the hirer in 
the original hire-purchase agreement before the 
contract could be terminated.115 The ownerÕs interest 
in the goods (a piano) also remained the same; hence 
he was only entitled to the remaining payments under 
the original agreement. Accordingly, Swinfen Eady 
M.R. observed that:  
"The contract was in my opinion assignable by the hirer, 
but the assignee could only retain possession of the 
chattel upon the terms of the contract É The defendant 
therefore acquired all the interest of the vendor, and 
moreover she had the right in equity to compel the 
vendor to pay the remaining instalments to the plaintiffs 
and enforce for the benefit of the defendant all rights 
conferred..." 116 
 
Significantly, Warrington L.J. also noted that,  
"The agreement therefore, or rather the contractual 
interest of the hirer in the chattel by virtue of the 
agreement, was assignable in equity. The result of that is 
not, of course to give to the assignee any interest greater 
or other than that which was possessed by the assignor, 
but the effect is to give to the assignee as between him 
and the other contracting party exactly the same interest 
as that which the assignor had as between himself and 
the other contracting party." 117 
 
In the earlier case of Belsize Motor Supply 
Company v Cox,118 also cited by Oditah, although 
there was a no-assignment clause which had been 
breached by the hirer, the court ruled that since the 
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115 ibid. at 816, Swiinfen Eady M.R.: "the defendant (third party) acquired the 
right of Miss Nolan (the hirer) under the agreement before anything was or could 
be done to terminate it, no instalment then in arrear, and that the measure of the 
plaintiffs' damage was the amount of instalments unpaid." 
116 Whiteley Ltd v Hilt [1918] 2 K.B. 808, 818. 
117 ibid at 821. As observed by Oditah, His Lordship notably stated (at 822) that 
"But in a complex contract of this nature it by no means follows that because that 
part of the contract which is a contract of bailment is at an end the other part of 
the contract, which confers a proprietary interest, is also at an end." It is 
submitted that here, he was merely pointing to the fact that the option to 
purchase, if exercised, would confer a proprietary interest. This should not 
therefore be taken to mean that the mere presence of the option confers a 
proprietary interest, whether exercised or not.  
118 [1914] 1 K.B. 244. 
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owner had not terminated the agreement on the 
ground of the hirerÕs default, the hire-purchase 
agreement subsisted. The consequence of this was 
that the contractual interest of the hirer was passed to 
the pledgee who stood in the same position as the 
former against the owner.119 
 
In Wickham Holdings Ltd v Brooke House 
Motors Ltd, 120  as Oditah has rightly pointed out, 
Denning L.J. explored the possibility of the hirer 
having a limited proprietary interest. While 
Dankwerts and Winn LJJ, held that the finance 
company was estopped from denying that they would 
accept £274 in settlement and, therefore, that was the 
measure of their loss.121 Denning L.J. in limiting the 
damages to the amount outstanding under the hire-
purchase agreement rather than the value of the car, 
stressed that Òin a hire-purchase transaction there are 
two proprietary interests, the finance company's 
interest and the hirer's interest.Ó122 
 
This proposition is inconsistent with earlier 
authorities. For instance in Kelly v Lombard Banking 
Co,123 the finance company was permitted to recover 
the goods and also keep all the hire payments. This 
was after Lord Denning observed the hardship that the 
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119 ibid. at 252, per Channell J. 
120  [1967] 1 W.L.R. 295. 
121 Danckwerts L.J.: "Whether it is put on the ground of estoppel or on the. 
Ground of waiver, it does not matter very much; it comes to very much the same 
thing. I think the result was to waive the provisions od clauses 12 and 15 od the 
HP agreement." at 301 
122 [1967] 1 W.L.R. 295, 300. 
123 [1959] 1 W.L.R. 41. 
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decision inflicted on the hirer.124  
 
In Helby v Matthews,125 the reasoning was that 
the "hire" instalments paid by the hirer were not 
consideration for purchasing the goods but merely 
considerations for hiring the goods. Lord Macnaghten 
observed that, 
ÒIt was the intention of the parties - an intention 
expressed on the face of the contract itself - that no one 
of those monthly payments until the very last, should 
confer upon the customer any proprietary right in the 
piano or any interest in the nature of a lien or any 
interest of any sort or kind beyond the right to keep the 
instrument and use it for a month to comeÓ126 
 
Contrary to Lord MacnaghtenÕs assertion, it 
seems Lord Denning had treated the hire-purchase 
agreement in Wickham Holdings v Brook House 
Motors as a secured sale (in substance), given that he 
regarded the finance companyÕs interest in the good 
as being reduced with each hire payment.  
 
In Belvoir Finance v Stapleton 127  which 
involved the measurement of damages for irreversible 
conversion, although Lord Denning echoed his 
position in Wickham in respect of the measurement of 
damages for hire-purchase cases, 128  Megaw L.J. 
viewed the figure which the court ordered the owner 
to be paid as,  
ÒRecognising and giving effect to the mere fact of the 
payments and to the fact that those payments can fairly 
be assumed to represent the actual diminution of the 
value of the cars in consequence of the fact of this 
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124 ibid at 44: ÒI see the hardship on the hirer. I often think it is hard under these 
hire-purchase agreements when the hirer has parted with his money and the 
finance company take both the car and the money: but there is the law.Ó 
125 (1895) A.C. 471. 
126 ibid. at 481.  
127 [1971] 1 Q.B. 210. 
128 ibid. at 217. 
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bailment - this bare bailment - to Belgravia during the 
periods prior to the respective conversions."129 
 
In practical terms, by subtracting the hire rents 
paid for diminution, the Court recognised that the 
finance company still had absolute ownership of the 
cars, but took into consideration the fact that the value 
of the cars must have diminished through use during 
the pendency of the hire-purchase agreement. This by 
no means recognised the hirerÕs proprietary interest. 
 
In Transag Haulage Ltd v. Leyland DAF 
Finance Plc. 130  Knox J. simply stated that Òa 
contingent right to exercise an option appears to me to 
be properly described as a Ôproprietary right.Ó 131  
Significantly, his Lordship neither gave any basis or 
precedent for this conclusion nor did he expatiate on 
it. 
 
Against this background, it cannot be asserted 
with certainty that the hirer has a limited proprietary 
right as opposed a mere possessory right.132 No doubt, 
the attempts to explore means of recovering sums 
paid by hirers in terminated hire-purchase agreements 
are well-intentioned considering that such repayments 
grant finance companies a windfall to the detriment of 
innocent creditors of the hirers.133 It would seem that 
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129 ibid. at 221. 
130 [1994] B.C.C. 356. 
131 ibid. at 365. 
132 Clough Mills v Martin [1985] 1 W.L.R. 111, 116 112, 125, Hendy Lennox 
(Industrial Engines) Ltd. v Grahame Puttick Ltd. [1984] 1 W.L.R. 485, 492; 
Anthony Zacaroli, Fidelis Oditah, (fn 98) 29, 34: ÒThere does not appear to be 
any basis for suggesting that the beneficiary of an option to purchase goods has 
any legal proprietary interest in the goods, prior to the exercise of that option." 
133 In Kelly v Lombard Banking Co. Ltd [1959] 1 W.L.R. 41, 44, Lord Denning 
noted thus: ÒI see the hardship on the hirer, I often think it is hard under these 
hire agreements when the hirer has parted with his money and the finance 
  
41 
the problem lies in the very nature of hire-purchase 
transactions and the solution could lie in the treatment 
of hire-purchase agreements in accordance to their 
economic function, namely, as secured sales Ð this is 
however beyond the purview of this research.134 
 
The general rule is that assets of a bankrupt 
are to be available to its creditors at the 
commencement of insolvency. Given that the finance 
company retains absolute property in the goods 
subject to the exercise of the option to purchase,135 the 
goods will not be available the hirerÕs creditors. In the 
absence of an insolvency-termination clause, what 
ought to pass to the insolvent estate is the obligation 
to pay the instalments and the option to purchase. 
This position is underpinned by the principle that the 
liquidator stands exactly in the same position as the 
debtor itself stands in.136 
 
However, the contractual right of the hirer is 
subject to or limited by the bankruptcy termination 
clause. This makes the hirerÕs contractual right a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
company takes both the car and the money, but there is the law.Ó Guest admits, 
ÒIt is certainly unfair that the hirerÕs creditors should be deprived both of the 
goods themselves and of the benefit of the installments already paid.Ó A.G. 
Guest, The Law of Hire-purchase (fn. 102) 382. Oditah describes this position as 
being Òhideously harsh for the hirer, and even more so for his creditors when he 
becomes insolvent, for the loss of both the goods and any pre-payments erodes 
his estate.Ò 
134 The Crowther Committee Report on Consumer Credit had recommended a 
change in the law to recognize that "the extension of credit in a hire-purchase 
transaction is in reality a purchase-money loan and that the reservation of title 
under a hire-purchase agreement is in reality a chattel mortgage securing a loan. 
The Diamond Report of 1989 on Security Interests in Property echoed this 
position. Cf. Bridge v Campbell Discount Co. Ltd [1962] AC 600, 626. 
135 Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson [2004] 1 A.C. 919, 941: ÒThe hire-purchaser 
has no title to the goods and no power to convey any title to a third party. The 
title to the goods and the power to transfer that title to any third party remains 
with the hire-purchase company and with it alone.Ó per Lord Hobhouse. 
Forthright Finance Ltd v Carlyle Finance Ltd [1997] 4 All ER 90. 
136 In re Scheibler (fn. 45) 727. 
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determinable interest Ð the termination clause 
therefore sets the boundary to the hirerÕs rights.137 The 
validity of the clause is underpinned by the distinction 
between determinable and defeasible interests which 
is settled in English law - the former being valid and 
enforceable.138 Accordingly, the hirer is not deprived 
of any asset which ought to fall into the insolvent 
estate. 
    
Finally it is it is suggested that a hirer who is 
on the verge of forfeiting the goods as well as the 
sums paid as instalments can seek equitable relief 
from forfeiture. It is settled that equitable intervention 
will be available to a debtor who has either a 
proprietary and/or a possessory right. 139  The hirer 
undoubtedly has possessory right which would effect 
the courtÕs equitable jurisdiction. 140  Whether relief 
from forfeiture will be granted or not will depend on 
the facts of each case.141  
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137 Guest argues that by virtue of the insolvency termination clause, it would 
seem that there is no interest in the hire-purchase agreement that could pass to the 
trustee. A.G. Guest, The Law of Hire-purchase (fn 102) 381. This is at variance 
with OditahÕs position that although the proprietary interest can be forfeited for 
breach; it cannot be made to vanish upon his becoming bankrupt as this will 
constitute a fraud upon the bankruptcy laws. Fidelis Oditah, ÒAssets and the 
treatment of claims in insolvency,Ó (1992) 108 L.Q.R. 459, 486. 
138 Evaluated in detail in 1.4.1. 
139 BICC Plc. v Burndy Corp. [1985] 1 All E.R. 417; Bridge v Campbell Discount 
(fn 134) 631; Stockloser v Johnson [1954] 1 QB 476; A. L. Diamond, ÒEquitable 
Relief for the Purchaser of Hire-Purchase GoodsÓ (1958) 21 M.L.R. 199. On the 
other hand, contrary opinions have been previously expressed in Galbraith v 
Mitchenall Estates (1965) 2 Q.B. 473; Campbell Discount v Bridge [1961] 1 
Q.B. 445; E.J. Prince, ÒEquitable Relief in Law of Hire-PurchaseÓ (1957) 20 
M.L.R. 620. The notion that equity's jurisdiction does not extend beyond 
contracts Ònot involving any transfer of proprietary or possessory rightsÓ was 
applied (without comment) by the House of Lords in Sport International Bussum 
BV v Inter-Footwear [1984] 1 W.L.R. 776 
140 On Demand Information Plc. v Michael Gerson (Finance) Plc. [2003] 1 A.C. 
368. 
141 In deciding whether the court had jurisdiction to grant relief, claimants must 
show that their application falls into at least one of the three categories identified 
by Lord Wilberforce in Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding [1973] AC 691. The three 
categories are (a) where the object of the transaction and the forfeiture provision 
is to secure payment of money; (b) where there is fraud, accident or mistake; and 
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As a general principle, relief is not available 
where rights are purely contractual. 142  The 
unwillingness of English courts to extend equity's 
jurisdiction to commercial contracts creating purely 
contractual rights is perhaps premised on 
considerations of policy, namely that the parties have 
bargained on equal terms and have contemplated a 
degree of certainty in their dealings with one another.  
 
   
c.    Retention of title clauses 
    
Retention of title clauses are primarily aimed 
at providing ÒsecurityÓ for a seller where the buyer 
becomes insolvent and part or whole of the purchase 
price is unpaid.143 The bid to maximize the usefulness 
of retention of title clauses has led to the creation of 
diverse types of complex retention of title clauses. 
These devices are based on the same property/contract 
law principle which underpins the earlier evaluated 
hire purchase and conditional sale agreements Ð that a 
debtor is not deprived of an asset that never belonged 
to it in law or equity. Consequently, the manner in 
which a retention of title clause is drafted will give 
rise to diverse considerations. This section will focus 
on three broad types of retention of title clauses 
namely the simple retention of title clause, all-moneys 
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(c) where the primary object is to secure a stated result. Celestial Aviation 
Trading 71 Ltd v Paramount Airways Pte Ltd [2010] 1 C.L.C. 165. 
142 Crittall Windows Ltd v Stormseal Window Systems [1991] R.P.C. 265; Sport 
IntÕl Bussum BV v Inter-Footwear (fn. 139). 
143 ÒThe main purpose of the retention of title clause is to protect an unsecured 
creditor against the insolvency of the buyer.Ó Clough Mill v Martin (fn. 132) 122 
per Oliver LJ. 
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clause and proceeds clause, and evaluate their validity 
vis--vis the anti-deprivation rule.  
 
While English courts will uphold the validity 
of simple retention of title clauses and has shown 
readiness to uphold all-moneys clauses, the same 
cannot be said of other complex clauses where sellers 
attempt to extend their proprietary rights beyond the 
original goods supplied. These latter types of clauses 
stand the risk of being re-characterised as charges. 
Retention of title clauses purporting to retain title to 
products and/or proceeds of original goods are 
characterised as charges on the basis of construction 
of the contract leading to an (objective) determination 
of the intentions of the parties Ð i.e., if the sellerÕs 
interest in the product/proceeds is defeasible by 
payment of the purchase price, that interest will be 
viewed as being intended to provide security rather 
than ownership, thus constituting a charge which will 
be void for non- registration.144 
   
 
i.   Simple retention of title clause 
 
Section 19(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 
provides a doctrinal basis for the simple retention of 
title clause. Here the seller will retain ownership in 
the goods delivered as against the buyer until the 
latter completes payment of the full purchase price.145 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
144 s. 850H Companies Act 2006. 
145 Armour v Thyssen Edelstahlwerke A.G. [1991] 2 A.C. 339, 347 per Lord Keith 
of Kinkel. 
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It is now settled that these types of clauses are 
effective to protect the seller upon the buyerÕs 
insolvency.146 In addition, the validity of the clause 
will not be affected even if the buyer is permitted to 
resell, transform or consume the goods before 
payment is made.147  
 
Given that ownership remains vested in the 
seller, a termination of the agreement and 
repossession of the goods based on an insolvency-
termination clause will not be objectionable. The 
simple retention of title clause is a veritable means 
with which creditors (suppliers of goods) can insulate 
themselves from the mandatory insolvency rules. 
However, the extent of its effectiveness is 
questionable given the narrowness of its scope. For 
instance if a buyer sub-sells the goods to a sub-buyer 
who buys in good faith and without notice, the clause 
will be worthless in the light of s. 25(1) of the Sale of 
Goods Act which confers a good title on such a sub-
buyer. 
 
An insolvent buyer that has made payments 
towards the acquisition of an asset under the 
transaction may recover the sums for total failure of 
consideration Ð given that the asset for which it had 
paid for is no longer available.148 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
146 Clough Mill v Martin (fn. 139). 
147 Re BA Peters [2008] EWHC 2205 (Ch.) (86), Hendy Lennox v Grahame 
Puttick [1985] 1 W.L.R. 485, 489; Michael Bridge, The Sale of Goods (3rd edn, 
Oxford University Press 2014) 126. 
148 Dies v British and Int'l Mining (fn. 93) 743. 
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ii. All-moneys clause 
 
In the all-moneys clause the seller retains the 
property in the goods until all debts or other 
obligations owed by the buyer have been discharged. 
In practical terms, where a seller supplies the buyer 
with goods on a recurring basis, the seller can bring 
the buyerÕs past indebtedness forward and attach to 
any goods of the seller in the buyerÕs possession. 
 
The unique advantage of this clause to the 
seller is that, like a general as opposed to a particular 
lien, it extends the category of debts against which 
title is retained. The validity of current account 
clauses has been affirmed in Armour v Thyssen 
Edelstahlwerke AG 149  where the retention of title 
clause stipulated that: 
"All goods delivered by us remain our property (goods 
remaining in our ownership) until all debts owed to us 
including any balances existing at relevant times - due to 
us on any legal grounds - are settled." 
 
The House of Lords ruled that the provisions 
of the Sales of Goods Act making the passing of 
property a matter of contractual intention was not 
confined to payment of the contract price. 
Accordingly, s. 17(1) and s. 19(1) of the Sale of 
Goods Act gives a seller ÒsecurityÓ for the unpaid 
debts of the buyer through a legitimate retention of 
title and not by any other right over his property.150 
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149 [1991] 2 AC 339. 
150 ibid. at 342 and 347 per Lord Keith. Whilst s. 17 allows for party autonomy as 
to the passing of title to goods sold, s. 19 allows for the Ôreservation of the right 
of disposalÕ until certain conditions are fulfilled.  Michael Bridge, The Sale of 
Goods (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2014) 127. 
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Accordingly, the all-moneys clause was upheld as 
having the effect of retaining property in the assets in 
the seller, thereby preventing it from forming part of 
the assets of the insolvent buyer available to its 
creditors. In the light of this, an all-moneys clause 
will not violate the English anti-deprivation rule. 
 
  
iii. Proceeds of sale clause 
 
This retention of title clause provides for a 
seller to retain title in the unmixed goods after a sale, 
as well as any proceeds obtained from a sub-sale of 
the goods by a buyer. The Court of Appeal confirmed 
the validity of this clause in Aluminium Industrie 
Vaassen B.V. v Romalpa Aluminium Ltd 151 
notwithstanding that there was no express clause in 
the contract for the retention of title to the proceeds, a 
term retaining such title was implied into the contract 
as the Court ruled that it was clear that the parties had 
intended that the buyers would be allowed to resell 
the goods in its original, unmixed state. 152  
 
Significantly, a fiduciary relationship was found 
based on the concession by the defendantÕs counsel 
that the defendant held the goods as a bailee. 
Consequently, the clamant was able to trace into the 
defendants account by virtue of the rule laid down by 
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151  [1976] 1 W.L.R. 676. 
152 ibid. at 690. 
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Thesiger L.J. in Hallett's Estate Knatchbull v. 
Hallett153 to the effect that, 
ÒWherever a specific chattel is intrusted by one man to 
another, either for the purposes of safe custody or for the 
purpose of being disposed of for the benefit of the 
person intrusting the chattel; then, either the chattel itself, 
or the proceeds of the chattel, whether the chattel has 
been rightfully or wrongfully disposed of, may be 
followed at any time, although either the chattel itself, or 
the money constituting the proceeds of that chattel, may 
have been mixed and confounded in a mass of the like 
material.Ó154 
 
Accordingly, a seller who claims the proceeds 
of a sub-sale of goods by a buyer cannot establish an 
equitable right by merely relying on a retention of title 
to the goods sub-sold. He must be able to trace the 
title of his goods to the proceeds of a sub-sale. As a 
precondition to tracing in equity, he must be capable 
of establishing that the buyer holds those proceeds as 
the sellerÕs fiduciary. In the absence of this, the clause 
will be re-characterised as a charge on the proceeds, 
with the consequence of being void for non-
registration. It is instructive to note that even where a 
fiduciary relationship is established, tracing may not 
be possible where the buyer pays the proceeds of the 
sub-sale into an overdrawn account. The general rule 
is that equitable tracing does not extend to tracing 
through an overdrawn bank account Ð whether at the 
time the money is paid in or subsequently.155 
 
Significantly, subsequent claims to proceeds 
have been unsuccessful. The sellerÕs rights in the 
proceeds are often characterised as arising by way of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
153 (1880) 13 Ch. D. 696. 
154 ibid. at 723. 
155 Bishopsgate Investment Mgt. Ltd v Homan [1995] Ch. 211, 220-221, 222. 
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security (charge) and void for non-registration.  This 
is an indication that either the Romalpa decision 
turned on its special facts or a subtle disapproval of 
the decision by English courts.  
 
For instance in Re Bond Worth
156 where a term 
in the contract of sale stipulated that Òour beneficial 
entitlement shall attach to the proceeds of resale or to 
the claims for such proceeds,Ó157 Slade J. held that the 
fact that the buyer was going to be able to use the 
proceeds in the ordinary course of business made the 
arrangement inconsistent with a fiduciary relationship 
and indicated a mere debtor-creditor relationship. This 
case was further distinguished from the Romalpa case 
on the ground that in Romalpa, the goods were held 
separately and the proceeds were to be properly 
segregated.158 Notably, the clause purported to retain 
equitable title, which could only arise by way of grant 
rather than retention Accordingly, the clause was held 
to create a charge which was void for non-registration.  
 
Hendy Lennox v Grahame Puttick Ltd159 was 
decided on the ground that the buyer did not properly 
store the sellerÕs goods in a manner that showed that it 
was the sellerÕs and that they had no express 
obligation to do so. Slaughton J. noted the stipulation 
for repossession ruled out any implied right to the 
proceeds. His lordship also observed that there was no 
express mention of the buyer as Òfiduciary ownerÓ 
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156 [1980] Ch. 228. 
157 ibid. at 235. 
158 ibid. at 265. 
159 [1984] 1 W.L.R. 485. 
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and that the one-month credit period provided 
neutralised any fiduciary relationship and any implied 
obligation to keep the proceeds in a separate 
account.160 In Re Andrabell161 where the buyer mixed 
the proceeds of the sub-sale with other moneys, it was 
held that the relationship was that of a debtor and 
creditor. 
 
Again in Pfeiffer GmbH v Arbuthnot Factors 
Ltd162 there was a clause retaining title for the seller 
and nevertheless authorizing the buyer to make sub-
sales. Just like in the Romalpa case, the agreement 
required the buyer to pass on to the seller all the 
buyerÕs rights under the sub-sales contracts, however, 
it requested this to be done only up to the amount of 
the amount of the buyerÕs outstanding indebtedness to 
the seller. Phillips J. held that when a buyer resells 
goods in the ordinary course of business, he does so 
on his own account and will not hold the proceeds 
received in a fiduciary capacity on behalf of the 
seller.163 The court subsequently ruled that the nature 
of the interests which the seller was to have by way of 
security in respect of debts created by sub-sales and 
its terms were incompatible with a fiduciary 
relationship and created a charge in favour of the 
seller which was void for non- registration.164 
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160 ibid. at 499. Curiously, in the Romalpa case, there was a 75-day credit period 
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161 [1984] 3 All ER 407 
162 [1988] 1 W.L.R. 150 
163 ibid. at 159. 
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In Tatung (UK) Ltd v Galex Telesure Ltd165 
two sets of conditions were used by the seller. The 
first condition provided that the proceeds of sale were 
to belong to the seller absolutely, while the second 
placed an obligation on the buyer to keep the proceeds 
of resale in a separate account for the benefit of the 
seller. Phillips J held that the clause was the source of 
the partiesÕ obligations rather than the equitable 
principles that would have applied in its absence. 
Hence a charge was created over the proceeds of 
sale.166  
 
Finally in Compaq Computer Ltd v Abercorn 
Group Ltd 167  the clause provided that the sellerÕs 
goods should be stored separately so as to be 
identifiable and that the buyer held the goods as 
Òbailee and agentÓ of the seller and was obligated to 
account as a bailee and agent for the full proceeds of 
sale and to keep a separate account of the proceeds. 
Mummery J. ruled that the sellerÕs interest in the 
proceeds was limited to the amounts owing by the 
buyer and was determinable once the original 
purchase price and any outstanding expenses had been 
discharged.168 
 
The foregoing cases illustrate the seeming 
reluctance of English courts to enforce proceeds of 
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165 [1989] 5 B.C.C. 325. 
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sale clauses. 169  Oditah has rightly summarised the 
debate on the efficacy of proceeds clauses as being 
whether the clause is an ancillary security by which 
the seller perfects his title to that which in equity 
belongs to him (i.e. the goods), or a substantive 
assignment.170 If the former, the clause is valid and 
not open to attack as an unregistered charge, If the 
latter, the clause is invalid as an unregistered 
charge.171  
 
A successful Romalpa clause (although highly 
unlikely) ought to shield the seller from the anti-
deprivation rule, given that the title to goods and the 
proceeds are effectively reserved by the seller. This 
position is underpinned by the same principle which 
is applicable to the earlier evaluated conditional sales 
and hire-purchase agreements Ð being that the debtor 
cannot be deprived of asset that never belonged to 
it. 172  It is instructive to note that the failure of 
proceeds clauses to insulate sellers from insolvency is 
not based on a wrongful withdrawal of assets from the 
insolvent estate, in contravention of the anti-
deprivation rule. Rather, English courts proceed on 
the basis that in a bid to retain title to proceeds, the 
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169  ÒThe question is this: what form of words will be sufficient to make a 
proceeds clause an ancillary security? The evidence from the cases suggests that 
the answer is ÒNone.Ó - Fidelis Oditah, ÒAssets and the treatment of claims in 
insolvency,Ó (1992) 108 L.Q.R. 459, 481; 169 Fidelis Oditah, Legal Aspects of 
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one is compelled to conclude that ÒproceedsÓ clauses will inevitably be 
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170 Fidelis Oditah, Legal Aspects of Receivables Financing (Sweet & Maxwell, 
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affected seller has created a charge without due 
registration as required by law.173  
 
  
d.         Construction contracts  
    
This section will examine the validity of three 
types of clauses commonly included in construction 
contracts namely plant and material property vesting 
clauses, direct payment clauses and retention funds in 
relation to the anti-deprivation rule.  
 
 
i.    Plant and material property vesting clauses 
 
Generally, building equipment brought onto a 
construction site remain the property of the contractor 
unless and until it is affixed to land.174  However it is 
common practice for construction contracts to include 
contractual clauses which vests the plant and other 
building materials brought to the building site upon 
the employer even before they are fixed to the land.  
 
Vesting clauses provide security to the 
employer for the money he has advanced to the 
contractor for the building work. They also ensure 
that in the event of default, there is a seamless 
takeover of the project by a new contractor Ð devoid 
of claims from the original contractor or his assignees. 
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The question here is whether this will constitute a 
withdrawal of assets from the estate of the insolvent 
contractor in the event of insolvency. 
 
It is suggested that whether or not vesting 
clauses will violate the anti-deprivation rule will 
depend on the manner in which they are drafted, 
which will determine how they will operate. 175  A 
vesting clause which is triggered by and comes into 
effect upon the contractorÕs insolvency will 
contravene the anti-deprivation rule as it will have the 
effect of depriving the insolvent estate of the 
contractorÕs valuable assets. 176  A number of the 
reported English cases on the anti-deprivation rule are 
in this character.177 
  
Notwithstanding the above, employers can 
evade the anti-deprivation rule through deft drafting.  
First, the vesting clause could provide that all plants 
and material property of the contractor Òshall 
becomeÓ178 the property of the employer as soon as 
they are bought on the site. This would effectively 
vest ownership on the employer immediately the 
equipment is bought on the land.  
 
In Re Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd179 Parker J. 
distinguished between the clauses Òshall be deemed to 
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175 In Garrud (1880-1) 16 Ch. D. 522; In Re Apex Supply Company Ltd [1942] 
Ch. 108, 113-4. 
176 In re Harrison (1879) 14 Ch. D 19, 25. 
177 In Garrud (fn. 175); In re Walker (1884) 26 Ch. D. 510. 
178 Re Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd [1998] 2 W.L.R. 131, (1998) Ch. 495, 504, 505, 
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beÓ and Òshall become.Ó While the former was held 
not to be effective in transferring ownership of the 
plant to the employer, but had the effect of creating an 
equitable charge, the latter did.180 The Court of Appeal 
upheld this position but stated that a floating charge 
was created rather than fixed, because the restriction 
imposed upon the contractor was in place for 
operational purposes, rather than to preserve the asset 
for the purpose of satisfying the security. 181 
 
Secondly, where the vesting clause stipulates a 
number of events of default of which insolvency is 
only one of them, a forfeiture based on another event 
will not be in breach of the rule. This will be the case 
notwithstanding that the event coincides with 
insolvency and the forfeiture prima facie amounts to a 
withdrawal of asset from that which otherwise would 
have been available to creditors.182 Hence in In re 
Garrud183 the forfeiture provision which operated on 
breach and not on bankruptcy was held to be valid.184 
The bankrupt builder had broken the terms of his 
agreement with the landowner and it was provided in 
the agreement that the chattels would be forfeited to 
the landowner as and for liquidated damages. This can 
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180 ibid. at 41-42. 
181 Re Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd (fn. 178). 
182 In Re Apex Supply Company Ltd (fn. 175) 113-4; In re Garrud (fn. 175) 522. 
Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd and another v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd 
[2010] 3 W.L.R. 87, 103-4, per Lord Neuberger. ÒI agree with Lord Neuberger of 
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difficult to see why the anti-deprivation rule should apply. The property has been 
removed pursuant to a valid contractual provision on grounds other than the 
insolvency of the counterparty and cannot, on any view, form part of the 
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183 (1880-1) 16 Ch. D. 522. 
184  BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd 
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be contrasted with In re Harrison 185 where the builder 
was not in breach of contract, and the right to forfeit 
was expressed to be triggered, inter alia, on the 
builder becoming bankrupt.  
 
It is admitted that there can sometimes be a 
thin line in the distinction where the event of default 
coincides with insolvency. The approach of the judges 
in In re Garrud has generated a huge amount of 
debate.186 In his judgment, James L.J. had pronounced 
that it was Òimmaterial at what particular moment the 
seizure was madeÓ as Òthe broad general principle is 
that the trustee in a bankruptcy takes all the bankrupt's 
property but takes it subject to all the liabilities which 
affected it in the bankrupt's hands.Ó187  
 
This approach was rejected by Patten J at the 
Court of Appeal in Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v BNY 
Corporate Trustee Services Ltd188 where he rightfully 
stated that such a forfeiture provisions could not 
remain exercisable on grounds other than insolvency 
after the commencement of the procedure, as it was in 
breach of the pari passu principle. Perhaps the 
problem with In re Garrud is that it is not clear from 
the facts when the breach actually occurred. It is 
suggested here that the pronouncement of James L.J. 
would be plausible if the breach occurred prior to the 
commencement of insolvency Ð given that ownership 
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would have been transferred on breach to the 
employer. The contrary would mean a transfer of 
ownership after the commencement of insolvency, in 
breach of the pari passu rule. 
 
 
ii.     Direct payment clauses  
    
The purpose of direct payment clauses is to 
enable the employer to by-pass the contractor and 
make direct payments to sub-contractors on occasions 
where the contractors have been paid for work done 
by the sub-contractors but fail to remit the monies to 
the latter. The employer can set-off those sums with 
future sums due to the contractor. The issue for 
consideration here is whether, in the event of the 
contractorÕs insolvency, these payments will 
constitute assets which ought to be available to the 
contractorÕs general body of creditors. 
   
As a matter of general principle, on insolvency, 
all assets of the debtor ought to be vested in the 
liquidator for the benefit of the general body of 
creditors. Funds used for such direct payments are 
assets of the contractor which ought to fall into the 
insolvent estate. An unpaid sub-contractor is entitled 
to prove in the insolvency as an unsecured creditor.189  
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It is suggested that In re Tout & Finch Ltd190 
and In Re Wilkinson,191 where the validity of direct 
payment clauses were upheld after bankruptcy of the 
contractor, are no longer good law in this context.192 
In those cases the courts did not consider the validity 
of the arrangement against the background of the anti-
deprivation rule and the pari passu principle. Indeed 
in Mullan v Ross and London,193 the Irish Court of 
Appeal applied the rule in British Eagle and declined 
following the decisions in Wilkinson and Tout and 
Finch Ltd. 
 
Finally, what if the employer who makes the 
direct payment claims to rely on the fact of the 
contractorÕs non-payment of the sub-contractors and 
not insolvency? It is crucial to note that the power to 
make direct payments is usually conditioned on 
failure of the main contractor to pay the sub-
contractor and not necessarily on the main contractor's 
insolvency. Accordingly, the payment may not 
infringe the anti-deprivation rule Ð if it is shown that 
it was not actually triggered by insolvency.194 This 
notwithstanding, the payment will be in contravention 
of the pari passu rule given that the sub-contractors 
would otherwise have been entitled to prove in the 
insolvency as unsecured creditors. 
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iii.           Trust retention fund 
 
A retention fund serves as a mechanism with 
which employers can build up money deposits during 
the course of construction work. The fund serves as 
an inducement to a contractor to remedy any defect 
during the liability period. Sub-contractors employed 
by the contractors may be paid from the fund to avoid 
interruptions due to non-payment by the contractor.  
 
It is suggested that the question as to whether 
the anti-deprivation rule will be breached will depend 
on whether the retained funds constitute a trust by 
virtue of a retention trust clause. The retention trust 
clause will provide for the retention fund to be held 
by the employer as a fiduciary and trustee of the 
contractor and sometimes of the subcontractor.195 For 
instance, in Carreras Rothmans Ltd v Freeman 
Mathews Treasure Ltd,196 monies placed in a special 
account were held to be exempted from the pari passu 
rule of asset distribution as such assets did not belong 
to the company.  
 
Hence, a trust fund that is properly established 
before liquidation and operated by an employer as 
soon as retention monies come into existence can be 
used to isolate monies from those available to the 
general body of creditors. A criticism against the 
retention of trust clause is the fact that, unlike other 
security interests, it does not require any registration. 
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Hence there is often no prior notice to creditors about 
the encumbered assets of the contractor. A more 
detailed consideration of how the trust device protects 
proprietary rights and consequently insulates creditors 
from the anti-deprivation rule is done in the next 
section.  
                   e.      Trust devices  
    
From the analysis of trust retention funds in 
construction contracts, it has been shown that trust 
devices can be used in commercial situations to 
successfully isolate monies that would otherwise have 
been available to the general body of creditors at 
insolvency and divert them elsewhere. Accordingly a 
properly constituted trust will create an exception to 
the anti-deprivation rule. 
 
A quistclose trust arises when a sum of money, 
on loan or otherwise is advanced to a recipient with a 
specific purpose stated as to the use of such monies.197 
When this purpose fails or if it is not complied with, 
the trust fastens on the monies, 198  and confers 
proprietary interest upon the transferor instead of a 
mere personal right which is contractual in nature.199 
Accordingly, the borrower or transferee cannot obtain 
any beneficial interest in the money, at least while the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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designated purpose is still capable of being carried out. 
If for any reason the purpose cannot be carried out, in 
the event of insolvency, the money does not fall 
within the general assets of the debtor Ð as it is not its 
property. 
 
The real implications of the trust mechanism 
are amplified at insolvency. Assets held on trust 
belong to the beneficiary and as such, are not 
available to the general body of creditors. Lord Millet 
confirmed this in Twinsectra v Yardley,200 when he 
remarked in the context of the quistclose trust that,  
ÔÔThe whole purpose of the arrangements ... is to prevent 
the money from passing to the borrower's trustee-in-
bankruptcy in the event of his insolvency''201 
 
Viewed from another perspective, trust as a 
form of quasi-security device is unique in the sense 
that it is the return of the advance on the failure of the 
specified purpose which is being secured and not the 
failure to repay the monies itself, which is common in 
conventional security arrangements. Hence, the trust 
mechanism aids in securing the execution of the 
debtor's promise to perform the purpose contingent 
upon the advance of the monies. Accordingly, if that 
purpose is executed, the lender becomes an unsecured 
creditor.202 
The trust can also be a snare for unsecured 
creditors given that even a detailed examination may 
sometimes not reveal its existence due to non-
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registration. This places a trust beneficiary (alongside 
other retention of title creditors) in a more 
advantageous position than both traditionally and 
unsecured creditors. Bridge has rightly argued that 
that the absence of registration is justifiable in view of 
the emergency aspect of the matter as well as 
(sometimes) the non-professional character of the 
arrangements.203 The case of Paul v Constance204 also 
buttresses this point. In that case the Court of Appeal 
held that a trust need not be clearly expressed by the 
parties but can be found from the totality of one's 
conduct. In other words, a trust can be created by one 
without knowing or understanding the legal concept. 
 
 
     f.       Subordination agreements  
 
There are diverse kinds of debt subordination 
agreements. A secured creditor may agree to 
subordinate his security interest to that of a fellow 
secured creditor over whom he would otherwise have 
priority. An unsecured creditor may agree with a 
similarly ranked creditor not to take payment from the 
debtor until any debts owed by the debtor to the third 
party have been paid (i.e. a contingent debt 
subordination). Furthermore, a junior creditor may 
agree to hold proceeds of the junior debt on trust for a 
senior creditor (i.e. a subordination trust). 
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It is now settled in English law that debt 
subordination among creditors does not violate the 
pari passu principle. 205 This is subject to the rule that 
a creditor and debtor cannot agree to subordinate the 
debts of another creditor who is not a party to the 
agreement or without its consent. The focus of this 
section will be an evaluation of whether, upon the 
insolvency of the junior creditor whose debt is being 
subordinated, these subordination agreements will 
amount to clawing back assets which should 
otherwise be available to creditors. 
    
First, in the case of a creditor whose secured 
claim is being subordinated, it is suggested that where 
there is sufficient collateral to secure all claims, the 
anti-deprivation rule will not be contravened. 
However where the collateral of the debtor is 
insufficient, the subordination agreement will have 
the effect of making the insolvent junior creditor 
undersecured.  
 
The practical effect of this is that in the event 
of the debtorÕs insolvency, the insolvent junior 
creditor stands the risk of not receiving dividends for 
the part of its debts that is unsecured. To this extent, it 
is suggested that the creditors of the insolvent junior 
creditor have been deprived of valuable assets. The 
extent of the deprivation can only be determined on 
the debtorÕs insolvency. As long as the debtor is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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solvent, the assumption is that it has sufficient assets 
to meet its liabilities to both secured and unsecured 
creditors. 
 
The facts of Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v BNY 
Corporate Trustee Services Ltd206 were peculiar given 
that the flip or subordination clause was a contingent 
interest. Hence, Neuberger L.J., agreeing with Patten 
L.J.Õs view,207 noted that, 
ÒThe effect of the ÒflipÓ provisions was thus not to 
divest LBSF of moneys, property, or debts, currently 
vested in it, and to revest them in the noteholders, nor 
even to divest LBSF of the benefit of the security rights 
granted to it. It was merely to change the order of 
priorities in which the rights were to be exercised in 
relation to the proceeds of sale of the collateral in the 
event of a default.Ó208  
 
Neuberger J.Õs statement is arguably plausible given 
that from the outset of the agreement, the interest of 
LBSF was contingent on the occurrence or non-
occurrence of an event of default. In consequence, 
LBSF did not actually have a priority of which it was 
divested of. In fact, based on the occurrence of the 
event of default, namely insolvency, it never acquired 
the priority.  
 
It is suggested that an alternative argument in 
support of the validity of the flip provision in the 
above case would have been that, in the event that 
priority had been acquired by LBSF, such interest was 
merely limited in nature and determinable at 
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insolvency. This is in contradistinction with an 
absolute interest which is forfeitable upon insolvency. 
 
In a contingent debt subordination agreement, 
the junior creditorÕs dividends will be deferred until 
the senior creditor has been repaid in full. Where the 
assets are insufficient after the payment of preferential 
creditors, the junior creditor will either receive 
nothing or a reduced share Ð as opposed to a pro rata 
share with the senior creditor. This will in turn reduce 
the assets which would otherwise have been available 
to the insolvent junior creditorÕs estate. Against this 
background, it is suggested that contingent debt 
subordination agreement will have the effect of 
contravening the anti-deprivation rule in cases where 
there are insufficient assets.  
 
The validity or otherwise of a subordination 
trust, where a junior creditor agrees to hold proceeds 
of the junior debt on trust for the senior creditor may 
give rise to diverse considerations. Where a trust has 
been properly constituted, it is suggested that this 
ought not to contravene the anti-deprivation given that 
as a matter of general law, such assets are owned by 
the beneficiary under the trust.209 However, it has also 
been rightly suggested that there will likely be a 
substantial question regarding registrability. 210  For 
instance, an extensive clause in a trust which is 
drafted to cover amounts not owed stands the risk of 
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being re-characterised as a charge which in turn will 
require registration to be valid.211 
  
 
                  g.       Cessation of Indemnity rights  
     
An indemnity right is an entitlement to an 
obligation to be paid a sum of money by way of 
compensation or reparation for a specific loss suffered. 
It is a contractual obligation to make the injured party 
or indemnitee whole again in the event of the 
occurrence of a contractually specified event or sets of 
events.212 Can a contractual clause for the termination 
of an indemnity right upon the indemniteeÕs 
insolvency amount to a withdrawal of an asset from 
the indemniteeÕs insolvent estate? 
 
The above question was in issue in the case of 
Mayhew v King213 where a clause for the cessation of 
an indemnity right on the insolvency of the 
indemnitee was challenged on the ground that it was 
in breach of the anti-deprivation rule. Affirming the 
decision of the lower court, the Court of Appeal214 
ruled that the forfeiture provision was an attempt to 
extinguish the indemniteeÕs right on insolvency and 
this had the effect of withdrawing assets which would 
otherwise be available to the general body of creditors 
from the insolvent estate.215  
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Significantly, the court rejected the argument 
that the indemnity right was a chose in action which 
was subject to a precondition, thus making it a flawed 
asset. Rimmer J stated thus, 
ÒIf the condition resulting in the non-availability of an 
asset to creditors in the event of the subsequent 
insolvency of the asset holder is unrelated to such 
insolvency, it may well be that the anti-deprivation 
principle has no role to play. In this case, however, the 
relevant condition was MilbankÕs (the indemniteeÕs) 
insolvency.Ó216 
 
Two points are worth noting from the above 
pronouncement of Rimmer J. First, contrary to the 
assertion of his Lordship, insolvency can actually be 
used as a condition to delineate or limit the interest of 
a debtor in an asset. A detailed analysis of this issue is 
carried out in 1.4.1. Secondly, the rejection of the pre-
conditions or so called flawed asset argument in this 
case shows that there is some scope for looking at the 
substance of agreements and not just the form or 
terms of contracts in the application of the anti-
deprivation rule by English courts. 
 
In the light of the forgoing evaluation of 
contracts and contractual clauses, it is submitted that 
under English insolvency law, the questions as to 
what constitutes an asset, ownership of asset and 
deprivation, can only be ascertained by reference to 
the applicable non-insolvency law alongside the terms 
of the partiesÕ contracts Ð to ascertain the rights and 
obligations which they have imposed on themselves. 
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In consequence and in contrast to the 
Bankruptcy CodeÕs anti-ipso facto rule, the anti-
deprivation rule regime follows the general contract 
lawÕs characterisation of pre-petition contractual 
interests e.g. as proprietary, security, quasi-security 
and personal Ð and does not prescribe its own rules. It 
is however incumbent on courts to re-categorise 
contracts which were improperly characterised (pre-
petition) by parties. However, such re-categorisation 
will be with reference to the standard under the 
general insolvency law. 
 
      
1.2.3.      Time of the divestiture 
 
The anti-deprivation rule will only be 
applicable if the transfer of the debtorÕs assets is 
triggered by the commencement of formal insolvency 
proceedings. 217  A transfer that is initiated and 
completed before the commencement of the formal 
insolvency procedure will not offend the anti-
deprivation rule.218 Patten L.J. noted this principle in 
Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee 
Services Ltd219 thus, 
 ÒIf the provisions in question can be and are operated 
on other grounds prior to the commencement of any 
bankruptcy proceedings, it is difficult to see why the 
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anti-deprivation rule should apply. The property has 
been removed pursuant to a valid contractual provision 
on grounds other than the insolvency of the counterparty 
and cannot, on any view, form part of the insolvent 
estate.Ó 220  
 
The previously evaluated plants and equipment 
vesting clauses in construction contracts, 221  which 
provide for such materials to become the property of 
the employer as soon as they are bought on the site 
also illustrates this principle.222  
 
This same principle applies to the CodeÕs anti-
ipso facto provisions.223 The preamble of s. 365(e)(1) 
limits the effect of the provision to Òany time after the 
commencement of the case.Ó224 An executory contract 
requires a performance to be due from both 
contracting parties; 225  hence, once terminated, the 
executory element evaporates.226 Hence in Comp III 
Inc. v Computerland Corp,227 Brozman J. noted that, 
ÒWhere an executory contract has been terminated in 
accordance with its terms prior to bankruptcy, s. 
365(e)(1) does not authorise the bankruptcy Court to 
reach beyond the veil of the petition to reinstate the 
contract.Ó228 
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This equally applies to s. 541(a) and (c), which 
are only applicable if the debtor has a legal or 
equitable interest in the asset when the case is 
commenced. 229  Thus contracts only constitute 
property of the bankruptcy estate to the extent that 
they have not been terminated pre-petition.230 As a 
corollary, the trustee cannot assume a contract that is 
no longer in existence as at the time a bankruptcy 
petition is filed, as it has been extinguished.231 In 
practical terms, this means that the anti-ipso facto 
provisions cannot be used to revive pre-petition 
terminated contracts with the aim of assuming 
them.232 
 
  Significantly, in the recent cases of In re Charter 
Communications Ltd233 and Lehman Brothers Special 
Financing Inc. v BNY Corporate Trustee Services 
Limited,234 Peck J. noted that Òa caseÓ as used in ss. 
365(e)(1) and 541(c)(1)(B) of the Code is not 
restricted to the debtorÕs case, but included the 
bankruptcy of any other closely related entity. In 
practical terms, Peck J.Õs proposition is that the 
commencement of formal insolvency proceedings for 
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one counterparty in a contractual arrangement will 
trigger off the anti-ipso facto rules in relation to the 
ipso facto clauses of other solvent counterparties who 
are closely related to it.  
 
The accuracy of this proposition is doubtful. 
Contrary to Peck J.Õs view, the phrase Òafter the 
commencement of the caseÓ in s. 365(e)(1) is 
intended to limit the application of the language in s. 
365(e)(1)(B). The limiting language thus prevents the 
application of s. 365(e)(1) to any ipso facto clause 
that is effective prior to the commencement of the 
bankruptcy case. 
 
Furthermore, the legislative history of s. 
365(e)(1) explains the essence of the provision as 
being to prevent the enforcement of insolvency-
triggered termination clauses, which frequently 
hamper rehabilitation efforts, and to enable the trustee 
assume or assign such contracts.235 The focus is on the 
insolvent entity and its rehabilitation and not on any 
other related entity.  
 
Peck J.Õs proposition also raises the question 
of what constitutes a Òsufficient relationshipÓ between 
counterparties so as to make the insolvency of one 
trigger the anti-ipso facto rule for another. Put 
differently, what are the criteria for determining the 
proximity of parties such as to make the insolvency of 
one trigger off the anti-ipso facto rule for another? 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Significantly, Peck J.Õs proposition runs counter to 
earlier precedents. 
 
Peck J.Õs position also runs counter to the 
prevailing and settled position in the UK. As noted by 
Lord Patten in Perpetual Trustees v BNY Corporate 
Trustee Services Ltd, 236  compliance with the 
Insolvency Act constitutes the foundation for the 
common law anti-deprivation rule whose aim is to 
prohibit the enforcement of contracts which offend 
the letter and spirit of the Act. 237 Accordingly the 
anti-deprivation rule ought to be applied within the 
confines and limits of the insolvency legislation. 
 
There are effective anti-avoidance provisions 
in both the Insolvency Act and the Bankruptcy Code 
that invalidate provisions depriving an insolvent 
company of its assets before the commencement of 
formal insolvency.238 Extending the anti-deprivation 
and anti-ipso facto rule to retroactively invalidate pre-
insolvency deprivations or contract terminations will 
conflict with these established statutory rules. 
   
It is arguable that certain post-petition 
terminations may not be objectionable under the two 
rules. A contract modification or termination which 
occurs at insolvency or immediately thereafter based 
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on a pre-petition notice of termination ought not be 
caught by the anti-divestiture rules. A good example 
of this scenario would be cases where termination is 
by service of notice.  There seems to be no reason 
why the automatic termination of the contract at or 
after the commencement of proceedings should 
contravene the rules. 
    
First, such termination cannot be said to have 
been conditioned upon or triggered by insolvency. 
Here, the decision to terminate the contract was taken 
when the notice of termination was issued i.e. prior to 
the commencement of the insolvency procedure.239 As 
earlier argued, it is also suggested that terminations of 
this nature which are colourable are within the 
purview of the anti-avoidance rules of the regimes Ð 
given that actual termination of contract, and if any, 
asset withdrawal, has occurred before the 
commencement of insolvency. 
 
Secondly, it can be argued that contract 
terminations of the above nature do not actually 
amount to a withdrawal of any assets from the 
insolvent estate in the two jurisdictions. Under the 
Bankruptcy Code, by virtue of s. 541(a), all the 
executory contracts of the debtor are automatically 
transferred to the bankruptcy estate at the 
commencement of the case. It is suggested that s. 
541(a) will have only a temporary effect on contracts 
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of the present nature given that the contractual right 
transferred to the insolvent estate will be limited to 
the right that subsists before the expiration of the 
notice. 240  Consequently, the contract will 
automatically terminate at the expiration of the notice 
of termination and cease to be part of the bankruptcy 
estate.  
 
A cardinal rule of English insolvency law is 
that a liquidator inherits no greater rights than the 
debtor.241 Accordingly, when contracts that are subject 
to limitations, such as the passing of time, are 
transferred to the insolvent estate, they are transferred 
with and subject to such limitations, which will also 
be equally binding on the liquidator.  
 
The above positions in both jurisdictions are 
plausible. Although a primary objective of the anti-
divestiture rules is to maximise realisations for the 
insolvent estate, insolvency law ought not to be used 
as a tool for expanding the debtorÕs rights against 
others more than they exist at the commencement of 
formal proceedings.  This point was well emphasised 
by Gambardella J. in In re Tudor Motor Lodge 
Associates Ltd242 when she observed that, 
ÒSection 541 of the bankruptcy Code defines property of 
the estate and specifies what property becomes property 
of the estate. The commencement of a bankruptcy case 
creates an estate comprised of Òall legal or equitable 
interests of the debtor in property as of the 
commencement of the case.Ó Although the language of s. 
541 is broad, Congress clearly did not intend to Òexpand 
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the debtor's rights against others more than they exist at 
the commencement of the case.Ó 243 
 
    
1.2.4.       Divestiture conditioned on insolvency 
 
A divestiture that is triggered by an event 
other than the commencement of formal insolvency 
will not violate the anti-deprivation rule. This will be 
the case even if the deprivation coincides with 
insolvency. For instance in Ex parte Jay,244 Brett J. 
noted that if forfeiture had taken place on the 
builderÕs breach (as the provision envisaged) rather 
than at bankruptcy, then it would have been valid.245 
Similarly, although the contract in Ex parte Barter246 
provided for other events outside bankruptcy in which 
the property could be forfeited, it was held to violate 
the rule as it was established that bankruptcy was the 
basis of the powers of control exercised by the 
buyers.247 
 
The foregoing can be contrasted with Re 
Detmold248 where the provision was held valid as it 
was triggered by an event that occurred before the 
commencement of insolvency i.e. alienation by way 
of the appointment of a judgement creditor as a 
receiver by way of equitable execution.249  In In re 
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Garrud250 the forfeiture provision which operated on 
breach and not on bankruptcy was held to be valid.251 
Here, the bankrupt builder had broken the terms of his 
agreement with the landowner and it was provided in 
the agreement that the chattels would be forfeited to 
the landowner as and for liquidated damages.252  
    
Prima facie the above principle is also 
applicable to the anti-ipso facto rules where a 
termination or modification of a contract is premised 
on conditions outside the ipso facto events listed 
under s. 365(e)(1)(A), (B) and (C) of the Code.253 An 
example of a case where a post-petition termination 
will not breach the anti-ipso facto rules will be where 
a contract has a specified termination date. The 
contract will automatically terminate on the stated 
date. 
 
A divestiture that is conditioned upon an event 
that is unrelated to formal insolvency will not 
contravene the anti-ipso facto rule.254 This point is 
well illustrated in Nemko Inc. v Motorola Inc., 255 
where a contract for supplies was cancelled on April 4, 
1990, two weeks after the debtorÕs insolvency petition 
was filed, due to the failure of the debtor to make 
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deliveries that were due on March 12, 1990. 256 
Regardless of the ipso facto clause in the contract, the 
court held that s. 365(e)(1) did not apply where a 
debtor had materially breached an executory contract 
pre-petition, made no attempt to assume, reject or 
cure the defaults and the counterparty, in a timely 
fashion, terminated the contract post-petition based on 
the pre-petition default.   
 
An argument against the foregoing approach is 
the fact that it could create an avenue for creditors to 
evade the rules. For instance, creditors may 
strategically purport to employ a non-ipso factor term 
in an agreement to modify or terminate the rights of a 
debtor while in fact effecting such termination or 
modification due to insolvency. This notwithstanding, 
it is argued that this approach does not conflict with 
the earlier evaluated policy objectives of the rules. 257 
Moreover, it also supports the point previously made 
that the insolvent estate ought not to acquire any 
greater contractual interest than that which was held 
by the debtor prior to insolvency by reason of the 
rules.  
 
A termination, which is timed to coincide with 
insolvency, although premised on another ground, 
may give rise to a number of considerations. It is 
arguable that such a clause is more likely than not to 
be invalidated under the US regime. In deed the facts 
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of Garnas v American Family Mutual Insurance258 
clearly illustrate the extent to which US courts can go 
in preventing the termination or modification of 
executory contracts after the filing of the petition.  
 
In Garnas v American Family Mutual 
Insurance the insurance firm was prevented from 
refusing to renew the insurance cover of a bankrupt 
which was meant to renew automatically. Although 
the insurance firm neither stated insolvency as the 
ground for refusal or for its decision not to renew, the 
court concluded that it was an attempt to circumvent 
the purpose of s. 365(1)(e).259 
 
In addition, there have cases where creditors 
who had termination-at-will clauses have been 
prevented from enforcing them, given that their 
exercise coincided with the commencement of the 
insolvency case. In In re Siegel Company260 the court 
ruled that the exercise would Òfor all practical 
purposes, nullify the remedial policy of s. 365(e).261 
This position was echoed in In re National Hydro-Vac 
Industrial Services.262 
    
The approach of the courts may be defended 
on the ground that the actions of the creditors were 
viewed as veiled attempts to circumvent the anti-ipso 
facto rules. Hence, in the above cases, the bankruptcy 
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courts looked beyond the face of the agreements in a 
bid to unearth the true nature of such termination 
clauses. For instance in Yates Development Inc. v Old 
Kings Interchange Inc. Proctor J. noted that,263  
Òs. 365(e)(1) also expressly applies to...provisions which 
do not mention bankruptcy but have the same effect as a 
clause triggered by a bankruptcy filing.Ó264 
 
It is indeed doubtful if any contractual 
terminations or modifications which coincide with 
insolvency will survive the anti-ipso facto rule if the 
above statement is to be taken literally. Furthermore, 
it is difficult to see how this does not constitute a 
subtle expansion of the contractual rights of the 
insolvent estate beyond that which the debtor had pre-
petition. For instance, if a solvent party has a right to 
terminate a contract or modify same on the occurrence 
of a non-insolvency event, stripping the party of such 
right merely because it coincides with insolvency is 
akin to redrafting the agreement and expanding the 
rights of the debtor post-insolvency. 
 
In contrast, under the English insolvency law 
regime, terminations which coincide with insolvency 
but are conditioned on grounds other than insolvency 
will more likely be enforceable. For instance in In Re 
Apex Supply Company Ltd265 where a hirer in a hire-
purchase agreement was to pay compensation for acts 
of default one of which was liquidation, Gibson J. 
upheld the provision on the ground that since the 
claim could arise in a multitude of circumstances, one 
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only of which is the possible liquidation of the 
company, it would be extravagant to suggest that the 
clause was aimed at defeating the bankruptcy laws or 
at providing for a distribution differing from that 
which the bankruptcy laws permit.266  
 
The disadvantage of this approach is the 
tendency for an erosion of the anti-deprivation rule 
through the veiled conditioning of insolvency-
triggered terminations on other related grounds. 
Nevertheless, it is arguable that this approach aligns 
with the touchstone for determining deprivations in 
the English regime, namely that courts ought to look 
at the contractual terms of parties with a view to 
ascertaining their rights and obligations alongside 
reference to the applicable non-insolvency law. The 
next paragraphs will consider two more examples to 
illustrate this point, as well as how parties can 
structure the termination of their contracts to coincide 
with insolvency without being in breach of the rule 
under English insolvency law.  
 
  
a.    Termination for anticipatory breach 
 
An anticipatory breach occurs when, before 
performance is due, a party either renounces the 
contract or disables himself from performing.267 This 
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entitles the innocent party to terminate performance of 
the contract immediately, if he so wishes, and sue for 
damages.268 The rationale for permitting the innocent 
party to treat the contract as repudiated is that there 
has been a breach of a right to have the contract kept 
open as a subsisting and effective contract.269 Before 
examining the validity of termination for anticipatory 
breach vis-a-vis the anti-deprivation rule, it is 
pertinent to examine the preliminary issue of whether 
insolvency constitutes an anticipatory breach.  
 
Prima facie, insolvency in itself will not 
amount to an anticipatory breach, entitling the 
innocent party to terminate the contract. 270  The 
insolvency must show or lead to an inference of an 
intention not to perform or an inability to perform. 
Accordingly, it must be shown that the insolvent party 
has either renounced the contract or has disabled 
himself from performing it. 271  Renunciation will 
require a ÒclearÓ and ÒabsoluteÓ refusal to perform.272 
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Disablement273 involves a ÒdeliberateÓ act that makes 
performance impossible.274  
 
 
    Disability: 
 
Oditah views disability as being more difficult 
to establish, noting that a party who elects to treat 
disability as an anticipatory breach may be running a 
serious risk.275 His view is rightly premised on the 
ground that insolvency, which creates disability, can 
hardly be described as deliberate, although in some 
cases the insolvent party may be at fault.276  
 
Accordingly, in the absence of establishing 
that a company is in fact unable to perform a specific 
contract in issue, a solvent party cannot rely on mere 
insolvency proceedings to establish disability. For 
instance in Re Agra Bank, 277  a bank opened an 
irrevocable credit but became insolvent and stopped 
payment before the presentation of the documents. 
The customer, who had instructed the bank to open 
the credit, arranged for alternative credit facilities and 
sought to prove for damages based on the extra 
expense so incurred. The court upheld the liquidator's 
rejection of the proof. The bank's insolvency did not 
constitute an anticipatory breach of the contract 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
273 Oditah coins this ÒincapacityÓ - Fidelis Oditah, ÒAssets and the treatment of 
claims in insolvency,Ó (1992) 108 L.Q.R. 459, 495. 
274 Universal Cargo Cariers v Citati [1957] 2 Q.B. 401, 438 
275 Oditah (fn. 273) 495. 
276 ibid. 
277 (1867) L.R. 5 Eq. 160. 
  
83 
because the mere fact of stoppage of payment was no 
proof that the bank will not accept the bills.278  
     
    
                 Renunciation: 
  
Insolvency on its own cannot be taken as 
conclusive evidence of renunciation of a contract.279 
This position is plausible given that the 
commencement of insolvency only amounts to an 
admission of the fact of insolvency and not 
necessarily the incapacity to perform specific or even 
all contracts of the insolvent company. Hence, even 
where insolvency will incapacitate the company from 
fulfilling certain contracts, it is difficult to ascertain 
which ones it will choose not to perform.280 
 
However, it is suggested that there are 
circumstances where commencement of insolvency 
proceeding will amount to renunciation. First, in cases 
where the contract forms the insolvent companyÕs 
only outstanding liability.  Here, the effect of a notice 
of insolvency without more would indicate the 
insolvent partyÕs inability to perform the contract.281 
Secondly if the declaration is made in such 
circumstances as to show that the insolvent company 
either cannot, or does not intend to carry out the 
contract, it is open to the solvent contractor to take the 
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278 ibid, at 165. See also Re Barber & Co (1870) L.R. 9 Eq. 725. 
279 Mess v Duffus [1901] 6 Com.Cas. 165; Morgan v Bain (1874) L.R. 10 C.P. 
15; Re Edwards (1873) L.R. 8 Ch. App. 289. 
280 See discussion on disclaimer or rejection of executory contracts in chapter 3. 
281 Morgan v Bain (1874) L.R. 10 C.P. 15 at 25-26 (Brett J.). 
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contract as having been repudiated. 282Against this 
background, it is suggested that whether insolvency 
constitutes a renunciation or not will depend on the 
facts of each case and the nature of the insolvency 
proceeding.  
  
Renunciation appears to be an easier form of 
establishing repudiation. However, the problem is that 
often the solvent party will be leaving his fate in the 
hands of the liquidator who may need time to 
ascertain whether it is profitable to perform or 
disclaim a contract. Hence a solvent party may have 
to adopt what Oditah describes as a Òwait and seeÓ 
approach.283 
 
Anticipatory breach has been rationalized as a 
breach of an implied term of the contract that neither 
party will, without just cause, repudiate his 
obligations under the contract before the time fixed 
for performance. Accordingly, a termination may not 
necessarily contravene the anti-deprivation rule, as the 
implied condition is not an independent forfeiting 
condition, but a contractual limitation of the 
insolvent's interest in the contract. 284 Given that a 
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282 Mess v Duffus (fn. 279) 167. 
283 Oditah also suggests that renunciation necessarily entails a Òwait and seeÓ 
approach as the solvent party has to wait and see whether the liquidator will find 
the contract profitable to perform. Morgan v Bain (1874) L.R. 10 C.P. 15, 26 
284  Considering that these are mere ordinary executory contracts with 
unperformed obligations, Oditah submits that this is not underpinned by the 
determinable/defeasible interest distinction but that acceleration and rescission 
clauses are built-in limitations on each party's entitlement to the other's 
unperformed obligations. 
  
85 
liquidator takes subject to equities, he must be bound 
by the contractual terms that qualify the contract.285  
 
b.     Insolvency as a condition subsequent 
 
As an alternative to anticipatory breach and as 
a means of avoiding the complexities associated with 
establishing disability and the wait-and-see dilemma 
in renunciation, a contract may be terminated upon 
insolvency for breach of condition Ð without 
necessarily violating the anti-deprivation rule. A 
breach of condition in a contract is a breach of an 
obligation and is one which goes to the root of the 
contract, entitling the injured party to elect to 
terminate the agreement and claim damages for any 
breaches which occurred prior to termination and the 
loss of opportunity to receive performance of the 
promisorÕs outstanding obligations.286 
 
In Lombard North Plc. v Butterworth, 287 
Mustill L.J. noted that it was possible by express 
provision in a contract to make a term a condition, 
notwithstanding that it would not be so in the absence 
of the provision. Hence from the perspective of 
termination, a condition is a label which the law 
attaches to a contractual term, on the basis of the 
agreement of contracting parties and the breach of 
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285 Shipton, Anderson & Co. (1927) Ltd. v. Micks, Lambert & Co [1936] 2 All ER 
1032. 
286 BNP Paribas v Wockhardt EU Operations (Swiss) AG [2009] EWHC 3116 
(33); Lombard North Plc. v Butterworth [1987] Q.B. 527, 535 per Mustill L.J., 
and per Nicholls L.J. at 546. 
287 [1987] Q.B. 527. 
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which effectively confers a right to terminate on the 
innocent party.288 
 
Against this background, parties can include 
the insolvency of a party as a condition subsequent 
under the contract, alongside other conditions in the 
contract. The practical implication of this is that the 
debtor will commit a breach of condition once it 
becomes insolvent, entitling the solvent party to 
accept the breach as repudiation, terminate the 
contract and prove for damages in the insolvency 
procedure.  
 
It is argued that this may not necessarily 
breach the anti-deprivation rule, given that 
termination is based on breach of condition which 
goes to the root of the agreement. The foregoing is 
clearly a veiled breach of the anti-deprivation rule, 
however, it also illustrates how solicitous English 
insolvency is towards giving effect to armÕs length 
contract terms.  
    
 
1.2.5.     The role of good faith and intention  
 
The good faith of the contracting parties in 
inserting an ipso facto clause in their agreement is 
totally irrelevant under the Bankruptcy Code. The 
anti-ipso facto rules are absolute in nature and focus 
on the effect of the termination clauses in the contracts. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
288 Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] A.C. 827, 849-850. 
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The rule disregards security interests and treats 
secured and unsecured creditors alike, so far as the 
termination or modification of those contracts or the 
rights therein are conditioned upon insolvency. 
 
The advantage of this one-cap-fits-all 
approach is that the rule has been able to achieve a 
high level of coherence and uniformity in its 
application. Notwithstanding that secured claims are 
interfered with, it is arguable that this approach is 
capable of ensuring that very few executory contracts, 
viewed as contingent assets, are lost by the insolvent 
estate, bearing in mind that the aim is to utilise these 
contingent assets to maximise realisations and boost 
rehabilitations. 
 
Numerous (and sometimes conflicting) judicial 
pronouncements have been made regarding the role of 
good faith in the application of the anti-deprivation 
rule. In Money Markets International v London Stock 
Exchange,289  while reviewing the principles in the 
application of the anti-deprivation rule, Lord 
Neuberger had observed that, 
"It may be that at one time, the fact that there was no 
intention to interfere with, or to override the pari passu 
rules on bankruptcy would have been a reason for 
holding a deprivation provision valid. However, in the 
light of the observations of Lord Cross in British Eagle, 
I consider that that contention is no longer maintainable: 
he said that it was "irrelevant" that the parties to the 
arrangements in that case "had good business reasons for 
entering into them and did not direct their minds to the 
question how the arrangements might be affected (on) 
insolvency." To my mind, he was indicating that one 
must look at the effect of the deprivation provision, and 
whether, it applies in the context of an insolvency, it is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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contrary to public policy in the light of the bankruptcy 
laws."290 
 
Lord Neuberger thus treated the anti-
deprivation rule as if it was the same as the pari passu 
rule, hence his reference to the observation of Lord 
Cross in British Eagle, 291  wherein the latter was 
clearly dealing with the role of intention in the 
application of the pari passu rule. 292 It is however 
worth noting that Money Markets International was 
decided prior to the Belmont case i.e. at a time when 
no clear distinction was made between the pari passu 
principle and the anti-deprivation rule. 
 
Lord Neuberger was actually right in his 
assertion that some previous authorities may have 
taken the intentions of parties into consideration. This 
point was highlighted in Belmont Park Investments 
Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd 293 
where Lord Collins reviewed a long line of previous 
decisions294 and concluded that, 
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290 ibid.  at 1177. 
291 [1975] 1 W.L.R. 758, 780. 
292 Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd 
[2011] B.C.C. 734, 752 per Lord Collins: Òby contrast, in the leading pari passu 
principle case, British Eagle, it was held by the majority that it did not matter that 
the clearing transaction was a sensible commercial arrangement not intended to 
circumvent the pari passu principle.Ó 
293 [2011] B.C.C. 734. 
294 ibid, at 752. Lord Collins observed that the early decisions in Higinbotham v 
Holme and Whitmore v Mason showed that the anti-deprivation rule were 
premised on the presence of Òfraud onÓ the bankruptcy policy or an intention to 
defraud creditors. He observed that in Ex parte Mackay (1873) LR 8 Ch. App. 
643, 647 the divestiture clause constituted an ineffective charge, as it was Òa 
clear attempt to evade the operation of the bankruptcy laws.Ó  In Ex parte 
William (1877-1878) L.R. 7 Ch.D. 138, 143-4 evidence that the parties Òclearly 
intendedÓ to deprive the debtor of its assets at insolvency led the court to 
conclude that a deprivation had occurred. In Worrell v Johns [1928] Ch. 737, 748 
the anti-deprivation principle was breached as there was a Òdeliberate deviceÓ by 
the parties to secure the transfer of money from the debtor to a third party in the 
event of bankruptcy. In contrast, the anti-deprivation rule was not infringed in 
Bombay Official Assignee v Shroff [1932] 48 T.L.R. 443, 446 as the rules relating 
to the forfeiture of membership of the Bombay BrokerÕs Hall were Òentirely 
innocent of any design to evade the law of insolvency.Ó In BorlandÕs Trustees v 
Steel Brothers [1901] 1 Ch. 279, 290, 291, the court concluded that the anti-
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ÒThe overall effect of the authorities is that, where the 
anti-deprivation rule has applied, it has been an almost 
invariably expressed element that the party seeking to 
take advantage of the deprivation was intending to evade 
the bankruptcy rules; but that where it has not applied, 
the good faith or the commercial sense of the transaction 
has been a substantial factor.Ó295 
 
Lord Collins concluded his analysis by stating that a 
subjective intention was not required but that in 
borderline cases a commercially sensible transaction 
entered into in good faith should not be held to 
infringe the anti-deprivation rule.296 
 
Lord ManceÕs view on the role of the state of 
mind does not accord with that of Lord Collins. His 
Lordship submitted that the court had to make an 
objective assessment of the purpose and effect of the 
relevant transaction or provision in bankruptcy, when 
considering whether it amounts to an illegitimate 
evasion of the bankruptcy law or has a legitimate 
commercial basis in other considerations.297  
 
Accordingly, while Lord Collin noted that it 
was obvious from the wide range of non-insolvency 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
deprivation rule was not breached as the provision in issue was inserted bona fide 
and therefore did not constitute a fraud on the insolvency law policy. In In re 
Appex Supply Company Ltd [1942] Ch. 108, 113-4 the hire-purchase agreement 
stipulated various grounds for the repossession of the property, including 
insolvency. The Court declined to invalidate the repossession in the absence of 
clear evidence indicating intention to defeat the bankruptcy laws.  
295 [2011] B.C.C. 734, 752. 
296 ibid. at 752. 
297 [2011] B.C.C. 734, 772. His lordship observed that in other cases the anti-
deprivation rule was stated in terms of focusing on the character of the 
transaction or provision, identified objectively. For instance in Wilson v 
Greenwood (1818) 1 Swans. 471, Mr. Swanston stated that Òthe owner of 
property may, on alienation, qualify the interest of his alienee by a condition to 
take effect on bankruptcy; but cannot by contract or otherwise qualify his own 
interest by a like condition, determining or controlling it in the event of his own 
bankruptcy, to the disappointment or delay of his creditorsÓ. This was 
subsequently quoted by Lord Hatherley L.C. in argument in Whitmore v Mason, 
209Ð210 and by Fry L.J. in Ex p. Barter (1884) L.R. 26 Ch. D. 510, 519Ð520. He 
however admitted that in some cases such as Higinbotham v Holme 19 Ves 88, 
Ex p. Mackay (1873) LR 8 Ch. App. 643 and Re Johns [1928] Ch. 737, a 
conclusion that the anti-deprivation principle applied was expressed in terms 
referring to an express or deliberate object of evading the bankruptcy law.  
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circumstances capable of constituting an event of 
default under the swap agreement that the provisions 
were not deliberately intended to evade insolvency 
law,298 Lord Mance stated that what mattered was 
whether the deprivation was triggered by bankruptcy, 
and that, if it is, it is irrelevant that there were also 
events other than bankruptcy, which if they had 
occurred would have triggered deprivation, but which 
did not in fact occur.299 
 
It is suggested that Lord ManceÕs view is the 
more persuasive of the two positions. As a 
background to applying this objective approach, it is 
pertinent to re-emphasise that the determination of 
what constitutes an asset of a company and a 
deprivation must be made with reference to the pre-
insolvency contractual intentions of the parties as 
evidenced in the terms of their agreement and the 
applicable non-insolvency law. For example, in a 
conditional sale transaction reference must be made to 
the fact that the parties intended to contract on the 
basis that title in the goods would remain in the seller 
despite the passing of possession to the insolvent 
buyer. Hence, reference ought to be made to the 
applicable law, the Sale of Goods Act to determine 
ownership of assets. 
 
The result of the application of this objective 
test would be that once there is a determination, with 
reference to the non-insolvency law, that assets which 
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299  ibid. at 773. 
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ought to fall into the bankruptcy estate have been 
clawed back, such arrangement will be invalidated, 
notwithstanding that the transaction makes 
commercial sense or was entered into in good faith 
with no intention to evade the bankruptcy scheme. 
 
It is suggested that this approach aligns with 
the policy objective of the anti-deprivation rule which 
is the maximisation of realisations by preventing 
withdrawal of assets from the insolvent estate. 
Recognising the good faith of the parties or 
commercial sense of the transactions does not 
contribute anything to the upholding of this objective. 
On the contrary, it creates loopholes and avenues for 
asset dissipation in contravention of the policy 
objective. 
 
It may be argued that certain pre-petition 
contracts that have the effect of divesting the 
insolvent estate of assets at insolvency may have been 
commercially sensible to the contracting parties at the 
time they were entered into. Accordingly, such 
contracts may have been entered into in good faith 
and for the benefit of the company Ð given that at the 
time of contracting, the deprivation clause may have 
been viewed as a reasonable price that the insolvent 
entity has to agree to for the agreement to be reached 
in the first place.  The response to the above argument 
is this; first, if the reasoning is followed, it will 
eviscerate the anti-deprivation rule and consequently 
defeat its core objective of asset maximisation. It will 
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make the application of the rule to be dependent on 
either the ability of lawyers to draft agreements in a 
manner which good faith and commercial sense can 
be inferred or to simply prove the absence of intention 
to evade the bankruptcy scheme.  
 
Secondly, it is difficult to define what 
constitutes a commercially sensible contract. Put 
differently, what amounts to a commercially sensible 
contract to one party may not make sense to another. 
Accordingly, while deprivation clauses will be 
commercially sensible to a benefiting creditor, it may 
not make commercial sense to other creditors Ð not 
just because they were not privy to the contract, but 
also because the deprivation will be detrimental to 
their interests. Unfortunately in the Belmont case, 
Lord Collins failed to expatiate on this point or 
specifically state from whose perspective the 
transaction is to be judged from. It is suggested that it 
would be incorrect to do so from the perspective of a 
single benefiting creditor, as this would run counter to 
the collective nature of insolvency law proceedings. 
 
Insolvency-triggered deprivation clauses in 
contracts are aimed at insulating solvent 
counterparties from formal insolvency. Hence, the 
main objective of such clauses is to claw back assets 
which otherwise would have fallen into the insolvent 
estate. The clauses effectively deprive the general 
body of creditors of valuable assets. From this 
perspective, it begs the question as to the 
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circumstances which insolvency-triggered deprivation 
clauses will be held to have been entered into in good 
faith and without intention to evade the bankruptcy 
rules.300 
 
It is suggested that creditors who do not wish 
to be lumped together with unsecured creditors in the 
event of formal insolvency, ought to protect 
themselves by taking security or retaining title in their 
assets. As previously noted, in such cases, English 
courts will give effect to such security and proprietary 
interests Ð given that such assets will not fall into the 
insolvent estate at insolvency. 
 
It is worth noting that discountenancing good 
faith and the common sense of transactions in the 
application of the anti-deprivation rule will not 
necessarily achieve coherence in the application of the 
anti-deprivation rule. This is primarily because the 
rule is usually applied with reference to the pre-
petition contractual terms of parties as well as diverse 
non-insolvency laws Ð depending on the type of 
contract in issue. However, it is argued that the 
elimination of good faith and commercial sense will 
ensure coherence in the application of the rule to very 
similar types of contracts.  
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1.3.      Exceptions to the anti-ipso facto rules 
    
1.3.1.  Validation by applicable non-insolvency law 
 
A creditor cannot be compelled to continue 
with an executory contract by virtue of s. 365(e) if the 
applicable non-insolvency law excuses the creditor 
from accepting or rendering performance to the 
trustee or an assignee.301 In the case of In re Cutler,302 
Òapplicable non-bankruptcy lawÓ was defined as the 
statute that governed the contract of the parties prior 
to the commencement of insolvency.303 This exception 
is reinforced by s. 365(c)(1) of the Code which 
prohibits an officeholder from Òassuming or 
assigningÓ executory contracts if applicable non-
insolvency law excuses the creditor from accepting or 
rendering performance to an entity other than the 
debtor or debtor-in-possession. It is suggested that 
this latter provision is designed to protect the creditor 
from being compelled to render or accept 
performance from an entity other than the trustee or 
debtor with which it originally contracted. 304 
Significantly, the bankruptcy Code permits a creditor 
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301 s. 365(e)(2)(A); In re ANC Rental Corporation 277 B.R. 226, 237 (Bankr.D. 
Del. 2002); In re Pennsylvania Peer Review Organisation 50 B.R. 640, 645 
(Bankr MD Pa. 1985). 
302 165 B.R. 275, 280 (Bankr.D.Ariz.1994). 
303 ibid at 280. 
304 In re TechDyn Systems Corp. 235 B.R. 857, 861-862 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1999); 
Dean v Postle Enterprises Inc. 48 B.R. 721, 724 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1985). The 
operative clause in the preamble of s. 365(c)(1) provides that Òthe trustee may not 
assume or assign any executory contract or unexpired lease.Ó 
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to waive this exception by consenting to the 
assignment.305  
The phrase Òassume or assignÓ under s. 
365(c)(1) has given rise to a division in judicial 
opinion over the nature of non-assumable contracts 
under this heading. Some courts have adopted the so-
called hypothetical approach wherein a literal 
language of the provision is followed to a conclusion 
that the bankruptcy estate loses the rights of the pre-
bankruptcy debtor to assume contracts that are not 
assignable under pre-insolvency law Ð even if the 
officeholder does not contemplate an assignment.306 
 
On the other hand, other courts have applied 
the so-called actual test wherein the assumption of 
contracts which are non-assignable outside 
bankruptcy are only prohibited where there is a 
finding that under particular circumstances, the 
assumption would amount to a forbidden assignment 
under the applicable non-insolvency law.307 
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305 In re Allentown Ambassadors Inc. 361 B.R. 422, 445 (E.D. Pa. 2007); In re 
Pioneer Ford Sales Inc. 729 F.2d 27, 28 (1st Cir. 1984). 
306 Perlman v. Catapult Entertainment Inc. 165 F.3d 747 (9th Cir.) (applying the 
Òhypothetical testÓ to bar assumption of nonexclusive patent licenses); In re West 
Electonics Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83-84 (3rd Cir. 1988) (barring assumption of 
government contract); Breedon v. Catron 158 B.R. 629 (E.D. Va. 1993) (barring 
assumption of partnership agreement). 
307  In re GP Express Airlines, Inc. 200 B.R. 222, 231-32 (Bankr. D. Neb. 
1996) (applying the actual test and finding that applicable law barring the 
assignment of certain airline contracts did not prevent the debtor in possession 
from assuming such contracts); In re American Ship Building Co. Inc. 164 B.R. 
358, 362-63 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994); In re Hartec Enter, Inc. 117 B.R. 865, 872-
74 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (adopting the Òactual testÓ and allowing the debtor 
in possession to assume a nonassignable government contract); In re Cardinal 
Indus. Inc. 116 B.R. 964, 977 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990); Institute Pasteur v. 
Cambridge Biotech Corp. 104 F.3d 489, 493-94 (1st Cir.) (debtor in possession 
may assume patent licenses even though reorganization plan provides for transfer 
of debtor's stock to third party); Summit Inv. and Dev. Corp. v. Leroux 69 F.3d 
608, 612-14 (1st Cir. 1995) (rejecting Òhypothetical testÓ); Texaco, Inc. v. 
Louisiana Land and Exploration Co. 136 B.R. 658, 668-71 (M.D. La. 1992) 
(Statute which required the consent of a state board to assign a state mineral lease 
was not Òapplicable lawÓ blocking the assumption of a lease by the debtor in 
possession). 
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It is suggested that the hypothetical test runs 
counter with the general policy of the anti-ipso facto 
regime earlier analysed Ð notwithstanding that it 
accords with a literal construction of s. 365(c)(1). 
Under the test, valuable contingent assets of the 
debtor are legally forfeited merely because of the 
bankruptcy filing. This is regardless of the fact that 
there is no plan of actually assigning the contracts 
after assumption. It would thus appear that the actual 
test, although inconsistent with the literal 
interpretation of s. 365(c)(1) yields correct results 
from the perspective of the policy of the anti-ipso fact 
rule. 
 
There is no corresponding exception under 
common law anti-deprivation regime. However, it is 
suggested that UK courts will give effect to a non-
insolvency statutory provision that precludes the 
application of the anti-deprivation rule from specific 
types of contracts. In addition to the respect for 
parliamentary sovereignty, such exemptions would 
certainly be based on a well thought-out policy that 
outweighs the application of the anti-deprivation rule 
in the circumstance.308  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
308  MMI Stockbrokers Ltd v LSE Ltd [2002] 1 W.L.R. 1150, 1190 (139) 
(Neuberger J): ÒWhile there will no doubt be exceptions, it seems to me that it 
will be a rare case where the Convention and the common law conflict. Bearing 
in mind the basis of the common law, the way in which it has developed over the 
centuries, and the continuing ability of the courts to adapt it with the passage of 
time, it would be surprising if it were otherwise.Ó  
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An example of a provision of an English non-
insolvency law that precludes the application of 
insolvency law in a commercial transaction is the real 
remedies conferred by the Sales of Goods Act on an 
unpaid seller. This exception is evaluated in 
paragraph 1.4.5. Another example of the intervention 
of Convention in English law and by extension the 
anti-deprivation rule is Article 7 of the European 
Union Financial Collateral Directive, 309  which 
mandates member-states to recognise and enforce 
close-out netting provisions in financial collateral 
agreements in the event of the commencement or 
continuation of formal insolvency proceeding.310 
 
 
    
1.3.2. Loans and financial accommodation contracts 
    
Ipso facto clauses relating to loan transactions 
and other financial accommodation contracts are 
enforceable. 311  The Bankruptcy Code expressly 
excludes transactions of this nature from the anti-ipso 
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309 2002/47 (2002) OJ L168/43. 
310  Enacted in England as the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No.2) 
Regulations 2003. 
311 The legislative history of s. 365 describes this exception as a Òcharacterisation 
of contracts to make loan or to extend other debt financing or financial 
accommodationsÓ and it is Òlimited to the extension of cash or a line of credit and 
is not intended to embrace ordinary leases or contracts to provide goods or 
services with payments to be made overtime.Ó 124 CongressÕ Record H1108 
(daily ed. September 28, 1978); Government National Mortgage Corp v Adana 
Mortgage Bankers 12 B.R. 977, 986 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980); See also In re Best 
Products Co 210 B.R. 714, 716 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997). In re Ernie Haire Ford 
Inc. 403 B.R. 750, 755 (M.D. Fla. 2009); In re Neuhoff Farms Inc. 258 B.R. 343, 
347Ð348  (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2000); Gill v Easebe Inc. 900 F.2d 1417, 1420 (9th 
Cir.1990); Airline Reporting Corp. v Charringhton Worldwide 110 B.R. 973 
(M.D.Fla.1990); Airlines Reporting Corp. v Wills Travel Service Inc. 72 B.R. 
380, 383 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987). 
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facto policy. 312  Hence a trustee cannot assume or 
assign such contracts and a lender cannot be 
compelled to make further loans to the debtor, even if 
there is a subsisting pre-petition agreement to that 
effect.313  
This exception protects a creditor who has 
made an unperformed lending commitment to the 
debtor from being compelled to continue with the 
obligation post-petition.314 This is expressed in the 
legislative history of s. 365(c)(2) which explains the 
purpose of the exception as being,  
ÒTo make it clear that a party to a transaction which is 
based upon the financial strength of a debtor should not 
be required to extend new credit to the debtor whether in 
the form of loans, lease financing or the purchase of 
discount notes.Ó 315 
 
Significantly, the financial accommodation exception 
leaves no room for consent by the creditor; hence the 
creditor cannot waive it. 316  The plain statutory 
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312 s. 365(e)(2)(b) and (c)(2) of he Code; Mims v Fidelity Funding Inc. 307 B.R. 
849, 858 (N. D. Tex. 2002); Broyhill v Deluca 194 B.R. 65, 75 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
1996); The Huntington National Bank Co. v Alix 146 B.R. 720, 731 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ohio 1992); In re New Town Mall 17 B.R. 326, 327 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1982); Louis 
Levit, ÒUse and Disposition of Property under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code: Some Practical concernsÓ (1979) 53 AM Bankr. L.J. 275, 276. 
313 Continental Experts Enterprises Inc. v Stowers 26 B.R. 308, 309 Bankr. S.D. 
Fla. 1982); Peninsula International Corp. v Citizens & Southern International 
Bank 19 B.R. 762, 764 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982). 
314  In re TS Industries 117 B.R. 682, 686 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990); Airline 
Reporting Corp. v Charringhton Worldwide Enterprises (n 156) 975; Whinnery v 
Bank of Onalaska 106 B.R. 983, 990 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wis.1989); In re Travel 
Shoppe Inc. 88 B.R. 466, 470 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988). 
315 Senate Report No. 95-989 at 58-59 (95th Cong. 2d Sess. 1978). Andrea Coles-
Bjerre, ÒIpso Facto: The Pattern Of Assumable Contracts In BankruptcyÓ (fn. 31) 
96. 
316 Government National Mortgage Corp. v Adana Mortgage Bankers 12 B.R. 
977, 986 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980). In In re Prime Inc. 15 B.R. 216, 218, 219 
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981), the parties had agreed to continue an accounts 
receivables financing contract after the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The court 
acknowledged that, literally, s. 365(c)(2) prohibits assumption whether the 
creditor consents or not. However, the court concluded that Congress had 
intended for the business of the debtor to proceed in as normal a fashion as 
possible. Thus concluding that the statutory pattern of the Code permitted the 
inference in the language of s. 365(c)(2) that a trustee may assume a contract for 
debt financing if the creditor consents. The Court of Appeals in In re Sun Runner 
Marine 945 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1991) rejected the decision in In re Prime 
Inc., describing the reasoning as Òunconvincing.Ó It insisted that the courtÕs 
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language of the exception suggests that the consent of 
the creditor is irrelevant. This can be contrasted with 
the previous exception under s. 365(e)(2)(A) where a 
consent proviso is included.  
At first blush, the foregoing approach may 
appear to run counter to the policy objective of the 
anti-ipso facto rule which is to encourage corporate 
rehabilitation. In addition, one may venture to wonder 
why the protection accorded to this category of 
creditors is not extended to dealers in commodities. 
No doubt, the financial condition of a debtor is a 
fundamental consideration in any credit contract and 
is assessed prior to entering the financing contract. 
The commencement of a bankruptcy case 
dramatically alters assumptions under which the 
contract was arranged317 Ð but this is also the case for 
contracts for the supply of commodities. Hence, if a 
lender is given the privilege of reassessing the 
desirability and terms for offering credit to the debtor 
in the light of the changed circumstances, why should 
a supplier of commodities be denied the same 
opportunity? 
 
It is arguable that the strict stance against 
waivers of financial accommodation contracts is 
partially due to the fact that the Code has a well-
structured post-petition financing provision - s. 364 of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
inference should not have overridden the plain language of s. 365(c)(2) which 
prohibits assumption of such contracts regardless of a creditorÕs consent. 
317  Raymond Nimmer, ÒExecutory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Protecting the 
fundamental Terms of the BargainÓ (1983) 54 Univ. Colo. L. Rev. 507, 533-534. 
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the Bankruptcy Code.318 The post-petition financing 
provision clearly outlines the procedures for post-
petition financing agreements as well as incentives 
and adequate protection for post-petition lenders and 
existing creditors. Accordingly, precluding such pre-
petition financing arrangements is a way of avoiding 
any conflicts with this post-petition financing regime.  
 
In addition, the above position is in tandem 
with the collective nature of corporate insolvency 
proceedings given that such pre-petition financing 
arrangement may not necessarily be in the interest of 
the general body of creditors. Put differently, the 
prohibition against financial accommodation contracts 
is not only for the protection of a creditor who is 
involved in the contract in issue but for the benefit of 
all creditors.319 
 
There is no rule precluding the application of 
the common law anti-deprivation rule to financing 
contracts under UK insolvency law.  Given that most 
financing agreements are executory in nature Ð 
consisting of unperformed obligations, it is suggested 
that a termination at insolvency, will not necessarily 
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318 Andrea Coles-Bjerre, ÒIpso Facto: The Pattern Of Assumable Contracts In 
BankruptcyÓ (fn 31) suggests that the question of assumability of financing 
contracts with consent or waiver of the creditor is purely academic, considering 
that court approval would be necessary whether it is conceptualized as a waiver 
plus assumption under s. 365(a) or as the incurring of unsecured financing 
outside the ordinary course of business under s. 364(b).   
319 In re Placid Oil 72 B.R. 135, 139 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987). In re TS Industries 
117 B.R. 682, 687 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990) the court upheld a waiver of a 
financing contract holding that it was a pre-petition workout by the parties in 
anticipation of insolvency. The court noted that the creditor knew that the 
financing agreement would be incorporated into the reorganisation and that it 
would be financing a reorganised debtor-in-possession. With respect, the Court 
seemed to have ignored the adverse effect that the waiver would have on other 
creditors in the bankruptcy estate.  
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breach the anti-deprivation rule based on the earlier 
analysis.320 As a matter of general principle in English 
insolvency law, where a contract provides for the 
future performance of reciprocal obligations, the 
performance of each of which is the quid pro quo of 
the other, a termination-at-insolvency clause is 
unobjectionable.321     
! ! ! !
! ! !
    Acceleration clauses 
 
Under English commercial law, it is common 
practice for parties in loan agreements to set out 
circumstances that constitute events of default. One of 
these events is usually the borrowerÕs insolvency. At 
the occurrence of any of the events, the facility 
agreement empowers the lender to declare the loan 
and accrued interest immediately due and payable, 
thereby accelerating the loan.322 Accordingly, English 
courts will often give effect to these arrangements and 
acceleration clauses.  
 
It is suggested that an acceleration as 
described above upon the debtorÕs insolvency will not 
be in breach of the anti-deprivation rule. Loan 
contracts with acceleration clauses are contingent or 
conditioned on the non-occurrence of the 
contractually specified events of default. Accordingly, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
320 BNY Corporate Trustee Services v Belmont Investment Pty Ltd [2011] B.C.C. 
734, 780. 
321 ibid. at 780. 
322 Note that an acceleration provision that purports to recover future interest that 
would have been payable over the remainder of the term of the facility agreement 
may constitute a penalty and be unenforceable. Oresundsvarvet AB v Lemos 
[1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 122, 125. 
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a default (including insolvency) effectively brings 
such a contract to an end. Again, this accords with the 
touchstone for the determination of deprivations Ð 
given that the courts will have to refer to the 
contractual terms of the parties in the loan agreement 
to ascertain their contractual rights and obligations. 
 
As previously noted, the Bankruptcy CodeÕs 
anti-ipso facto rules will not apply to financial 
accommodation contracts. Moreover, where a lender 
has partially or wholly performed his obligations, the 
contract cannot be rightly described as executory.  It 
is therefore settled that acceleration clauses in loan 
facilities will not engage the CodeÕs ipso facto rules. 
In the recent case of EETC v AMR Corp.,323 where the 
lender had made an advance, the court ruled that anti-
ipso facto policy was not applicable because the 
agreement was an executed contract, as opposed to 
being executory.  
 
Similarly, in In re General Growth Property 
Inc.324 the debtor had argued that the failure by the 
lenders to accelerate the defaulted loan obligations 
pre-petition rendered the automatic acceleration 
clause contained in the credit agreement ineffective 
upon the debtorÕs bankruptcy. In rejecting this 
argument, Gropper J. held that the anti-ipso facto rule 
was not applicable given that the credit agreement 
was an executed contract Ð hence the loan was 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
323 2013 WL 4840574 (2d Cir. Sept. 12, 2013). 
324  409 B.R. 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.  2011). 
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accelerated automatically on date of the filing of the 
bankruptcy.325 
    
   
 
 
1.3.3.       Complex market and financial contracts 
 
The Bankruptcy Code exempts certain market 
and financial contracts from the ambit of the anti-ipso 
facto rules. In contracts that are protected by these 
safe harbours, the solvent counterparties retain their 
right to terminate, liquidate or accelerate the contracts 
at the insolvency of a party. 326  Section 555 of the 
Code precludes the application of the anti-ipso facto 
rules to the right of a solvent party in a securities 
contract to liquidate, terminate or accelerate the 
contract on the insolvency of a counterparty. Section 
556 permits commodity brokers, forward contracts 
merchants and other financial participants in 
commodities contracts or forward contracts to close 
out such contracts in the event of the insolvency of a 
counterparty.327  
 
Section 560 exempts contracts for the 
liquidation, termination and acceleration of swap 
agreements from the anti-ipso facto rules. 
Accordingly, participants in swap arrangements are 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
325 ibid. at 330. 
326 Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. SDNY 15 Sept 2009) 
327 s. 761(4) of the Code contains a list of ten different kinds of contracts that can 
constitute commodities contract. In the Matter of Cordora IntÕl 77 B.R. 441, 448 
(Bankr D.N.J. 1987). 
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free to offset or net-out any termination values or 
payment amounts arising in relation to the termination, 
acceleration or liquidation of such transactions 
regardless of the commencement of insolvency 
proceedings by or against a counterparty.  
 
Section 559 of the Code exempts the 
liquidation, termination or acceleration of repurchase 
agreements from the ambit of s. 365(e)(1). 
Participants can exercise this contractual right 
notwithstanding the commencement of a partyÕs 
insolvency proceedings. Finally, s. 561 of the Code 
precludes the application of the anti-ipso facto rules to 
contractual clauses that seek to terminate, liquidate, or 
accelerate diverse types of contracts under a master 
netting agreement and across contracts.328 
 
These safe harbours are justifiable as being in 
recognition of the sensitive and sophisticated nature 
of these contracts. Financial market contracts are fluid 
and the insolvency of a party may have catastrophic 
effects on other participants, related transactions and 
the market if solvent participants are unable to 
promptly closeout the transaction.329 With these safe 
harbours, immediate steps can easily be taken to limit 
exposure caused by the insolvency of a participant. 
Furthermore, the potential systemic risk in the market 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
328 The contracts are securities contracts, commodity contracts, forward contracts, 
repurchase agreements, swap agreements or master netting agreements. 
329 In the Matter of Cordova IntÕl (fn 327); Franklin Feldman, Judah Sommer, 
ÒThe Special Commodity Provisions of the New Bankruptcy CodeÓ (1981-1982) 
37 Bus Law 1487. 
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due to the domino effect of the insolvency is 
effectively curbed. 
 
A point worth noting is that the protection by 
the CodeÕs safe harbours is not foolproof. For an ipso 
facto clause to be protected by the safe harbours, it 
must specifically be for the liquidation, termination or 
acceleration of the contract. Accordingly, in Lehman 
Brothers Financing Inc. v BNY Corporate Trustee 
Services Ltd,330 the non-defaulting party was unable to 
rely on s. 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master Agreement to 
suspend payments to the insolvent party as the safe 
harbour provisions of s. 560 and s. 561 that protect a 
non-defaulting partyÕs contractual rights were limited 
to the liquidation, termination or acceleration of the 
swap agreement and netting termination values. The 
court held that the safe harbour did not provide a basis 
to withhold performance under a swap if it was not 
terminated.331 
 
There are no similar statutory safe harbours 
for financial market contracts in English insolvency 
law. Financial market arrangements may therefore be 
subjected to the general anti-deprivation rule, with 
each contract decided on its merit. An illustration of 
this can be seen in the recent decisions in Belmont 
Investment Park Co. v BNY Corporate Trustee 
Service,332 Lomas and ors v JFB Firth Rixson Inc.333 
and Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. v 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
330 422 B.R. 407 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
331 ibid. at 421. 
332 [2011] B.C.C. 734. 
333 [2012] 1 C.L.C. 713. 
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Carlton Communications Ltd,334 which all involved 
complex financial market transactions.  
 
The effect of the anti-deprivation rule in 
relation to s. 2(a)(iii) of the 1992 form of ISDA 
Master Agreement was in issue in the last two 
cases.335 The relevant provision made the payment 
obligations of four corporate counterparties under the 
ISDA Master Agreement to be subject to a condition 
precedent that there was no continuing event of 
default or potential default on the part of Lehman 
Brothers International Europe. Hence the payment 
obligations of the non-insolvent parties were to be 
suspended if there was an event of default, one of 
which was insolvency.  
 
In holding that the provision did not offend the 
anti-deprivation rule, the Court of Appeal held that s. 
2(a)(iii) of the Master Agreement was commercially 
justifiable and there was no intention to evade the 
insolvency law.336 The provision suspended the non-
defaulting partyÕs obligations with the aim of 
protecting it from the credit risk of performing its own 
obligations to a party that may be unable to 
reciprocate.  
 
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied 
heavily on the decision in Belmont case where the 
Supreme Court regarded the Òcommercial senseÓ of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
334 ibid. 
335 Which is substantially similar to the current 2002 form of ISDA Master 
Agreement. 
336 [2012] 1 C.L.C. 713, 746 (87). 
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the contract and absence of intention to evade 
insolvency laws as highly relevant factors. 337 
Longmore L.J. copiously cited and relied on Lord 
CollinÕs ruling that the modern tendency was for 
commercially justifiable contractual stipulations to be 
upheld even if they contravene the anti-deprivation 
rule.  
 
His Lordship noted that this approach will 
prevent the application of the rule to Òbona fide 
commercial transactions which do not have as their 
predominant purpose, or one of their main purposes, 
the deprivation of the property of one of the parties on 
bankruptcy.Ó338 Based on this touchstone, the court of 
appeal concluded that 2(a)(iii) of the Master 
Agreement did not offend the anti-deprivation 
principle.339  
 
As has been previously explained, giving 
effect to the good faith of parties or the commercial 
sense of a transaction in applying the rules will result 
to an evisceration of the rules. It would seem that in 
the instant cases, their Lordships were well aware of 
the adverse and unsettling effect that an invalidation 
of the ISDA provision would have had on the industry 
and other similar existing transactions. Hence in their 
rulings, there was emphasis on the need for courts to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
337 ibid. at 744-746.  Cf. [2011] B.C.C. 734, 760-761.  
338 [2012] 1 C.L.C. 713, 744-746. 
339 ibid. at 748. 
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endeavour as much as possible to give effect to the 
terms of such complex transactions.340  
 
The foregoing can be contrasted with the US 
case of Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. v 
Metavante Corp., 341  where the court reached a 
contrary conclusion as regards the effect of the anti-
ipso facto rule on s. 2(a)(iii) of the 1992 form of 
ISDA Master Agreement. Peck J. ruled that s. 365(e) 
prohibited a non!insolvent party from relying on such 
a condition precedent in order to withhold payments 
indefinitely. 
 
 
1.4.     Exceptions to the anti-deprivation rule 
    
1.4.1.       Limited and determinable interests 
 
The anti-deprivation rule will not be engaged 
where the debtor is divested of an interest in a 
property and such interest was not absolute but 
limited and determinable by insolvency. 342  English 
insolvency law draws a distinction between the grant 
of an interest which is limited to a specified period of 
time and which is effective on its own terms (a 
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340 Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd (fn. 
332) 760: ÒIt is desirable that, so far as possible, the courts give effect to 
contractual terms which parties have agreed. And there is a particularly strong 
case for autonomy in cases of complex financial instruments such as those 
involved in this appeal.Ó per lord Collins; Lomas & Ors v JFB Firth Rixson Inc. 
& Ors (fn. 333) 745 "It is desirable that, so far as possible, the courts give effect 
to contractual terms which parties have agreed. And there is a particularly strong 
case for autonomy in cases of complex financial instruments such as those 
involved in this appeal.Ó per Longmore L.J. 
341 No. 08‐13555 (JMP) (Bankr. SDNY Sept. 15 2009). 
342 Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (4th edn, Sweet and 
Maxwell 2011) 220-221. 
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determinable interest) and the grant of an absolute 
interest (or limited interest not expressed to be so 
determinable) with a proviso for forfeiture on 
alienation at insolvency (a defeasible interest). 343 
While a determinable interest is valid and enforceable 
at insolvency, a defeasible interest is unenforceable.344 
 
A determinable interest does not offend the 
anti-deprivation rule because the interest granted to 
the insolvent company is limited and automatically 
terminates at insolvency. Given that the quantum of 
the debtorÕs interest in the property or his period of 
entitlement is delineated by the event of insolvency, 
such determinable interest ceases to be an asset of the 
debtor upon insolvency and there is no deprivation as 
such. 345 
 
In the case of a defeasible interest, there is an 
absolute transfer of an asset to the debtor, who 
becomes owner of the asset until insolvency. It thus 
involves an absolute transfer with a condition-
subsequent for a re-transfer at insolvency. The 
consequence of a forfeiture or retransfer at insolvency 
is that the asset that would otherwise be available to 
the debtorÕs general body of creditors will be 
withdrawn from the insolvent estate. This breaches 
the anti-deprivation rule. 
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343 Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd and ors v BNY Corporate Trustee Services 
Ltd  [2011] 3 W.L.R. 521, 547-548 (87); In re Scientific Investment Pension Plan 
Trust [1999] Ch. 53, 59; Brandon v Robinson (1811) 18 Ves. 429, 433-434; Roy 
Goode, ÒPerpetual Trustee and the Flip Clauses in Swap transactionsÓ (fn. 57) 3. 
344 Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd (fn. 343) 547, 555. 
345 In re Scientific Investment Pension Plan Trust (n 182) 59; Re Sharp Settlement 
Trusts [1973] Ch. 331, 340. 
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The distinction between a determinable 
interest and a defeasible interest generally tends to be 
more formalistic than realistic, as it places emphasis 
on form over substance. It is arguable that treating a 
transfer of asset as determinable or defeasible, to a 
large extent, is dependent on the manner which the 
contract is drafted. It is thus argued that, with skilful 
drafting, the defeasible interest trap can be gotten 
around while still achieving the same desired result.346  
 
Against this background, Calnan has described 
it as a distinction without difference as it amounts to 
simply playing with words.347 Porter M.R. in KingÕs 
Trust348 had described it as being Òa little short of 
disgraceful to English jurisprudence when applied to a 
rule professedly founded on considerations of public 
policy.Ó349 The above notwithstanding, the distinction 
has recently been endorsed by the Supreme Court in 
the Belmont case, where Lord Collins described it as 
being Òtoo well established to be dislodged otherwise 
than by legislation.Ó350 
 
Notwithstanding the criticisms regarding the 
emphasis on form over substance, it would seem that 
in appropriate cases, English courts may 
discountenance the wording used in contracts and 
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346 Richard Calnan, Proprietary rights and insolvency (OUP, Oxford 2010) 8. 
347 ibid. at 8. 
348 (1892) 29 L.R.  401. 
349 ibid. at 410. This assertion was endorsed by Pennycuick V-C. in Re SharpÕs 
Settlement Trusts [1973] Ch. 331, 340G. 
350 [2011] B.C.C. 734, 757. 
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give effect to the substance of agreements. In Belmont, 
Lord Mance observed that, 
ÒThere is some scope for looking at the substance, rather 
than the form when an agreement confers limited or 
determinable interest or amounts to a condition 
subsequent depriving the bankrupt of property on 
bankruptcy.Ó 
 
Accordingly, in Mayhew v King351 where T agreed by 
a settlement agreement to indemnify M against their 
liability to a third party (constituting an effective 
acceptance of a pre-existing exposure to M in 
negligence), a clause limiting or terminating that 
agreement upon MÕs bankruptcy was held to be in 
breach of the anti-deprivation rule. The forfeiture 
clause was viewed as having no commercial or other 
object, except to prevent M from continuing to have 
the benefit of the indemnity in the event of the 
commencement of a formal insolvency proceeding. 
 
In contrast, the Bankruptcy Code does not 
recognise any distinction between a determinable and 
forfeitable interests. Any interest in an asset, granted 
with a proviso for its forfeiture at insolvency will 
offend the anti-ipso facto provisions. Consequently 
such clauses will be unenforceable at insolvency 
irrespective of how they are couched.  
 
This position eliminates the confusion that 
shrouds the distinction under the English insolvency 
law regime.352 It is suggested that this approach is also 
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351 [2010] EWHC 1121. Folgate London Market Ltd v Chaucer Insurance Plc 
[2011] EWCA Civ 328, [2011] B.C.C. 675. 
352 Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (fn. 342) 222. Professor 
Goode describes the Bankruptcy CodeÕs approach as Òa sound rule and one 
which English law could sensibly follow.Ó 
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in tandem with the general policy objective of the 
anti-ipso facto regime, which curbs attempts to 
withdraw existing and contingent assets from the 
insolvent estate. Perhaps it is incumbent on a creditor 
who intends to retain an interest in an asset to take a 
form of recognised security under Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). 
    
 
a.    Lease of land and licences 
 
In English insolvency law, it is trite that 
provisos for termination of leases on land and licences 
at insolvency will not contravene the anti-deprivation 
rule.353 This position is underpinned by the distinction 
between determinable and defeasible interests 
explained above. Accordingly, in Whitmore v 
Mason,354 the court noted that the underlying principle 
can be expressed in the maxim Òcujus est dare ejus est 
disponereÓ meaning Òhe who gives anything can also 
direct how the gift is to be used.Ó 355 
 
In the case of Butters and ors v BBC Worldwide 
Ltd356 Lord Neuberger explained the present exception 
to the anti-deprivation rule thus, 
ÒThe fundamental reason why the clause does not 
infringe the rule is that its invocation does not involve 
what has been the property of the insolvent party 
becoming vested in a third party. It merely involves a 
limited interest being brought to an end, in accordance 
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353 s. 146(9) Law of Property Act; Butters and Ors v BBC Worldwide Ltd (fn. 
236) 114 (81); MMI Stockbrokers Ltd v LSE Ltd [2001] 1 W.L.R. 1150, 1164, 
1174; Whitmore v Mason (fn. 33) 212-213; Adrian Walters, ÒLehman Brothers 
and The British Eagle PrincipleÓ (2010) Company Lawyer 65. 
354 (1861) 2 J & H 204. 
355 Ibid. at 212-213. 
356 [2010] 3 W.L.R. 87, 114 (81). 
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with its terms by the third party who had granted it to 
the party who has become insolvent.Ó357 
 
Hence the lessor or licensor retains a 
reversionary interest in the lease or licence and there 
is no absolute transfer of interest to the lessee or 
licensee. 358 The interest of the lessee and licensee is 
limited to the period stated in the contracts i.e. upon 
insolvency. Insolvency automatically terminates the 
limited or determinable interest of the lessee or 
licensor.   The debtor has no interest in the lease or 
licence and thus there can be no deprivation.359 This 
distinction has legislative backing under s. 146 (9) of 
the Law of Property Act.   
 
As previously noted, the Bankruptcy CodeÕs 
anti-ipso facto regime does not recognise the 
distinction between determinable and defeasible 
which underpins the treatment of determinable land 
leases. Indeed s. 365(e)(1) and s. 541(c)(1) expressly 
invalidates contractual provisions for the termination 
or modification of unexpired leases invalid and 
unenforceable. An exception to this rule will be cases 
where the applicable non-insolvency law excuses the 
lessor from rendering or accepting performance at 
insolvency.360 
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357 ibid 114 (81), 115 (83), 132 (143). 
358 Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustees (fn 343) 547. 
359 [2010] 3 W.L.R. 87, 132 (143).  
360 s. 365(e)(2)(A) and (c)(1) of the Code. 
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b. Chattel Lease agreements (Operating and Finance 
leases) 
    
An operating lease is an agreement of hire of a 
machinery or plant, where the lessee rents the 
equipment for a time period that is less than the 
equipmentÕs useful life, and makes payments the total 
of which is less than the purchase price of the 
equipment. The lessee has only possession and use of 
the chattel and property in the chattel remains in the 
lessor.  
 
In contrast, finance leases are lease 
agreements where the period of rentals are designed to 
enable the lessor to recover the cost of purchasing the 
equipment as well as other financing costs, while also 
earning returns on the investment in the lease. The 
period of the lease is usually the equivalent of the 
estimated useful life of the equipment. Substantially 
all financial risks and rewards associated with 
ownership are transferred to the lessee, although 
property remains in the lessor.  
 
Given that property in the chattel remains in 
the lessor in both operating and finance leases as 
described above,361 insolvency-termination clauses in 
these transactions will be valid and enforceable. The 
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361 Interestingly, in Bristol Airport Plc. v. Powdrill [1990] Ch. 744, the Court of 
Appeal held that for the purposes of s. 11(3)(c) of the Insolvency Act 1986, the 
interest of a lessee under an operating lease was ÒpropertyÓ within the definition 
in s. 436 of the Act. Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C said, Òalthough a chattel 
lease is a contract, it does not follow that no proprietary interest is created in the 
chattel. The basic equitable principle is that if, under a contract, A has certain 
rights over property as against the legal owner, which rights are 
specifically enforceable in equity, A has an equitable interest in such property.Ó  
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underpinning principle is the same as that discussed 
under hire-purchase agreements. At insolvency, the 
insolvent estate cannot be deemed to have been 
deprived of any asset which ought to have fallen into 
it, given that the seller retained proprietary interest in 
the asset. This position is also hinged on the 
distinction between a limited or determinable interest 
and an absolute forfeitable interest. The general rule 
being that the former does not amount to a withdrawal 
of asset from the lessee/debtor but a delineation of the 
lesseeÕs interest in the lease. Hence, given that the fact 
of insolvency qualifies the debtor's interest in an asset, 
what is available for distribution is not the asset free 
of the qualification, but the asset so qualified.362  
    
The above position may be harsh to a buyer in 
a finance lease considering some of the distinctive 
features of finance leases. First, in a finance lease, the 
lessee will amortise the full value of the chattel over 
the term of the lease by the rental payments. Secondly, 
the lessee bears the risks and enjoys the rewards 
associated with ownership. Thirdly, the lease is 
expected to run throughout the life period of the 
chattel. In consequence, at the time the agreement is 
entered into, there is a reasonable expectation by the 
lessee and lessor that the chattel will not be returned 
to the lessor.  To mitigate the harshness of termination 
at insolvency, a lessee may seek equitable relief from 
forfeiture. This is evaluated below. 
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362 Fidelis Oditah, ÒAssets and the treatment of claims in insolvencyÓ (1992) 108 
L.Q.R. 459, 473. 
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c.       Equitable relief 
 
The general rule is that jurisdiction exists only 
where the contract involves the transfer of a 
proprietary or possessory right.363  Generally, lessees 
in chattel leases have possessory rights. By virtue of 
the decision in On Demand Information Plc. v 
Michael Gerson Plc.364 it is now settled that courts 
have jurisdiction to grant equitable relief against 
forfeitures of finance leases.365 On the other hand, 
notwithstanding the possessory rights of lessees in 
operating leases,366 Celestial Aviation Trading 71 Ltd 
v Paramount Airways Pte Ltd367 tends to suggest that 
courts may not necessarily have jurisdiction to grant 
equitable relief against forfeitures. 
 
In the Celestial Aviation Trading case, equitable 
relief was sought against the forfeiture of three 
aircraft (with an economic life of at least 20 years 
each) in an eight-year specific operating lease 
agreement. Hamblen J. ruled that equitable relief was 
only available where possessory rights were indefinite, 
noting that, 
 ÒFor the relief jurisdiction to apply to contracts 
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363 Celestial Aviation Trading 71 Ltd v Paramount Airways Pte Ltd [2010] 1 
C.L.C. 165, 179; On Demand Information plc v Michael Gerson (Finance) plc 
[2003] 1 A.C. 368; Transag Haulage Ltd v Leyland DAF Finance plc [1994] 2 
B.C.L.C. 88; Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co AB v Flota Petrolera 
Ecuatoriana [1983] 2 A.C. 694, 702C where the House of Lords confirmed that 
jurisdiction did not arise in a contract of services such as a time charter.  
364 [2003] 1 A.C. 368. 
365 ibid. at 379 (29). 
366 On Demand Information Plc v Michael Gerson (Finance) Plc. (fn. 364) 379 
(per Lord Millett); Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding [1973] A.C. 691.  
367 [2010] 1 C.L.C. 165. 
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transferring a bare possessory right for only a proportion 
of the economic life of the chattel would represent a 
major extension of existing authority.Ó368  
 
An analogy can be drawn between Hamblen 
J.Õs reasoning and the facts in On Demand v Michael 
Gerson369 that also involved an indefinite possession 
of chattels. The rent was payable for a primary period 
of 36 months at a rate that was designed to recoup the 
cost of the chattels for the lessor by the end of the 
primary period alongside other costs and profit. The 
lessee was thereafter entitled to indefinite possession 
for a nominal annual rent. The consequence of this 
arrangement was that the lessorÕs continuing interest 
in the chattel was in substance an economic one -- its 
interest was in payment of the rent rather than the 
return of the chattel. 
 
In contrast, under the leases in Celestial 
Aviation Trading, the lessor retained real interest in 
the aircraft and most of the risks and rewards, 
including their maintenance, the extent of their use, 
their condition, and their rental and resale value. In 
addition, possession of the aircraft was to revert to the 
lessor at a time when the bulk of their economic life 
was still to run, and there were detailed terms 
addressing the return of the aircraft and their required 
redelivery condition. 
  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
368 ibid. at 181-182. The appeal was disallowed in Celestial Aviation Trading 71 
Ltd v Paramount Airways (Private) Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ. 340 but not on the 
merits of the case. 
369 [2003] 1 A.C. 368. 
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1.4.2.       Compensation with fair value/fair terms 
 
Where there has been either a replacement of 
assets withdrawn from the debtor or any other form of 
adequate compensation, the anti-divestiture rules 
ought not to be engaged. 370 It is suggested that the 
asset that is used as a replacement or the monetary 
compensation must constitute a fair value in relation 
to the divested asset. This will ensure that the 
insolvent estate does not lose any value. In this case, 
there will arguably be no divestiture as any previous 
deprivation is matched with a subsequent 
compensation or asset replacement. Accordingly there 
will be no reduction in the balance sheet of the 
insolvent company.  
 
The case of Borland Trustees v Steel Brothers 
Company371 illustrates the forgoing points. In that case 
Farwell J. upheld the enforceability of a provision in a 
companyÕs articles of association which stipulated for 
the sale of the shares of a bankrupt member on the 
ground that such a party was fairly compensated. His 
Lordship noted that there was no attempt to defraud 
the bankruptcy law considering that the price at which 
the shares were to be sold was fixed for all members 
and was not shown to be less than the fair price.372  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
370 Butters and ors v BBC Worldwide Ltd and ors (fn. 236) (83). 
371 [1901] 1 Ch. 279. 
372  ibid. at 291. Note also the comments of Farewell J at p.292 where he 
distinguished the case before him with that of Whitmore v Mason (fn. 33) 216 
where an article in a deed provided for the forfeiture of an entire lease by an 
insolvent counterpart without any compensation. 
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Accordingly, what constitutes fair value is a 
question of facts to be determined on a case-by-case 
basis.373 In ascertaining whether the compensation is 
the fair value, courts will take into consideration 
factors that are peculiar (internal) to the contract and 
other external factors. The former will include factors 
such as the terms of the contract and the manner in 
which other parties in similar circumstance were 
treated or would be treated.  
 
In Borland Trustees case374 it was impossible 
to determine the market value of the shares in issue 
due to the restriction clauses in the articles of 
association.375 The fairness of the price was therefore 
determined on factors that were internal to the 
company. The court considered that the price of the 
companyÕs shares under its Articles was fixed for 
both bankrupt and non-bankrupt shareholders, and 
reasoned that any price differential would have been 
repugnant to insolvency law policy.376 The court also 
took into account the fact that two other bankrupt 
shareholders had earlier been compelled to sell their 
shares on the same terms without any objection.377 
The insolvent party did not therefore receive less than 
what he would otherwise receive in any other 
circumstance. Hence there was no deprivation. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
373 MMI Stockbrokers Ltd v LSE Ltd [2002] 1 W.L.R. 1150, 1183 (119). 
374 [1901] 1 Ch. 279. 
375 With respect, the dicta of Neuberger J. in Butters and Ors v BBC Worldwide 
Ltd (fn. 236) 115 (83) to the effect that the sale in Borland Trustees was at 
Òmarket valueÓ is incorrect as the market value of the shares in that case was 
incapable of being determined due to the restrictive clause as noted by Farewell 
J. in p.291. 
376 ibid. at 191. 
377 ibid. at 291-292. 
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The present exception does not run counter to 
the anti-ipso facto rule regimeÕs objectives of 
corporate rehabilitation and maximization of 
realisations. However, it will not be upheld under the 
regime due to the nature of the rules. The ipso facto 
rules are codified and admit of only two exceptions 
that are equally codified. In addition, the rules are 
automatically triggered off once there is a divestment 
which is conditioned on insolvency. In consequence, 
there is no room for judicial discretion. Accordingly, 
what happens subsequently by way of compensation 
or restitution from the creditor to the debtor is 
inconsequential.  
 
 
1.4.3.  Valueless assets and pre-emption rights 
 
In the case of Money Markets International 
Stockbrokers Ltd v London Stock Exchange Ltd 378 
Neuberger J. described Òvalueless assetsÓ as being,  
ÒThose where the right or property subject to the 
deprivation provision has no value, or (in many cases) if 
it is incapable of assignment, or depends on the 
character or status of the owner.Ó379 
 
According to his lordship, an asset is valueless if its 
withdrawal from the debtor will not be detrimental to 
the debtorÕs creditors or the insolvent estate.380 An 
example of this is the withdrawal of rights attached to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
378 [2002] 1 W.L.R. 1150; Belmont Park Investments v BNY Corporate Trustee 
Services Ltd (fn. 344) 547, 555. 
379 Money Markets IntÕl Stockbrokers Ltd v LSE Ltd  [2002] 1 W.L.R. 1150, 
1180. 
380 ibid. 
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a membership of an association, if such rights are 
incapable of uncontrolled transfer.  
 
This was indeed the issue in MMI v LSE.381 
Under LSEÕs articles of association, only members 
could hold category B shares. Members were bound 
to transfer their shares to LSE on their cessation of 
membership of the Exchange for no consideration. 
MMI ceased to be a member of the Exchange due to 
its failure to honour its obligations and was put into 
voluntary liquidation in March 1999.  
 
MMIÕs shares in the exchange were rescinded 
by LSE in February 2000. MMI sued LSE seeking 
reinstatement as a member or compensation for the 
loss of B share on the ground of the deprivation 
provision. Neuberger J. ruled that since the share in 
LSE was incapable of uncontrolled transfer given that 
it was contingent on oneÕs membership of the 
Exchange (which had been validly terminated), there 
was no deprivation. 382 
 
An important point that is worth noting is that 
on February 14 when MMIÕs B share was rescinded, 
the share carried only voting rights and no monetary 
value. The LSE demutualised on March 15, with each 
B share valued at £2.8m. This was indeed taken into 
consideration by the court.383 Hence, besides the fact 
that the share of LSE was ancillary to being a member 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
381 [2002] 1 W.L.R. 1150; Belmont Park Investments v BNY Corporate Trustee 
Services Ltd (fn. 344) 547, 555. 
382 MMI Stockbrokers Ltd v LSE Ltd (fn. 381) 1183-1184. 
383 ibid. 
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of the Exchange, the share had no monetary value as 
at the time MMI filed for voluntary liquidation and at 
the time it was rescinded by LSE. 
 
It is suggested that if the forfeiture had been 
effected after March 15, it would have been difficult 
to justify the rescission as not constituting a 
withdrawal of a valuable asset from the insolvent 
estate Ð in the absence of adequate compensation with 
fair value.  This is regardless of the fact that the share 
was incapable of being transferred without the 
consent of the directors. 
 
Hence in Borland Trustees v Steel Brothers 
Company,384 the decision of Farwell J. to uphold the 
enforceability of a provision in a companyÕs articles 
of association which stipulated for the sale of the 
shares of a bankrupt member was premised on the 
ground that the party was fairly compensated. His 
Lordship noted that there was no attempt to defraud 
the bankruptcy law considering that the price at which 
the shares were to be sold was fixed for all members 
and was not shown to be less than the fair price.385  
    
The US Bankruptcy CodeÕs anti-ipso facto 
rules will be engaged once there is a modification or 
termination of executory contracts or contractual 
rights, subject to the two exceptions previously 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
384 [1901] 1 Ch. 279. 
385 ibid. at 291. Note also the comments of Farewell J at p. 292 where he 
distinguished the case before him with that of Whitmore v Mason (at p. 216) 
where an article in a deed provided for the forfeiture of an entire lease by an 
insolvent counterpart without any compensation. 
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evaluated. Accordingly, any divestiture will be 
invalidated irrespective of whether the assets are 
valueless. It is however doubtful how useful the 
invalidation of ipso facto clauses in such valueless 
assets will be towards promoting the objective of 
maximisation of realisations and rehabilitation. It may 
well be that the officeholder will have no choice but 
to reject them in the course of the insolvency 
procedure. 
 
1.4.4. Close-out netting in Financial Collateral agreements 
 
The EU Financial Collateral directive 386 
mandates European Union member-states to recognise 
and enforce close-out netting provisions in financial 
collateral agreements in the event of the 
commencement or continuation of a formal 
insolvency proceeding.387 Accordingly, the provisions 
of the directive have been enacted in England and 
Wales.388 Under this statutory instrument, financial 
collateral arrangements are exempted from the orbit 
of the anti-deprivation rule.389 Consequently, subject 
to exceptions relating to good faith, 390  a financial 
collateral arrangement and its close-out netting 
provision will be capable of enforcement in 
accordance with their terms, notwithstanding the 
commencement of insolvency. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
386 Article 7, 2002/47 (2002) 
387 Financial Collateral Directive (2002) OJ L168/43 
388 Financial Collateral Arrangements (No.2) Regulations 2003.  
389 ibid rules 12 and 13. 
390 i.e. knowledge of the insolvency proceedings. 
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The rationale for the EU directive is to remove 
obstacles that may impair the use of collateral in 
cross-border transactions. In effect, a simple, clear 
and effective cross-border financial collateral 
contracts regime within the EU is set up, propped up 
by legal certainty. The exemption from the anti-
deprivation rule averts the negative domino effect that 
the unwinding of such multilateral netting 
arrangements would have on other participants and 
the financial system generally. This exemption applies 
only to financial collateral arrangements and will not 
apply to ordinary multi-party netting agreements like 
that in the British Eagle case. 
  
 
1.4.5. Unpaid sellerÕs real remedies  
 
The Sale of Goods Act grants an unpaid seller 
a number of security and property rights, 
notwithstanding that property in the goods has passed 
to a buyer. 391 A significant feature of the rights that is 
relevant to this discourse is that they are made to 
override the effects of insolvency, hence insulating 
the seller from the buyerÕs insolvency. This section 
will examine two of these real remedies namely the 
unpaid sellerÕs lien and the right of stoppage of goods 
in transit, in relation to the anti-deprivation rule in the 
event of buyerÕs insolvency. 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
391 s. 39 Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
  
125 
     a.         Unpaid sellerÕs lien 
 
The unpaid seller has a lien on the goods or a 
right to retain the goods for the price while he is in 
possession of the goods.392 This right is conferred on 
the seller notwithstanding that property in the goods 
has passed to the buyer. For the exercise of this right 
to be possible, a seller must be in possession of the 
goods.393 In addition, a seller who is in possession as 
agent, a bailee or a custodian for the buyer can also 
exercise the lien.394 Significantly, the unpaid sellerÕs 
lien is not affected by the insolvency of the buyer Ð 
the consequence, being that his claim cannot be 
reduced to mere dividends in the insolvency 
proceedings. 
    
    
       b.     Unpaid sellerÕs right of stoppage in transit 
 
The unpaid seller is also granted the right 
prevent delivery of goods to the buyer and resume 
possession. The seller can stop goods in transit395 after 
he has parted with possession of the goods 
notwithstanding that property in the goods has passed 
to the buyer.396 Significantly, the right of stoppage in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
392 s. 39(1)(a) SGA. 
393 By virtue of s. 43(1) SGA the unpaid seller can lose his lien in three ways, 
namely, when he delivers the goods to a carrier or other bailee or custodier for 
the purpose of transmission to the buyer without reserving the right of disposal of 
the goods, when the buyer or his agent lawfully obtains possession of the goods 
and by waiver of the lien or right of retention. 
394 s. 41(2) SGA. 
395 s. 45(1) SGA provides that goods are deemed to be in course of transit from 
the time when they are delivered to a carrier or other bailee or custodier for the 
purpose of transmission to the buyer, until the buyer or his agent in that behalf 
takes delivery of them from the carrier or other bailee or custodier. 
396 s. 39(1)(b) SGA; s. 44 SGA. 
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transit can only be exercised where the buyer is 
insolvent. 397  The unpaid sellerÕs right of stoppage 
exists only when the goods are in the possession of a 
third party or the carrier. The right will cease to exist 
once the buyer has possession of the goods.398 
c. The unpaid sellerÕs real remedies in insolvency 
proceedings 
 
A significant feature of the unpaid sellerÕs real 
remedies is that they only apply where the property in 
the goods has passed to the buyer. This approach may 
be premised on the ground that if property has not 
passed, it would be more convenient for an unpaid 
seller to rely on his proprietary rights (i.e. ownership 
of the goods) on the buyerÕs failure to pay on 
insolvency.399 The conferment of the rights on unpaid 
sellers has a number of implications.  
 
First, the unpaid seller is effectively conferred 
with the status of a secured creditor in the event of 
insolvency. This blurs the distinction between 
personal and proprietary interests, which is paramount 
in English insolvency law. Accordingly, considering 
that the sellers have proprietary interest in the goods, 
repossessing such goods upon the insolvency of the 
buyers will not constitute a clawing back of assets 
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397 ibid. 
398 This can give rise to certain legal issues where the carrier is an agent of either 
the debtor or the creditor. For instance by virtue of s. 45(2), if the buyer or his 
agent in that behalf obtains delivery of the goods before their arrival at the 
appointed destination, the transit is at an end. However s. 45(5) stipulates that in 
cases where goods are delivered to a ship chartered by the buyer it is a question 
depending on the circumstances of the particular case whether they are in the 
possession of the ship-owner as a carrier or as agent to the buyer. 
399 Bolton v Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co. (1866) L.R. 1 C.P. 431. 
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from the insolvent estate. They will merely take back 
what has remained their property by operation of law. 
 
The real remedies of the unpaid seller 
represent a significant incursion into the realm of 
insolvency law by a non-insolvency law. What should 
make this incursion even more worrisome to the 
insolvent estate is the fact that in Bethell v Clark,400 
Esher M.R. emphasised that these rights are always 
construed favourably to unpaid sellers.  A number of 
arguments have been put forward as justifications for 
giving an unpaid seller a security in cases of stoppage 
of goods in transit. In Bohtlingk v Inglis 401  and 
Berntson v Strang,402 the rule was explained as being 
for the benefit of trade. In practical terms, this means 
that sellers are encouraged to surrender goods to the 
carrier when they know that the goods can be stopped 
on the buyerÕs insolvency.   
 
In Bloxam v Sanders403 the policy objective for 
the stoppage rule was given as being that the buyerÕs 
right to possession of goods, the property in which 
has passed to him is defeasible on his insolvency. 
This reason is to a large extent unconvincing to the 
extent that no explanation was given as to why the 
buyerÕs property and possession is defeasible in 
transit cases. In DÕAquila v Lambert,404 it was simply 
stated as being that the sellerÕs goods should not be 
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400 (1888) 20 Q.B.D. 615, 617). 
401 (1803) 3 East 381. 
402 (1867) LR 4 Esq 481, 490. 
403 (1825) 4 B&C 941. 
404 (1761) 1 Amb 399. Approved in Booth Steamship Co Ltd v Cargo Fleet Inn 
Co Ltd [1916] 2 K.B. 579, 580. 
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applied to the payment of the insolvent buyerÕs debts. 
This reason seems to be counterintuitive. In view of 
the fact that since property in the goods has passed to 
the seller, it is faulty to describe them as the sellerÕs 
goods.   
 
The necessity of conferring these security 
interests on a select group of creditors is arguably 
questionable. It is suggested that the decision as to 
whether to obtain security for oneÕs transactions 
should be left to individual creditors and not imposed 
by law, to the detriment of other prospective creditors. 
These transactions are consensual hence a seller has 
the choice of insisting on payment at the time of the 
transaction, retaining title in the goods or retaining the 
right of disposal until payment is made and stipulating 
for payment under a documentary letter of credit. 
There is also an option of taking security on the 
goods. 
 
The fact that creditors are perhaps better 
positioned to protect themselves is illustrated by the 
seeming lack of continued relevance of the sellerÕs 
right of stoppage in transit. In international sales, 
there is now a widespread use of bankersÕ confirmed 
commercial credits with reduced prospects of non-
payments. Accordingly, sellers are guaranteed 
continuing property in the goods by reserving the 
right of disposal after shipment and surrendering this 
right on documentary exchange only against 
payments under a bankerÕs credit.  
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Conclusion 
 
The Insolvency ActÕs anti-deprivation rule and 
the Bankruptcy CodeÕs anti-ipso facto rules are aimed 
at ensuring that assets which are vested in the debtor 
and which ought to be available to the general body of 
creditors at insolvency are not withdrawn from the 
insolvent estate upon the commencement of formal 
insolvency proceedings. A primary distinction 
between the anti-deprivation rule and the anti-ipso 
facto rules is that the former is limited to deprivation 
of assets and does not extend to the termination of 
ordinary executory contracts upon insolvency.  
  
The approach in the UK is underpinned by the 
principle of freedom of contract and autonomy of 
parties. However, it has been suggested in this chapter 
that executory contracts can be viewed as contingent 
assets which the debtor can perform or assign to 
realise the benefits thereof. Against this background, 
where the insolvent estate is able and willing to 
perform, permitting the termination of executory 
contracts simply on the basis of an insolvency filing 
may be viewed as being unnecessarily harsh to the 
insolvent estate and general body of creditors. In 
addition, depriving the estate of the opportunity of 
performing and realising the benefits of such contracts 
runs counter to the value-maximisation objective of 
the anti-deprivation rule.  
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If the UK is to adopt a regime where ipso 
facto clauses are unenforceable when the insolvent 
estate is able and willing to perform its obligations, it 
would be proper for affected creditors to be 
adequately protected, as is the case under the 
Bankruptcy Code. As would be seen later in chapter 
three, the CodeÕs pre-condition of adequate protection 
for creditors prior to assumption of executory 
contracts ensures that creditors who are prevented 
from terminating such executory contracts and whose 
contracts are assumed, receive benefits which they 
would have been entitled to outside insolvency and in 
the absence of the debtorÕs default. This ensures that 
such creditors are not forced into gratuitous contracts 
with insolvent entities, which may from the onset 
have no intention or ability to perform their 
obligations therein.  
  
The US anti-ipso facto regime has achieved a 
high level of coherence while the application of the 
anti-deprivation rule has been plagued with 
incoherence and lack of a uniformed approach. The 
coherence in the application of the anti-ipso facto 
rules is because the standard for judging the validity 
or otherwise of insolvency-triggered contractual 
termination clauses is clearly prescribed under s. 
365(e) and s. 541(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Accordingly, reference is made to the provisions, 
rather than any applicable non-insolvency law or the 
contractual intentions of the parties, to determine the 
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validity of divestiture clauses in prepetition contracts. 
Although this approach entails a some-what arbitrary 
invalidation of ipso facto clauses and may often result 
incursion into the security and proprietary rights of 
parties, it enhances the maximisation of realisations 
for the insolvent estate. 
In contrast, the anti-deprivation rule follows 
the characterisation of the non-insolvency law in the 
treatment of interests of creditors as secured, 
proprietary or personal. In applying the rule, questions 
regarding what constitutes an asset, ownership of 
assets and deprivation are addressed with reference to 
contractual intention of the parties as evidenced in the 
terms of their pre-petition contracts as well as the 
applicable non-insolvency law. Given that reference is 
made to diverse types of pre-petition contracts 
alongside different applicable rules outside the 
insolvency forum, it would be virtually impossible to 
achieve coherence in the application of the rule.  
 
The incoherence notwithstanding, adopting the 
principled and uniform touchstone highlighted 
throughout this chapter is capable of ensuring that 
there is coherence in the application of the rules in 
similar types of contracts. In contrast to the anti-ipso 
factor rules, the anti-deprivation rule gives effect to 
contractual arrangements that confer security or 
proprietary interests on solvent parties. To a great 
extent, this approach promotes certainty of contracts 
given that the anti-deprivation rule is applied with 
reference to the pre-petition contract terms of parties 
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as well as the applicable non-insolvency law. Again, 
this ensures that insolvency law does not engage in 
the pursuit of redistribution simply for the sake of 
equality Ð which could in turn encourage 
opportunistic behaviours on the part of unsecured 
creditors. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
AUTOMATIC STAY/MORATORIUM 
 
 
2.0. Introduction 
    
A significant consequence of the 
commencement of a formal insolvency proceeding is 
the automatic activation of a statutory prohibition 
against enforcement actions and claims against the 
insolvent company. The moratorium in UK 
insolvency law and automatic stay in US bankruptcy 
law are self-executing and restrain a wide range of 
claims and actions to enforce contractual remedies 
during the period of the formal procedures. It is 
instructive to note from the outset that the statutory 
moratorium1 does not extinguish the substantive law 
rights of creditors. The mechanism is procedural in 
nature and merely suspends such rights during the 
duration of the procedure.2  
 
As a matter of general principle, creditors with 
property rights are not subject to insolvency lawÕs 
mandatory administration or distribution process. This 
is because assets of third parties neither fall into the 
insolvent estate nor are they available to the general 
body of creditors. However, the statutory moratorium 
strikes at the heart of security and property rights. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1  The term Òstatutory moratoriumÓ is used when referring to both the UK 
moratorium and the US automatic stay throughout the chapter.  
2 Jack William, ÒApplication of the Cash Collateral Paradigm to the Preservation 
of the Right to set off in BankruptcyÓ (1990) 7 Bankr Dev. J. 27, 30. 
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Accordingly, in addition to the avoidance of 
antecedent transactions and the treatment of floating 
charges, the statutory moratorium is one of the rare 
occasions where security and property rights of 
creditors are interfered with in the insolvency process. 
  
This chapter comparatively evaluates the 
impact of the statutory moratorium in the UK and US 
insolvency regimes on corporate contracts. It analyses 
the scope and policy objectives of the statutory 
moratorium in the jurisdictions and evaluates the 
efficacy of the rules against this background. Given 
the inevitable clash in the policy expectations of 
contract law and those of insolvency law in the 
application of the moratorium, this chapter also 
evaluates the relief procedure in the two jurisdictions 
as well as the treatment of property rights. 
 
 
2.1.    Policy objectives of the statutory moratorium 
   
2.1.1.    Debtor protection and asset preservation 
  
 
There are two major policy objectives for the 
Bankruptcy CodeÕs automatic stay and the Insolvency 
ActÕs moratorium. As a primary objective, the 
statutory moratorium preserves the assets in the 
insolvent estate from piecemeal dismemberment by 
creditors who are often understandably anxious to 
enforce their contractual remedies against the debtor 
at insolvency. The mechanism therefore preserves the 
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assets of the debtor and those in its possession from 
enforcement claims and repossession actions by 
creditors and their assignees. Hence in the UK case of 
AES Barry Ltd v. TXU Europe Energy Trading3 Patten 
J. noted that, 
ÒThe moratorium É is primarily concerned to avoid the 
assets of the Company from being removed by creditors 
whilst the administrators continue to attempt to achieve 
the statutory purposes for which the administration order 
was made.Ó4 
 
Similarly, the accompanying legislative 
statement of the US Bankruptcy Code describes the 
automatic stay provision as Òone of the fundamental 
debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy 
laws.Ó5 In the US case of Small Business Admin. v. 
Rinehart,6 Larson J. noted that, 
ÒA primary purpose of the automatic stay provision is to 
afford debtors in Chapter 11 reorganizations an 
opportunity to continue their businesses with their 
available assets.Ó7 
 
The temporary restraint on enforcement and 
collection activities gives the officeholder a breathing 
spell to plan and perform his statutory responsibilities 
without interference from creditors and their 
assignees.8 Accordingly, the officeholder is offered 
ample time and opportunity to utilize the debtorÕs 
assets and other assets in its possessions to achieve 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 AES Barry Ltd v TXU Europe Energy Trading [2005] 2 B.C.L.C. 22, 25. 
4 ibid. 
5 S. Rep. No. 95Ð989, p. 54 (1978); H.R.Rep. No. 95Ð595, p. 340 (1977), U.S. 
Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, pp. 5787, 5840, 5963, 6296. In re Soares 107 
F.3d 969, 975-76 (1st Cir. 1997); Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dept of 
Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 503, 106 S.Ct. 755, 760, 88 L.Ed.2d 859 
(1986); In re Smith Corset Shops, Inc., 696 F.2d 971, 977 (1st Cir.1982). 
6 887 F.2d 165 C.A.8 (S.D. 1989). 
7 ibid. at 168. 
8 Ian Fletcher, John Higham, Corporate Administrations and Rescue Procedures 
(2nd edn, Tottel Publishing 2004) 50; Jack William, ÒApplication of the Cash 
Collateral Paradigm To the Preservation of the Right to set off in BankruptcyÓ 
(fn. 2). 
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the purpose of the insolvency procedure. 9  The 
statutory moratorium thus relieves the insolvent estate 
of the financial pressures which drove the debtor into 
insolvency in the first place.10 
 
 
2.1.2.     Creditor protection and collective procedure 
 
By restraining unilateral and disorderly 
realisations by some creditors, the statutory 
moratorium protects other creditors from the adverse 
effects of such individual enforcement efforts.11 In 
consequence, it promotes insolvency law policyÕs 
cardinal objective of collectivity among creditors in 
the administration and distribution of assets.12 Hence, 
in addition to the primary objective, the CodeÕs 
legislative statement asserts that the automatic stay, 
ÒProvides creditor protection. Without it, certain 
creditors would be able to pursue their own remedies 
against the debtor's property. Those who acted first 
would obtain payment of the claims in preference to and 
to the detriment of other creditors...Ó13 
   
Similarly, in the US bankruptcy case of In re 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9  Small Business Administration v Harold Rinehart (fn. 6) 167-168; In re 
Archer 34 B.R. 28, 29-30 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1983). 
10 In re Stephen Jamo 283 F.3D 392, 398 (1st Cir. 2002); Pertuso v Form Motor 
Credit 233 F.3d 417, 423 (6th Cir. 2000); Soares v Brockton Credit Union (fn 5) 
975; In re Atlantic Business and Community Corp. 901 F.2d 325, 327 (3rd Cir. 
1990); Olson v McFarland Clinic 38 B.R. 515, 516 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984); 
Avellino & Bienes v Frenville 744 F.2d 332, 334 (3d Cir. 1984); Johnson v First 
National Bank of Montevideo 719 F.2d 270, 276 (8th Cir.1983); In re Smith 
Corset Shops Inc. 696 F.2d 971, 977 (1st Cir.1982); In re Related Asbestos Cases 
23 B.R. 523, 527 (D. Ct. ND. Cal. 1982). 
11  S.E.C. v Environmental Resources 230 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2000); Civic 
Centre square Inc. v Ford 12 F.3d 875, 878 (9th Cir.1993); Penn Terra Ltd v 
Dept. of Environmental Resources 733 F.2d 267, 271 (3d Cir 1984). 
12   In re BNT Terminals 125 B.R. 963, 971(Bankr.N.D.Ill.1991); In re AP 
Industries Inc. 117 B.R. 789, 799 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); Scott Silverman, 
ÒAdministrative Freeze and the Automatic Stay: A New PerspectiveÓ (1994) 72 
Wash. U. L. Q. 441, 443. 
13  S. Rep. No. 95Ð989, p. 54 (1978); H.R.Rep. No. 95Ð595, p. 340 (1977), 
U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, pp. 5787, 5840, 5963, 6296; In re 
Atlantic Business and Community Corp. (fn. 10). 
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Germansen Decorating Inc.14 Ginsbegr J. noted that, 
ÒThe automatic stay is meant to prevent one creditor 
from securing an advantage over its peers after a petition 
is filed by or against a debtor. It makes no difference 
whether that creditor gets that advantage as a result of a 
voluntary or involuntary transfer.Ó15 
 
The statutory moratorium therefore curbs the race of 
diligence by creditors. It deters them from jockeying 
for advantage to the detriment of others. 16  The 
moratorium safeguards the insolvent estate and 
general body of creditors from a multiplicity of 
actions and claims by different creditors in the same 
or different courts, which is capable of setting in 
motion a free-for-all and a piecemeal dismemberment 
of the debtorÕs assets outside the formal insolvency 
procedure.17 
 
Lastly, the statutory moratorium also assures 
equality in asset administration and distribution 
among similarly situated creditors.  Here it must be 
noted that this objective has no bearing on holders of 
secured claims or proprietary interests, given that 
such creditors are normally not subject to insolvency 
lawÕs pari passu distribution scheme. Nevertheless, to 
unsecured creditors, the moratorium ensures that 
creditors do not improve their pre-insolvency 
positions through converting an unsecured pre-
petition claim to a secured claim, obtaining actual 
possession of property in the insolvent estate and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 149 B.R. 517 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992). 
15 ibid. at 521. 
16 Mann v Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. 316 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2003); 
University Medical Centre v Louis Sullivan 973 F.2d 1065, 1074 (3d Cir.1992); 
In re Szechuan City Inc. 55 B.R. 8, 40 (Bankr. D.D.C.1985); USA v Nicolet Inc. 
(n 3) 207; Grady v A.H. Robins Co. 839 F.2d 198, 200 (4th Cir. 1988). 
17 Soares v Brockton Credit Union (fn 5) 975; Sunshine Dev. Inc. v FDIC 33 F.3d 
106, 114 (1st Cir.1994). 
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commencing or continuing legal processes that may 
effect unequal allocation of the debtorÕs assets. 
 
 
2.1.3.     Acts in breach of the moratorium 
 
Judicial opinion is divided as to the effect of a 
violation of the CodeÕs moratorium. While the 
prevailing view is that actions in violation of the stay 
are void,18 some bankruptcy courts have held such 
acts to be voidable.19 This semantic distinction has at 
least two significant practical consequences. First, 
characterising such acts as void or voidable influences 
the burden of going forward.20 If the violation of the 
moratorium is deemed to be voidable, the burden of 
proceeding in challenging the action is placed on the 
debtor. In contrast, if the violation of the moratorium 
is treated as being void, the burden would be shifted 
to the offending creditor. 
 
Secondly, the prefatory part of s. 362(d) vests 
bankruptcy courts with the discretion to inter alia 
annul the moratorium. ÒAnnulmentÓ presupposes a 
retroactive relief and entails retrospectively validating 
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18 In re Ernie Haire Ford Inc. 403 B.R. 750, 760 (M.D. Fla. 2009); Bronson v 
United States 46 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re SamboÕs Restaurants 
Inc. 754 F.2d 811, 816 (9th Cir.1985); Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp v Hall 685 
F.2d 1306, 1308 (11th Cir.1982); In re Advent Corporation 24 B.R 612, 614 
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1982); In re Miller 10 B.R. 778, 779 (Bankr.Md.1981); Meyer v 
Rowen 181 F.2d 715, 716 (10th Cir. 1950); Kalb v Feuerstein 308 US 433, 438 
(1940). 
19Raymark Industries Inc. v Lai 973 F.2d 1125, 1132 (3rd Cir. 1992); In re 
Schwartz 954 F.2d 569, 574 (9th Cir. 1991); In re Calder 907 F.2d 953, 956 
(10th Cir.1990); In re Sapp 91 B.R. 520, 522 (Bankr. ED Mo. 1988); In re 48th 
Steakhouse Inc. 835 F.2d 427, 431 (2d Cir. 1987); Matthews v Rosene 739 F.2d 
249, 251 (7th Cir. 1984); In re Smith Corset Shop Inc. (fn. 10) 976; In re Potts 
142 F.2d 883, 888, 890  (6th Cir.1944). 
20 Soares v Brockton Credit Union (fn. 5) 976. 
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acts of a creditor that constituted a violation of the 
moratorium prior to the grant of relief.21 As a matter 
of general principle, void acts cannot be validated or 
cured. Hence, if acts that violate the moratorium are 
void, the power to annul the stay will be extraneous.22 
 
In resolving this conflict, it has been held that 
a retroactive relief under s. 362(d) means that there 
has been no violation of the moratorium. 23  The 
implication of this is that it is immaterial to determine 
whether the effect of the violation is void or voidable 
in such cases. This approach is a logical one. First, it 
ensures that the insolvent estate is not burdened with 
the task of expending the same valuable assets which 
the moratorium is aimed at preserving in pursuing the 
judicial invalidation of acts that are in breach of the 
moratorium. Secondly, it ensures that s. 362(d) which 
grants courts powers to retroactively grant reliefs 
from the moratorium is not made otiose. 
    
Under the UK regime, there have been 
conflicting decisions as regards the retrospective 
application for relief. Virtually all the decisions have 
been on the commencement of proceedings or legal 
processes, hence, it is arguable that these decisions 
are not relevant to other forms of violation of the 
moratorium. In Wilson v Banner Scaffolding Ltd24 
Milmo J. held that proceedings commenced against a 
company in compulsory liquidation without prior 
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21 In re Albany Partners 749 F.2d 670, 675 (11th Cir.1984). 
22 Easley v Pettibone Michigan Corporation 990 F.2d 905, 910 (6th Cir. 1993). 
23 In re Schwartz 954 F.2d 569, 573 (9th Cir. 1991). 
24 The Times, 22 June 1982. 
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permission were a nullity and could not be 
retrospectively validated. Rattee J. echoed this 
position in In re National Employers Mutual General 
Insurance Association Ltd. 25  where an action was 
commenced without leave against a company in 
compulsory liquidation, contrary to s. 130(2) of the 
Insolvency Act. 
  
The contrary view was reached by Lindsay J. 
in In re Saunders,26 to the effect that legal proceedings 
commenced against a bankrupt or a company in 
compulsory liquidation were not a nullity as the court 
had jurisdiction to give retrospective permission for 
their commencement. 27  The Saunders case was 
followed in Godfrey v Torpy28 and Bank of Scotland 
Plc. v. Breytenbach.29 In Gaardsoe v. Optimal Wealth 
Management Ltd, 30  deputy judge John Martin QC 
ruled that the moratorium on administration embodied 
in para. 43(6) did not render void any legal 
proceedings initiated in breach and such proceedings 
could be retrospectively validated.  
 
Similarly in Bank of Ireland and anor v. 
Colliers International UK plc.31 Richards J. ruled that 
the purpose of the provisions in par. 43(6) of Sch. B1 
was not so much the protection of creditors as the 
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25 [1995] B.C.C. 774, 777. 
26 [1997] Ch. 60. See also Bristol & West Building Society v Trustee of Back. 
[1997] B.P.I.R. 358; Re Linkrealm Ltd [1998] B.C.C. 478. 
27 A contrary position was adopted by Judge Kershaw QC in In re Taylor (A 
Bankrupt) [2007] Ch. 150. 
28 [2007] Bus. L.R. 1203. 
29 [2012] B.P.I.R. 1. 
30 Unreported February 28, 2012. 
31 [2013] 2 W.L.R. 895. 
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need to ensure that when such an order had been made 
all proceedings having any bearing upon the 
administration should remain under the supervision 
and control of the court which had made the order. 
Given that purpose, proceedings brought without the 
permission required under the relevant provision were 
not a nullity and retrospective permission could be 
given.32 
 
As previously noted from the outset, the 
foregoing decisions specifically focused on the 
moratorium provision in respect of commencement of 
legal proceedings under para. 43(6) of the Act. It is 
suggested that they do not serve as authority for the 
consequence of a breach of other provisions of the 
moratorium relating to repossession of goods, 
enforcement of security and peaceable re-entry.  
 
Nevertheless, the reasoning of Vinelott J. in 
Re AGB Research Plc33 (relating to forfeiture of a 
lease) suggests that a violation of the moratorium is 
voidable. In that case Vinelott J. ruled that the grant 
of the new lease was an unequivocal assertion by the 
lessor of its right to re-enter. Notwithstanding that it 
was in breach of a moratorium, Vinelott J. held that 
the lease had been forfeited.34 By implication, this 
suggests that the violation of the moratorium was 
merely voidable. The demerit of this position has been 
previously noted; it places the burden of setting aside 
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32 ibid. at 898. 
33 [1995] B.C.C. 1091. 
34 ibid. at 1094. 
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such breaches on the insolvent estate. This will 
require the dissipation of the estateÕs resources, which 
is at odds with the asset-preservation policy objective 
of the moratorium. 
  
  
2.2.     Scope of the moratorium 
 
The Bankruptcy CodeÕs automatic stay 
suspends post-petition commencement, continuation 
and enforcement actions relating to pre-petition 
contractual claims against the debtor.35 As the name 
suggests, the stay is automatic in nature and comes 
into effect immediately an insolvency petition is 
filed.36 The debtor does not need to take any steps to 
effectuate it. 37  The Insolvency ActÕs moratorium 
operates in a similar manner to the CodeÕs automatic 
stay. It temporarily restrains the enforcement of 
contractual remedies and property rights at the 
commencement of a formal insolvency proceeding. 
This restraint preserves the assets of the debtor and 
gives the officeholder ample opportunity to perform 
his statutory duties.38 It is procedural and does not 
extinguish or modify the substantive property law 
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35 House Report No 595, 95th Congress, 1st session 340 (1977); In re Schwartz 
(fn. 19) 571; Szechuan City Inc. v North American Motor Inns Inc. 96 B.R. 37, 
40 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1989); USA v Nicolet Inc. (fn. 16) 207; H & H Beverage 
Distributors v Dept. of Revenue of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 850 F.2d 165, 
166  (3d Cir. 1988); Grady v A.H. Robins Co. (fn. 16) 200. 
36 In re Weiner Merchant 958 F.2d 738, 741  (6th Cir. 1992); In re Stephen Jamo 
(fn. 10) 398. 
37 Eskanos & Adler P.C. v Leetien 309 F.3d 1210, 1214 (9th Cir. 2002); Soares v 
Brockton Credit Union (fn. 5) 975; Sunshine Derv Inc. v FDIC 33 F.3d 106, 133 
(1st Cir. 1994); Rexnord Holdings Inc. v Bidermann 21 F.3d 522, 527 (2d Cir. 
1994); Shimer v Fugazy 982 F.2d 769, 776 (2d Cir. 1992). 
38 Re Atlantic Computer Systems [1992] 1 All ER 476, 489. 
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rights of creditors. 39  In contrast to the CodeÕs 
automatic stay, the Insolvency Act has separate 
provisions for moratorium in administration on one 
hand, and a less extensive moratorium in winding up 
on the other.40 
 
Actions that are stayed by the Bankruptcy 
Code on the filing of a petition are listed under s. 
362(a) of the Code. Its scope has been devised to be 
as broad as possible in order to capture diverse forms 
of formal and informal actions against the corporate 
debtor and its estate.41 Subject to some exceptions, the 
automatic stay provision does not affect assets which 
do not belong to the debtor or which have ceased to 
be its assets before the bankruptcy filing. 42  This 
position is plausible given that in accordance with its 
earlier evaluated policy objective, the moratorium in 
both jurisdictions ought to apply to only the assets of 
the debtor or assets in the insolvent estate. 43 As a 
corollary, it is suggested that the automatic stay 
cannot also be used to revive lost interests in assets. 
The contrary position, it is argued, will result in the 
use of the moratorium to expand the contractual right 
of the debtor. 
 
There are two types of administration 
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39 Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Ltd v Sibec [1992] 1 W.L.R. 1253, 
1257; Ian Fletcher, John Higham, Corporate Administrations and Rescue 
Procedures (2nd edn, Tottel Publishing 2004) 50. 
40 They are examined in detail in chapter 6 under post-insolvency and post 
commencement contracts. 
41 James Sack, ÒAdequate ProtectionÓ (1985) 2 Bankr Dev. J. 21, 27. 
42 In re Mann 907 F.2d 923, 927  (9th Cir.1990); In re Gull Air Inc. 890 F.2d 
1255, 1259 (1st Cir. 1989); In re Air Illinois 53 B.R. 1, 2-3 (Bankr.S.D.Ill.1985);  
43 s. 362(a)(3); s 541(a) of the Code; Erickson v Polk 921 F.2d 200 (8th Cir. 
1990); In re Cole 88 B.R. 763, 767 (Bankr. E.D.Va.1988). 
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moratorium, namely, a moratorium for the period 
during which the company is in administration44 and 
an interim moratorium pending either the disposal of 
an application for an administration order or the 
coming into effect of an out-of-court appointment of 
an administrator.45 Similar procedural restrictions on 
the enforcement of rights apply to the two moratoria. 
The only significant distinction between the two is 
their duration and the mode for seeking relief. As the 
name implies, the interim moratorium is imposed 
prior to the commencement of the administration and 
the duration is shorter. Relief from the interim 
moratorium can only be sought from the court as no 
administrator is usually in office at the relevant time. 
This chapter will focus on the moratorium during 
administration. 
 
There is also a moratorium at the 
commencement of winding up proceedings under UK 
law. After the making of a winding up order, any 
disposition of the companyÕs property, transfer of its 
shares and alteration of the status of its members are 
void unless validated by the court.46 This restraint also 
applies to any attachment, sequestration, distress or 
execution against the estate or effects of the insolvent 
company. 47  This provision complements s. 130(2), 
which restrains the commencement or continuation of 
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44 Sch. B1, Paras 42 and 43 of Insolvency Act. These provisions are similar to 
their corresponding sections under the previous s. 11(3) of the 1986 Insolvency 
Act; hence the old cases decided under s. 11(3) are still relevant.  
45 Sch. B1, Para 44 of Insolvency Act. 
46 s. 127 Insolvency Act. Ian Fletcher, Law of Insolvency (4t edn, Sweet Maxwell 
2009) 700. 
47 s. 128(1) Insolvency Act. 
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any action against the company or its property after a 
winding up order has been made unless the court 
permits. The winding-up moratorium is primarily 
concerned with the protection of the debtorÕs assets 
from depletion by the activities of company directors 
and other insiders, 48  while the administration 
moratorium focuses on the activities of creditors and 
outsiders. 
 
In contrast to the administration moratorium, 
the winding up moratorium does not affect security 
interests and property rights. 49  Holders of secured 
claims can proceed to enforce their clams or repossess 
their goods.50 Considering that the primary purpose of 
liquidation is an orderly and equitable distribution of 
the companyÕs assets to unsecured creditors, it would 
be unfair to utilise the assets of secured creditors for 
this purpose. The Bankruptcy CodeÕs automatic stay 
restrains the enforcement of liens in Chapter 7 
liquidation procedures. However, bankruptcy courts 
will often grant relief from the stay as a matter of 
course once the creditor makes an application, 
showing that the debtor-company has no equity in the 
property. 
  
The comparative analysis in this chapter will 
focus on the UK administration moratorium and the 
CodeÕs Chapter 11 reorganisation automatic stay.  
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48 David Milman, ÒAdministration orders: the moratorium featureÓ (1992) 5(9) 
Insolv. Int. 73-75. 
49 Re Aro Co [1980] Ch. 196, 204. 
50 In re Wanzer Ltd (1891) 1 Ch. 305, 310-311; Re David Lloyd (1877) 6 Ch. D. 
339, 343-344. 
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The application and effect of the moratorium is most 
notable in these procedures in view of their purposes. 
The next paragraphs will specifically evaluate four 
areas and contract-related claims which statutory 
moratorium provisions restrain in the two 
jurisdictions namely enforcement of security, 
repossession of goods, forfeiture of leases and set-off 
claims. 
 
 
2.2.1.     Enforcement of security  
    
The moratorium imposes a total, albeit 
temporary, suspension on the rights of creditors to 
enforce their security at the commencement of 
administration under UK insolvency law. Steps can 
only be taken to enforce security with the consent of 
the administrator or leave of court.51 This prohibition 
is pre-emptive as it transcends the mere enforcement 
of security, and includes preparatory acts to enforce 
security.52 The Bankruptcy Code restrains all acts to 
create, perfect or enforce liens against the bankruptcy 
estate after the filing of the bankruptcy petition.53 As 
is the case under the Act, the Code restrains 
preparatory steps taken to enforce a lien. Under the 
Code, Òlien" is a generic term for various forms of 
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51 Schedule B1, Paras 42 and 43 of Insolvency Act. 
52  ÒSecurityÓ is defined under s. 248(b)(1) of the Act to include any mortgage, 
charge, lien or other security. ÒOther securityÓ will encompass forms of 
consensual and non-consensual security. 
53 s. 362(a)(4) and (5) of the Code. In re Edgins 36 B.R. 480, 482 (9th. Cir. BAP 
1984). 
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security interests similar to those mentioned in the 
Insolvency Act.54  
 
A significant difference between the 
prohibition under the Insolvency Act and the 
Bankruptcy Code is that the Act does not stay steps 
taken to create or perfect security. Woolf L.J. 
emphasized this point in Bristol Airport Plc. v 
Powdrill and Ors55 when he stated that, 
ÒIt is not the creation of the security without the consent 
of the administrator or the leave of the court which is 
prohibited by section 11(3)(c) (now paragraph 42 and 43 
of Schedule B1) but the taking of steps to enforce that 
security. Ò56 
Accordingly, in addition to restraining all acts to 
enforce security, 57  the Code also restrains acts to 
create and perfect security. This means that a creditor 
under the UK regime may subsequently take steps to 
perfect his security during the pendency of an 
administration procedure without violating the 
moratorium, thus becoming secured.58 At first blush 
this gives the impression that the scope of the CodeÕs 
prohibition is wider than the ActÕs. It is suggested that 
this may not necessarily be the case given that the 
automatic stay also accommodates an exception 
relating to the perfection of certain liens. This is 
examined in 2.4.1.  
 
Again, in respect of the different approaches 
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54 Article 9 of the United States Uniform Commercial Code, which deals with 
secured transactions, adopts a universal concept of security interest as against the 
different terminologies and ways of securing a claim under English law.  
55 (1990) 2 W.L.R. 1362 [1990] Ch. 744. 
56 ibid. at 768. 
57 Bristol Airport Plc. v Powdrill & ors [1990] 2 All ER 499, 508. 
58  London Flight Centre (Stansted) Ltd v Osprey Aviation Ltd [2002] W.L. 
1310827. 
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of the regimes towards the creation of security, it is 
suggested that the exemption of creation of security 
from the ambit of the statutory moratorium does not 
run counter to the objectives of the moratorium. For 
acts or steps to be at cross-purposes with the earlier 
evaluated objectives of the moratorium, such acts 
must interfere with or impede the administrator in the 
fulfillment of his statutory duties in relation to the 
insolvent estate. Alternatively, such acts must have 
the effect of depleting or interfering with the assets of 
the debtor or in possession of the debtor. The creation 
of security, absent any steps to enforce such security, 
will not have any of these effects.  
 
Significantly, the US court of appeals in In re 
John Morton59 has ruled that s. 362(a)(4) of the Code 
does not prohibit acts to extend, continue or renew 
otherwise valid statutory liens. The issue for 
determination in that case was whether a judgment 
lien, normally valid under New York law for a period 
of ten years, remained enforceable after expiration of 
the ten-year period when during that period the 
property subject to the lien becomes part of a 
bankrupt estate protected by the automatic stay 
imposed. The court reasoned that the extension, 
continuation or renewal of the lien under the State law 
was incapable of enlarging the lien or threatening 
property of the estate which would otherwise be 
available to general creditors. To the contrary, the 
extension simply allowed the holder of a valid lien to 
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59 866 F.2d 561, 564  (2d Cir.1989) 
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maintain the status quo. 60 It is suggested that the 
position of the court of appeal is plausible based on 
the specific provisions of the State law that was in 
issue.  
      
   
2.2.2.     Acts of Repossession 
 
The Insolvency Act restrains preparatory steps 
taken to repossess goods in the debtorÕs possession 
under a hire purchase agreement except where the 
consent of the administrator or leave of court is 
obtained. 61  ÒHire purchase agreementÓ under this 
provision embraces transactions such as chattel 
leasing, retention of title agreements, conditional sale 
and other quasi-security transactions.62 By virtue of 
this provision, suppliers who retain some form of 
interest or title in the goods in the possession of the 
insolvent buyer to avoid an absolute transfer of such 
property, will be temporarily restrained from 
exercising their proprietary or security rights to 
repossess the goods during the administration.63 
 
Section 362(a)(3), which is at the heart of the 
CodeÕs automatic stay regime, restrains creditors from 
engaging in acts to obtain possession of property of or 
from the bankruptcy estate. It also restrains attempts 
to exercise control over any property of the 
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60 ibid. at 564. 
61 Sch. B1, Para 43(3) of the Insolvency Act.  
62 Par 111, Sch. B1, Insolvency Act; s. 436 of the Insolvency Act, which makes 
reference to the definition under s. 189(1) of Consumer Credit Act 1974. 
63 Re Atlantic Computer Systems Plc. (fn. 38) 492. 
  
150 
bankruptcy estate. Most acts prohibited under this 
provision will have elements of harassment. This 
therefore begs the question in both jurisdictions 
whether voluntary handover of assets by the debtor or 
officeholder will violate the automatic moratorium. 
 
Considering that administrators have the 
power to consent to relief from the moratorium, it is 
suggested that the above issue will only arise in an 
interim moratorium. Accordingly, Goode has argued 
that in an interim moratorium, repossession is 
intended to be limited to enforcement measures. He 
however posits that where the company is under 
interim management, courts will likely look carefully 
at the reality of the companyÕs ÒconsentÓ and will 
disregard it where it was obtained by threat. GoodeÕs 
argument is underpinned by the notion that the 
interim moratorium is aimed at preserving the 
companyÕs assets.64  
 
GoodeÕs position can be disputed on the 
ground that he ignores the fact that the interim 
moratorium is also aimed at protecting creditors 
against the enforcement and collection activities of 
other creditors which could result in the conferment 
of unfair preferences. Furthermore, the language of 
the provision does not entirely support his position, 
given that in contrast to the restriction on security, the 
restriction on repossession is not expressed to be 
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64  Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (4th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2011) 440. 
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confined to enforcement. 
 
The foregoing issue was considered in the US 
(where only bankruptcy courts can grant relief from 
the stay) in the case of In re Germansen Decorating 
Inc.65 The parties had worked out a payment plan to 
pay off the past due account balance. Pursuant to the 
payment plan, the debtor delivered post-dated checks 
to the creditor. While the creditor contended it took 
no action post-petition to collect from the debtor, the 
trustee disputed this fact and contended that the 
creditor exerted pressure on the debtor to pay its 
prepetition debt post-petition. The court ruled that the 
payment violated the automatic say notwithstanding 
that it was voluntary. The court based its decision on 
the ground that the stay was also a creditor-protection 
mechanism, hence cannot be waived by the debtor. 66 
  
The above decision is plausible on at least 
three grounds. First, as noted by the court and as 
previously analysed in this chapter, 67  a subsidiary 
policy objective of the statutory moratorium is the 
protection of creditors from the activities of other 
creditors which may result to gaining an unfair 
preference.68 Hence an agreement between a debtor 
and a single creditor that has the effect of waiving the 
moratorium may be detrimental to other creditors and 
thus runs counter to this policy objective. This point 
was noted by Ginsberg J. in In re Germansen 
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65 149 B.R. 517, 521 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992). 
66 In re Germansen Decorating Inc. 149 B.R. 517, 521 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992). 
67 See 2.1.2. 
68 ibid. at 521. 
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Decorating Inc.69 where he stated thus, 
ÒThis court will not sit idle and permit debtors to waive 
willy-nilly the automatic stay so that certain creditors 
may be preferred with impunity and the estate 
dismembered without reference to the Code É The 
automatic stay is meant to prevent one creditor from 
securing an advantage over its peers after a petition is 
filed by or against a debtor.  It makes no difference 
whether that creditor gets that advantage as a result of a 
voluntary or involuntary transferÓ70 
 
Secondly, where a debtor has just a few assets or 
a single vitally valuable asset, it is arguable that such 
voluntary release of assets or waiver of the statutory 
moratorium may have the effect of frustrating the 
asset-preservation objective of the statutory 
moratorium. 71  However, one may argue that this 
concern is exaggerated, given that under the UK 
regime, administrators have been given the power to 
grant relief from the moratorium. 
 
Thirdly, the language of s. 362(a) does not 
distinguish between voluntary and involuntary 
repossessions. It operates to stay Òany act to obtain 
possession of property of the estate or of property 
from the estate or to exercise control over property of 
the estate.Ó Moreover, s. 362(a)(6) provides that s. 
362 operates as a stay of Òany act to collect, assess, or 
recover a claim against the debtor that arose before 
the commencement of the case under this title.Ó 
 
It is argued that the provisions restraining acts 
or steps relating to the repossession of goods of the 
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69 149 B.R. 517, 521 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992). 
70 ibid. at 521-522. 
71  In re McBride Estates Ltd 154 B.R. 339, 342 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1993); In re 
Excelsior Henderson Motorcycle Manufacturing Co. Inc. 273 B.R. 920, 924 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2002).  
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debtor in the jurisdictions practically have the same 
effect on contracts notwithstanding that they are 
couched differently. First, the prohibitions do not 
extinguish the substantive law rights of creditors as 
their rights to repossess their goods are merely 
suspended during the procedure. Secondly, the 
moratorium in the jurisdictions restrain preparatory 
steps or acts taken by creditors with the aim of 
repossessing or taking control of goods. Thus while 
the Insolvency Act prohibits any step taken to 
repossess goods, the Code restrains acts to obtain 
possession.  
 
Thirdly, it is settled under the UK insolvency 
law regime that the moratorium on repossession of 
goods equally applies to the property of the debtor in 
the physical possession of a third party. In Re Atlantic 
Computer Systems Plc.,72 the Court of Appeal ruled 
that computer equipment which had been sub-let (and 
which was still in the physical possession of the sub-
lessees) were in possession of the lessee for the 
purpose of the moratorium.73 Nicholls L.J. reasoned 
that repossession from the sub-lessee amounted to 
repossession from the lessee/debtor and that the 
provision was concerned with relations between the 
lessor and the lessee/debtor. Consequently, the latter 
had possession of the goods regardless of whether it 
was on its premises or not, entrusted by the company 
to others for repairs or sublet by the company.74  
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72 (1992) Ch. 505. 
73 ibid. at 532. See also Fashoff (UK) Ltd v Linton [2008] B.C.C. 542. 
74 ibid. 
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In the same vein, it is also settled that property 
which does not belong to the debtor but is otherwise 
in its possession by reason of a hire-purchase or lease 
agreement is subject to the moratorium.  In Bristol 
Airport Plc. v. Powdrill and ors75 where the debtor 
airline held aircraft under the terms of leases, it was 
held that the aircraft were "property" of the debtor 
airline within the meaning of s. 436 of the Insolvency 
Act 1986 and for the purpose of the moratorium. In 
fact in Re David Meek Plant Ltd76 Judge Weeks QC 
ruled that the moratorium will also be extended to 
such goods, whether or not the agreement had been 
terminated before the presentation of the petition for 
an administration order or on that event, provided the 
goods remained in the company's possession.77 
  
It is suggested that the above principle will 
also be applicable under the US regime 
notwithstanding the absence of a judicial view in this 
regard. This assertion is supported by the language of 
the provision in the Code which expressly prohibits 
acts to obtain possession of property ÒofÓ and ÒfromÓ 
the bankruptcy estate. 78  While acts to obtain 
possession of property of the bankruptcy estate refers 
to the property of the debtor in its possession or in the 
possession of third parties, property from the 
bankruptcy estate presupposes the property of third 
parties in the possession of the debtor. Accordingly in 
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75 [1990] Ch. 744, 759, 760, 761, 762 - 763- 764, 767. 
76 [1993] B.C.C. 175. 
77 ibid. at 180. 
78 s. 362(a)(3) of Bankruptcy Code. 
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In re Plastech Engineered Products, 79  Shefferly J. 
held that the possessory interest that the debtor-
supplier in the case had in equipment was sufficient to 
trigger the protection of automatic stay and to prevent 
the manufacturer, without first obtaining relief from 
the stay, from taking possession of equipment. 
 
Finally a potential difficulty with the present 
restraint is determining with certainty which actions 
will constitute steps or acts to repossess goods. The 
provisions of both statutes are unhelpful, as they offer 
no guidance in this regard. It has been suggested that 
the prohibition under the Act will only restrain acts 
that interfere with the debtorÕs enjoyment of its 
property or the property in its possession or inhibit the 
administratorÕs use of such property in the conduct of 
the business.80  
 
This proposition is a useful touchstone given 
that it would be impossible to draw an exhaustive list 
of factual scenarios that will constitute steps or acts to 
repossess. The proposition aligns with the underlying 
purpose of the moratorium which is to preserve assets 
available to the debtor by precluding the taking of 
steps which might impair the administratorÕs ability to 
use the assets or manage the business for the purpose 
of the procedure. Hence, it is incumbent on courts to 
exercise their discretion judiciously in dealing with 
applications on a case-by-case basis. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
79 382 B.R. 90, 106  (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2008). 
80 Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency (fn. 64) 429, 430 e.g. service 
of a demand on a company for payment or a notice terminating a contract or 
making time of performance of essence. 
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2.2.3.      Forfeiture of lease by peaceable re-entry 
 
At the commencement of administration, a 
landlordÕs right to forfeiture by peaceable re-entry in 
respect of premises let to a debtor is suspended under 
the Insolvency Act. This right can only be exercised 
with the administratorÕs consent or leave of court.81 
The contention that formerly existed as to whether or 
not forfeiture of leases by peaceable re-entry 
constituted an enforcement of security is now a settled 
issue by virtue of the present provision.82  
 
There is no specific corresponding provision 
of this nature in the Bankruptcy Code. However, all 
property of the debtor automatically becomes part of 
the bankruptcy estate once a bankruptcy case is 
commenced. 83  Property includes Òall legal and 
equitable interests of the debtor in property as at the 
commencement of the case.Ó It is suggested that this 
definition is broad enough to encompass rights over 
premises let to or occupied by the debtor. This 
position is supported by the assertion of Tabb in his 
seminal work that, 
ÒWhether the debtor holds a fee simple, a joint interest, 
a leasehold, a naked possessory right, legal title only; 
whatever the debtor has comes into the estate.Ó 84 
 
In the light of this, it is argued that s. 362(a)(3) will 
restrain attempts to forfeit or obtain possession of 
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81 Schedule B1, Para 43(4) of the Insolvency Act. 
82 In re Lomax Leisure Ltd [2000] Ch. 502, 512, Redleaf Investment Ltd v Talbot 
[1995] B.C.C. 1091; Exchange Travel Agency v Triton Property Trust Plc. 
[1991] B.C.L.C. 396, 400-401. This provision was not available in the previous 
legislation, giving rise to divisions in judicial opinions as to whether forfeiture of 
leases by peaceable re-entry constituted an enforcement of security. 
83 s. 541(a)(1) of Bankruptcy Code. 
84 Charles Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy (2nd edn, Foundation Press 2009) 399. 
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premises or exercise control over it. 
 
Goode has argued that where a lease stipulates 
for forfeiture by notice on stated grounds or events, 
the landlord will not be precluded under this provision 
from exercising such a right. 85  This position is 
plausible, given that in this circumstance, the landlord 
will not be required to take physical possession of the 
property, an act which the moratorium restrains. The 
issuance of a notice will simply have the effect of 
terminating the lease. Nevertheless, it is suggested 
that if the premises in issue is still under the 
occupation of the debtor/lessee, leave of court may 
still be required. 
 
 In addition, it is instructive to note that 
although the UK moratorium restrains the 
commencement and continuation of legal proceedings 
against the debtor and its property after the 
commencement of administration,86 the prohibition is 
limited to any legal or quasi-legal processes or other 
proceedings which require the assistance of courts.87 
Accordingly, self-help measures such as notices of 
termination that do not require the assistance of courts 
do not come under the ambit of this restrain.88  In deed 
the wording of the present provision has put to rest 
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85 Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency (fn 64) 435. 
86 Schedule B1, Para 43(6) of Insolvency Act. Legal processes include legal 
proceedings, execution, distress and diligence. 
87 Carr v British International Helicopters Ltd [1994] 22 B.C.L.C. 474, 475, 482. 
88 Gavin Lightman, Gabriel Moss, et. al The Law of Administrators and Receivers 
of Companies (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2013) 589. Self-help effort which do 
not require the assistance of the courts include service on the company of a 
contractual termination notice, service of a notice of making time of essence for 
the purposes of a contract, set-off etc. 
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the controversy associated with the equivalent 
provision in the legislation that preceded it as to 
whether non-legal proceedings can constitute Ôother 
proceedingsÕ as was used therein. 89  Hence In Re 
Olympia & York Canary Wharf Ltd90 Millet J. ruled 
that the service upon a company in administration of a 
contractual notice purporting to make time of the 
essence or to terminate the contract did not require the 
consent of the joint administrators of the company or 
the leave of the court.91 
 
In contrast to the foregoing, a forfeiture of a 
lease by notice on stated grounds or events will likely 
be in breach of the CodeÕs automatic stay provision. 
The automatic stay restrains almost all forms of self-
help mechanisms that can be employed by creditors to 
recover or collect their debts, outside judicial, arbitral 
or administrative means.92  For instance in Olson v. 
McFarland Clinic, 93  a creditor's letter informing 
debtors that the creditor, would no longer be able to 
provide services to the debtor based on failure to pay 
for services already provided was held to constitute an 
act to collect a pre-petition claim against debtors in 
breach of s. 362(a)(6).  
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89 Bristol Airport Plc. v Powdrill & ors (fn. 57) 506 illustrates this point. Here it 
was held that the detention of aircraft did not constitute legal or other 
proceedings under the old regime. The court reasoned that reference to the 
ÒcommencementÓ and ÒcontinuationÓ of proceedings indicates that what 
Parliament had in mind was legal proceedings. 
90 [1993] B.C.C. 154. 
91 ibid. at 157-8. 
92 s. 362(a)(6) of the Code. In re Henry 266 B.R. 457, 470 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
2001); In re Haffner 25 B.R. 882, 886 (Bankr.N.D.Ind.1982); In re Green 15 
B.R. 75, 78 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981); In re Lanford 10 B.R. 132, 134 
(Bankr.D.Minn.1981); In re Heath 3 B.R. 351 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980). 
93 38 B.R. 515, 518 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984). 
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In Sechuan City Inc. v. North American Motor 
Inns Inc.94 the conduct of lessor and his associates in 
posting various signs throughout a hotel lobby that 
restaurant lessee had filed for bankruptcy and was not 
paying its bills, coupled with lessor hotel's decision 
not to allow alcoholic drinks to be served in debtor 
lessee restaurant, was held to violate the automatic 
stay. Lastly in In re Promower Inc.,95 a lessor was 
held to have violated the automatic stay by Òengaging 
in self-helpÓ against the debtor/tenant through, inter 
alia, barricading debtor's business premises. 
 
Indeed the US regime illustrates a manifest 
Congressional intention to close every possible 
loophole with which creditors may exploit to interfere 
with assets in the insolvent estate. This 
notwithstanding, it is argued here that the automatic 
stay can still be evaded via self-help. It is suggested 
that self-help measures that are adopted without 
express reference to the debtorÕs insolvency may not 
be in breach of the automatic stay. This position has 
judicial support in the earlier cited Olson v 
McFarland Clinic,96 where the court agreed with the 
defendant's assertion that if the defendant had simply 
refused service without any mention of the debtors' 
bankruptcy filing in their letter, s. 362(a)(6) would not 
have come into play.97 
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94 96 B.R. 37, 40 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa. 1989). 
95 56 B.R. 619, 621 (Bankr.D.Md.1986). 
96 38 B.R. 515 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984). 
97 ibid at  518. 
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2.2.4.     Set-off 
 
Insolvency set-off rights are recognised under 
the Insolvency Act and Bankruptcy Code.98 However, 
the jurisdictions differ as to the effect of the statutory 
moratorium on set-off rights. The Insolvency ActÕs 
set-off rights are self-executing and are consequently 
not suspended or interfered with by the moratorium.99 
Hence it constitutes one of the so-called true 
exceptions to the pari passu principle. Accordingly, 
the factual effect of a set-off claim is that it confers a 
preference on the creditor who holds the right. Prima 
facie this runs counter to the two policy objectives of 
the statutory moratorium earlier evaluated namely, 
asset-preservation and ensuring a collective 
procedure. 
 
The Bankruptcy CodeÕs automatic stay 
suspends the exercise of set-off rights at the 
commencement of insolvency.100 In the light of the 
preferential effect of set-off rights, this position 
accords with the earlier evaluated policy objectives of 
the automatic stay. Restraining such rights potentially 
has the effect of avoiding the preferential treatment of 
certain pre-petition creditors. More importantly, the 
estate is preserved from erosion and the officeholder 
is given the breathing spell to carry out his 
responsibilities without interference from holders of 
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98 s. 553 of the Code; Rules 2.85 and 4.90 of the Insolvency Rules 1986. 
99 Ian Fletcher, John Higham, Corporate Administrations and Rescue Procedures 
(fn. 8) 57. 
100 s. 362(a)(7) of the Code; Bank of America NatÕl Trust and Savings Ass. v 
Edgins (fn. 53) 482. 
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set-off rights. 
 
Significantly, the Code draws a distinction 
between set-off rights and common law recoupment 
rights. While a set-off is a claim arising out of a 
completely independent and unrelated transaction,101 
in recoupment, the debt must arise from the same 
transaction. Here is a hypothetical illustration of this 
distinction: If S sues B for $1,000 for goods that S 
supplied, and B seeks to reduce the judgment by $500 
representing SÕs (unrelated) unpaid rental of B's 
warehouse, B is seeking a setoff. On the other hand, if 
S sues B for $1,000 for goods that S supplied, and B 
seeks to reduce the judgment by $500 representing 
BÕs expenditure to repair some of the goods which 
turned out to be defective or the cost of replacing 
them, B is seeking a recoupment. In this regard in In 
re Delicruz,102 Shefferly J. noted that  
ÒOnly apples can be recouped against apples, not apples 
against oranges. Apples may be set-off against oranges, 
but this takes the matter out of the nature of 
recoupment.Ó103 
 
Recoupment is therefore an affirmative defence 
that may be asserted by a defendant whose claim is 
based on the same transaction that is the subject of the 
claimantÕs suit.104 This distinction is alien to English 
insolvency law. In contrast to set-off rights, 
recoupment claims are not affected by the 
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101 s. 553 of the Code; Atlantic City Hospital v Finkle 110 N.J. Super. 435, 439 
(Cty. Ct. 1970). 
102 300 B.R. 669 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2003), 
103 ibid at 683. 
104 Beneficial Finance Co. v Swaggerty 86 N.J. 602, 609, (432 A.2d 512 1981). 
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moratorium. 105  Factually, a recoupment claim 
constitutes an exception to insolvency lawÕs policy of 
equal treatment of unsecured creditors. Accordingly, 
regardless of the justifications that are often given as 
underpinning the recognition of recoupment rights 
(evaluated in 2.3.2), it factually runs counter to the 
policy objectives of the moratorium, namely asset-
preservation and collectivity. 
  
Applying the statutory moratorium to the 
CodeÕs set-off rules often results in what is termed the 
ÒbankerÕs dilemma.Ó This occurs where, prior to 
bankruptcy filing, a bank lends funds to a debtor who 
also has a cheque account with the bank. On 
insolvency, the bank will have a right to set-off. As a 
matter of general principle, set-off rights only subsist 
as long as there is mutuality of debts. Once the 
element of mutuality is lost, the set-off right is 
extinguished. A strict adherence to s. 362(a)(7) and 
(a)(6)) will require a creditor to hand over the asset to 
the debtor, the consequence of which will be a 
permanent loss of the set-off right. In deed, there is an 
authority to the effect that a bank that fails to preserve 
its setoff rights by freezing a debtorÕs account is not 
entitled to any compensation if post-petition clearing 
of cheques depletes the account.106 Accordingly in 
First Union National Bank of Florida v. Abbey 
Financial Corp.107 a bank which failed to protect its 
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105 In re Slater Health Centre 398 F.3d 98 (1stb Cir. 2005); In re Holford 896 
F.2d 176(5th Cir 1990); B & L Oil 782 F.2d 155(10th Cir 1986). 
106 In re Kleather 208 B.R. 406 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1997).  
107 193 B.R. 89 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996). The same decision would be reached 
where a creditor turns over the property to the trustee in the absence of 
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contingent right of setoff by placing an administrative 
freeze on the debtor-customer's account was held not 
to be entitled to a refund of monies it had wire-
transferred to the customer's debtor-in-possession 
account. 
 
In order to preserve their set-off rights, 
bankers and creditors have devised the 
Òadministrative freeze,Ó which is a temporary hold on 
an account wherein the account is not debited. The 
debtor is temporarily prevented from having access to 
the account and making withdrawals while awaiting a 
judicial decision regarding the validity of the set-off 
right.108 However, it is suggested that this does not 
provide a foolproof solution to the against the 
background of a number of provisions in the Code 
which are seemingly difficult to reconcile with s. 
362(a)(7).  
 
For instance s. 363(c)(2)(A) and (B) of the 
Code prohibit debtors from using cash collateral 
without the consent of the creditor or authorisation of 
the court. Cash collateral is defined as cash or cash 
equivalents in which the bankruptcy estate and an 
entity other than the estate have an interest.109 Monies 
that are subject to set-off rights or an administrative 
freeze qualify as cash collateral. Furthermore, s. 
542(a) of the Code, which mandates a creditor to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
compulsion. In re Gehrke 158 B.R. 465 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1993), distinguishing 
In re Archer 34 B.R. 28 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983) as a case in which turnover was 
involuntary" because of the creditor's fear of contempt. 
108  James Wynn, ÒFreeze and Recoupment: Methods for circumventing the 
automatic stayÓ (1988) 5 Bankr Dev. J. 85 fn.1. 
109 s. 363(a) of the Code. 
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deliver to the trustee any debt or property owed to the 
debtor, expressly exempts creditors with set-off rights 
from turning over an asset to the trustee. 110  The 
foregoing provisions clearly support the use of the 
administrative freeze mechanism. 
 
On the other hand, the administrative freeze is 
not without its shortcomings.  It is arguable that it 
amounts to an act Òto exercise control over property 
of the estateÓ in violation of the moratorium.111 The 
debtor is denied the immediate use of the funds in the 
creditorÕs possession at a time that could be highly 
critical in its reorganisation.112 The freeze also violates 
the moratorium provisions that prohibit the creation, 
enforcement and perfection of pre-petition liens and 
any acts to collect, assess or recover pre-petition 
claims against the debtor respectively.113 Accordingly, 
the administrative freeze amounts to a unilateral 
extra-judicial determination by the creditor of the 
validity of its setoff- right..114 Prima facie it constitutes 
a resort to self-help which (as previously noted) the 
Bankruptcy regime discourages. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, the fact remains 
that handing over an asset which is subject to a set-off 
right to a debtor while hoping to get it back through a 
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110 s. 542(b) and (c) of the Code. 
111 s. 362(a)(3) of the Code. 
112 In re Fred Patterson 967 F.2d 505, 510 (11th Cir.1992); James Wynn (fn. 
108) 92. 
113 s. 362 (a)(4) and (a)(6) Code. In re Fred Patterson (fn 112) 511; In re Homan 
116 B.R. 595, 602 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990); In re First Conn Small Business 
Investment Co. 118 B.R. 179, 181 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990). 
114 In re Homan (fn 113) 603; In re Wildcat construction 57 B.R. 981, 986 
(Bankr. D.Vt.1986); KenneyÕs Franchise Corp v Central Fidelity Bank 12 B.R. 
390, 391 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1981). 
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court order, may not be a very sensible option.  In 
deed it may amount to merely locking the barn door 
after the horse has bolted.115 There is also a risk of the 
dissipation of the asset in the hands of the debtor. The 
Supreme Court has attempted to put this contentious 
issue to rest with its decision in CitizenÕs Bank of 
Maryland v. Strumpf. 116  In that case the Supreme 
Court held that administrative freezes do not 
constitute the exercise of set-off rights as there is 
often no intention to permanently reduce the debtorÕs 
account balance by the amount of the defaulted loan.  
 
The Supreme Court identified three steps that 
must be taken to effect a set-off, namely, a decision to 
effectuate the set-off, some action accomplishing the 
set-off and a recording of the set-off.117 The court 
however emphasized the need for a prompt 
application for relief while the administrative freeze is 
pending.118 Accordingly, an unnecessarily prolonged 
administrative freeze without a timely application for 
relief may be construed as constituting the exercise of 
a set-off right in violation of the stay.119 For instance 
in Town of Hempstead Employees Federal Credit 
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115 Bank of America NatÕl Trust and Savings Ass v Edgins (fn. 53) 484. 
116 516 US 16 (1995). 
117 516 US 16, 19(1995); Normand Josef Enterprises Inc. v Connecticut National 
Bank 230 Conn. 486, 504-505 (A.2d 1289 1994); In re Crispell 73 Bankr 375, 
377 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987); In re Carpenter 14 B.R. 405, 407 (Bankr. M.D. 
Tenn. 1981); Baker v National City Bank of Cleveland 511 F.2D 1016, 1018 (6th 
Cir. 1975); Paul Groschadl, ÒFreezing the DebtorÕs Bank Account: A violation of 
the Automatic Stay?Ó (1983) 57 Am Bankr. L.J. 75, 76. 
118 See also Air Atlanta v National Bank of Georgia 81 B.R. 724, 725  (N.D. Ga. 
1987); In re Hoffman 51 B.R. 42, 46 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1985); Stann v Mid Am. 
Credit Union 39 B.R. 246, 248 (D. Kan. 1984); KenneyÕs Franchise Corp v 
Central Fidelity Bank 22 B.R. 747, 748-749  (W.D. Va. 1982); In re Carpenter 
14 B.R. 405, 407 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981). 
119 In re Crispell 73 Bankr 375, 379 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987). 
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Union v. Wicks120 a four-month administrative freeze 
by a creditor that never sought relief from the stay 
was held to constitute a violation of the automatic 
stay. 
  
It is suggested here that the Supreme CourtÕs 
approach in Strumpf plainly offends the moratorium 
provision and its policy objectives. The Code 
expressly suspends the exercise of set-off rights and 
this construction is an emasculation of that 
prohibition.121 In addition, the legislative statement 
accompanying the set-off provision expressly 
mentions the automatic stay as being one of the two 
exceptions to the set-off rule. 122  Furthermore, an 
account that is described as being open but in respect 
of which the debtor cannot make use of the funds is of 
no practical use to the debtor. Nevertheless, given that 
a strict literal construction and application of s. 
362(a)(7) will result in a permanent loss of a set-off 
right, it may be argued that the equitable approach in 
Strumpf is in order subject to the condition that a 
timely application for relief must be made to court. 
This pragmatic approach effectively balances the 
competing interests of the parties. While the holder of 
the set-off right retains his right, the matter is also 
timely resolved by the courts to prevent any delays 
that may hamper the insolvency procedure. 123  
 
Perhaps a step towards completely resolving 
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120 215 B.R. 316 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
121 s. 362(a)(7) of the Code. 
122 House Report No 595, 95th Congress, 1st session 340 (1977). 
123  i.e. ss. 362(a)(7), 553 and 506(a)(1) of the Code. 
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this issue would be the codification of administrative 
freeze and comprehensively defining what would 
constitute a freeze as opposed to a set-off. A possible 
alternative to the contentious administrative freeze 
would be for the creditor to file an ex parte motion 
pursuant to s. 362(f) and 363(e).124 While s. 362(f) 
provides that, 
 ÒUpon request of a party in interest, the court, with or 
without a hearing, shall grant such relief from the stay 
provided under subsection (a) of this section as is 
necessary to prevent irreparable damage to the interest 
of an entity in property, if such interest will suffer such 
damage before there is an opportunity for notice and a 
hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this section.Ó 
 
Section 363(e) provides that, 
ÒNotwithstanding any other provision of this section, at 
any time, on request of an entity that has an interest in 
property used, sold, or leased, or proposed to be used, 
sold, or leased, by the trustee, the court, with or without 
a hearing, shall prohibit or condition such use, sale, or 
lease as is necessary to provide adequate protection of 
such interest. This subsection also applies to property 
that is subject to any unexpired lease of personal 
property (to the exclusion of such property being subject 
to an order to grant relief from the stay under s. 362).Ó 
 
The motion would be accompanied with the 
funds from the debtor's account to be paid into the 
registry of the court pending the determination of the 
motion. This procedure will have the merits of 
ensuring that the interests of all parties are protected. 
While there is no risk of the creditor losing his set-off 
rights, the matter will also be decided speedily so as 
not to starve the insolvent estate of funds which it 
may be entitled to.  
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124 Air Atlanta v National Bank of Georgia 81 B.R. 724, 725  (N.D. Ga. 1987). 
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2.3.   Exceptions to the statutory moratorium 
 
The Bankruptcy CodeÕs automatic stay 
provisions do not apply in every case and do not stop 
all forms of enforcement and collection actions. US 
lawmakers have decided that certain debts are very 
significant and deserve to be granted priority over the 
policy objectives of the automatic stay. Accordingly, 
the Code has set out a number of exceptions to the 
automatic stay. 125  Conversely, the Insolvency Act 
does not expressly list exceptions to the moratorium. 
Most of the exceptions under the Code relate to 
personal bankruptcy, albeit, the next paragraphs will 
evaluate the exceptions which are relevant to this 
thesis. It will also examine the likely attitude of UK 
courts to these exceptions. 
 
 
2.3.1.    Retroactive perfection of interests 
 
The CodeÕs automatic stay does not suspend 
the right of creditors to perfect or continue to perfect 
an interest in property of the bankruptcy estate to the 
extent that the trusteeÕs rights and powers are subject 
to perfection under s. 546(b) of the Code. 126  The 
companion provision, s. 546(b), limits the debtor's 
powers to avoid statutory liens by providing that they 
Òare subject to any generally applicable law that 
permits perfection of an interest in property to be 
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125 s. 362(b) of the Code. 
126 s. 362(b)(3) of the Code; In re New England Carpet Co. 26 B.R. 934 (Bankr. 
D. Vt. 1983). 
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effective against an entity that acquires rights in such 
property before the date of perfection.Ó127   
 
Hence s. 546(b) of the Code deals with 
statutes that provide for the perfection of liens during 
periods of grace. For example a lien that arises pre-
petition but is not perfected before the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition, can be perfected if the applicable 
non-insolvency law permits a later perfection against 
any party who has acquired an interest in the 
property.128 The doctrine of relation back operates to 
give the perfection a retroactive effect thereby pre-
dating the insolvency.129  
 
Thus s. 362(b)(3) and s. 546(b)(1)(A) read 
together, plot the boundaries of the exception to the 
automatic stay which is at issue here. 130  A good 
example of a case where the present exception will be 
applicable is a purchase money security interest 
(PMSI), where Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code gives the secured creditor a grace period within 
which to perfect the PMSI and still maintain priority 
over intervening lien creditors.131 Hence if the debtor 
files for bankruptcy during the grace period, s. 
362(b)(3) permits the secured party to go ahead and 
perfect its PMSI, and that perfection is given 
retroactive effect under s. 546(b). 
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127 s. 546(b)(1)(A). 
128 The perfection can only be performed if the period of grace for perfection 
under the applicable non-insolvency law has not expired before the intervening 
insolvency. 
129 s. 546(b) of the Code. 
130 In re 229 Main Street Ltd. Partnership 262 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2001). 
131 UCC 9-317(e). 
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A further illustration of the foregoing can be 
seen in In re 229 Main Street Ltd.132 In that case C 
notified the owner of a property of its intention to file 
a lien against the property under Massachusetts Oil 
and Hazardous Materials Prevention Act. The owner 
sought administrative hearing under the Act, and 
before obtaining ruling, filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy. The Court of Appeals held that CÕs 
simultaneous creation and perfection of lien 
constituted perfection under the Code, hence fell 
within the present exception to the automatic stay.  
 
Similarly, in In re Cohen,133 CA sought relief 
from automatic stay to foreclose on its lien, Gerling 
C.J., ruled that CA was not entitled to relief from stay 
in order to foreclose on lien that it had not yet 
perfected by filing notice thereof.134 Nevertheless, the 
court ruled that CA could file its notice post-petition 
under the present exception given that the general 
applicable law, s. 339a of the New York Real 
Property Law, permitted a perfection of such interest 
with a retroactive effect. 
  
This exception is not necessary under UK 
insolvency law regime considering that the 
Insolvency ActÕs moratorium only restrains steps 
taken to enforce security and does not restrain steps 
taken to create or perfect security.135 However, the 
ability of a creditor under the Code to perfect his 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
132 262 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001). 
133 279 B.R. 626 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2002). 
134 ibid at 636, 
135 Para 43(2) of Insolvency Act. 
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security during the statutory injunction is limited 
compared to a creditor under the Act. This is because 
perfection under the Code is only possible if such is 
permitted by the applicable non-insolvency law, by 
way of a grace period, as stipulated under s. 546 (b) of 
the Code. 
  
It is suggested that the exclusion of perfection 
of security from the statutory moratorium can be 
justified on at least two grounds. First, If the broad 
stay of s. 362(a)(4) and (5) is left unqualified, it 
would operate to make certain creditors worse off 
than they would have been outside of bankruptcy. 
Such would run counter to the purposes of the stay 
which is meant only to preserve the status quo and the 
assets available to the insolvent estate. Secondly, 
perfection (as opposed to enforcement) of security 
interests during the pendency of the statutory 
moratorium will not necessarily be at cross-purposes 
with the policy objectives of the moratorium. 
Perfection of security will not interfere with the assets 
in the insolvent estate, the officeholderÕs work or 
grant the creditor an unfair preference. Accordingly, 
there is no strong policy argument against perfection 
of liens by creditors who desire to make their security 
effective in the insolvency and against third parties. 
The statutory moratorium ought not to be used as a 
mechanism for extinguishing security interests and 
permanent confiscation of assets of third parties. 
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2.3.2.    Complex market contracts 
 
Series of complex market-related contracts are 
exempted from the ambit of the CodeÕs automatic 
stay.136 Some examples of these include enforcement 
of contractual rights by a commodity broker, forward 
contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, 
financial participant, or securities clearing agency in 
such transactions. 137  In the same vein, the UK 
administration moratorium will not interfere with 
enforcement of market charges.138 This exception is to 
ensure that financial market operations are 
safeguarded against the insolvency of participants.139 
The exemptions are plausible considering the domino 
effect that the disruption of a single market 
transaction by the insolvency of a participant can have 
on the entire market. Against this background, priority 
is granted to these complex market transactions over 
the policy objectives of the statutory moratorium. 
  
   
2.3.3.    Recoupment and set-off 
 
Whilst set-off rights are suspended, 140 
recoupment rights are exempted from the operation of 
Bankruptcy CodeÕs automatic stay.141 As previously 
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136 s. 362(b)(6) of the Code. 
137 s. 362(b)(6), 555 and 556 of the Code. 
138 The statutory moratorium does not prohibit the enforcement of market charges 
as defined by s. 173(1) of CA 1989. 
139 Part VII of Companies Act 1989; Ian Fletcher, John Higham, Corporate 
Administrations and Rescue Procedures (2nd edn, Tottel Publishing 2004) 57. 
140 Bank of America NatÕl Trust and Savings Ass. v Edgins (fn. 53) 482. 
141 s. 362(a)(7) of the Code stays only set-off rights; Holford v Powers (fn. 105) 
179. 
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noted, the Bankruptcy Code differentiates recoupment 
rights from setoff rights.142 There are two primary 
distinctions between these two doctrines. First, 
recoupment allows a creditor to reduce the amount of 
a debtor's claim by asserting a claim against the 
debtor which arose out of the same transaction to 
arrive at a just and proper liability on debtor's 
claim. 143  In contrast, setoff involves a claim of a 
creditor against a debtor which arises out of a 
transaction which is different from that on which 
debtorÕs claim is based.144 A hypothetical illustration 
of this distinction can be seen in 2.2.4. 
 
A second distinction between the two 
doctrines is that while pre-petition debts can be 
recouped from the debtorÕs post-petition assets,145 pre-
petition debts can only be set-off from the debtorÕs 
pre-petition revenues or assets.146 Hence in Rakozy v. 
Reiman Construction Inc.147 the court observed that Òa 
claim of recoupment should be allowed regardless of 
whether the plaintiff's claim is considered a pre-
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142 See 2.2.4. 
143 Rakozy v. Reiman Construction 42 B.R. 627, 628 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1984). 
144 In re Slater Health Center Inc. (fn. 105) 103; In re Holyoke Nursing Home 
Inc. 372 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.2004); United Structures of America Inc. v G.R.G 
Engineering 9 F.3d 996, 998 (1st Cir.1993); Holford v Powers (fn 105) 178. 
145 American Central Airlines, Inc., v Dept. of Transportation 60 B.R. 587, 589 
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986); United States v Midwest Service Co. Inc. 44 B.R. 262 
(Bankr. D.C. Utah 1983); Sapir v Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Greater New York 34 
B.R. 385 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1983); Waldschmidt v CBS, Inc. 14 B.R. 309 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1981). 
146   In re Springfield Casket Co. Inc. 21 B.R. 223, 228 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 
1982) (Anderson, J.). Ò(I)n the context of bankruptcy, post-petition debts may not 
provide the basis for setoff because mutuality ceases upon the filing of the 
bankruptcy estate, i.e. a claim owing to a creditor by a debtor may not be offset 
by a debt owing by the creditor to that debtor's estate, since the parties are not 
identical and mutuality has ceased.Ó In re Kleather, 208 B.R. 406, 413 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ohio 1997). 
147 42 B.R. 627 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1984). 
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petition or post-petition claim.Ó 148 The leading case of 
Ashland Petroleum Co. v Appel 149  illustrates this 
point. In that case. B&L and Ashland entered into an 
oil division contract
 that gave Ashland the right to 
purchase unspecified amounts of crude oil produced 
by B&L. In August 1982, Ashland overpaid B&L on 
two occasions. In September 1982, B&L filed for 
bankruptcy. Ashland withheld payments for 
subsequent post-petition deliveries in order to recover 
its pre-petition overpayments. The US Court of 
Appeals held that Ashland had properly recouped pre-
petition overpayments made to B&L by withholding 
money for deliveries made after B&L had filed for 
bankruptcy. 150  The court thus refused to limit 
recoupment in the same way as set-off claims. 
 
The above decision turned on the ground that 
it was inequitable for the debtor to benefit from post-
petition sales to the creditor under the contract 
without the burden of repaying pre-petition 
overpayments made by the creditor under the same 
contract.151 In other words, the court reasoned that 
since both debts arose out of a single integrated 
transaction, it would have been Òinequitable for the 
debtor to enjoy the benefits of that transaction without 
also meeting its obligations.Ó152 This indeed has been 
the main justification for the scope of the doctrine of 
recoupment and for exempting it from the ambit of 
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148 Rakozy v. Reiman Construction (fn. 143) 628.  
149 782 F. 2d 155 (10th Cir. 1986). 
150 ibid. at 158-159. 
151 ibid. at 159. 
152 In re University Medical Center 973 F.2d. 1065, 1081 (3rd Cir. 1992). 
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the automatic stay.153   
 
Accordingly, a recoupment right is deemed to 
be essentially a defense to the debtor's claim against 
the creditor rather than a mutual obligation. 154 
Furthermore, in United Structures of America Inc. v. 
G.R.G. Engineering, S.E.,155 Breyer C.J. noted that 
allowing the creditor to recoup damages simply 
allows the debtor precisely what it is due when 
viewing the transaction Òas a whole.Ó156 In practical 
terms, there is but one recovery due on a contract157 
and the creditor does not interpose an independent, 
countervailing claim, but merely counterclaims to 
limit the debtorÕs recovery to what is due. 
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, recoupment 
rights prima facie run counter to the asset-
preservation and collectivity objectives of the 
statutory moratorium. Recoupment claims are capable 
of disrupting the debtorÕs cash flow and the 
officeholderÕs task just as much as set-off claims and 
other enforcement and collection activities restrained 
by the automatic stay. If creditors with proprietary 
and security claims against the debtor are temporarily 
restrained from enforcements and repossessions for 
the benefit of the procedure generally, why should a 
creditor who has neither reserved title in goods nor 
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153 In re Women's Technical Institute, Inc. 200 B.R. 77, 80 (Bankr.D.Mass.1996); 
In re Slater Health Centre (fn. 105). 
154 In the Lee v. Schweiker 739 F.2d 870, 875 (3rd Cir.1984). 
155 9 F.3d 996, 999 (1st Cir. 1993). 
156 ibid. at 999. 
157 In re Maine 32 B.R. 452, 455 (Bankr.W.D.N.Y.1983); In re Women's 
Technical Institute, Inc. (fn. 153) 80.  
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taken security be allowed to walk away with his claim 
by virtue of an ÒaccidentalÓ security which he never 
bargained for?  
 
Although there may be merits in recouping the 
debtorÕs claims with pre-petition claims against it, 
using a debtorÕs post-petition assets to satisfy pre-
petition recoupment claims without any court 
approval seems to be contrary to sound bankruptcy 
policy. It runs counter to the philosophy of US 
bankruptcy law which generally tends to suggest that 
the bankruptcy petition date effects a cleavage 
between the sins of the past and the promise of the 
future. Hence the debtorÕs post-petition assets and 
revenues ought to be used for its rehabilitation 
generally and not channelled towards pre-petition 
claims of a creditor.  
 
For instance s. 549 permits the trustee to avoid 
post-petition transfers not otherwise authorized under 
the Code or by the court. Section 552 makes property 
acquired post-petition not to be subject to any pre-
petition liens (such as an after-acquired property 
clause). Also s. 553(a) retains a creditorÕs right of 
setoff for mutual debts Òthat arose before the 
commencement of the case.Ó It is perhaps in 
recognition of the foregoing that US bankruptcy 
courts have time and time again counselled for a 
narrow construction and application of the 
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recoupment doctrine.158 
 
Under the US bankruptcy law regime, a set-off 
right is based on the principle that justice and equity 
require that the demands of parties mutually indebted 
be set-off against each other and only the balance 
recovered.159 A set-off right in US bankruptcy law 
regime is thus rooted in equity.
160  However, the 
rationale for the suspension of set-off rights under the 
automatic stay regime has been stated as being that 
they undermine the principle of equality among 
unsecured creditors, by granting a preference to a 
creditor through the full satisfaction of his claim. 161 
This accords with the policy objectives of the 
statutory moratorium namely, preservation of the 
assets in the insolvent estate and ensuring a collective 
procedure. It may however not be entirely correct to 
posit that this position promotes the principle of 
equality, given that the restraint is temporary and does 
not extinguish the set-off holderÕs Òsecurity.Ó  
  
 
The doctrine of recoupment is alien to UK 
insolvency law. Pre-petition mutual credits, debts or 
other mutual dealings between the debtor and any of 
its creditors proving or claiming to prove for a debt in 
the procedure can only result to insolvency set-off 
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158 In re McMahon 129 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir.1997); In Re Public Serv. Co. of N.H. 
107 B.R. 441, 444 (Bankr.D.N.H.1989). 
159 United States v. Norton 717 F.2d 767, 773 (3d. Cir. 1983). 
160 In re Braniff Airways 42 B.R. 443, 448 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984) 
161 In re Slater Health Centre (fn. 105); In re Women's Technical Institute Inc. 
(fn. 153) 80; Matter of Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Corp. 896 F.2d 54 
(C.A.3 1990). 
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claims. 162  Insolvency set-off rights in English 
insolvency law are self-executing, mandatory163 and 
are not subject to the moratorium.164 In Forster v. 
Wilson, 165  it was stated that the objective of 
insolvency set-off is to do substantial justice between 
contracting parties. Similarly in Re Kaupthing Singer 
and Friedlander Ltd166 Etherton L.J. noted that, 
ÒThe provisions for insolvency set-off are intended to 
promote speedy and efficient administration of the 
assets so as to enable a distribution to be made to 
creditors as soon as possible and in a manner which 
achieves substantial justice between the parties to the 
set-off and, so far as practicable, equality in the 
treatment of creditors. The purpose of insolvency set-off 
has nothing to do with the release of liabilities owed to 
the company save to the extent necessary to achieve 
those objectives.Ó167 
 
Accordingly, insolvency set-off rule may be 
rightly viewed as a rule of convenience given that it 
promotes speedy and efficient administration of the 
debtorÕs assets. Insolvency set-off also promotes 
substantial justice between parties to transactions 
which the set-off rule is applied. However, it is 
arguable that such justice is only limited to the 
contracting parties and not other creditors in line with 
the collective nature of insolvency law.168  
 
Furthermore, the assertion that insolvency set-off 
rule promotes equality in treatment of parties is 
doubtful. In the context of the statutory moratorium 
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162 r. 4.90 IR; M.S. Fashions Ltd. and Ors v Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International S.A. [1993] Ch. 425, 446. 
163 Halesowen Presswork & Assemblies Ltd v. NatÕl Westminster Bank Ltd [1972] 
A.C. 785 
164  Ian Fletcher, John Higham, Corporate Administrations and Rescue 
Procedures (fn. 8) 57. 
165 (1843) 12 M&W 191, 204. 
166 [2011] B.C.C. 555. 
167 ibid. at 565. 
168 See Lord HoffmanÕs observation in Stein v Blake [1996] A.C. 243, 250 that 
the justice of the set-off rule is by no means universal i.e. not accepted by all.  
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and within the wider context of insolvency lawÕs 
collective process, set-off rights are arguably unfair. 
The rights result in certain creditors being given 
preferential treatments ÔaccidentallyÓ or in 
circumstances where they never bargained for. Just as 
is the case with recoupment claims, set-off rights are 
capable of disrupting the cash flow in the insolvent 
estate, thus interfering with the task of the 
officeholder and the asset-preservation objective of 
the moratorium. 
 
 
              2.3.4.     Action by a Government unit 
 
The Bankruptcy Code exempts government 
agencies from the ambit of the statutory moratorium 
when the agencies are carrying out their regulatory 
functions. 169  This exception is confined to 
enforcement actions or claims arising from the 
performance of regulatory duties.170 For instance in In 
re Catalano 171  the debtor moved for issuance of 
temporary restraining order to prevent a city authority 
from demolishing rental unit allegedly necessary for a 
successful reorganization. Mahoney C.J. held that the 
condemnation proceeding brought by the city 
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169 s. 362(b)(4) and (5) Code.  
170 USA v Nicolet Inc. (fn. 16) 207. David Epstein, Steve Nickles, Bankruptcy 
(West Group 1993) 121. The two tests which are often applied in this regard are 
the Òpecuniary testÓ Ð see In re Universal Life Church 128 F.2d 1294, 1297 (9th 
Cir. 1997); Thomassen v DMQA 15 B.R. 907, 909 (9th Cir. BAP 1981); Yellow 
Cab Cooperative v Metro Taxi Inc. 132 F.3d 591, 597 (10th Cir. 1997) and the 
Òpublic policy testÓ Ð see Continental Hagen 932 F.2d 828, 833  (9th Cir.1991); 
NLRB v Edward Cooper Painting Inc. 804 F.2d 934, 942 (6th Cir. 1986); In re 
Corporacion de Servicios Midicos Hospitalarios de Fajardo 805 F.2d 440, 
445  (1st Cir. 1986). 
171 155 B.R. 219 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1993). 
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authority for the removal of a structure determined to 
be unsafe was exempted from the reach of the 
automatic stay on the ground that it was an Òexercise 
of police or regulatory power by a governmental 
unit.Ó172  
 
The present exception will not apply where a 
government agency is seeking to enforce a contract. 
The accompanying legislative statement expressly 
excludes the application of the exception in a manner 
which will protect the governmentÕs pecuniary 
interest in property of a debtor or estate. 173 
Accordingly, where a government department wears 
two hats as a creditor and a regulator, bankruptcy 
courts have to determine which capacity the 
government department is actually acting in 
connection to the contract.174 In In re Kansas Personal 
Communication Services 175  a Chapter 11 debtor-
licensee/winning bidder at a pre-petition government 
auction of radio spectrum licenses listed the licenses 
on its schedule of assets and identified them as 
property subject to a lien securing a creditor. The 
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172 ibid. at 221. 
173 The American Bankruptcy Institute has noted that the absence of a specific 
exception permitting governmental agencies, acting in their police or regulatory 
capacities, to Òexercise controlÓ over property of the estate hinders the ability of 
government agencies to carry out their important licensing and regulating 
functions that protect the safety and welfare of others. It has thus recommended 
the inclusion of this exception in the carve-out: 
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Working_Group_Proposals
&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=36559 (accessed on 28 
January 2013). Note that although some courts have often adopted a flexible 
approach and concluded that s. 362(b)(4) permits government agencies to 
exercise control over property of the estate to enforce police or regulatory powers 
without seeking bankruptcy courtÕs permission e.g. In re Universal Life Church 
Inc. (n 125) 442, others have adhered to the traditional construction of the 
automatic stay e.g. Hillis Motors Inc. v Hawaii Automobile Dealers 997 F.2d 
581, 590 (9th Cir. 1993). 
174 In re Kansas Personal Communication Services (fn. 175) 191. 
175 252 B.R. 179, 191 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2000). 
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regulator initiated an action for removal of the 
licenses from the schedule. Robinson J. ruled that the 
cancellation of the licenses was not a regulatory act 
excepted from the automatic stay.176 
 
The accompanying legislative statement of s. 
362(b)(4) explains the rationale for the present 
exception as being to permit governmental units to 
exercise police and regulatory powers in pursuing 
actions to protect public health and safety. 177  The 
current exception appears to embody US lawmakers' 
recognition that enforcement of certain public and 
environmental protection laws merits a higher priority 
than the debtor's rights to a Òcease fireÓ or the 
creditors' rights to an orderly administration of the 
estate.  
 
From another perspective, it can be argued 
that the present exception protects the integrity of the 
statutory moratorium by preventing the mechanism 
from becoming a sanctuary of public and 
environmental wrongdoers. Accordingly the 
exception has the potential of preventing the abuse of 
the moratorium by debtors who may be improperly 
seeking refuge under the stay with the aim of 
frustrating necessary governmental functions. For 
instance in USA v. Nicolet Inc.178 the automatic stay 
was held not to apply to Government's action to 
recover response clean-up costs under an 
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176 See also In re Corporacion de Servicios Midicos Hospitalarios de Fajardo 
(fn. 170) 445. 
177  Senate Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51-52 (1978). 
178 857 F.2d 202 (C.A.3 (Pa.) 1988). 
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environmental law from the debtor for clean-up of the 
debtor's hazardous waste site, even though the action 
sought money judgment for pre-petition derelictions. 
  
There is no similar exception under the UK 
insolvency law regime. Accordingly, the regime does 
not draw a distinction between cases when a 
government department acts in a regulatory capacity 
on one hand and when it is engaged in a contract with 
pecuniary interest on the other. In consequence, the 
moratorium will apply to government agencies 
regardless of the capacity in which they are dealing 
with a debtor. Government agencies whose regulatory 
responsibilities are impeded by the moratorium may 
promptly seek for relief from the moratorium from the 
court. 
 
    
2.3.5.    Running of time and extension of time in contracts 
 
The CodeÕs automatic stay will neither 
suspend the running of time in a contract nor stop an 
automatic transfer of property following the 
expiration of an agreed or statutory period of 
redemption. 179  Accordingly, contracts that are 
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179  In addition, s.108(c) of the Code provides for extension of time for the 
enforcement of claims or rights against the debtor as agreed by the debtor and its 
creditor if such a time period has not expired before the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition. Here the creditorÕs redemption period will be the latter of either the end 
of such period, including any suspension of such period occurring on or after the 
commencement of insolvency; or 30 days after notice of the termination or 
expiration of the stay. s. 108(c)(1) and (2). In the light of this, an interpretation of 
s. 362(a) as an indefinite stay of the statutory period of redemption will make s. 
108(c) meaningless. In re Hoffinger Industries Inc. 329 F.3d 948, 953 (8th Cir. 
2003); In re Morton 866 F.2d 561, 565-566  (2d Cir.1989); In The Matter of 
Construction Leasing and Investment Corp. 20 B.R. 546, 547 (Bankr. MD Fla. 
1982); Bank of Commonwealth v Bevan 13 B.R. 989, 994 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
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scheduled to automatically terminate on a specified 
date without the requirement of any action by the 
parties will be terminated on the agreed date, 
regardless of the commencement of insolvency.180 The 
foregoing is illustrated in the case of Hazen First 
State Bank v. Phillip Speight 181 where the expiration 
date under the terms of agreement was expressly 
stated, the Court of Appeal ruled that no act on the 
part of the parties was required in order for the 
contract to expire on the contractually-specified date 
and that the expiration was not within the purview of 
the s. 362(a) stay.182 Similarly in Moody v Amoco Oil 
Co.183 the court ruled that the fact that termination was 
not effective for ninety days did not make the 
termination different from that effected immediately. 
  
This present exception can be justified on the 
ground that suspending the running of time of 
contracts will amount to enlarging the contractual 
right of the debtor. At insolvency, an insolvent estate 
consisting of Òall legal or equitable interests of the 
debtor in property as of the commencement of a caseÓ 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1981); In re Ecklund & Swedlund Development Corp. 17 B.R. 451, 455, 456 
(Bkrtcy.D.Minn.1981). See the contrary view in Johnson v First National Bank 
of Montevideo 719 F.2d 270, 275 (8th Cir. 1983); In re Jenkins 19 B.R. 105, 110 
(D.Colo.1982); In re Johnson 8 B.R. 371, 374 (Bkrtcy.D.Minn.1981). The 
purpose of s. 108(c) is to prevent a debtor from taking advantage of the 
bankruptcy scheme by filing for bankruptcy and then waiting for the statute of 
limitation to run on the creditorÕs claim. Hazen First State Bank v Phillip Speight 
888 F.2d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1989). 
180  In re Beverages IntÕl Ltd 61 B.R. 966, 972 (Bankr.D.Mass.1986); In re 
Heaven Sent Ltd 37 B.R. 597, 597-598 (Bankr. E.D.Pa.1984); Moody v Amoco 
Oil Co. 734 F.2d 1200, 1213 (7th Cir. 1984); Johnson v First National Bank of 
Montevideo (fn. 10) 276. 
181 888 F.2d 574, 576 (8th Cir. 1989). 
182 ibid. at 576. 
183 734 F.2d 1200, 1213 (7th Cir. 1984), 
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is formed by virtue of s. 541(a).184 Thus, whatever 
rights a debtor has in property at the commencement 
of the case continue in bankruptcyÑno more, no 
less.185 Once a termination notice is given and time 
starts running, the debtorÕs contractual interest is 
limited to the period before the expiration of the 
notice. This limited interest is what falls into the 
bankruptcy estate. Accordingly, time and time again 
bankruptcy courts have noted that the filing of a 
bankruptcy petition does not expand the contractual 
right of a debtor by suspending the running of time.186 
 
It is submitted that the above reasoning 
is consistent with the settled principle of bankruptcy 
law that an executory contract or lease validly 
terminated prior to the institution of bankruptcy 
proceedings cannot be revived by the filing of a 
bankruptcy petition. 187  In In re Butchman 188 
Schwartsberg J. had rightly observed that,  
ÒWhen a debtor's legal and equitable interests in 
property are terminated prior to the filing of the petition 
with the Bankruptcy Court that was intended to preserve 
the debtor's interest in such property, the Bankruptcy 
court cannot then cultivate rights where none can 
grow.Ó189 
 
Hence, as a matter of general principle, the trustee 
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184 H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & 
Ad.News 5787. 
185  Moody v Amoco Oil Co. (fn. 131) 1213; Schokbeton Industries Inc. v. 
Schokbeton Products Corp. 466 F.2d 171, 176Ð177 (5th Cir.1972). 
186 Moody v Amoco Oil Co. 734 F.2d 1200, 1213 (7th Cir. 1984); New Media 
Irjax v. D.C. Comics 19 B.R. 199 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla.1982); In re Benrus Watch 
Co. 13 B.R. 331 (Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y.1981); In re Beck 5 B.R. 169 (Bkrtcy. D. 
Haw.1980) 
187 In re Commodity Merchants, Inc. 538 F.2d 1260, 1263 (7th Cir. 1976); In re 
GSVC Restaurant Corp. 10 B.R. 300, 302 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1980); In re Youngs 7 
B.R. 69, 71 (Bkrtcy., D.Mass.1980); In re Mimi's of Atlanta, Inc., 5 B.R. 623, 
627-29 (Bkrtcy., N. D. Ga. 1980); In re Bronx-Westchester Mack Corp., 4 B.R. 
730, 731 (Bkrtcy. S.D.N.Y. 1980); D. Fogel, ÒExecutory Contracts and 
Unexpired Leases in the Bankruptcy CodeÓ (1980) 64 Minn. L. Rev. 341, 346.  
188 4 B.R. 379, 381 (Bkrtcy. S.D.N.Y. 1980), 
189 ibid. at 381. 
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succeeds only to the rights the bankrupt possessed.190  
 
In the UK, just as is the case under the US 
regime, it is suggested that the moratorium will not 
affect the running of time in a contract. As a matter of 
general principle in English insolvency law, the 
officeholder takes, with a few exceptions,191 subject to 
equities. Accordingly, he takes the assets of the debtor 
in substantially the state in which he finds them.192 
Against this background, the officeholder will be 
bound by the contractual terms which qualify the 
contract i.e. the running of time. The contractual 
interest which is passed to the insolvent estate is 
therefore limited to the period before the expiration of 
the contract.  
 
Judicial support for the above reasoning can be 
found in the case of Re Maxwell Fleet & Facilities 
Management Ltd.193 The issue for consideration in that 
case was whether limitation periods ceased to run 
during the period of an administration. After a careful 
examination of the position in compulsory liquidation, 
where limitation periods cease to run, Judge Sher QC 
concluded that, 
ÒThe moratorium on proceedings, strong though it is, is 
not nearly enough to enable a court to read into a 
comprehensive modern statute like the Insolvency Act 
1986 an implied disapplication of the limitation periods 
during the tenure of the administrator.Ó194 
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2.4.   Relief from the statutory moratorium 
 
The effect of the moratorium is procedural and 
creditorsÕ rights ought to be suspended and not 
extinguished. In some cases, creditors may face the 
risk of incurring substantial losses if they opt to wait 
till the termination of the moratorium by operation of 
law or at the end of the procedure. The value of the 
assets may depreciate and creditors may lose the 
benefits that they would have derived from putting 
such assets into immediate use. In other instances, the 
asset may not be relevant or required in the 
insolvency procedure. Against this background, 
creditors in the two jurisdictions are afforded the 
opportunity to safeguard their security and proprietary 
interests in assets by applying for relief from the 
statutory moratorium.195 
 
Under the UK insolvency law regime, the 
administrators and courts have the power to grant 
relief from the moratorium. This is in contrast with 
the US regime where only bankruptcy courts can 
grant relief from the automatic stay. Although no 
rationale has been proffered for this approach, it is 
arguable that Congress has deliberately opted to 
restrict the grant of relief to courts with the aim of 
avoiding inevitable conflict of interests that will arise 
if the power is extended to officeholders. Under 
CodeÕs debtor-in-possession regime, pre-petition 
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company managers will also be saddled with the 
responsibility of granting or refusing relief from the 
stay.  
 
There are no statutory guidelines for the grant 
of relief from the moratorium under the Insolvency 
Act. However, a non-exhaustive set of guidelines to 
assist administrators and courts in determining 
applications for relief was laid down by Nicholls J. in 
Re Atlantic Company Systems Plc.196 On the other 
hand, a creditor seeking for relief under the Code 
must show cause as to why the relief should be 
granted. 197  The Bankruptcy Code has listed two 
circumstances that constitute cause, namely lack of 
adequate protection by the debtor for the creditorÕs 
interest in property and the dual conditions under s. 
362(d)(2), to wit, the debtorÕs lack of equity in the 
property and that the property is not necessary for an 
effective reorganization.198 
 
A number of authorities however suggest that 
cause for stay of relief is not limited to the above.199 
This is because the operative word which introduces 
the causes under s. 362(d) is Òincludes,Ó suggesting 
that the list is not exhaustive. Given that the Code 
does not define what constitutes cause, bankruptcy 
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courts have often exercised their discretion in the 
grant or denial or reliefs based on the circumstances 
of each case.200 This approach has been confirmed in 
the leading case of In re Robbins201 where it was noted 
that  
ÒAccording to s. 362(d), the bankruptcy court may lift 
the stay Òfor cause.Ó Because the Code provides no 
definition of what constitutes Òcause,Ó courts must 
determine when discretionary relief is appropriate on a 
case-by-case basis.Ó202 
 
In a similar vein, in the Atlantic Computer case 
in the UK, Nicholls J. reiterated the point that the 
factors he enumerated where merely guidelines, hence 
the list is not exhaustive.203 Patten J. echoed this point 
in A.E.S. Barry Ltd. v. TXU Europe Energy Trading204 
when he noted that, 
ÒThe court of appeal (in Atlantic Computer) was careful 
to emphasize that these are simply principles for the 
guidance of the court and are not intended in some way 
to override the general discretion vested in the Court 
under the provisions of the statute. Nonetheless they are 
a useful guide as to the matters which one ought to 
consider when coming to exercise the discretion.Ó205 
In consequence, the factors to be considered in 
granting relief in both jurisdictions have been left 
open, giving courts wide powers to exercise their 
discretion on a case-by-case basis. The next 
paragraphs will evaluate four specific factors that are 
capable of influencing the exercise of discretion by 
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courts in the two jurisdictions, namely the effect of 
the relief on the procedure, the balance of equities, 
treatment of secured claims and the conduct of the 
parties. The paragraphs will also examine the extent 
to which these factors align with the policy objectives 
of the statutory moratorium. 
  
 
2.4.1.     Effect of relief on procedure 
  
The paramount consideration in granting relief 
from the statutory moratorium in both jurisdictions is 
whether such relief will derail the insolvency 
procedure or hinder the officeholder from performing 
his duties. This consideration aligns with the principal 
policy objective of the statutory moratorium in both 
jurisdictions previously evaluated in 2.1.1.  
 
Under the Bankruptcy Code, relief will be 
granted if no bankruptcy policy necessitates 
interfering with the secured creditorÕs right to 
repossess his assets or enforce his security. 206  As 
noted in the prefatory section of 2.4, this will include, 
but not limited to, where the debtor has no equity in 
the property in issue and the property is not necessary 
to an effective reorganisation. 207  Accordingly, in 
Chapter 7 liquidation cases, the latter requirement is 
not necessary. This part of the thesis will focus on the 
second or latter limb of the requirement, while the 
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requirement for the debtorÕs equity in the property is 
evaluated in 2.4.2. 
 
To show that a property is Ònecessary for an 
effective reorganisation,Ó it must be shown that the 
property is essential for an effective procedure, and 
that there is a reasonable possibility of a successful 
reorganisation within a reasonable time.  In In re 
Plastech Engineered Products 208  the creditor 
successfully established that the debtor, an automobile 
parts supplier, had no equity in the property in issue (a 
tooling equipment), given that full payment had been 
made. This notwithstanding, the bankruptcy court 
denied relief on the ground that the debtor had shown 
that the equipment was necessary to an effective 
reorganisation reasonably in prospect.  
 
Establishing that property is necessary to an 
effective reorganisation is a question of fact and the 
burden of proof is on the debtor.209 It is suggested that 
showing that an asset is necessary for the effective 
reorganization may be easier to establish in cases 
where an asset constitutes the only asset or revenue-
generating asset of the debtor. For instance in In re 
San Clemente Estates 210  this requirement was 
established because the asset was the only asset 
available for the debtor to build a reorganisation plan 
around.211 
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Furthermore, it is now settled that what is 
required is not merely a showing that if there is 
conceivably to be an effective reorganization, the 
property will be needed for it; but that the property is 
essential for an effective reorganization that is in 
prospect. This means that there must be Òa reasonable 
possibility of a successful reorganization within a 
reasonable time.Ó212 It can thus be argued that even 
where a property is undoubtedly useful to the debtor, 
the regime will not permit the property to be retained 
if there is only a remote prospect of a successful 
reorganisation. It would seem that the only reasonable 
means of establishing this against an application for 
relief which is brought at an early stage of the 
procedure would probably be through a feasible 
reorganisation plan. 
  
Under UK insolvency law regime, as a general 
rule, relief will be granted where it is equitable to do 
so. A secured creditor will not be deprived of the 
fruits of his security if enforcement will neither 
impair the officeholder from performing his duties nor 
adversely affect insolvency procedure. In the leading 
case of Re Atlantic Computer Systems Plc213 Nicholls 
L.J. stated this point when he observed that, 
ÒThe prohibition in s 11(3)(c) and (d) is intended to 
assist the company, under the management of the 
administrator, to achieve the purpose for which the 
administration order was made. If granting leave to a 
lessor of land or the hirer of goods (a 'lessor') to exercise 
his proprietary rights and repossess his land or goods is 
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unlikely to impede the achievement of that purpose, 
leave should normally be given.Ó214 
This point was echoed in Metro Nominees 
(Wandsworth) (No.1) Ltd v. Rayment215 where it was 
stated that, 
ÒThe general rule in the normal case is that if a creditor 
seeks to exercise a proprietary right that is unlikely to 
impede the achievement of the purpose for which the 
administration is being pursued, then leave should 
normally be given.Ó216 
 
As previously noted while evaluating the US 
regime, this approach aligns with the underlying 
policy objective of the moratorium.  The moratorium 
is primarily aimed at preserving the assets available to 
the officeholder at insolvency. It therefore enables the 
administrator to collect and manage those assets 
without being impaired by enforcement actions or 
other legal processes. Against this background, where 
the grant of relief from the stay will not impede the 
officeholder from achieving his tasks or the purpose 
of the administration, it is only logical that relief be 
granted.  This would often be the case where the asset 
is not actually useful to the company or where the 
objective of the procedure has already been achieved 
or substantially achieved. 
 
Hence in the recent case of Lazari GP Ltd v 
Jervis217 the landlords applied for relief to exercise 
their rights to forfeit a lease of the premises of a 
company in administration which was occupied by a 
buyer under a pre-pack sale. In granting the relief, 
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Briggs J. held that the purpose of the administration 
had been substantially achieved by the business sale 
agreement and would in no way be interfered with by 
a grant of relief to the landlords to pursue their 
proprietary rights.218 A significant factor which the 
court took into cognizance was the fact that under the 
pre-pack, the third party buyer had agreed to take full 
risk of the exercise of those rights, hence a forfeiture 
had no potential adverse consequence for the 
achievement of the purpose of the administration.219 
 
In Magical Marketing Ltd v Phillips220 relief 
from stay was granted after Norris J. reached the 
conclusion that allowing the creditor to pursue its 
claim would not significantly impede the objective of 
the administration.221 An important factor that led to 
this conclusion was the finding that the administration 
achieved its objective on the first day by selling its 
entire undertaking and assets to an associated 
company which was to collect the debts. Accordingly, 
the only task left for the administrators was the 
distribution of funds which they had in their hands.  
 
The Magical Marketing Ltd case is similar to 
the facts of Metro Nominees (Wandsworth) (No.1) Ltd 
v Rayment222 where relief was granted on the ground 
that the object of the administration namely, a better 
realisation of the assets than would have been 
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achieved in an immediate liquidation, had been 
achieved by an earlier sale agreement between the 
administrators and a third party.223 
  
In contrast, in Re David Meek Plant Ltd224 
Judge Weeks QC denied relief from the moratorium 
after concluding that a repossession of the goods in 
issue would bring the administration to an abrupt 
end.225 Hence where it is clear that insisting on an 
original bargain will be detrimental to the success of 
the procedure, property rights may be suspended or 
altered, but not extinguished. The case of Innovate 
Logistics Ltd v. Sunberry Properties Ltd226 illustrates 
this point. In that case the granting of a licence for 
premises to a purchaser by an administrator in breach 
of the original licence agreement and without leave of 
court, was not sufficient to persuade the court to grant 
relief to the landlord. The court reasoned that in some 
circumstances, an administrator may be compelled to 
breach existing company contracts in pursuit of the 
achievement of the objective of the administration.227 
In this case, it was established that the landlord would 
not be substantially prejudiced by a refusal to grant 
leave because the administrators had agreed that the 
fee for the licence would be paid to the landlord. 
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2.4.2.    Balance of equities 
  
Where there is likelihood that the grant of 
relief may impede the officeholder or derail the 
procedure, 228  courts in both jurisdictions ought to 
make a decision based on the weighing of the interests 
of the applicant-creditor against those of the debtor 
and its other creditors. 229  This weighing exercise 
manifests in diverse ways. The next paragraphs will 
evaluate some of the ways in which courts weigh the 
interests of parties to determine the grant of relief. 
The approaches will be evaluated against the 
background of the policy objectives of the 
moratorium. As previously noted, a creditor seeking 
for relief under the Code must show cause as to why 
the relief should be granted. 230  Accordingly, all 
relevant factors including the three factors listed as 
causes under s. 362(d), namely adequate protection, 
debtorÕs equity in the property in issue and the 
necessity of the property for an effective 
reorganisation will be taken into consideration in the 
balancing exercise. 
 
An important factor that is capable of 
influencing the manner in which the courtÕs discretion 
is exercised is the availability of adequate protection 
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under s. 362(d)(1) to holders of secured claims. While 
its absence will constitute cause for grant of relief,231 
its presence may persuade the court to decline 
granting relief subject to the balancing of other 
factors. For instance in Matter of Holt County Grain 
Storage Inc.232 a holder of first mortgage was denied 
relief from the stay notwithstanding that the debtor 
had no equity in the asset. The bankruptcy court took 
cognizance of the fact that the creditor had been 
adequately protected and that the asset represented all 
of the debtorÕs property, hence was necessary for the 
reorganisation.233  
 
Lack of adequate protection is indeed the most 
common basis for the grant of relief under the 
Code.234 Adequate protection requires that the value of 
the secured creditor's collateral position should not be 
allowed to decline because of the stay.235 By virtue of 
s. 361, adequate protection includes cash payments, 
additional or replacement liens that are commensurate 
with the decrease in the value of the creditorÕs 
security interest or any relief that will enable the 
creditor to realise the indubitable equivalent of his 
interest in the property.236   
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Although not specifically mentioned in s. 361, 
the existence of equity cushion (evaluated in 2.4.3) on 
its own has been held to constitute adequate 
protection.237 For instance in In re Curtis238 King Jr. J. 
held that the existence of equity cushion of 
approximately $40,000 in property which was the 
subject of a mortgage was adequate protection for the 
creditor who held first mortgage in amount of $35,000 
and had obtained default judgment in foreclosure 
action in amount of $38,222.32. The court thus held 
that the creditor was not entitled to relief.239 This is 
plainly correct. Generally, it is incumbent on 
bankruptcy courts to weigh the contending interests of 
parties i.e. the harm which would be incurred in the 
event of a grant or denial of relief to either of the 
parities. For instance, in In re Idolia Avila240 relief 
from stay was denied after it was established that the 
creditor was adequately protected by a large equity 
cushion and that the debtor would suffer a substantial 
loss in the event of foreclosure, with no economic 
harm to the creditor. 
  
Under the UK regime, relief from the 
moratorium will be granted where it is equitable to do 
so. 241  Hence, courts must carry out a balancing 
exercise by weighing the potential prejudice which 
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the relief will cause to the debtorÕs insolvency 
procedure against the hardship which the relief may 
inflict on applicant-creditor if it is denied. 242 
Prospective significant loss to the applicant-creditor 
will be a factor in his favour. However, such loss, 
irrespective of how significant, may be 
discountenanced if other creditors will incur 
substantially greater losses.243  The instructive point to 
note in the balancing exercise is that it involves the 
exercise of judicial discretion and facts that courts 
ought to take into consideration in weighing the 
interests of parties are virtually limitless. Hence in Re 
Atlantic Computer Systems Plc. 244  Nicholls L.J. 
emphasized that,   
ÒParliament has left at large the discretion given to the 
court, and it is not for us to cut down that discretion or, 
as it was put in argument, to confine it within a 
straitjacket É s. 11(3)(c) and (d) (nor paragraph 43 of 
Schedule B1) applies to a very wide range of steps and 
proceedings, and the circumstances in which leave is 
sought will vary almost infinitely.Ó245 
 
 
In the Atlantic Computer Systems case, Nicholls 
laid down guidelines that courts may follow in the 
balancing act. In the case itself, the court conducted 
its balancing exercise by examining the effect on the 
administration if leave were given,246 the effect of a 
grant or denial on the parties, the prospects of a 
successful procedure if leave was refused Ð especially 
the fact that the administration was a prelude to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
242 Innovate Logistics Ltd v Sunberry Properties Ltd [2009] B.C.C. 164, 174; In 
re Indian River Estates Inc. 293 B.R. 429, 433 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003); In re 
LDN Corporation 191 B.R. 320, 324 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996); In re Robbins 964 
F.2d 342, 345 (4th. Cir. 1992). 
243 [1992] Ch. 505, 543. 
244 [1992] Ch. 505. 
245 ibid. at 541. 
246 ibid. at 538. 
  
199 
winding up the company247 and the conduct of the 
parties.248  
 
Another illustration of the balancing act can be 
seen in Lazari GP Ltd v. Jervis.249 In granting relief 
from the moratorium, Briggs J. took into 
consideration evidence that demonstrated a real 
prospect that the applicant/landlords would suffer 
financial loss by any delay caused by being unable to 
enforce their rights, as well as the probable adverse 
effect of inability to grant a new lease new lease of 
the premises. On the part of the debtor, his Lordship 
observed that the relief would not impede the 
procedure, given that its purpose had been 
substantially achieved via a pre-pack sale.250  
 
In Bristol Airport Plc. v Powdrill & ors251 Sir 
Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C endorsed the 
balancing act of the lower court which had taken into 
consideration factors such as the fact that the 
applicants were unsecured creditors, the detriment to 
similarly ranked creditors, the impediment of a relief 
to the achievement of the purpose of the procedure 
and the conduct of the parities.252 Lastly in Re David 
Meek Access Ltd.253 Judge Weeks QCÕs decision to 
deny relief from the moratorium was premised on the 
ground that the applicant finance companies had not 
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proved that they would suffer a significant loss 
compared with the position they would have been in if 
they had been allowed to repossess their goods when 
the administration order was made.254 
 
In the light of the foregoing, the balancing of 
interests to determine whether relief from the 
statutory moratorium should be granted is an exercise 
of judicial discretion. This discretion ought to be 
exercised in a manner that gives effect to the 
objectives of the statutory moratorium. Furthermore, 
in the exercise of the discretion, regard ought to be 
given to the diverse interests of contending parties, 
especially the proprietary rights of creditors. 
  
 
2.4.3.    Treatment of secured claims 
  
In weighing the interests of the creditor and 
debtor to determine whether to grant relief from the 
moratorium, the courts in both jurisdictions aim to 
protect property rights of creditors. This approach is 
underpinned by the principle that, save in exceptional 
cases, an administration or a reorganisation for the 
benefit of unsecured creditors ought not to be 
conducted at the expense of creditors with security 
interests or proprietary rights.255 This also aligns with 
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the wider insolvency law policy that only assets of the 
debtor ought to be available to the general body of 
creditors. Accordingly and as discussed in 2.4.2., the 
Code places significant importance on the provision 
of adequate protection for secured creditors, the 
absence of which can constitute cause for relief. 
  
An alternative ground for relief from the 
CodeÕs automatic stay under s. 362(d)(2) is showing 
that the debtor does not have an equity in the property 
in issue. This must however be accompanied by the 
showing that the property is not necessary for an 
effective reorganisation, a point evaluated in 2.4.1. 256 
Accordingly, bankruptcy courts have developed the 
equity cushion test for determining whether a debtor 
has equity in the property. It is suggested that 
ascertaining whether a debtor has equity in property is 
plausible given that if the trustee is to sell the property 
in which the debtor has equity, there would be 
something left over for the estate after paying the 
creditor his due. This will not harm the secured 
creditor who will be paid in full. A sale by the trustee 
would therefore enhance the likelihood of maximising 
realization for unsecured creditors. In contrast, if the 
sale is done by the secured creditor, there is a 
likelihood that the creditor may have no incentive to 
attempt to obtain a sale price over and above his own 
debt. 
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Land Bank v Radford 295 U.S. 555 (1935). 
256 In re Plastech Engineered Products 382 B.R. 90, 109 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
2008); In re CBJ Development Inc. 202 B.R. 467, 473 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1996). 
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In carrying out the equity cushion test, some 
courts have insisted on consideration of all liens 
regardless of whether or not other lien holders have 
also requested for relief, 257 while other courts have 
often considered the value of the lien of the applicant 
alone.258 Here is a hypothetical illustration: Debtor has 
property valued at $10,000. Creditor C1 has a senior 
lien against the property securing a debt of $8,000. 
Creditor C2 has a junior lien against the property 
securing a debt of $3,000. Creditor C1 moves for 
relief from stay. Under the first approach, Creditor C1 
will satisfy the equity cushion test given that the two 
secured debts of $8,000 and $3,000 together total 
$11,000 and thus greater than the $10,000 value of the 
property. In contrast, under the second approach, only 
Creditor C1Õs $8,000 will be considered, this will be 
less than the $10,000 value of the property, and 
Debtor will have equity in the property.  
 
The first view is premised on the literal 
construction of the relevant provision. First, the 
statute refers to the debtorÕs ÒequityÓ which has been 
defined as Òthe amount or value of a property above 
the total liens or charges.Ó259 In addition, the statute 
does not refer to the debtor's equity as against the only 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
257 Viper Mining Co. v Diversified Energy Venture 311 B.R. 712, 717 (Bankr. 
W.D. Pa. 2004); Nantucket Investors II v California Federal Bank 61 F.3d 197, 
206-207 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Mikole Developers Inc. 14 B.R. 524, 525 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. 1981); In re Dallasta 7 B.R. 883 (Bkrtcy., E.D.Pa.1980); In re Gardner 
14 B.R. 455, 456 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); Stewart v Gurley 745 F.2d 1194, 1195 
(9th Cir.1984); In re Trina-Dee Inc. 26 B.R. 152, 154 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1983); 
258  In re Spring Garden River Foliage Inc. 15 B.R. 140, 143 (Bankr. M.D. 
Fla.1981); In re Palmer River Reality 26 B.R. 138, 140 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1983); In 
re Certified Mortgage Corp. 25 B.R. 662, 663 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982); In re 
Wolford Enterprises, Inc. 11 B.R.571. (Bkrtcy. W.Va., 1981). 
259 In re Faires 34 B.R. 549, 552. 
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plaintiff-lienholder seeking to lift the stay or persons 
holding liens senior to that of the plaintiff-lienholder. 
This view undoubtedly favours a creditor seeking 
relief.  
 
The second and opposing view which favours 
a debtor is based on the need to protect the interests 
junior lienholders as opposed to the interests of the 
debtor or senior lienholder. It is suggested that a more 
persuasive argument for the second approach would 
be that it is more supportive of the asset-preservation 
objective of the statutory moratorium.260 Here, the 
comparison of the equity in the property will be 
between the debtorÕs and that of the applicant/lien-
holder. Accordingly, an equity cushion test which 
ignores any outstanding junior encumbrance against 
the subject property so long as the debtor has a 
substantial and meaningful equity cushion over and 
above the senior encumbrance, will shore-up this 
objective. This will undoubtedly give the debtor a 
greater chance of proving that it has equity in the 
property. 
 
However, it is suggested that the first 
approach is the appropriate approach based on the 
reasons proffered by the courts above. A number of 
courts have defined ÒequityÓ as used in s. 
362(d)(2)(A) as the value above all secured claims 
against the property that can be realised from the sale 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
260 Baird describes this as Ôa defensible interpretation of the language of the 
Bankruptcy Code.Ó Douglas Baird, Elements of Bankruptcy, 5th edn., Foundation 
Press 2010, 200; Charles Tabb, Law of Bankruptcy (2nd edn., Foundation Press 
2009) 319. 
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of the property for the benefit of unsecured creditors 
and equity security holders. 261  Against this 
background, the focus is solely on the debtorÕs equity 
in the property and not the debtorÕs equity compared 
to that of the applicant/senior lien-holder. Hence the 
fact that the debtorÕs equity is slightly greater than 
that of the applicant is immaterial so far as the former 
is less than the total outstanding lien. This position is 
the same even in cases where some junior lienholders 
are in support of the reorganisation.262 The general 
rule being that equity is computed from the 
perspective of the debtor and not the creditor who is 
seeking for relief.263 
  
UK courts also pay significant attention to the 
proprietary rights of creditors. 264  As a matter of 
general rule, insolvency ought not to be conducted for 
the benefit of unsecured creditors at the expense of 
holders of secured or proprietary interests. 265  
Accordingly, it is incumbent on courts to ensure that 
holders of proprietary rights are not left worse off 
than they would have been in an insolvent liquidation. 
Even where assets which are owned by third parties or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
261 In re Plastech Engineered Products (fn 256) 109; Stephens Industries Inc. v 
McClung 789 F.2d 386, 392 (6th Cir.1986); In re Roane, 8 B.R. 997, 1000 
(B.Ct.E.D.Pa.1981), affirmed in 14 B.R. 542 (D.C.E.D.Pa.1981).  
262 A contrary decision was reached in In re Spring Garden River Foliage Inc. 15 
B.R. 140, 143 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1981); In re Palmer River Reality 26 B.R. 138, 
140 (Bankr.D.R.I.1983) where in calculating the total equities, the Courts 
excluded the equities of lien holders who were in support of the debtorÕs 
reorganisation plan. In In re Spring Garden Foliage, Inc. 15 B.R. 140, 143 
(Bkrtcy. M.D. Fla. 1981), Paskay J. described this approach as having Òno 
support by logic or by the legislative history of ¤ 362.Ó  
263 Nantucket Investors II v. California Fed. Bank (fn. 257); Stewart v. Gurley 
745 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir 1984); Charles Tabb, Law of Bankruptcy (fn. 84)319. 
264 Re Atlantic Computer Systems Plc. (fn. 38): ÒGreat importance or weight 
should be given to proprietary interests of a lessor and where an administration 
order is made in lieu of liquidation.Ó 
265 Metro Nominees (Wandsworth) (No.1) Ltd v Rayment (fn. 205) 45-6. 
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subject to security interests are used in the course of 
the administration procedure,266 the general position is 
that the affected secured creditor must be adequately 
compensated by being given the equivalent value of 
his security.267 An unavoidable case could be where 
there is a great prospect of success of an insolvency 
procedure and the court also considers that the 
secured creditor will not incur any substantial loss by 
a further delay in granting relief.268 This approach 
places a secured creditor in the UK regime on the 
same footing with his US counterpart. 
 
It is argued that the foregoing is sound 
insolvency law practice. First, insolvency law ought 
not to be a forum for confiscating the assets of other 
parties or expanding the contractual rights of debtors. 
Only assets of the debtor ought to be used for the 
procedure or available for the general body of 
creditors. However the insolvency policy in both 
jurisdictions has recognised that in some cases the 
officeholder may have a greater incentive to 
maximize the value of assets in the possession of the 
company, notwithstanding that such assets are owned 
by third parties or subject to security interests. As 
previously noted, by comparison, creditors may not 
necessarily have the incentive to realize any value 
above that owed by the company. 
 
In the light of the foregoing, the following 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
266 Re Atlantic Computer Systems Plc. (fn. 38) 501-502; Innovate Logistics Ltd 
(fn. 157) 174. 
267 [1992] 1 All ER 476. 
268 Sch. B1, Paras 70, 71 and 72 of the Act. 
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conclusions can be reached as regards the treatment of 
secured claim holders in the two jurisdictions with 
regards to the statutory moratorium. First, both 
jurisdictions duly respect the proprietary rights of 
creditors. Secondly, the procedure will not be carried 
out for the benefit of unsecured creditors at the 
expense of creditors with proprietary interests. 
Thirdly and notwithstanding the foregoing, assets that 
are subject to proprietary claims will only be used in 
the procedure where they are necessary for the 
reorganisation and there is a reasonable prospect of a 
successful reorganisation. Finally, assets that are 
subject to proprietary claims will only be used if the 
affected creditor is adequately protected. 
  
 
2.4.4.    Conduct of the parties 
 
As previously noted, grant of relief from the 
statutory moratorium is discretionary. Accordingly, 
courts in the two jurisdictions are mandated to take all 
relevant factors into consideration in the exercise of 
their discretion.269 The courts have a wide discretion 
in relation to factors to be considered in determining 
the grant of relief.270 One of such relevant factors 
capable of influencing the exercise of the courtÕs 
discretion is the conduct of the parties.  
 
Under UK insolvency law, it has been held 
that it is incumbent on the applicant-creditor to make 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
269 Bristol Airport v Powdrill & ors [1990] 2 W.L.R. 1362, [1990] Ch. 744. 
270 Fashoff (UK) Ltd v Linton (fn. 73) 367. 
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a good case for himself by making his position clear 
from the outset and promptly filing his application for 
leave.271 A delay in an application for relief or conduct 
which suggests that a creditor is in support of an 
officeholderÕs reorganisation plan is likely to have an 
adverse effect on a subsequent application for relief. 
In refusing to grant relief in Bristol Airport v 
Powdrill272 the court took into account the fact that 
during the administration, the applicants had stood by 
and benefited from the business under the supervision 
of the administrator and also received sums exceeding 
what they would have received in liquidation.273 Other 
objectionable conducts such as flouting the 
prohibition prior to an application may be detrimental 
to an application for relief.274 This can be contrasted 
with the attitude of the applicant in Re Atlantic 
Computer Systems Plc.275 who from the outset of the 
administration sought the administratorÕs consent to 
the realisation of its security.276 
  
Under the Bankruptcy Code, a debtorÕs bad 
faith can constitute sufficient cause for lifting the 
statutory moratorium.277 What will constitute bad faith 
will depend on the facts of each case. It is incumbent 
on courts to consider the actions of the debtor to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
271 Re Atlantic Computer Systems Plc. (fn. 38) 498; Fashoff (UK) Ltd v Linton 
(fn. 73) 378 (98)-(99), 379 (109)-(110). 
272 [1990] 2 W.L.R. 1362, [1990] Ch. 744 
273 ibid. at 767. 
274 (fn. 272) 767, 771. 
275  (1992) Ch. 505. 
276 ibid. at 539. 
277 s. 362(d)(1) of the Code; In re Club Tower 138 B.R. 307, 310 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. 1991); In re Citadel Properties Inc. 86 B.R. 275, 277 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
1988). James Sack, ÒAdequate ProtectionÓ (1985) 2 Bankr Dev. J. 21, 34. 
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determine if it is colourable in any way.278 In the case 
of In re RAD Properties 279  the debtor filed its 
bankruptcy petition on the eve of foreclosure. Proctor 
J. granted the creditorÕs application to modify 
automatic stay in order to permit continuance of 
foreclosure proceedings on the ground that the 
bankruptcy filing was done in bad faith. Similarly in 
In re Citadel Properties Inc.280 a bankruptcy petition 
was filed less than one hour prior to a scheduled 
foreclosure sale of a one-asset enterprise with no 
employees and no source of income. Again Proctor J. 
granted relief to the creditor on the ground of bad 
faith on the part of the debtor.281 
 
Indeed, time and time again bankruptcy courts 
have held that bad faith filing of a bankruptcy petition 
on its own constitutes cause for lifting of the statutory 
moratorium.282 This position is plainly correct. First, 
once bad faith is established in the filing, the whole 
bankruptcy petition is tainted and there is no need to 
examine the merits or otherwise of the moratorium. 
Accordingly, Epstein has noted that in cases relating 
to a finding of bad faith, the concern is much broader 
than the threat to the creditorÕs collateral; it amounts 
to an abuse of the bankruptcy process against the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
278 In re Phoenix-Piccadilly Ltd 84 B.R. 843 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1988); In re RAD 
Properties 84 B.R. 827 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1988). 
279 84 B.R. 827 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1988). 
280 86 B.R. 275. 
281 Ibid. at 276. 
282 ibid at 829; In re Bell Partners, Ltd. 82 B.R. 593 (Bkrptcy.M.D.Fla.1988); In 
re PhoenixÐPiccadilly, Ltd. (fn. 278); In re SarÐManco, Inc., 70 B.R. 132 
(Bankr.M.D.Fla.1986); In re Little Creek Development Co. 779 F.2d 1068 (5th 
Cir.1986); In re Albany Partners, Ltd. 749 F.2d 670 (11th Cir.1984); In re 
Victory Const. Co. Inc. 9 B.R. 549 (Bkrtcy..Cal. 1981). 
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intentions of the bankruptcy law. 283  Secondly, the 
moratorium ought to serve as a shield for the debtor in 
line with the earlier evaluated objectives and not as a 
sword. Hence, an efficient relief procedure ought to 
safeguard against the offensive use of the statutory 
moratorium solely as a means of preventing creditors 
from enforcing contractual remedies or as a 
bargaining tool to extract concessions from secured 
creditors.284 
  
UK courts have not had the opportunity to 
exercise their discretion in granting or refusing relief 
where the filing of the insolvency petition was done in 
bad faith. In the recent case of Somerfield Stores Ltd 
and Spring Ltd 285  Judge Purle QC stated that 
administrators cannot and should not hide behind the 
moratorium to delay proceedings brought under the 
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 Ð as it was improper 
for administrators to use the power to give or 
withhold consent as a bargaining tool. 
 
In the earlier case of Re Dianoor Jewels Ltd,286 
the principal contention was that the petition for the 
administration order was an abuse of process, given 
that the company was the alter ego of a husband and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
283 It has however been posited that in cases relating to a finding of bad faith, the 
concern is much broader than the threat to the creditorÕs collateral; It amounts to 
an abuse of the bankruptcy process against the intentions of the law. David 
Epstein, Steve Nickles, Bankruptcy (fn. 170) 149. 
284 In re Cooper 116 B.R. 469, 472 (Bkrtcy..E.D.Va. 1990); In re A.H. Robins 
Co. 828 F.2d 1023, 1026 (4th Cir.1987); Drubner v Gaslight Village 8 B.R. 866, 
870 (Bankr.D.Conn.1981). However see Pettibone Corp v Baker 110 B.R. 848, 
855 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1990) where it was held that the debtorÕs alleged offensive 
use of the stay Òis precisely what the law allows a debtor to do.Ó 
285 [2010] EWHC 2084 (Ch.). 
286 [2001] 1 B.C.L.C. 450. 
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the latter had simply influenced the directors into 
commencing the insolvency proceedings with the aim 
of thwarting the enforcement of a subsisting 
judgment.  In rejecting this argument, Blackburne J., 
stated that regardless of whether the administration 
petition was an abuse of process, the statutory 
requirements for commencing the procedure had been 
sufficiently demonstrated, namely, that the company 
is or is likely to become unable to pay its debts and 
the court considers that the making of an 
administration order would be likely to achieve one or 
more of the statutory purposes. According to his 
Lordship, 
ÒThe fact that the making of an administration order 
may thwart the genuine claims of a third party is not a 
reason for not making it ... It frequently happens that a 
purpose of the making of an administration order is to 
stop the prosecution of legal proceedings against the 
company's property. It is none the worse for that.Ó287  
 
Although this position may not be emotionally 
appealing, it is plainly correct. If the petition fulfills 
the statutory requirements, the motive is immaterial. 
 
Significantly, in Innovate Logistics Ltd v 
Sunberry Properties Ltd288 the granting of a licence 
for premises to a purchaser by an administrator in 
breach of the original licence agreement and without 
leave of court was not sufficient to persuade the court 
to grant relief to the landlord. Notwithstanding the 
objectionable behaviour of the administrator,289 the 
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287 ibid. at 458. 
288 [2009] B.C.C. 164. 
289 Goode describes the decision as "certainly an unusual one" in Roy Goode, 
Principles of Corporate Law (at p. 425). The decision has also been criticised by 
Counsel for the landlord in Gabriel Moss, "Court of Appeal Confiscates 
LandlordÕs Bargaining Position" (2009) Ins. Int. 1.  
  
211 
court of appeal proceeded with the balancing of 
interests and subsequently refused leave. The court 
reached the conclusion that in some circumstances, an 
administrator may be compelled to breach existing 
company contracts in pursuit of the achievement of 
the objective of the administration.290 
 
The approach of the court in Innovate 
Logistics can be justified on the ground that 
regardless of the initial wrongful act of the 
administrator, his action ensured that large sums, by 
way of book debts, which would pay off secured 
creditors and provide dividends to the unsecured 
creditors, were collected by reason of the fulfillment 
of the debtorÕs outstanding contracts.291 Furthermore, 
the landlord stood to benefit from the purchaserÕs 
occupation of the property since the debtor did not 
have funds to pay the rent and the purchaser had 
agreed to pay a monthly amount that was equal to the 
rent under the lease. In addition the rent payable under 
the lease was higher than the market rent and it would 
have been impossible for the landlord to re-let at such 
a rate.292 Granting leave to the landlord solely because 
of the breach of the leasehold covenant by of the 
administrator would have amounted to converting the 
relief procedure into a punitive mechanism. 
   
   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
290 ibid. at 179. 
291 [2009] B.C.C. 164, 179 (51), 176. Furthermore, the interference with the 
landlordÕs proprietary rights was temporary and was to last for the period of the 
unlawful licence when the purchaser was to occupy the premises to carry out the 
business and realise book debts. 
292 Ibid. at 181 (67). 
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Conclusion 
  
It is impossible for all creditors of an insolvent 
company to receive the fruits of their pre-insolvency 
contractual bargains.293 The fact that a company is 
undergoing an insolvency procedure clearly points to 
its inability to fulfil those pre-insolvency contractual 
obligations to the letter. Hence, permitting creditors to 
enforce their claims and effect repossession against 
the debtor once the insolvency procedure commences 
will effectively jeopardise the objectives of the 
procedure.  
 
The Bankruptcy CodeÕs automatic stay and the 
Insolvency ActÕs moratorium operate in a similar 
manner and substantially have the same effect on 
contracts. They constitute another occasion where 
insolvency law interferes with pre-petition contracts 
and the enforcement of contractual remedies. They 
also constitute one of the few instances where 
proprietary and security interests are interfered with 
during formal insolvency procedures.  
 
Once in place, the statutory moratorium 
constitutes a near impenetrable barrier to certain 
unilateral creditor actions and claims against the 
insolvent company. These suspensions of rights 
preserve the assets available to the officeholder, gives 
the officeholder a breathing spell to perform his 
responsibilities and enhances a collective procedure as 
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293 Daniel Keating, ÔOffensive Use of the Bankruptcy StayÕ (1992) 45 Vand. L. 
Rev. 71, 122. 
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opposed to a premature piece-meal dismemberment of 
the debtorÕs assets. 
 
Against this background, the statutory 
moratorium undoubtedly promotes sound insolvency 
law policy objectives. Accordingly its transient 
interference with legitimate contractual rights is 
arguably justifiable. The mechanism for relief from 
the statutory moratorium creates an avenue for the 
protection of the interests of creditors, especially 
holders of proprietary claims. Hence, while the 
restraint by the statutory moratorium may impose 
temporary inconvenience on individual creditors, it 
enhances efficiency in the administration of the 
insolvent estate as well as the maximisation of 
realisations for the general body of creditors.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
DISCLAIMER/REJECTION OF CONTRACTS 
       
    
                 3.0.    Introduction 
  
Companies usually engage in diverse 
contractual arrangements and relationships in the 
course of their operations. At the commencement of 
formal insolvency proceedings, some of these 
contracts may be essential to the success of the 
insolvency procedure. Conversely, others may be 
burdensome to the company, imposing enormous 
obligations without reciprocal benefits, such that the 
performance of those contractual obligations may 
result in the dissipation of the companyÕs limited 
resources. 
 
The commencement of formal insolvency does 
not automatically terminate pre-petition executory 
contracts unless otherwise stipulated in the contract.1  
Contracts that are not terminated prior to the 
commencement of insolvency will survive the 
insolvency filing. Although executory contracts are 
not automatically terminated, they are not also 
enforceable per se against the debtor or the 
bankruptcy estate. Certain officeholders in under the 
Insolvency Act and the Bankruptcy Code are 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1  Such termination-at-insolvency clauses are ipso facto clauses which are 
unenforceable at insolvency under s. 365 of the Code subject to the exceptions 
analysed in chapter one. UK law upholds termination at insolvency clauses so 
long as they do not effect a transfer of the debtorÕs asset. 
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empowered to disclaim or reject such contracts 
respectively in appropriate cases. 2  Conversely, 
officeholders are also empowered to look into the 
debtorÕs inventory of executory contracts and cherry-
pick beneficial contracts with the aim of maximising 
realisations for the general creditors.  
  
This chapter analyses the policy objectives of 
the power to disclaim executory contracts under the 
UK Insolvency Act and the corresponding power to 
reject or assume pre-insolvency executory contracts 
under the Bankruptcy Code. The chapter evaluates the 
statutory rules and their efficacy at achieving the 
policy objectives. It also attempts to develop a sound 
understanding of and distinction between the concepts 
of disclaimer and rejection of executory contracts in 
the two jurisdictions. 
 
 
3.1.   The policy rationale 
 
3.1.1   Asset-preservation/maximisation of realisations 
  
One of the cardinal objectives of corporate 
insolvency law is the maximization of realisations for 
the benefit of the general body of creditors. The 
disclaimer/rejection and assumption provisions are 
some of the mechanisms through which this 
insolvency law objective is achieved. The power of 
officeholders to disclaim/reject or assume executory 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 s. 178 0f the Act and s. 365(a) of the Code. The UK Insolvency Act does not 
explicitly empower administrators to disclaim contracts. 
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contracts and unexpired leases enables them to renege 
on any unbeneficial pre-petition executory contract in 
the debtorÕs inventory. In consequence, contracts 
which will require the dissipation of the limited assets 
of the company in performance, without 
commensurate benefits to the insolvency estate can be 
reneged.  
 
This power enables the debtor or bankruptcy 
estate to have a clean break from the pre-petition 
contractual liabilities of the debtor. This obviates the 
need to expend the limited resources of the corporate 
debtor in performing the obligations under such 
unbeneficial contracts.3 It also prevents the depletion 
of the debtorÕs assets, considering that the 
performance of such onerous contracts after the 
commencement of insolvency will give rise to 
liabilities ranking as expenses of the liquidation or 
reorganisation.4 The debtor is therefore relieved of 
burdensome contractual obligations that may have 
contributed to its insolvency.5  
   
Secondly, the power to assume pre-petition 
executory contracts under the Code, provides the 
officeholder with the opportunity to cherry-pick 
beneficial executory contracts. 6  This power enables 
the officeholder to preserve useful pre-insolvency 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 In re Park Air Services plc. [2000] 2 AC 172, 184; Report of the Review 
Committee, Insolvency Law and Practice, Cmnd 8558 (1982), para.1185. 
4 Re Nottingham General Cemetery [1995] Ch. 683. 
5 In re Perry Elton Register 95 B.R. 73, 74; Chattanooga Memorial Park  v. Still 
574 F.2d 349, 350Ð51 (6th Cir.1978); Robert Jordan, William Warren, et. al. 
Bankruptcy (5th edn, Foundation Press 1999) 335.    
6  Michael Andrew, ÒExecutory Contracts In Bankruptcy: Understanding 
ÔRejectionÕÓ (1988) 59 U. Colo. L. Rev. 845, 895. 
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executory contracts for the benefit of the general 
creditors. This ensures that valuable contracts and 
assets of the debtor are not lost in course of the 
insolvency, but channelled towards maximising 
returns to creditors.7 The assumption provision thus 
facilitates the swelling of assets in the estate in 
furtherance of insolvency lawÕs cardinal objective of 
maximisation of realisations.8  
 
The foregoing policy objectives of the 
rejection and assumption provisions were stated by 
Klobucher J. in In re Norquist9 when he noted that, 
ÒThe purpose for allowing the trustee or debtor-in-
possession to assume or reject an executory contract is 
to enable a trustee or troubled debtor to take advantage 
of a contract that will benefit the estate by assuming it or 
alternatively, to relieve the estate of a burdensome 
contract by rejecting it. Rejection of an executory 
contract É relieves the debtor of burdensome future 
obligations while he is trying to recover financially.Ó10 
 
It is instructive to note that, in contrast to the 
Bankruptcy Code, the Insolvency Act does not 
provide for an express assumption of contracts. 
Indeed in the recent case of Mackay v Kaupthing 
Singer & Friedlander Ltd11 it was held that using the 
term adoption in sale contracts is Òa trifle 
misleading,Ó given that the Insolvency Act only 
employs the expression in relation to contracts of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 In re Jeffrey Lavigne 114 F.3d 379, 386  (2nd Cir 1997); Leasing Service Corp 
v First Tennessee Bank National Association 826 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1987). 
8 SSSL Realisations (2006) Ch 619; Edward Bailey, Hugo Groves, Corporate 
Insolvency Law And Practice (3rd edn, LexisNexis Butterworth 2007)900; Roy 
Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011) 
200. 
9 43 B.R. 224 (Bankr.E.D.Wash.1984). 
10 ibid. at 225-6; In re Chateaugay Corp. 10 F.3d 944, 955 (2d Cir.1993); Burger 
King Corp. v. Rovine 6 B.R. 661, 666 (Bankr.W.D.Tenn.1980); In re Jolly,574 
F.2d 349, 350 (6th Cir.1978).  
11 [2013] B.C.C. 752, 760. 
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employment.12 The implication of an express power to 
assume contracts is evaluated in detail in 3.3. For 
now, it suffices to bear in mind that under the UK 
regime, an election by the liquidator not to disclaim a 
contract (i.e. to perform) has the same practical effect 
as an assumption by a trustee or debtor-in-possession 
under the Bankruptcy Code. 
 
 
3.1.2    Equality? 
 
In his seminal work, Baird has emphasised the 
role of rejection in furthering collectivity by asserting 
that the mechanism gives the trustee the ability to 
breach contracts, which ensures equal treatment 
among those who are similarly situated.13 He states 
that by virtue of the rejection provision, those with 
actions for damages against the trustee are treated the 
same way and that at the end of the day, they all have 
a claim against the debtor and they all share pro rata 
in the bankruptcy estate.14  
 
With respect, BairdÕs proposition of the role of 
rejection in promoting equality is overstated in terms 
of practice. In reality, rejection plays a very limited 
role in this regard. The primary focus of an 
officeholder when disclaiming or rejecting pre-
petition executory contracts is to relieve the debtor or 
bankruptcy estate from being shackled with 
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12 Sch. B1, par. 99(5) of the Act. 
13 Douglas Baird, Elements of Bankruptcy (5th edn, Foundation Press 2010) 117. 
14 ibid. 
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unbeneficial contracts. The aim is to avoid asset 
depletion through the performance of such contractual 
obligations. The effect of the pre-insolvency 
executory contract on individual creditors is not a 
primary consideration, what is paramount is the effect 
of the transaction on the debtorÕs net asset base.  
 
An illustration of this point is where the 
debtorÕs inventory has multiplicity of executory 
contracts for the same purpose. The logical action for 
an officeholder in this circumstance will be to 
perform or assume one or two of the contracts based 
on the needs of the debtor or the bankruptcy estate 
and disclaim or reject the rest so as not to dissipate 
limited resources on unprofitable contracts. The 
officeholder will be acting in line with the policy 
objectives of the disclaimer or rejection mechanisms 
notwithstanding that this will result in an unequal 
treatment of similarly ranked creditors.  
  
  
3.2.  Power to disclaim or reject contracts 
 
3.2.1.  The scope of power of disclaimer/rejection 
 
Upon insolvency under the UK regime, the 
liquidator is statutorily empowered to repudiate 
onerous pre-insolvency executory contracts of the 
debtor.15 A disclaimer is a unilateral repudiation of the 
contract by the debtor. It releases the debtor from all 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 s. 178 Insolvency Act 1986. 
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future obligations under the contract.16 Consequently, 
the contract is determined from the date of the 
disclaimer, together with the rights and liabilities of 
the debtor in the disclaimed contract or property. 
 
Under the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee can 
elect to either assume or reject executory contracts 
and unexpired leases in the debtorÕs inventory. 17 
Although the mechanism for the rejection of contracts 
is aimed at achieving a similar objective as the 
disclaimer under UK insolvency law, the two are 
conceptually different. Under the Bankruptcy Code, 
the debtor is regarded as a distinct entity from the 
bankruptcy estate created at the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition. This is premised on s. 541 of the 
Code which stipulates that Òthe commencement of a 
case under s. 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an 
estate.Ó 18  Sections 301, 302 and 303 deal with 
voluntary, joint and involuntary insolvency 
procedures. The bankruptcy estate is therefore not 
regarded as a party to pre-petition contracts of the 
debtor and is not bound by them. 
 
The consequence of this is that ÒrejectionÓ is 
not just the opposite of assumption. It is not a mere 
refusal to perform pre-petition executory contracts. It 
is a decision by the trustee on behalf of the 
bankruptcy estate not to assume the executory 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency (fn. 8) 200. 
17  s. 365(a) of the Code; Charles Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy (2nd edn, 
Foundation Press 2009) 815, 845. 
18 s. 541(a) Bankruptcy Code. 
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contract of the debtor.19 In a bid to eliminate the 
confusion to which the foregoing often gives rise to, 
the National Bankruptcy Review Commission had in 
the past recommended that the concept of ÒrejectionÓ 
in the Code should be replaced with Óelection to 
breachÓ while ÒassumptionÓ should be replaced with 
Òelection to perform.Ó 20  A rejection is therefore a 
choice by the bankruptcy estate not to become a party 
to a pre-insolvency contract of the debtor company 
and its counterparties.21 Conversely, in assuming an 
executory contract, the bankruptcy estate accepts the 
contract and place of the debtor in the pre-petition 
contract. 
 
A disclaimer or rejection does not have the 
effect of a rescission. There is no retrospective 
termination of accrued rights and liabilities; only 
prospective obligations under the contract are 
terminated. 22  In consequence, only executory 
contracts can be disclaimed or rejected. Executed 
contracts that have been fully or substantially 
performed cannot be disclaimed or rejected.23 Such 
contracts cannot be considered as being onerous or 
burdensome, as there are no outstanding or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Thompson v Lil Joe Records Inc. 476 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2007; In re Austin 
Development 19 F.3d 1077 (5th Cir. 1994); Charles Tabb, The Law of 
Bankruptcy (2nd edn., Foundation Press 2009) 818. 
20  David Epstein, Steve Nickles, ÒThe National Bankruptcy Review 
CommissionÕs Section 365 Recommendations and the ÔLarger Conceptual 
IssuesÕÓ (1997-1998) 102 Dick. L. Rev. 679, 680. 
21  Michael Andrew, ÒExecutory Contracts In Bankruptcy: Understanding 
ÔRejectionÕÓ (fn. 6) 931: ÒThe election to Ôassume or rejectÕ is the election to 
assume or not to assume; ÔrejectionÕ is the name for the latter alternative.Ó 
22 S. 178(4)(a) of the Act; Re No. 1 London Ltd [1991] B.C.C. 118, 119. 
23 Capital Prime Plc. v Worthgate Ltd [2000] 1 B.C.L.C. 647. 
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prospective obligations to be performed.24 
 
Under the UK regime, the power to disclaim 
contracts is conferred only on liquidators. Although a 
limited form of disclaimer has been given to 
administrative receivers in relation to employment 
contracts, 25  an administrator is not statutorily 
empowered to renege on the pre-insolvency contracts 
of the debtor.26 The justification for this position is yet 
to be properly explained. In Astor Chemicals v 
Synthetic Technology Ltd,27 Vinelott J. was reluctant 
to relieve a company in administration of its pre-
petition contractual obligations by way of a 
disclaimer. His lordship noted that, 
"There is in this respect no analogy between the position 
of a receiver and an administrator. The administrator is 
appointed to manage the affairs of the company and not 
to realise them for the benefit of one of the creditors."28  
 
The decision in Astor Chemicals was cited with 
approval by Scott J. in P & C and R & T (Stockport) 
Ltd 29  where the court concluded that Òan 
administration order does not constitute an authority 
for the administrators to break the company's 
contracts."30 It has been suggested that it would be 
inappropriate for a company in administration which 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 A contract for the sale of land cannot be disclaimed by the liquidator as this 
would deprive the buyer of his equitable title. Capital Prime Properties Plc. v 
Worthgate Ltd (fn. 23) 534; Re Bastable [1901] 2 K.B. 518, 527-8; See also the 
receivership cases of Telemetrix Plc. v Modern Engineers of Bristol Plc. [1985] 
B.C.L.C. 213, 217; Freevale Ltd v Metrostore Ltd [1984] B.C.L.C. 72, 81-82. 
25 s. 37(2) Insolvency Act. 
26 Joint Administrators of Rangers Football Club Plc. [2012] S.L.T. 599, 606; Re 
P & C v R & T (Stockport) Ltd [1991] B.C.C. 98, 104; Astor Chemical Ltd v 
Synthetic Technology Ltd [1990] B.C.C. 97; Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate 
Insolvency (fn. 8) 767; Edward Bailey, Hugo Groves, Corporate Insolvency Law 
And Practice (fn. 8) 900. 
27 [1990] BCLC 1. 
28 ibid. at 12. 
29 [1991] B.C.C. 98. 
30 ibid. at 104. 
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might yet resume trading to be able to disclaim 
onerous contracts and property.31 With respect, this 
reason is far from convincing.  
 
The primary objective of a disclaimer is to 
exempt the company from performing contractual 
obligations which may be detrimental to the insolvent 
estate. There will be occasions where disclaiming 
onerous contracts will enhance the prospects of 
achieving the purpose of administration. 32  For 
instance, the administration procedureÕs objective of 
achieving a better result for creditors as a whole than 
would be achieved in a winding up 33  equates to 
objectives pursued in liquidation, hence an express 
disclaimer power may be required. Judicial support 
for this argument can be found in the observation of 
Norris J. in BLV Reality Organisation Ltd v Batten34 
where he noted that, 
ÒThe obligation of the administrators is to perform their 
functions in the interests of Òthe creditors as a wholeÓ É 
It may be in the interests of the creditors as a whole that 
one particular contract with one particular creditor is 
terminated (even wrongfully): for example if the 
administrators thought that a particular service could be 
provided more cheaply or to a higher standard than was 
currently being done by a creditor with a continuing 
contract for a service necessary to the on-going trading, 
with a beneficial result to the creditors as such.Ó35 
 
 
Against this background, it would have therefore 
been expedient to expressly grant the administrator 
the power to disclaim in appropriate cases. This 
would reduce the likelihood of an administrator being 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Edward Bailey, Hugo Groves, Corporate Insolvency Law And Practice (fn 8) 
900. 
32 Sch. B1, Para 3(1)(a), (b) and (c) Insolvency Act.  
33 Sch. B1, Para 3(1)(b) Insolvency Act. 
34 [2009] EWHC 2994 (Ch) (20). 
35 ibid. at (20). 
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exposed to tortious liabilities for interfering with 
contracts for the purpose of the administration.36  
 
It is suggested that an administrator can 
choose not to perform a pre-petition executory 
contract in the exercise of his power to achieve the 
purpose of the administration.37 In addition, the Act 
confers an administrator with the power to Òdo 
anything necessary or expedient for the management 
of the affairs, business and property of the 
company.Ó 38  It is suggested that this provision is 
broad enough to encompass powers of the 
administrator to repudiate executory contracts which 
may impair the administration. UK courts will often 
ratify the repudiation of executory contracts involving 
personal rights by an administrator when it is done in 
furtherance of the purpose of the administration.39  
 
In Joint Administrators of Rangers Football 
Club Plc.,40 it was held that an administrator may 
have to decline to perform a contractual obligation of 
the company in pursuit of the statutory objective or 
objectives in his proposals if that is in the interest of 
the company's creditors as a whole.41 In addition the 
court ruled that should the administrator opt not to 
perform a contract, the court would not, absent 
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36 This issue is explored further below. 
37 Para. 3(1). See the submission of Counsel for administrator in  Lictor Anstalt v 
Mir Steel UK Ltd [2012] Bus. L.R. D84, D86. 
38 Para. 59(1) and 1(1). 
39 Innovate Logistics Limited v Sunberry Properties Limited [2009] B.C.C. 164. 
39 Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency (fn. 8) 453; Hachette UK v 
Borders [2009] EWHC 3487. 
40 [2012] S.L.T. 599 Ð a decision of ScotlandÕs Outer House, Court of Session. 
41 ibid. at 608. 
  
225 
exceptional circumstances, force the company to 
perform those contractual obligations to the detriment 
of the creditors as a whole.42  Hence, as matter of 
general principle, courts will leave commercial 
decisions to the discretion of administrators who are 
usually in a better position to make such decisions.43 
Commercial decisions will include the decision as to 
whether to renege or perform pre-petition contracts.44  
  
    
3.2.2.   The timing of the decision 
 
Executory contracts generally remain in effect 
pending assumption or disclaimer/rejection by the 
officeholder. 45  The timing of the officeholderÕs 
decision is therefore crucial. There are usually two 
competing interests. The officeholder will desire as 
much time as possible to decide which pre-petition 
contracts will be beneficial to the general creditors 
depending on the objective(s) of the insolvency 
procedure. Conversely, a solvent party will be in 
favour of having an early decision by the officeholder 
rather than being left in limbo. During the limbo 
period,46 the solvent party may be hesitant to expend 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 ibid. at 609. 
43 BLV Reality Organisation Ltd v Batten (fn. 34) (20): ÒWhat the administrators 
decide to do about it, is a matter of commercial judgement. They have decided to 
terminate the relationship.Ó See also MTI Trading Systems Ltd v Winter [1998] 
B.C.C. 591, 594; Re NS Distribution Ltd [1990] B.C.L.C. 169. 
44 Edward Bailey, Hugo Groves, Corporate Insolvency Law And Practice (fn. 8) 
399. 
45 In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. 884 F.2d 11, 14 (1st Cir.1989); In re Boston Post 
Rd. Ltd. P'ship 21 F.3d 477, 484 (2d Cir.1994); Matter of Whitcomb & Keller 
Mortgage Co., 715 F.2d 375, 378Ð79 (7th Cir.1983); In re Cochise College Park, 
Inc. 703 F.2d 1339, 1352 (9th Cir.1983). 
46  The period between the commencement of insolvency and when an 
officeholder makes a decision whether to disclaim or reject an executory 
contract. 
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resources towards making substitute contracts, given 
that the pre-insolvency executory contract may later 
be performed or assumed. Again, he may not be able 
to make reliable future business plans as the contract 
may be disclaimed or rejected by the officeholder.47  
  
Tabb has described the Bankruptcy CodeÕs 
approach as being Òmarkedly pro-debtor and 
remarkably unsympathetic to the concerns of the non-
debtor party to the contract.Ó48 This observation is 
premised on the ground that only the bankruptcy 
estate can enforce an executory contract prior to the 
debtor-in-possession or trusteeÕs decision to reject or 
assume the contract. 49  The contract cannot be 
enforced against the insolvent estate, notwithstanding 
that the estate has received post-petition benefits 
under it.50  
 
It is suggested that this position is underpinned 
by two principles. First, assumption or rejection of 
contracts determines whether a contract is to be 
categorised as an administrative expense under s. 
503(b) of the Code or a pre-petition claim under s. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 Note also that a unilateral termination of a contract by the solvent party based 
on insolvency will be invalid under the anti-ipso facto rule of s. 365(e) Code. 
48 Charles Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy (2nd edn., Foundation Press 2009) 872. 
49 In re Monarch Capital Corp 163 B.R.  899, 907 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994); In re 
Gunter Hotel Assocs. 96 B.R. 696, 700 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1988); In re T.H.W. 
Enterprises, Inc. 89 B.R. 351, 354 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1988); In re Metro Transp. 
Co. 87 B.R. 338, 339 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1988); In re Feyline Presents, Inc. 81 B.R. 
623, 626 (Bankr.D.Colo.1988); In re O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc. 79 B.R. 161, 
164 (S.D.N.Y.1987); In re Wilson 69 B.R. 960, 965 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1987). 
50 In re FBI Distribution Corp. 330 F.3d 36, 43 (1st Cir.2003); In re Monarch 
Capital Corp. (fn. 49) 907; United States ex rel. Postal Serv. v. Dewey Freight 
Sys., Inc. 31 F.3d 620, 624 (8th Cir.1994); In re Gunter Hotel Assocs. (fn. 49) 
699Ð700; Wilson v. TXO Prod. Corp. 69 B.R. 960, 965Ð66 
(Bankr.N.D.Tex.1987); N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco and Bildisco 465 U.S. 513, 532, 104 
S.Ct. 1188 U.S., 1984. 
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365(g) of the Code.51 Secondly, the Code requires 
assumption or rejection of contracts to be approved by 
a bankruptcy court. 52  In addition, assumption or 
rejection must be express, and not by implication or 
conduct.53 Hence in In re El Paso Refinery54 Clark J. 
noted that Òuntil the court has affirmatively authorized 
rejection, the non-debtor party is not free to ignore the 
terms of the contract, and must continue to 
perform.Ó 55  Worse still, there is authority for the 
proposition that the trustee can enter into a new 
contract that supersedes the old one.56 
 
It is however argued that the foregoing 
concerns may be somewhat exaggerated. Time and 
time again, bankruptcy courts have reached a 
conclusion that performance by a non-debtor during 
the limbo period will constitute an administrative 
expense. 57  For instance in FBI Distribution 58  where 
the debtor-in-possession induced a non-debtor to 
render performance under an un-assumed pre-petition 
executory contract, pending its decision to assume or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51In re National Steel Corp. 316 B.R. 287, 303=305 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004); In re 
Airlift International, Inc., 761 F.2d 1503 (11th Cir.1985). 
52 s. 365(a). In re Whitcomb & Keller Mortgage Co. (fn. 45). 
53  S.N.A. Nut Co. v. HaagenÐDazs Co. 191 B.R. 117, 121 
(Bankr.N.D.Ill.1996); In re Providence Television Limited Partnership 113 B.R. 
446, 452Ð53 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1990); In re Metro Transportation Co., 87 B.R. 338, 
342 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1988); In re Gunter Hotel Assocs. (fn. 49) 696, 700; In re 
A.H. Robins Co. Inc 68 B.R. 705, 709 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1986); In re Memorial 
Hospital of Iowa County, Inc. 82 B.R. 478, 483Ð484 (W.D.Wis.1988); In re 
Marrero 7 B.R. 586, 588 (D.Puerto Rico 1980). 
54 196 B.R. 58, 72 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1996). 
55 ibid. at 72. 
56  In re F.H. Lawson Co., 97 B.R. 895, 897 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1989). 
57 In re Section 20 Land Group, Ltd., 261 B.R. 711, 716 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2000); 
In re Res. Tech. Corp., 254 B.R. 215, 221 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.2000); Goldin v. 
Putnam Lovell, Inc. 163 B.R. 899, 907 (Bankr.D.Mass.1994); In re Chateaugay 
Corp., 10 F.3d 944, 955 (2d Cir.1993); Douglas Bordewieck, ÒThe Post-petition, 
Pre-Rejection, Pre-Assumption status of an executory contractÓ (1985) 59 Am. 
Bankr. L.J. 197, 219. 
58 330 F.3d 36, 42Ð44 (1st Cir. 2003). 
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reject, it was held that the non-debtor was entitled to 
administrative expense priority to the extent that the 
consideration supporting the claim was supplied to the 
debtor-in-possession post-petition and was beneficial 
to the estate. Similarly, In In re Florida West Gateway 
Inc,59 the court held that the non-debtor who had 
continued to sell jet fuel to a Chapter 11 trustee 
operating a debtor airline was entitled to payment of 
an administrative expense claim Ð notwithstanding 
that the trustee had not yet elected whether to reject or 
assume the contract.  
  
Under UK insolvency law regime, a 
liquidatorÕs decision to disclaim a pre-petition 
executory contract does not require the approval of a 
court. This is a departure from the preceding UK 
regime wherein leave of court was required under the 
corporate insolvency code (and re-enacted in s. 617(1) 
of the Companies Act 1985). 60  Further more, any 
value that a debtor receives during the gap period 
between the commencement of the formal insolvency 
procedure and the making of a decision to disclaim an 
executory contract by the liquidator will rank in 
priority as an expense of the liquidation.61 This is 
plainly fair and equitable. 
 
A Chapter 7 liquidation trustee has 60 days 
from the time of the commencement of the case to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 180 B.R. 299 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.1995). SSSL 
60 SSSL Realisations (fn. 8) 630. 
61 Rule 4.218(1) Insolvency Rules. 
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assume a pre-petition contract,62 and the contract will 
be deemed to be rejected if not assumed within this 
period. In Chapter 11 reorganisation cases, a decision 
must be made before the confirmation of the plan.63 A 
debtor has 120 days after the commencement of the 
case to file a plan.64  It is arguable that the difference 
in the length of periods given to officeholders in 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 cases reflects the fact that a 
Chapter 11 officeholder will often require more time 
to make decisions, given of the nature of the 
procedure. Accordingly, In In re American National 
Trust,65 the court held that a trustee in a reorganization 
proceeding Òis entitled to a reasonable time to make a 
careful and informed evaluation as to possible 
burdens and benefits of an executory contractÓ66 In 
order to mitigate the inconvenience that a lengthy 
limbo period may cause solvent parties, at the 
instance of a solvent party, a Court may order a 
trustee to make a decision within a specified period.67  
 
Under the UK regime, a liquidator can 
exercise the power of disclaimer at any time.68 Again, 
to avoid creditors waiting indefinitely in limbo, the 
Act empowers the solvent party to require the 
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62 s. 365(d)(1) Code. 
63 s. 365(d)(2) Code; NLRB v Bildisco & Bildisco (fn. 50) 529; Skeen v. Denver 
CocaÐCola Bottling Co. 81 B.R. 623, 626 (Bankr.D.Colo.1988). 
64 s. 1121(b) Code. 
65 426 F.2d 1059 (7 Cir.1970). 
66 ibid. at 1064. 
67 s. 365(d)(2) Code; In re Heward Brothers 210 B.R. 475, 476 (Bankr.D.Idaho 
1997); In the Matter of Whitcomb & Keller Mortgage Co. (fn. 45) 378; In re 
Anderson 36 BR 120 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1983) (debtor-in-possession was given 
120 days to make a decision); In re Merchants Plaza Inc. 35 B.R. 888 (Bankr. 
E.D. Tenn. 1983) (court gave 15 days within which to assume or reject); In re 
Will 33 B.R. 843 (Bankr. MD Fla. 1983) (30 days was given). 
68 The 12-month period under the preceding regime by virtue of s.618 (3) of the 
Companies Act 1968 has been removed. 
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liquidator to elect whether to disclaim the contract or 
not. Once a notice to this effect is served, the 
liquidator must exercise his power to disclaim or not 
perform within 28 days of the notice or lose the power 
to disclaim.69 A liquidator who loses his power to 
disclaim is not under any duty to perform or procure 
the corporate debtor to perform a contract; only his 
right to disclaim under the statute is lost.  
 
In the light of the foregoing, a significant 
difference between the two jurisdictions is the 
consequence of failure of an officeholder to make an 
election to perform or assume the contract within the 
required time. While the Code deems the absence of a 
decision as a rejection, the Act merely strips the 
liquidator of its power to disclaim Ð the consequence 
being that the contract is deemed to subsist. It is 
arguable that the CodeÕs approach is due to the 
distinction that the regime draws between the pre-
petition debtor and the post-petition bankruptcy 
estate. The two are deemed to be two distinct entities, 
accordingly the pre-petition contracts of the debtor 
does not automatically fall into the post-petition 
estate, except it is assumed for this purpose. It is 
argued that this, to a large extent, supports the policy 
objective of rejection. Principally, it ensures that only 
carefully considered contracts of the debtor are 
assumed. In other words, no unbeneficial executory 
contract can fall into the bankruptcy estate by default. 
The possible demerits of this approach in evaluated in 
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69 r. 4.191 Insolvency Rules. 
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3.3. 
 
The default rule in the UK regime can be 
explained on the basis of what would be obtainable in 
the absence of the power to disclaim. As a matter of 
general principle, insolvency in itself does not 
terminate contracts except otherwise stipulated. The 
pre-petition contracts of the debtor fall into the 
bankruptcy estate, given that the liquidator stands 
exactly in the same position as the debtor itself stands 
in. 70  It is arguable that this default rule may not 
necessarily be detrimental to the policy objectives of 
the disclaimer mechanism, given that the liquidator 
may nevertheless opt not to perform. In this case the 
solvent party will prove for damages in the insolvency 
as an unsecured creditor, just as would be the case if 
the contract was disclaimed. However, where the 
contractual obligations of the solvent party are 
continuing in nature, the latter can carry on with 
performance and prove for payments as they fall 
due.71 This will certainly erode assets in the insolvent 
estate. From this perspective, it may be argued that 
this is not actually a demerit of the disclaimer 
mechanism, but the adverse consequence of the 
liquidatorÕs failure to take advantage of the 
mechanism. 
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70 In re Scheibler (1874) L.R. 9 Ch. 722, 727. 
71 Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency (fn. 8) 204-205. 
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3.2.3.    Standard for disclaiming/rejecting executory contracts 
 
 
The power to disclaim under UK insolvency 
law can only be exercised over a debtorÕs onerous 
property. Onerous property is defined under the Act 
as any unprofitable contract and any other property of 
the company that is unsaleable, not readily saleable or 
is such that it may give rise to a liability to pay money 
or perform any other onerous act. 72  A significant 
distinction between the current law and its 
predecessor is that there is no additional requirement 
of showing that the worthless asset also binds the 
possessor/counterparty to the performance of an 
onerous act in all cases.73 The previous position of the 
law is illustrated in Re Potters Oils Ltd (No. 1)74 
where the liquidator sought to disclaim a chlorinated 
waste oil stored in tanks on the property of another, 
which had no commercial value and would have cost 
£14,500 to dispose of. Refusing leave, Harman J. 
ruled that the oil was not unsaleable "by reason of its 
binding the possessor thereof to the performance of 
any onerous act."75 
  
In SSSL Realisations76 the UK court of appeal 
accepted the following guidelines for determining 
when a contract will be unprofitable for the purpose 
of a disclaimer: 
i. A contract is unprofitable if it imposes on the 
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72 s. 178(3)(a) and (b) of the Insolvency Act; Re Celtic Extraction Ltd (2001) Ch. 
475. 
73 Ian Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency (4th edn., Sweet & Maxwell 2009) 768. 
74 Re Potters Oils Ltd (No. 1) [1985] 1 B.C.C. 99384. 
75 ibid. at 99388. 
76 [2006] Ch. 610, 628-629 (per Chadwick L.J.). 
  
233 
company continuing financial obligations that 
may be regarded as detrimental to the creditors, 
which presumably means that the contract confers 
no sufficient reciprocal benefit. 
ii. The contract may be unprofitable if it must give 
rise to prospective liabilities. 
iii. Contracts which will delay the winding up of the 
company's affairs because they are to be 
performed over a substantial period of time and 
will involve expenditure that may not be 
recovered are unprofitable. 
iv. No case has decided that a contract is 
unprofitable merely because it is financially 
disadvantageous. The cases focus upon the nature 
and cause of the disadvantage. 
v. A contract is not unprofitable merely because the 
company could have made or could make a better 
bargain.Ó77 
 
It is suggested that guidelines (i), (ii) and (iii) 
attempt to cover a broad range of factual scenarios 
where the performance of an executory contract will 
demand the insolvent estate to either dissipate its 
assets in performing or incur losses with no reciprocal 
benefits. This accords with the earlier evaluated asset-
preservation and value-maximisation objective of the 
disclaimer.  
 
It is argued that guidelines (iv) and (v) aim to 
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77 SSSL Realisations (2002) Ltd (fn. 76) 628-629 (Chadwick L.J.) citing the lower 
Court which had adopted the position of the Supreme Court of Austral in 
Transmetor Corporation Ltd v Real Investment Property [1999] 17 A.C.L.C. 
1314, 1321 (per Chesterman J.) 
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draw limits to the liquidatorÕs power to disclaim. 
First, it notes that a contract is not merely unprofitable 
because it is financially disadvantageous Ð as the 
focus is on the nature and cause of the disadvantage. 
In addition, the fact that the liquidator could make a 
better bargain, in comparison to the pre-petition 
contract, is not material. A hypothetical illustration of 
these two guidelines is as follows, 
Debtor (D) enters into a contract to sell a specified quantity of jet fuel to 
creditor (C) for £350,000. A formal insolvency proceeding is 
commenced for D before both payment and delivery is made. On 
assumption of office, DÕs liquidator discovers that the market price for 
jet fuel has skyrocketed such that a sale at the prevalent market price 
would fetch the insolvent estate approximately £700,000.  
 
 
According to guidelines (iv) and (v), this will 
not constitute an unprofitable contract to which a 
disclaimer is applicable. Prima facie this runs counter 
to insolvency lawÕs cardinal objective of 
maximisation of realisations for the general creditors. 
This is because an alternative sale of the jet fuel in the 
market and at the prevalent market price would 
generate double of the revenue compared to a sale to 
C. This point is further highlighted if the roles of the 
parties in the hypothetical transaction are reversed, 
Creditor (C) enters into a contract to sell a specified quantity of jet fuel 
to debtor (D) for £700,000. A formal insolvency proceeding is 
commenced for D before both payment and delivery is made. On 
assumption of office, DÕs liquidator discovers that the market price for 
jet fuel has slumped such that a purchase at the prevalent market price 
would approximately be £350,000.  
 
Again, if guidelines (iv) and (v) are strictly 
complied with, this will not constitute an 
Òunprofitable contractÓ to which a disclaimer is 
applicable. This clearly runs counter to one of the 
core objectives of insolvency law Ð maximisation of 
realisations. Here, the insolvent estate would save 
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$350,000 for the general body of creditors if the 
liquidator disclaims the contract and buys the fuel at 
the prevalent market rate. Note that guideline (i) may 
not be relevant to this type of one-off transaction, 
except the transaction can be categorised as one which 
imposes Òcontinuing financial obligationsÓ on the 
company. Accordingly it is arguable that the 
propositions in SSSL Realisations 78  are mere 
guidelines and do not represent an exhaustive list. 
 
A possible argument in favour of the narrow 
construction of the disclaimer power in SSSL 
Realisations is that the disclaimer provision is not an 
arbitrary contract-breaching device. Accordingly, the 
core objective of the power to disclaim is asset-
preservation through the repudiation of onerous 
contracts as narrowly defined in SSSL Realisations. 
An extension of this power beyond these parameters 
will amount to an abuse of the power. Again, 
notwithstanding that a disclaimer has the effect of a 
breach of contract, a breach of contract procured via a 
disclaimer is narrower, given that it is specifically 
conferred by the Insolvency Act and ought to be 
premised on the narrow and specific grounds laid 
down.  
 
Accordingly, liquidators who wish to 
substitute more financially advantageous contracts or 
better bargains for existing executory contracts can 
procure the company to breach those contracts 
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78 [2006] Ch. 610 628-629 (per Chadwick L.J.). 
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through other forms of disablement or renunciation, 
but not with the use of the disclaimer. The 
consequence of such a repudiatory breach will be the 
same as a disclaimer. The solvent counterparty will 
prove for damages in the insolvency as an unsecured 
creditor. An example of this is the earlier noted failure 
of the liquidator to make an election whether to 
disclaim or not within a required period. Here, except 
where the contract is one of a continuing nature, 
where payments will have to be made as they fall due 
Ð and which in any case, guideline (i) will apply, the 
liquidator will only lose his disclaimer power, but can 
not be compelled to perform the contract. 
 
The Bankruptcy Code is silent on the standard 
upon which trustees must rely in deciding whether to 
assume or reject executory contracts.79 A significant 
difference between the rejection under the Code and 
the Insolvency ActÕs disclaimer provision is that there 
is no express requirement for the rejected property to 
be onerous or burdensome. Accordingly s. 365(a) 
provides that, 
ÒExcept as provided in sections 765 and 766 of this title 
and in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section, the 
trustee, subject to the courtÕs approval, may assume or 
reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the 
debtor.Ó 
 
It is suggested that, apart from the courtÕs 
approval, the trusteeÕs power to reject executory 
contracts is not subject to any limitation. Bankruptcy 
courts have developed two broad standards for 
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79 The exception to this is a collective bargaining agreement which s. 1113(c)(3) 
of the Code stipulates the standard as being that the balance of equities must 
clearly favour rejection.  
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determining whether to approve rejection of 
executory contracts. While very few courts have 
adopted the burdensome test,80 majority of courts have 
favoured the prevailing test - the business judgment 
test.81 
 
Although the business judgment test was 
applied in The Matter of Minges,82 the court gave the 
rationale behind the burdensome test as being that the 
power to reject derives from the long-held doctrine 
that the bankrupt estate may abandon burdensome 
property.83 Under the burdensome test, a pre-petition 
executory contract will be rejected if assumption and 
performance will give rise to losses.84 The trustee 
must be able to demonstrate that the income generated 
through the performance of the contract will not cover 
the operating expenses incurred in its performance. 
Hence, emphasis is on preventing net loss and the 
trustee will not be expected to decline assumption 
merely because an alternative investment would yield 
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80 In re Lafayette Radio Electronics 8 B.R. 528, 533 (Bnktcy E.D.N.Y. 1981); In 
re Vidicom Systems, Inc. 2 B.C.D. 2 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1975); American Brake 
Shoe & Foundry Co. v. New York Rys. Co. 278 F. 842 (S.D.N.Y.1922); In re 
Chicago Rapid Transit Co. 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.1942). 
81  In re Stable Mews Association 41 B.R. 594, 595 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y.1984);  National Labor Relations Board v. Bildisco & Bildisco (fn 50) 
104, 1195. In re Roman Crest Fruit, Inc., 35 B.R. 939, 948Ð49 
(Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y.1983); In re O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc., 23 B.R. 104 
(Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y.1982); In re NatÕl Sugar Refining Co. 21 B.R. 196 
(Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y.1982); In re Sombrero Reef Club, Inc. 18 B.R. 612, 8 B.C.D. 
1277, 6 C.B.C.2d 506 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla.1982); In re IntÕl Coins & Currency 18 
B.R. 335, 6 C.B.C.2d 309 (Bkrtcy.D.Vt.1982); In re Summit Land Co. 13 B.R. 
310, 314, 7 B.C.D. 1361 (Bkrtcy.Utah 1981); In re Hurricane Elkhorn Coal 
Corp. II, 15 B.R. 987, 989 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Ky.1981); In re J.H. Land & Cattle Co., 
Inc., 8 B.R. 237, 238, 7 B.C.D. 228, 3 C.B.C.2d 695 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Okl.1981);  In 
re Lafayette Radio Electronics Corp. (fn. 80) 533;  In re Marina Enterprises, Inc. 
14 B.R. 327, 8 B.C.D. 59, 5 C.B.C.2d 434 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla.1981). 
82 602 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1979).  
83  ibid. at 42; 42 A Silverstein, Rejection of Executory Contracts, 31 
U.Chi.L.Rev. 467, 468-72 (1964).  
84 In re Vidicom Systems Inc. (fn. 80); In re D. H. Overmyer Co. Inc. 1 CBC 516 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
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a more favourable result.85  
  
An analogy can be drawn between the 
burdensome test and the previously evaluated 
standard for measuring for unprofitable contracts 
under the UK Insolvency law. As previously noted, 
guidelines (iv) and (v) narrow the disclaimer power of 
the liquidator in such a way that the availability of a 
better bargain of a more financially advantageous 
transaction will not justify a disclaimer. 86  This 
eliminates the consideration of the maximization of 
profit as a primary motivation for the disclaimer or 
assumption of pre-petition contracts.  
   
Prima facie the burdensome test does not align 
with the language of the CodeÕs rejection provision. 
As earlier noted, the Code does not impose any 
limitation to a trusteeÕs power to reject contracts, 
except that it is subject to the approval of the court. In 
addition, just like the narrow approach under SSSL 
Realisations, the burdensome test does not fully 
support insolvency lawÕs cardinal principle of 
maximization of realisations. The approach deprives 
the insolvent estate of the opportunity of entering into 
alternative contracts which can potentially yield 
greater returns for the benefit of the general creditors. 
Against this background, the standard has been rightly 
described as being ÒrigidÓ considering that a decision 
not to assume is only permitted on proof of net loss to 
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85  Michael Andrew, ÒExecutory Contracts In Bankruptcy: Understanding 
ÔRejectionÕÓ (fn. 6) 897.  
86 SSSL Realisations (2002) Ltd (fn. 76) 628-629. 
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the bankruptcy estate.87 From a perspective, the effect 
of this test is that a single counterparty will be 
allowed to reap substantial benefits under the assumed 
contract, while the debtorÕs other creditors are forced 
to make substantial compromises to their claims. 
 
Under the Code, rejection is not the revocation 
or repudiation or cancellation of a contract or lease, 
nor does it affect contract or lease liabilities. It is 
simply a bankruptcy estate's decision not to assume 
because the contract or lease does not represent a 
favorable or appropriate investment of the estate's 
resources. 88  This position is underpinned by the 
principle that the pre-petition and post-petition 
entities are separate legal entities. Hence, not being 
privy to the pre-petition executory contract, the post-
petition entity is not bound by it. Rejection therefore 
indicates an election by the bankruptcy estate not to 
become party to the contract. Placing a restriction or 
condition on the insolvent estate and on the power of 
the trustee to reject an executory contract by way of 
the burdensome test, will run counter to this settled 
position. 
The business judgment test lays emphasis on 
the potential profit which would accrue to the 
bankruptcy estate if a pre-insolvency executory 
contract is assumed or rejected.89 Thus if greater profit 
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87 In the Matter of Minges 602 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1979). 
88 Douglas Baird, Elements of Bankruptcy (fn. 13) 848-9; Michael Andrew, 
ÒExecutory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding Rejection.Ó (fn. 6). 
89 In re Orion Pictures Corp. 4 F.3d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Minges (n 
53) 43; Local Joint Exec. Bd. AFL-CIO v Hotel Circle Inc. 419 F. Supp. 778 
(S.D.Calif.1976) affirmed 613 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1977); In re New York Investors 
Mutual Group 143 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y.1956).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
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will accrue to unsecured creditors by a rejection, the 
trustee is entitled to decline assuming the contract.90 
This will be the position notwithstanding that the 
bankruptcy estate would not have incurred any loss if 
the contract had been assumed. Under this test, 
ÒburdenÓ is equated with Ònot beneficialÓ rather than 
Ònet loss.Ó91 This test is relatively more flexible and 
commercially sensible from the perspective of the 
bankruptcy estate.  
 
The business judgment test relatively accords 
with the language of the rejection provision under the 
Code. As the name suggest, the trustee or debtor-in-
possession is expected to use his good judgments in 
ensuring that the estate obtains the best of contractual 
bargains, subject to the approval of the court. Given 
that the trustee or debtor-in-possession is given the 
autonomy and discretion of weighing the benefits of 
the pre-insolvency contracts with other available 
alternatives, 92  the standard has the potential of 
maximising realisations for the general body of 
creditors.  
 
The best way to appreciate the advantage of 
the business judgment test over the burdensome test 
under the US regime as well as the distinction 
between the US regime and UK regime is to view 
rejection as the bankruptcy estate's determination not 
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90 In re Stable Mews Association (fn. 81) 596; In Re Florence Chi-Feng Huang 
23 B.R. 798, 801 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982). 
91 Charles Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy (2nd edn., Foundation Press 2009) 815Ð
816. 
92 In the Matter of Minges (fn. 87) 43. 
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to assume, as opposed to a special "power to breach" 
contracts. From this perspective, it would be 
appreciated that a decision to reject has nothing to do 
with repudiating or revoking a contractual obligation. 
It merely constitutes a decision to invest the estate's 
funds in a contract or a lease asset included in the 
debtor's property.93  
 
Lastly it is pertinent to note that although the 
business judgment test focuses on whether rejection 
would benefit general unsecured creditors, bankruptcy 
courts may intervene and decline approval of a 
rejection where the solvent party would be damaged 
disproportionately to any benefit to be derived by the 
general creditors. 94  Accordingly in In Re Gamma 
Fishing Co.95 Hargrove J. rightly noted that the  
ÒRequirement of Court approval furthers the Bankruptcy 
Code's policy of maximizing the value of the estate for 
the benefit of all creditors, while preserving certain 
rights of parties to contract with the debtor.Ó96 
    
 
3.3.  Effects of performing or assuming contracts 
  
3.3.1.     Assumption and performance 
  
ÒAssumptionÓ of contracts is peculiar to the 
Bankruptcy Code.97 The UK Insolvency Act does not 
mandate a liquidator to ÒassumeÓ a contract as an 
alternative to a disclaimer. The liquidator may simply 
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93  Michael Andrew, ÒExecutory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding 
Rejection.Ó (fn. 6). 
94In Re Florence Chi-Feng Huang (fn 89) 801; Matter of Minges (fn. 87) 44. 
95 70 B.R. 949 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.1987). 
96 ibid. at 952. 
97 s. 365(b) of the Code. 
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choose to perform the contract as opposed to 
disclaiming it. Assumption or rejection/disclaimer of 
an executory contract determines the status of the 
contracting creditor's claim, namely whether it is 
merely a pre-petition obligation of the debtor or is 
entitled to priority as an expense of administration or 
the liquidation of the estate.98  The legal effects of 
performing or assuming an executory contract in the 
two jurisdictions are substantially similar. An 
assumption of a pre-petition executory contract 
constitutes an assumption of both the prospective 
rights and obligations or liabilities under the 
contract.99 The post-insolvency performance by the 
solvent party under the contract ranks in priority as a 
liquidation or administration expense.100 
  
An election to assume or perform a pre-
petition contract does not guarantee performance from 
the solvent party. It merely ensures the continuation 
of the contract on its pre-petition terms. Hence in In 
re Lucre Inc.101 Hughes J. noted that, 
ÒAssumption itself does not guarantee performance by 
the other party. It simply means that the other party no 
longer can excuse its refusal to perform based upon the 
debtor's pre-petition breach.Ó102  
 
Consequently, the solvent party can no longer 
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98 In re Airlift International, Inc. (fn. 51); In re Univ. Med. Ctr. 973 F.2d 1065, 
1078 (3d Cir.1992) (quoting Leasing Serv. Corp. v. First Tenn. Bank Nat'l Ass. 
826 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir.1987). 
99 In re University Medical Centre 973 F.2d 1065, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992); Leasing 
Services Corp v First Tenn. Bank National Ass. (fn. 98) 437; In re Airlift 
International, Inc. (fn. 51) 1509. 
100 r. 4.218(1) Insolvency Rules; s. 503(b)(1)(A) Bankruptcy Code; In re NatÕl 
Steel Corp. (fn. 51) 304; In re Columbia Gas System Inc. 50 F.3d 233, 238-39 
(3d Cir.1995).  
In re Airlift International, Inc. (fn. 51) 1509.  
101  339 B.R. 648 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006), 
102 ibid. at 657; In re National Steel Corp. (fn. 51) 304; In re Univ. Med. Ctr. 973 
F.2d 1065, 1078 (3d Cir.1992); Leasing Serv. Corp. v. First Tenn. Bank Nat'l 
Association. (fn. 98) 437. 
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rely on the debtorÕs breach as a ground for non-
performance. 103  The solvent party can decline 
performance if he so wishes. In such an event, the 
debtor will be entitled to damages. Courts will only 
compel solvent parties whose contracts have been 
assumed to perform their contractual obligations if 
such are of a nature that an order of specific 
performance can be made, for example when the 
award of damages will not be adequate.104  
  
  
3.3.2.    Statutory preconditions for assumption  
  
The Bankruptcy Code has placed some 
preconditions to the assumption of pre-petition 
executory contracts by a trustee or debtor-in-
possession.105 As was seen in chapter one, subject to 
exceptions, the Code generally invalidates termination 
clauses conditioned upon insolvency. This 
invalidation renders unenforceable the rights of 
solvent parties to terminate such contracts or enforce 
other contractually agreed remedies at insolvency or 
for other insolvency-related breaches. In the light of 
this, it is suggested that the preconditions to 
assumption are aimed at ensuring that the contractual 
interests of affected solvent parties are adequately 
protected post-petition.  
 
Accordingly, before assuming an executory 
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103 In re Lucre Inc. 339 B.R. 648, 657 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006). 
104Telemetrix Plc v Modern Engineers of Bristol Plc. (fn. 24) 217; Freevale Ltd v 
Metrostore Ltd (fn. 24) 81-82. 
105In re BankVest 360 F.3d 291, 296 (1st Cir. 2004). 
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contract or unexpired lease under s. 365(a), the 
insolvent estate must (i) cure all defaults, 106  (ii) 
compensate the solvent party for any pecuniary losses 
arising from such default,107 and (iii) provide adequate 
assurance of future performance under the 
agreement.108 The implication of the foregoing is that 
even pre-petition debts in the contract must be cured. 
This effectively carves out another exception to the 
rule for the equal treatment of similarly situated 
creditors. In In re Superior Toy & Mfg. Co., 109 
Escbach C.J. stated the effect of the above provision 
thus, 
ÒThe language of s. 365(b)(1) is unequivocal. A party to 
an executory contract must be paid all amounts due to 
him under the contract before the contract may be 
assumed. In drafting ¤ 365(b)(1), Congress went further 
than requiring that the trustee guarantee payment for 
future performance under the contract. It required that 
the trustee guarantee payment of all amounts owed prior 
to assumption.Ó110 
 
The accompanying legislative statement of the 
provision justifies this requirement of giving a 
creditor the full benefit of his bargain on the grounds 
of Òfairness.Ó111 In other words, the debtor must cure 
all defaults, assure future performance, and make the 
other contracting party whole before it may be 
permitted to assume the agreement. Tabb suggests 
that the preconditions reflect the intention of the 
bankruptcy policy to protect the legitimate interests of 
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106 s. 365(b)(1)(A). 
107 s. 365(b)(1)(B). 
108 s. 365 (b)(1)(C); In re Dehon Inc. 352 B.R. 546, 559 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006); 
In re Airlift IntÕl Inc (fn. 51) 1508. 
109 78 F.3d 1169 (7th Cir.1996)  
110 ibid. at 1174. 
111 H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, at 348 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6304-05; Kimmelman v. The Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. 344 F.3d 311, 318 (3d 
Cir.2003). 
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counterparties whose contracts are being assumed.112 
It can also be argued that this protection is necessary 
considering that the CodeÕs invalidation of ipso facto 
clauses and other contractual remedies which are 
conditioned on or triggered by insolvency. 
 
There are no preconditions to performance 
under UK insolvency law. Although the UK regime 
ensures that a liquidator who elects to perform a pre-
petition executory contract cures post-insolvency 
defaults, it does not expressly make curing or 
compensation for such defaults a precondition. In 
addition, the Insolvency Act does not require a 
liquidator to cure pre-petition defaults on a contract 
before performing post-petition. In the last paragraph, 
the Bankruptcy CodeÕs approach has been attributed 
to its treatment of ipso facto clauses Ð extensively 
dealt with in Chapter one. This is in contrast with the 
Act which does not interfere with insolvency-related 
or triggered contractual remedies of parties.  As 
previously noted, 113  any post-insolvency benefit 
derived by the debtor as a result of a post-insolvency 
performance by a creditor during the limbo period 
will rank in priority as an expense of the 
liquidation.114 
 
 
3.3.3.     Non-assumable contracts 
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112 Charles Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy (2nd edn., Foundation Press 2009)  850. 
113 See text for fn. 42. 
114 r. 4.218 Insolvency Rules. 
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a.   Terminated and executed agreements 
 
A liquidator or trustee cannot disclaim or 
reject (or assume) contracts that have been terminated 
and leases whose terms have expired before the 
commencement of a formal insolvency procedure. 
Once a contract has been terminated prior to 
insolvency, there is no outstanding contractual right 
or obligation that can be enforced. Hence, the relevant 
provisions cannot be used to revive contracts that 
have been terminated pre-insolvency.  
 
Similarly, only executory contracts and 
unexpired leases can be disclaimed or rejected. 
Executed contracts cannot be disclaimed or 
rejected. 115  The insolvency policies in the two 
jurisdictions recognise and respect accrued rights of 
creditors. Officeholders cannot use the disclaimer or 
rejection provisions as a means of interfering with 
such settled rights. Contracts are ÒexecutedÓ (as 
opposed to being executory) where there has been 
substantial performance from both or either of the 
parties. Having benefitted from the performance 
therein, a debtor cannot turn around to repudiate the 
executed contract via a disclaimer or rejection. 
Conversely, where the debtor has performed its 
obligations under the contract, there will be no 
outstanding contractual obligations that can be 
described as onerous or burdensome, necessitating a 
disclaimer or rejection. 
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115 Capital Prime Plc v Worthgate (fn. 23). 
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b. Debt financing and loan contracts 
 
The Bankruptcy Code prohibits the 
assumption of a contract to lend or extend financial 
accommodation or debt financing.116 This has been 
previously evaluated in detail in 1.3.2. in the context 
of an exception to the CodeÕs anti-ipso facto rule.  
The present prohibition is therefore in line with the 
general policy of the Code towards contracts of this 
nature. As earlier noted in Chapter one, the Code is 
very strict on this prohibition such that a pre-petition 
agreement to continue with a financing contract after 
the commencement of formal insolvency will be 
invalid and unenforceable.  
 
A significant implication of the present 
prohibition is that, even where there is no ipso facto 
clause in a loan or financial accommodation 
agreement, a trustee or debtor-in-possession is 
effectively disentitled from assuming such contracts. 
The position will be unchanged where there is a 
subsisting pre-petition agreement to that effect. 117 As 
explained in chapter one, this prohibition is aimed at 
ensuring that a creditor who has made an 
unperformed lending commitment to the debtor from 
being compelled to continue with the obligation post-
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116 s. 365(c)(2) of the Code. 
117 Government NatÕl Mortgage Corp. v Adana Mortgage Bankers 12 B.R. 977, 
986 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980). In In re Prime Inc. 15 B.R. 216, 218, 219 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mo. 1981). 
  
248 
petition. 118  Furthermore, the Code has a well-
structured post-petition financing provision under s. 
364.119 The post-petition financing provision outlines 
the procedures for post-petition financing agreements 
as well as incentives and adequate protection for post-
petition lenders and existing creditors.120 Accordingly, 
precluding such pre-petition financing arrangements 
is a way of avoiding any conflicts with this post-
petition financing regime.  
 
In contrast, the UK Insolvency Act does not 
prohibit the continuation of pre-insolvency lending 
contracts or debt financing agreements. Liquidators 
can therefore continue performing the contractual 
obligations of the debtor. However, such contracts 
may often contain ipso facto clauses or acceleration 
clauses, which are plainly valid and enforceable under 
UK insolvency law. In the absence of such clauses, it 
is still doubtful if UK courts would compel an 
unwilling pre-petition lender to continue lending to a 
financially distressed company which is the subject of 
a winding up proceeding. This would in effect amount 
to compelling the lender to fund the winding-up 
procedure of the debtor, considering that the funds 
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118 Senate Report No. 95-989 at 58-59 (95th Cong. 2d Sess. 1978); In re TS 
Industries 117 B.R. 682, 686 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990); Airline Reporting Corp. v 
Charringhton Worldwide Ent. 110 B.R. 973, 975 (M.D.Fla.1990); Whinnery v 
Bank of Onalaska 106 B.R. 983, 990 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Wis.1989); In re Travel 
Shoppe Inc. 88 B.R. 466, 470 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988); In re Ernie Haire Ford 
Inc. 403 B.R. 750, 757 (M.D. Fla. 2009); Andrea Coles-Bjerre, ÒIpso Facto: The 
Pattern Of Assumable Contracts In BankruptcyÓ (2010) 40 N.M. L. Rev. 77, 96. 
119 Andrea Coles-Bjerre,  (fn 118) suggests that the question of assumability of 
financing contracts with consent or waiver of the creditor is purely academic, 
considering that court approval would be necessary whether it is conceptualized 
as a waiver plus assumption under s. 365(a) or as the incurring of unsecured 
financing outside the ordinary course of business under s. 364(b). 
120 s. 364 of the Code; Continental Experts Ent. Inc. v Stowers 26 B.R. 308, 309 
Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); Peninsula IntÕl Corp. v Citizens & Southern IntÕl Bank 19 
B.R. 762, 764 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982). 
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will presumably be passed on to other unsecured 
creditors. It is possible that a pre-petition agreement 
for the provision of funds to an insolvent company 
during insolvency may be enforceable if the latter has 
furnished consideration or the contract is by deed. 
  
 
c.  Prohibition of assumption or assignment by non-
bankruptcy law 
 
The Bankruptcy Code prohibits the 
assumption of pre-petition contracts where the 
applicable non-bankruptcy law prohibits assumption 
or assignment to a third party unless the creditor 
consents. 121  This exception had been previously 
evaluated in detail under 1.3.1. in the context of an 
exception to the anti-deprivation rule. Applicable non-
bankruptcy law as defined in In re Cutler122 is the 
statute that governed the contract of the parties prior 
to the commencement of insolvency.123  
 
Again, as noted in 1.3.2, there is a split in 
judicial opinion regarding the construction of the 
phrase Òassume or assignÓ under s. 365(c)(1) 
regarding the nature of non-assumable contracts. 
Some courts have adopted the so-called hypothetical 
approach wherein the literal language of the provision 
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121 s. 365(c) of the Code. In re ANC Rental Corporation 277 B.R. 226, 237 
(Bankr.D.Del.2002); In re Allentown Ambassadors Inc. 361 B.R. 422, 445 (E.D. 
Pa. 2007); In re Pennsylvania Peer Review Organisation 50 B.R. 640, 645 
(Bankr MD Pa. 1985); In re Pioneer Ford Sales Inc. 729 F.2d 27, 28 (1st Cir. 
1984). 
122 165 B.R. 275, 280 (Bankr.D.Ariz.1994). 
123 ibid. at 280. 
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is followed to a conclusion that the bankruptcy estate 
loses the rights of the pre-bankruptcy debtor to 
assume contracts that are not assignable under pre-
insolvency law Ð even if the officeholder does not 
contemplate an assignment. 124  Other courts have 
applied the so-called actual test wherein the 
assumption of contracts which are non-assignable 
outside bankruptcy are only prohibited where there is 
a finding that there is actually a plan to assign or that 
the assumption would amount to a forbidden 
assignment under the applicable non-insolvency 
law.125 
 
In 1.3.2. it was argued that the hypothetical 
test runs counter to the general policy of the anti-ipso 
facto regime notwithstanding that it accords with a 
literal construction of s. 365(c)(1). Similarly, it is also 
suggested here that the construction is at cross-
purposes with the asset-preservation objective of the 
rejection/assumption mechanism. The consequence of 
applying the test is that valuable contingent assets of 
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124 Perlman v. Catapult Entertainment Inc. 165 F.3d 747 (9th Cir.) (applying the 
Òhypothetical testÓ to bar assumption of nonexclusive patent licenses); In re West 
Electonics Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83-84 (3rd Cir. 1988) (barring assumption of 
government contract); Breedon v. Catron 158 B.R. 629 (E.D. Va. 1993) (barring 
assumption of partnership agreement). 
125  In re GP Express Airlines, Inc. 200 B.R. 222, 231-32 (Bankr. D. Neb. 
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assignment of certain airline contracts did not prevent the debtor in possession 
from assuming such contracts); In re American Ship Building Co. Inc. 164 B.R. 
358, 362-63 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994); In re Hartec Enter, Inc. 117 B.R. 865, 872-
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in possession to assume a non-assignable government contract); In re Cardinal 
Indus. Inc. 116 B.R. 964, 977 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990); Institute Pasteur v. 
Cambridge Biotech Corp. 104 F.3d 489, 493-94 (1st Cir.) (debtor in possession 
may assume patent licenses even though reorganization plan provides for transfer 
of debtor's stock to third party); Summit Inv. and Dev. Corp. v. Leroux 69 F.3d 
608, 612-14 (1st Cir. 1995) (rejecting Òhypothetical testÓ);Texaco, Inc. v. 
Louisiana Land and Exploration Co. 136 B.R. 658, 668-71 (M.D. La. 1992) 
(Statute which required the consent of a state board to assign a state mineral lease 
was not Òapplicable lawÓ blocking the assumption of a lease by the debtor in 
possession). 
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the debtor will be forfeited merely due to a 
bankruptcy filing. This is regardless of the fact that 
there is no plan of assigning the contracts after 
assumption. It is suggested that if non-insolvency law 
is not applicable because there is no plan to assign, it 
arguably makes little sense to give effect to such anti-
assignment law in insolvency when the debtor is not 
seeking to assign the contract. Furthermore, given that 
assumption is a prerequisite to assignment, the 
application of the hypothetical test will arguably 
render the word ÒassignmentÓ as used in s. 365(c)(1) a 
mere suplusage.  
 
By comparison, notwithstanding that the plain 
language of s. 365(c)(1) cannot provide the basis for 
the actual test given that it transforms the phrase 
Òassume or assignÓ to Òassume and assign,Ó it has 
been previously argued in Chapter one that the test 
will yield results which accord with the objective of 
the rejection/assumption regime. 126  Accordingly in 
Texaco Inc. v La. Land & Exploration Co., Parker J. 
noted that,127 
"The proposition tends to defeat the basic bankruptcy 
purpose of enhancement of the bankruptcy estate for 
benefit of rehabilitation and the general creditors upon a 
highly technical 'hypothetical' test which furthers no 
bankruptcy purpose at all. It would allow one 
disgruntled creditor to frustrate payment of claims to 
other creditors or rehabilitation, contrary to the whole 
purpose of bankruptcy."128 
 
The actual test is thus more in tune with the 
asset-preservation and value-maximisation goals of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
126In re TechDyn Sys. Corp. 235 B.R. 857, 864 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1999); In re 
Cardinal Indus. Inc. 116 B.R. B.R. 964, 981 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) 
127 136 BR. 658 (M.D. La. 1992). 
128 ibid. at 671.  
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the rejection regime and the bankruptcy estate. 
 
There is no equivalent provision of this nature 
in UK insolvency law. However, a specific provision 
of a statute, which excludes the application of the 
Insolvency Act, or some specific provisions 
(including the disclaimer regime) on good policy 
grounds will be enforceable by UK courts. For 
instance, a liquidator cannot disclaim market contracts 
or a contract effected by the exchange or clearing 
house for the purpose of realising property provided 
as margin in relation to market contracts;129 a transfer 
order or a contract for the purpose of realising 
security under settlement finality regulations;130 where 
a collateral provider or a collateral taker within the 
financial collateral regulations is being wound up, any 
financial collateral arrangement within those 
regulations.131 
  
  
3.4. Effects of disclaiming or rejecting contracts 
    
3.4.1.     Effect on parties to the contract 
 
A rejection or disclaimer of a contract in both 
jurisdictions is deemed as a breach which relates back 
to the date immediately preceding the commencement 
of the insolvency.132 The solvent parties are therefore 
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129 s. 164(1) Companies Act 1989. 
130 Financial Markets and Insolvency Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/2979). 
131 Financial Collateral Arrangements (No.2) Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/3226). 
132 s. 178(4) Act; s. 365(g)(1) Code. In re Jeffrey Lavigne (n 6) 387; In re The 
Drexel Burnham Lambert 138 B.R. 687, 707 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re 
  
253 
treated as unsecured creditors in the insolvency 
procedure. 133  Whereas this breach constitutes a 
unilateral termination of the contract under UK 
insolvency law, the contract remains in force under 
the US regime.134 This is because, under the Code, 
rejection by the trustee or debtor-in-possession on 
behalf of the bankruptcy estate is merely a decision to 
decline taking the place of the pre-petition debtor as a 
party in the pre-petition contract.135 Accordingly, In In 
re The Drexel Burnham Group,136 the court noted that 
Òrejection merely frees the estate from the obligation 
to perform.Ó137 
 
As has been previously noted, the bankruptcy 
estate is a distinct entity from the pre-petition debtor 
for this purpose, and therefore is not regarded as a 
party to the pre-petition contract.138 The bankruptcy 
estate therefore lacks legal capacity to ÒterminateÓ the 
contract. It can only decline assuming and performing 
the contractual obligations. Nevertheless, the legal 
effect of a rejection and disclaimer on a solvent party 
in the jurisdictions are substantially similar. The 
solvent party will be incapable of proceeding with the 
executory contract and is entitled to claim for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Modern Textile Inc. 900 F.2d 1184, 1191 (8th Cir. 1990); NLRB v Bildisco & 
Bildisco (n 37) 530. 
133 s. 502(g) of the Code. 
134 Thompkins v LilÕ Joe Records Inc. 476 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 2007); In re 
Jeffrey Lavigne (n 16) 387; Michael Andrew, ÒExecutory Contracts In 
Bankruptcy: Understanding ÔRejectionÕÓ (n 5) 916.  
135 In 6177 Reality Associates Inc. 142 B.R. 1017, 1018 (Bankr. S.D.Fla.1992); In 
re Austin Dev. Co., 19 F.3d 1077, 1082-83 (5th Cir.1994); In re Tri-Glied, 
Ltd.,179 B.R. 1014, 1017-18 (Bkrtcy.E.D.N.Y.1995); In re Continental 
Airlines, 981 F.2d 1450, 1459-61 (5th Cir.1993); In re Elm Inn Inc. 942 F.2d 
630, 633 (9th Cir. 1991); In re Modern Textile 900 (fn. 132) 1191-92. 
136 138 B.R. 687, 703 (Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y.1992). 
137 ibid. at 703. 
138 In re Tri-Glied Ltd (fn. 135) 1018. 
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damages as an unsecured creditor in the insolvency 
process.139 
  
Significantly, neither the Bankruptcy Code nor 
case law proffers any explanation as to what becomes 
of the breached contract after rejection. Based on the 
above analysis, the solvent counterparty cannot 
continue performing its obligations when the contract 
is rejected, as there will be no party to contract with. 
The only option available to the counterparty will be a 
claim for damages in the insolvency procedure as an 
unsecured creditor. Furthermore, the pre-petition 
contract cannot be said to have been Òterminated.Ó For 
instance, Andrew has rightly noted that, 
ÒRejection is not the power to release, revoke, 
repudiate, void, avoid, cancel or terminate, or even to 
breach, contract obligations. Rather, rejection is a 
bankruptcy estate's election to decline a contract or lease 
asset.Ó140 
 
In addition, theoretically, the trustee cannot be 
deemed to have terminated the contract considering 
that the bankruptcy estate was never a party to the 
contract. Similarly, termination cannot be attributed to 
the pre-petition corporate debtor who neither 
terminated the contract prior to the commencement of 
insolvency nor during the insolvency procedure. It is 
suggested here that a logical explanation would be 
that there has been a material breach by the corporate 
debtor, which excuses the solvent counterparty from 
performance and also entitles him to damages. 
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139 s. 502(g) of the Code; In re Jeffrey Lavigne (fn. 16) 387; In re The Drexel 
Burnham Lambert (n 132) 707; In re Modern Textile Inc. (fn. 88) 1191; NLRB v 
Bildisco & Bildisco (fn. 50) 530. 
140  Michael Andrew, ÒExecutory Contracts In Bankruptcy: Understanding 
ÔRejectionÕÓ (fn. 6) 931, cited with approval in In re Jeffrey Lavigne (fn. 7) 387. 
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Considering that the breach relates back to a date 
immediately preceding the commencement of the 
insolvency, this will rank as an unsecured claim. 
 
The US regimeÕs Òride-throughÓ option, 
developed by bankruptcy courts as a middle ground 
approach, supports the above reasoning. 141  As the 
provision for assumption and rejection of executory 
contracts are permissive, there is a Òno-actionÓ option 
for the officeholder in reorganisation procedures.142 
This doctrine will come into operation where the 
trustee has neither affirmatively accepted nor rejected 
an executory contract throughout the reorganisation 
procedure. 143  In addition, the solvent counterparty 
must also opt to seek redress for defaults in the 
contract outside the bankruptcy proceeding. 144  An 
exercise of the ride-through option ensures that an 
executory contract remains in force until rejected and 
unless rejected it passes through with the other 
property of debtor to the reorganised corporation.145 
The disadvantage of this option is that a corporate 
debtor may unwittingly burden itself post-insolvency 
with onerous contracts. 
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141 Boston Post Road v FDIC 21 F.3d 477, 484 (2d Cir. 1994). 
142 In re JZ L.L.C. 371 B.R. 412, 422 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2007); In re National 
Gypsum Co. 208 F.3d 498, 504 n.(5th Cir. 2000). This is not possible in Chapter 7 
cases or cases involving leases of non-residential real property as failure to act by 
the trustee in these cases within the specified time periods, will make the 
contracts to be deemed rejected Ð s. 365(d)(1),(4). 
143 In re Hernandez 287 B.R. 795, 799 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2002); FederalÕs Inc. v. 
Edmonton Inv. Co. 555 F.2d 577, 579 (6th Cir.1977). 
144 In re Dehon Inc. 352 B.R. 546, 560-561 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006); In re Day 
208 BR 358, 368 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1997); In re Polysat Inc. 152 B.R. 886, 890 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993). 
145  Consolidated Gas Electric Light and Power Co v United Railways and 
Electric Co. 85 F.2d 799, 805  (4th Cir. 1936). 
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3.4.2. Effect of rejection/disclaimer on third parties 
 
Although a disclaimer constitutes a unilateral 
repudiation, the Insolvency Act expressly excludes a 
disclaimer from affecting the rights and liabilities of 
third parties such as guarantors, issuers of letters of 
credit, sub-lessees, sub-tenants etc.146 The contractual 
rights and liabilities of these parties will remain intact 
and will only be affected by a disclaimer if it is 
necessary to ensure that the debtor is released from 
liability under the contract.147 The rationale for this 
position is that the disclaimer is aimed at obviating 
only the debtor of its burdensome contractual 
obligations and not other solvent counterparties. 
Consequently the rights and obligations of the debtor 
company will be severed from the contract while the 
contractual rights and obligations of the other third 
parties will subsist. 
 
There is no equivalent provision under the 
Bankruptcy Code. It is arguable that this may be due 
to the reasoning that the bankruptcy estate is not a 
party to the pre-petition contracts of the debtor. What 
then happens to third parties with subsisting rights 
and obligations under a rejected pre-petition contract? 
Again there appears to be no judicial authority for 
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146 s. 178(4)(b) of the Act; In re Thompson and CottrellÕs Contract (1943) Ch. 
97, 99; Arthur Hill v The East and West India Dock Company (1883-84) L.R. 9 
App. Cas. 448, 455, 461. 
147 Shaw v Doleman (2009) B.C.C. 730, 736, 737; Scottish Widows Plc. & Anor v 
Tripipatkul (2004) B.C.C. 200, 204; Basch v Steel (2001) L & T.R. 1, 9; Capital 
Prime Properties Plc. v Worthgate Ltd (2000) B.C.C. 525; Hindcastle Ltd v 
Barbara Attenborough (1997) A.C. 70, 86-87; W H Smith v Wyndham 
Investments (1994) B.C.C. 699, 700; Wamford Investments Ltd v Duckworth 
(1978) 2 All ER 517; Hill v East and West India Dock Co. (1884) 9 App. Cas. 
448; In re Levy (1881) L.R. 17 Ch. D. 746, 754. 
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this. However, it is suggested that, since a rejection 
constitutes a breach but not a termination, the pre-
petition contractual rights and obligations of other 
counterparties will subsist and survive the rejection. 
This of course will be the case where the contract can 
be continued without the debtor. For instance, a 
guarantor of the obligations of the debtor will not be 
relieved of his obligation under the guarantee 
agreement notwithstanding a rejection of the 
underlying contract. In the light of this, the position 
will be largely be similar to that in the UK regime.  
 
 
3.4.3.     Effect of rejection in special cases: Leases, licenses 
 
There are special cases where the Bankruptcy 
Code has provided special rules in relation to the 
rejection of contracts. The operative principle in these 
special rules is that a lessee/solvent party or licensee 
who is in possession of property under an unexpired 
lease or licence will be allowed to remain in 
possession of the property notwithstanding the 
rejection of the agreement by the trustee. 148  For 
instance, a lessee/solvent counterparty whose 
unexpired lease or licence term has been rejected has 
the option of retaining his interest in the lease or 
licence. 149  In this case the lessee will remain in 
possession of the property for the remainder of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
148 s. 365(h), (i) and (j) Code. 
149 s. 365(h)(1)(A)(ii). 
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term of the licence or lease.150 He will also be entitled 
to enforce any option for renewal or extension.151 
Alternatively, the lessee can treat the rejection as a 
termination in accordance with the applicable non-
bankruptcy law152 and proceed to claim for damages 
in the insolvency as an unsecured creditor. 
 
At first blush, it is arguable that forfeiting the 
lease upon rejection would be more favourable to the 
insolvent estate and would promote the asset-
preservation and value-maximisation objectives of the 
rejection provision, compared to permitting the 
lessee/solvent party to retain possession. This is 
because there is a possibility that the trustee may be 
able to lease out the property on more profitable 
terms. However, permitting a forfeiture of the lease 
would amount to treating the debtor/lessorÕs rejection 
as a rescission or termination. This will run counter to 
the previously evaluated Bankruptcy CodeÕs notion of 
rejection. It is suggested that the prevailing approach 
accords with Bankruptcy CodeÕs notion of ÒrejectionÓ 
under the Bankruptcy Code. As previously noted, a 
rejection under the Code does not constitute rescission 
or termination.153  
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150 s. 365(h) of the Code; In re Carlton Restaurant Inc. 151 B.R. 353, 356 
(Bankr. ED Pa. 1993). 
151 Under this option, the counterparty must keep paying rents and performing his 
obligations therein. However, the trustee is not obliged to perform his obligations 
under the lease, as rejection relieves him from any subsisting contractual 
obligations of the corporate debtor. The lessee/solvent counterparty may offset 
rent against the damages due from lessorÕs non-performance. s. 365(h)(1)(A)(ii). 
152 s. 365(h)(1)(A)(i) Code. 
153 In re Austin Dev. Co., 19 F.3d 1077, 1082-83 (5th Cir.1994); In re Tri-Glied, 
Ltd. (fn. 135) 1017-18; In re Continental Airlines (fn 135) 1459-61; In re Elm Inn 
Inc. (fn. 135) 633; In re Modern Textile (fn 132) 1191-92. 
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Tabb, in his seminal work has attributed the 
enactment of the present special rules for leases and 
licences to Òthe failure of some courts to ascribe the 
appropriate limited effect to rejectionÓ Ð so as to 
Òprotect the legitimate interests of non-debtor parties 
to contracts or leases in the event of rejection.Ó Tabb 
therefore argues that Òif all courts understood 
rejection, the special rules of s. 365 É would not be 
necessary.Ó 154  TabbÕs assertion is plausible. It is 
suggested that even in the absence of the special rules, 
the prevailing approach would be the outcome of such 
rejection of leases (in the light of the CodeÕs notion of 
rejection). 
  
Conversely, a rejection of an unexpired lease 
by a lessee/debtor will have the effect of terminating 
the lease.155 The reason for this can be found in the 
statutory language of s. 365(d)(4) of the Bankruptcy 
Code which provides that,  
ÒAn unexpired lease of non-residential real property 
under which the debtor is the lessee shall be deemed 
rejected, and the trustee shall immediately surrender that 
non-residential real property to the lessor, if the trustee 
does not assume or reject the unexpired leaseÉÓ 
 
Hence, in the absence of assumption within the 
specified time, the lease is deemed rejected. 
Consequently, the Code mandates the trustee to 
Òimmediately surrenderÓ the lease to the 
lessor/creditor. 156 Although the word ÒterminatedÓ is 
not used under the provision, it is suggested that the 
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154 Charles Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy (2nd edn., Foundation Press 2009) 831. 
155 In re Tri-Glied Ltd (fn 135) 1019; In re Elm Inn Inc. (fn. 135) 633; In re BSL 
Operating Corp 57 B.R. 945, 947 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Re-Trac Corp 
59 B.R. 251, 257 (Bankr. D Minn. 1986). 
156 In 6177 Reality Associates Inc. (fn. 135) 1019. 
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surrender of the lease effectively terminates it.157  
 
Judicial support for the foregoing can be found 
in In re Southwest Aircraft services Inc.158 where the 
debtor-in-possessionÕs argument that his rejection of 
the lease did not terminate the lease, but rather, the 
lease was abandoned to the insolvent estate, was 
rejected. Russell J. noted that such an argument, if 
correct, would render s. 365(d)(4) an exercise in 
futility for a lessor. 159 Similarly in In re Criadores de 
Yabucoa Inc.160 the lessors filed motions requesting 
immediate surrender of premises leased by Chapter 11 
debtor. Lamoutte C.J. held that the debtor-in-
possession was required to immediately surrender the 
leased premises due to its failure to assume unexpired 
leases within the statutory period after the date of the 
order for relief. In addition, there is authority for the 
proposition that where a debtor holds over after 
rejection of the lease, rent will accrue at the fair use 
and occupancy rate.161 
 
It is suggested that this position is plainly 
correct. Having rejected the unexpired term of the 
lease, it is only fair that it should be forfeited. A 
contrary position would amount to the leased property 
being occupied for free Ð given that the lessor will not 
be entitled to any payment by way of administrative 
expense priority.  
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157 In re Giles Association Ltd 92 B.R. 695, 698 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1988); In re 
Southwest Aircraft services Inc. 53 B.R. 805, 810 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1985). 
158 53 B.R. 805, 810 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1985). 
159 See also In re Giles Association Ltd (fn. 157) 698. 
160 75 Bankr. 96, 97 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1987). 
161 In re Herr 61 Bankr. 252 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986). 
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The leading authority for the present issue 
under UK law is the House of LordÕs decision in 
Hindcastle Ltd v Barbara Attenborough Associates.162 
In that case, Lord Nicholls considered the effect of a 
disclaimer on different lessee-lessor relationships. 
First and similar to the approach under the Code, 
where there is only a debtor/lessee and a lessor, a 
disclaimer effectively terminates the lease. The 
lessorÕs reciprocal covenants are also determined so 
as to relieve the debtor/lessee of any further 
obligations. This is clearly in line with UK insolvency 
lawÕs policy on disclaimer which views a disclaimer 
as a unilateral determination. 163 Thus the disclaimer 
operates to determine all the debtor/lesseeÕs 
obligations under the lesseeÕs covenant and its rights 
under the lessorÕs covenants.  
 
In contrast to the position under the 
Bankruptcy Code, the above effect will also apply 
where a debtor/lessor disclaims a lease. Unlike under 
the Bankruptcy CodeÕs approach, where the solvent 
counterparty/lessee is given the option of retaining the 
lease or licence for the remainder of the unexpired 
term, under UK law a disclaimer effectively 
terminates the lease agreement. There is no question 
whatsoever of the solvent counterparty/lessee having 
an option to remain in the leased property for the 
remainder of the term or to keep possession of the 
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162 [1997] AC 70. 
163 ibid. at 87. 
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licence for the remainder of the term of the 
agreement. The solvent counterparty/lessee or 
licensee is entitled to a claim for damages in the 
winding up. As previously noted, this approach is 
capable of giving the liquidator the opportunity to 
lease out the property on more profitable terms which 
in turn could maximise realisations for the general 
creditors. 
 
Another scenario envisaged by Lord Nicholls 
is where there are third parties with subsisting rights 
such as sub-lessees and sureties. A disclaimer will not 
affect their rights and obligations under the lease.164 It 
is suggested that this position accords with the 
Insolvency ActÕs provision in relation to third parties. 
In Shaw v Doleman,165 a guarantorÕs contention that 
her guarantee liability ceased on the disclaimer of a 
lease by a liquidator was rejected. The Court of 
Appeal ruled that by virtue of s. 178(4)(b) the 
disclaimer of the lease did not affect the guarantorÕs 
liability to the landlord but the liability remained as 
though the lease had not come to an end but had 
continued after the disclaimer. The rights and 
liabilities of sub-lessees, sureties and other persons 
deriving interests from the insolvent entity will only 
be interfered with Òso far as is necessary for the 
purpose of releasing the company from any 
liability.Ó166  
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164 ibid. at 87-89. RVB Investments Limited v Alastair Roderick Bibby [2013] 
EWHC 65 (Ch) (15)-(17). 
165 [2009] B.C.C. 730, 738-9. 
166 s. 178(4)(b) Act. 
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The Bankruptcy Code is silent on this issue. 
However, as previously noted, a rejection of an 
unexpired lease by a debtor/lessee under the Code has 
the effect of terminating the lease, considering that the 
Code directs a debtor/lessee to surrender the lease to 
the lessor upon rejection.167 As a corollary, in view of 
the requirement for a surrender of the lease, it is 
suggested that the rejection of an unexpired lease by a 
debtor/lessee will effectively terminate all interests of 
other parties within the debtor/lesseeÕs interest.  
Judicial support for this reasoning can be found in In 
6177 Reality Associates Inc.168 In that case, a Chapter 
7 debtor/lessee's rejection of a lease was held to have 
terminated the lease, thereby precluding a sub-lessee 
from further sub-leasing the property in its Chapter 11 
case. Mark J. noted that upon termination of master 
lease, lessor was entitled to immediate surrender of 
premises not only by lessee but also by sub-lessee and 
any other parties claiming interest in premises through 
lessee. 169  A different conclusion will be reached 
where the debtor is the lessor. As explained above, a 
rejection of the lease will constitute a breach and not a 
termination and the lessee/solvent party will have the 
option of either terminating the lease or retaining his 
interest in it. In this case, the fate of the sub-lessees 
will rest on the decision of the lessee. 
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167 s. 365(d)(4) of the Code. 
168 142 B.R. 1017, 1019 (Bankr. S.D.Fla.1992). 
169 ibid. at 1019. 
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Conclusion 
 
An insolvent company will often have several 
pre-petition executory contracts and unexpired leases 
in its inventory. At insolvency, the company will 
almost certainly lack the capacity to honour all the 
contractual obligations in the executory contracts. 
Indeed the objectives of the insolvency procedure 
might be jeopardised if all counterparties are allowed 
to insist on and enforce their pre-petition executory 
contracts. Accordingly, while some executory 
contracts might be unbeneficial or burdensome to the 
debtor, others may maximise realisations for the 
insolvent estate and hence the success of the 
procedure may be largely dependent on their 
continuation.  
 
Against this background, the 
rejection/disclaimer regime negates the principle of 
certainty of contracts. Insolvency lawÕs pursuit of 
maximisation of value trumps the pre-petition 
contractual entitlements of individual creditors. This 
notwithstanding, it is arguable that the disclaimer or 
rejection mechanism does not actually constitute a 
drastic deviation from what would otherwise be the 
position outside the insolvency law forum. For 
instance, outside formal insolvency, a repudiatory 
breach of a contract will entitle the innocent party to 
damages. Similarly a disclaimer or rejection 
constitutes a breach which relates back to the time 
immediately before the date of the commencement of 
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the procedure.  
 
Accordingly, just as is the case outside formal 
insolvency proceedings, the solvent counterparty is 
entitled to prove for damages in the insolvency as an 
unsecured creditor. This narrative can indeed serve as 
a basis for the justification of the disclaimer or 
rejection mechanism. From this perspective, the 
disclaimer or rejection regime merely projects in the 
formal insolvency forum, what would have ordinarily 
been the position in the absence of a formal 
insolvency proceeding.  
 
This chapter has highlighted the fact that in 
contrast to the Bankruptcy Code, the power to 
disclaim under s. 178 of the UK Insolvency Act is 
limited to liquidators and is not expressly extended to 
administrators. Notwithstanding that English courts 
are often inclined to sanctioning decisions of 
administrators to renege on pre-petition contracts if 
such will enhance the achievement of a purpose of the 
procedure, it is necessary for the powers to be 
expressly extended to administrators. This will ensure 
certainty as regards the powers of administrators to 
disclaim such unbeneficial contracts. Such express 
provision will also protect administrators from 
exposure to tortious liability for interference with 
contracts. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONTRACTS AT AN 
UNDERVALUE/FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS 
 
 
4.0.    Introduction 
 
Transaction avoidance rules are significant in 
two respects. First, they represent the only instance 
where pre-petition transactions can be reopened and 
retrospectively avoided or adjusted. This can be 
contrasted with the rules evaluated in the previous 
chapters which either operate on or after the 
commencement of formal insolvency procedure. 
Secondly, transaction avoidance rules constitute one 
of the very few instances where insolvency law 
interferes with proprietary rights of solvent parties. 
This chapter will specifically focus on provisions 
against transactions at an undervalue under the 
Insolvency Act and the corresponding rule against 
fraudulent transfer under the Bankruptcy Code. 
  
This chapter comparatively analyses the effect of 
the rules against transactions at an undervalue and 
fraudulent transfers on pre-insolvency contracts. It 
evaluates the policy objectives for these contract 
adjustment and avoidance rules and the efficacy of the 
rules in achieving the policy goals. This chapter also 
evaluates the application of the rules to two contracts 
which are likely to raise transaction at an undervalue 
or fraudulent transfer concerns, namely leveraged 
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buyouts and intra-corporate guarantee contracts. In 
line with the theme of this thesis, the analysis of 
transactions in this chapter is limited to transactions 
that constitute or involve the performance of contracts 
as opposed to gifts and other non-contract 
transactions. 
 
The present transaction avoidance rules present a 
significant instance where insolvency law interferes 
with the policy concerns of contract law. Accordingly, 
the analysis in this chapter examines how the 
jurisdictions manage the competing interests of 
parties with the aim of exempting non-colourable 
transactions from the ambit of the rules. 
 
 
4.1.    The Scope of the rules 
  
4.1.1.     Rules against fraudulent transfers 
 
The first limb of the Bankruptcy CodeÕs 
fraudulent transfers and obligations provision enables 
a trustee to avoid transfers or obligations in contracts 
incurred by the debtor during the twilight period with 
actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor.1 
This avoidance rule is radically different from the 
English insolvency rules against transactions at an 
undervalue because it places primacy on the debtorÕs 
intention and also focuses on the protection of 
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1 s. 548(a)(1)(A) of the Code; In re Sherman 67 F.3d 1348, 1353, 1354 (8th Cir. 
1995); Max Sugarman Funeral Home Inc. v ADB Investors 926 F.2d 1248, 1254 
(1Ò Cir. 1991). David Epstein, Steve Nickles, Bankruptcy (West Group 1993) 
368-369. 
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creditors individually and not collectively. A 
functional analogy can however be drawn between 
this rule and the Insolvency ActÕs provision against 
transactions at an undervalue with the aim of 
defrauding creditors. 2   Both of these avoidance 
provisions deal with attempts to intentionally 
prejudice the interest of individual creditors through 
contracts that have the effect of delaying, hindering or 
defrauding them.3  
 
 The second limb of the Bankruptcy CodeÕs 
fraudulent transfers and obligations provision focuses 
on constructive fraud.4  Subject to certain conditions, 
it empowers trustees to avoid pre-insolvency transfers 
made during the twilight period for less than a 
reasonably equivalent value by the debtor.5 As would 
be observed in the evaluation in this chapter, this limb 
operates in a similar manner as the Insolvency ActÕs 
rules against transactions at an undervalue. Both of 
these avoidance rules enable the officeholder to 
retroactively avoid or adjust pre-insolvency contracts 
where the debtor either received no consideration or 
received consideration that was significantly less in 
value than what it gave.  
 
In addition to the above, most US States have 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 s. 423 of the Act; Pena v Coyne (No.1) [2004] 2 BCLC 703, 722. 
3 s. 423 has no time limitation in relation to when the voidable transaction was 
entered into. 
4 Douglas Baird, ÒLegal approaches to restricting distributions to shareholders: 
the role of fraudulent transfer lawÓ (2006) E.B.O. L. Rev. 199 (n 1): ÒIn the 
United Kingdom, fraudulent conveyance law evolved differently. Its legacy can 
still be seen in such provisions as s. 238 of the Insolvency Act 1986.Ó 
5 s. 548(a)(1)(B)(I), (II) and (III) of the Code; Robert Jordan, William Warren, 
Bankruptcy (3rd edn, Foundation Press 1993) 499. 
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versions of fraudulent transfer laws under the 
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act or its successor 
legislation, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 6 
These State fraudulent transfer laws are largely 
modelled after the Bankruptcy CodeÕs. However the 
State fraudulent transfer laws retrospectively avoid 
transfers in contracts made within a period of four 
years prior to formal insolvency in contrast to the 
two-year twilight period under the Bankruptcy Code. 
In practice, a trustee can bring a fraudulent 
conveyance action either under the Bankruptcy Code 
or State law when transactions involve more than one 
jurisdiction or State.7 In the interests of simplicity, 
this chapterÕs comparative evaluation will be 
restricted to the Bankruptcy CodeÕs fraudulent 
transfers and obligations provisions. 
 
 
4.1.2.      Rules against transactions at an undervalue 
 
As previously noted, the rules against 
transactions at an undervalue are designed to 
retrospectively avoid or adjust pre-petition contracts 
where the corporate debtor had either received no 
consideration or received consideration that was 
significantly less in value than what it gave. The 
Insolvency Act has two rules aimed at frustrating pre-
petition transactions that are at an undervalue  under 
s. 238 and s. 423 of the Act. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 s. 544 of the Code incorporates state fraudulent transfer laws. 
7 In re Pajaro Dunes Rental Agency 174 B.R. 557, 572 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1994); 
David Baird, Elements of Bankruptcy (5th edn, Foundation Press 2010) 139. 
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Section 238 of the Act operates in a similar 
manner as the second limb of the Bankruptcy CodeÕs 
fraudulent transfers and obligations provision. It 
retroactively adjusts or avoids transactions which had 
been entered into prior to the commencement of the 
formal proceeding, wherein the debtor has either 
received no consideration or has received one which 
is significantly less than what it has given. Another 
significant similarity between this provision and the 
second limb of the CodeÕs fraudulent transfer 
provision is that the vulnerable transactions must have 
been entered into at a time in the period of two years 
ending with the onset of insolvency.8  
  
Section 423 of the Act operates in a substantially 
similar manner as s. 238. The overlap between the 
two provisions has been judicially noted in a number 
of cases. For instance in Agricultural Mortgage Corp. 
Pty Ltd v Woodward9 which was on s. 423, the court 
relied on Millett J.Õs comments in Re MC Bacon Ltd 
(No. 1)10 in relation to the meaning of undervalue 
under s. 238.11 Similarly, in Menzies v National Bank 
of Kuwait12 Balcombe L.J. ruled that Òthe definition of 
a Ôtransaction at an undervalueÕ in s. 423(1) is in all 
relevant respects the same as the definition in s. 
238(4)Ó13 and accordingly applied the ruling of Millet 
J. in M C Bacon Ltd (No. 1)14 where s. 238 was in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 s. 240(1) Insolvency Act; s. 548(a)(1) Bankruptcy Code. 
9 [1994] B.C.C. 688, 695. 
10 [1990] B.C.C. 78. 
11 ibid. at 340. 
12 [1994] B.C.C. 119. 
13 ibid at 128-9. 
14 [1990] B.C.C. 78. 
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issue. 
 
However, for a transaction to be impugned under 
s. 423, the purpose of the transaction must be to either 
put the assets beyond the reach of an existing or 
prospective creditor15 or prejudice the interests of a 
creditor in relation to the claim. 16  Against this 
background, a functional analogy can be drawn 
between this rule and the first limb of the Bankruptcy 
CodeÕs fraudulent transfers and obligations provision. 
The latter provision enables a trustee to avoid 
transfers or obligations in contracts incurred by the 
debtor during the twilight period with actual intent to 
hinder, delay or defraud a creditor. Both avoidance 
provisions deal with attempts to intentionally 
prejudice the interest of individual creditors through 
contracts that have the effect of delaying, hindering or 
defrauding them.17  
  
In deed both provisions have the same origin. 
The origins of the provisions can be traced to the 
English Fraudulent Conveyances Act 1571 otherwise 
known as the Statute of Elizabeth 1571.18 The statute 
provided that a conveyance made Òto the end, purpose 
and intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditorsÓ is 
voidable. In the US, this law was passed into the 
common law and was later revised and codified in 
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15 s. 423(3)(a) Insolvency Act. 
16 s. 423(3)(b) Insolvency Act. 
17 s. 423 has no time limitation in relation to when the voidable transaction was 
entered into. 
18  Andrew Keay, Peter Walton, Insolvency Law, Corporate and personal, 
Pearson Longman 2003, 506; In re Bay Plastics 187 BR 315, 322 (Bankr. C.D. 
Cal. 1995) per Samuel L. Bufford J. 
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1918 when the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act 
was promulgated. In the UK it was repealed by 
the Law of Property Act 192519 and the successor to 
the rules are presently in s. 423. 
  
   
 
4.2.   The policy rationale  
  
4.2.1.    Preservation of the debtorÕs net assets 
  
The central objective of the Bankruptcy CodeÕs 
rules against constructive fraud and the Insolvency 
ActÕs rules against contracts at an undervalue is asset-
preservation through the recovery of the debtorÕs 
valuable assets that have been unjustifiably 
transferred for an unreasonably or significantly 
inadequate consideration.20 The rules aim to ensure 
that the debtorÕs assets that are transferred through 
vulnerable pre-insolvency transactions are 
recaptured.21 Hence in In re Bay Plastics22 Bufford J. 
noted that,  
ÒThe purpose of fraudulent transfer law is to prevent a 
debtor from transferring away valuable assets in 
exchange for less than adequate value, if the transfer 
leaves insufficient assets to compensate honest 
creditors.Ó23 
 
The rules against contracts at an undervalue 
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19 s. 207. 
20 In re Bay Plastics 187 BR 315, 322 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995); Robert Jordan, 
William Warren, Bankruptcy (n 5) 499; Review Committee on Insolvency Law 
and Practice (1982) Cmnd 8558 para 1221: The Cork Committee considered 
provisions relating to transactions at an undervalue in relation to personal 
insolvency and expressed the principal rationale as being: ÒTo prevent assets 
from being put in the hands of the debtorÕs family or associates in order to 
preserve them from claims of creditors.Ó 
21 Elliot v. Glushon, 390 F.2d 514, 516Ð17 (9th Cir.1967). 
22 187 BR 315 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995). 
23 ibid. at 322; Pajaro Dunes Rental Agency v. Spitters (In re Pajaro Dunes 
Rental Agency) 174 B.R. 557, 571 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.1994). 
  
273 
focus on the net assets of the company, as opposed to 
individual rights of creditors. Accordingly, a 
distinction can be drawn between the present rules 
and preference avoidance rules, given that the latter 
rules are aimed at ensuring equal treatment of 
similarly situated creditors. A hypothetical illustration 
of this distinction can be made with a cake that is to 
be equally shared between X, Y and Z. While 
preference avoidance rules ensure that X, Y and Z 
receive equal portions of the cake, the rules against 
transactions at an undervalue will ensure that the 
whole cake is preserved and not reduced before the 
sharing is done. Reducing the size of the cake will 
proportionally reduce the size of the portions of cake 
that X, Y and Z will receive, although it will not result 
to the unequal treatment of X, Y and Z. 
    
In the light of the foregoing, the often-held view 
that the pari passu rule is at the heart of insolvency 
avoidance rules is incorrect.24  The insolvency pari 
passu rule is only relevant and applicable among 
creditors of an insolvent company. The pari passu rule 
is of no relevance to non-creditors. The present 
avoidance rules are not restricted to creditors and 
sureties as is the case with preference avoidance rules. 
Rules against contracts at an undervalue frustrate 
vulnerable contracts of both creditors and non-
creditors. In essence, the rules are concerned with the 
size of the cake rather than how it is divided up.  
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24 Andrew Keay, ÒThe avoidance of pre-liquidation transactions; An Anglo-
Australian comparisonÓ (1998) J.B.L. 515, 519: ÒThe pari passu principle has 
been widely regarded as constituting the essential rationale for the existence of 
the avoidance provisions.Ó 
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The case of Re MC Bacon (No. 1)25 illustrates the 
foregoing point. In that case a charge which was 
granted to secure pre-existing indebtedness (in return 
for the creditor to continue to provide credit) was held 
not to constitute a transaction at an undervalue as it 
did not diminish the value of the companyÕs net 
assets. By charging its assets, the company 
appropriated them to meet its liabilities due to the 
secured creditor. This is notwithstanding that it had 
the potential of adversely affecting individual 
entitlements of creditors. 26  However, the grant of 
security for no consideration will constitute a 
transaction at an undervalue. 
 
  
4.2.2.     Protection of creditors 
  
 The primary objective of the first limb of the 
Bankruptcy CodeÕs fraudulent transfer provision is 
the protection of the individual rights of existing and 
prospective creditors of the corporate debtor. The rule 
enables a trustee to avoid contractual transfers made 
or obligations incurred by the debtor during the 
twilight period with actual intent to hinder, delay or 
defraud a creditor.27 As previously noted, s. 423 of the 
Insolvency Act, which avoids transactions at an 
undervalue with the aim of defrauding creditors, also 
has an individual-creditor-protection objective.28 This 
latter avoidance provision primarily targets attempts 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25  [1990] B.C.C. 78. 
26 ibid. at 92. 
27 s. 548(a)(1)(A) of the Code; In re Sherman 67 F.3d 1348, 1354 (8th Cir. 1995). 
28 s. 423 of the Act; Pena v Coyne (No.1) (fn. 2) 722. 
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by a debtor to either put assets beyond the reach of a 
creditor or to intentionally prejudice his interests.29 
  
 Both the first limb of the CodeÕs fraudulent 
transfer rules and s. 423 protects individual rights of 
creditors. For instance in contrast to other avoidance 
rules under the Act where only an officeholder can 
institute proceedings, a victim of the fraudulent 
contract can file an application for an order under s. 
423.30 Furthermore, a s. 423 application can be made 
outside a formal insolvency procedure. A 
consequence of this is that neither of these two rules 
promote insolvency lawÕs cardinal objectives of 
collectivity or equality among creditors. In 
consequence, neither of the instant rules promotes 
collectivity or equality among unsecured creditors. 
The central objective of this category of avoidance 
rules is therefore to ensure that individual (as opposed 
to collective) rights and collection efforts of creditors 
are not hampered by debtors.  
 
 
4.2.3.    Destination of recoveries 
 
The foregoing analysis of the objectives of the 
present avoidance rules will be incomplete without an 
evaluation of the destination of recoveries from the 
actions. This is in the light of floating charges or liens 
which are designed to cover all the assets of the 
company both present and future and will entitle the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 s. 423(3) of the Act. 
30 s. 424 of the Act. 
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charge-holder to payment ahead of unsecured 
creditors. As most courts have not expressed specific 
views on the fate of recoveries in transactions at an 
undervalue or fraudulent transfers, some of the cases 
below relate to preferences. It is however accepted 
that for this purpose, transactions at an undervalue are 
analogous to preferences.31 
  
Section 550(a) of the Code provides that the 
trustee may recover transfers avoided under s. 548 
Òfor the benefit of the estate.Ó Similarly, s. 552(a) of 
the Code sinks a floating lien upon a bankruptcy 
filing. The section provides that property acquired by 
the estate or by the debtor after the commencement of 
the case is not subject to any lien resulting from any 
security agreement entered into by the debtor before 
the commencement of the case. Accordingly, the 
provision frees post-petition assets and recoveries 
from the clutches of pre-petition liens.32  
 
However, this provision is subject to s. 552(b) 
which provides that a pre-petition security interest can 
attach to the post-petition proceeds, product, 
offspring, profits or rents of pre-petition collateral.33 
There is judicial consensus that the right to avoid 
transfers under the trustee's various avoiding powers 
does not constitute Òproceeds, product, offspring as 
provided in the security agreement and applicable 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31
 Andrew Keay, ÒAnother way of skinning a cat: enforcing directors' duties for 
the benefit of creditors,Ó (2004) Insolv. Int.  1, 7. 
32 Charles Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy (2nd edn, Foundation Press 2009) 739. 
33 s. 552(b) of Code.  
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non-bankruptcy lawÓ under s. 552(b). 34  First, the 
potential right to avoid a transfer comes into existence 
at the time of the property transfer (and is exercised 
only by the trustee). Secondly, a corollary can be 
drawn between this position and the long-held 
principle that a trustee cannot assign or sell the right 
to avoid pre-petition transfers.35 
  
Accordingly, in In re Integrated Testing 
Products Corp.36 the reasoning of Cowen J. was that 
since the debtor never possessed the right to institute 
an avoidance action, the secured creditor could not 
have ÒacquiredÓ the right prior to the filing of the 
petition as required under s. 552, and consequently 
can have no security interest in the recovery.37 The 
court also held that Òit makes little sense to allow the 
appellant (secured creditor) to recover from the 
trustee what it could not have received from the 
debtor absent the preference action.Ó38  
 
The above reasoning was followed in In re Sun 
Island Foods,39 where the court placed emphasis on 
the fact that the avoidance action was a result of the 
filing of the bankruptcy and that absent the petition in 
bankruptcy, there would have been no recoveries. The 
court reasoned that, 
ÒIt is illogical to allow a secured creditor to attach the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 In re Integrated Testing Products Corp. 69 B.R. 901, 904 (D.C.N.J.1987); In 
re Figearo 79 B.R. 914, 917 (Bankr.Nev.1987). 
35  United Capital Corp. v. Sapolin Paints Inc. 11 Bankr. 930, 937 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. 1981); Grass v. Osbor 39 F.2d 461, 461 (9th Cir. 1930). 
36 69 B.R. 901 (D.C.N.J.1987). 
37 ibid. at 905. 
38 ibid. 
39 125 B.R. 615 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1991). 
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proceeds of recoveries É if the trustee herein had not 
pursued the preference actions, the secured creditor 
could not have sued on its own to recover the 
preferences. Yet, by the trustee having pursued the 
recoveries, the plaintiff argues that the secured creditor 
now is in a position to claim the proceeds as covered by 
their security interest. This is an anomaly, and it results 
in the use of powers created by the Bankruptcy Code for 
the benefit of one creditor alone, and is to be avoided.Ó 40 
 
Against this background, the argument is 
primarily premised on the ground that since the right 
of action only arises at insolvency and since only the 
trustee can sue for such recoveries, the secured 
creditor is not entitled to the assets recovered as a 
result of the action. This position supports the asset-
preservation and creditor-protection policy objective 
of the rules against fraudulent transfers. The 
reasoning ensures that recoveries are not made for the 
sole benefit of a secured creditor, but for the benefit 
of the general body of creditors 
  
A principal duty of the officeholder, is to 
gather the assets of the insolvent estate. Accordingly, 
the grant of power to recover improper transfers is an 
important component of the associated duty to 
maximize the value of the estate. In exercising the 
avoidance powers, the trustee does not assert a cause 
of action that at any time belonged to the debtor and 
devolved upon the officeholder with the insolvency 
filing. Rather, the officeholder asserts a personal 
right, exercisable by the officeholder while acting in a 
representative capacity on behalf of all creditors. 
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40 ibid. at 619. In In re First Capital Mortgage Loan Corp. 60 B.R. 915, 917 
(Bankr.D.Utah 1986). 
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Conversely, the approach might be criticised 
on the ground that it has the effect of granting 
unsecured creditors a windfall. In other words, assets 
that were subject to security will be unencumbered 
when recovered. This is notwithstanding that the loss 
of the asset was through no fault of the secured claim 
holder. For instance, in In re Figearo41 Thompson J. 
held that funds received by trustee from a fraudulent 
transfer action were subject to creditor's security 
interest and not equivalent to a post-petition 
acquisition of property by the estate as contemplated 
by s. 552(a). The court reasoned that, 
ÒWhere the trustee to recover the property from Pacific 
(the preferred creditor) free of any pre-petition 
encumbrances, he would recover a greater interest in the 
property than that held by Pacific or the debtor prior to 
the transfer.Ó 42 
 
In contrast to the reasoning in the Integrated 
Testing Products Corp. and Sun Island Foods line of 
cases, the court opined that the transferee merely held 
voidable title to the transferred property. In 
consequence, the successful exercise of the trustee's 
avoiding power caused the transfer to become void. 
Any property recovered by the trustee which was 
subject to a security interest pre-petition, continued to 
be subject to such security interest. Accordingly, it 
has been argued that a secured creditor who held a 
pre-petition floating lien should be entitled to claim 
the benefits flowing from an avoidance action on the 
ground that this is consistent with the benefits which 
the creditor would have received in the absence of the 
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41 79 B.R. 914 (Bankr.Nev.1987). 
42 ibid. at 918; In re MidÐAtlantic Piping of Charlotte 24 B.R. 314, 321-325 
(Bankr. W.D.N.C.1982). 
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voidable transaction.43 
  
The above position may be criticized on the 
ground that it completely disregards the imperative of 
the fact that recoveries via avoidance actions are only 
possible through a right conferred solely on the 
trustee or debtor-in-possession.44 It thus overlooks the 
fact that formal insolvency proceedings alters the 
dynamics in company operations and produces new 
sets of relationships and duties. As opposed to being 
run by directors for the benefit of shareholders, the 
company is administered by a trustee or debtor-in-
possession for the benefit of the general body of 
creditors. Accordingly, in avoiding such transfers, a 
trustee or debtor-in-possession acts on behalf of the 
insolvent estate and for the general body of creditors. 
  
Two other notable US decisions supporting 
the argument that avoidance recoveries are subject to 
security interest worth mentioning are the cases of In 
re Cambria Clover Mercantile Co. 45  and In re 
Lively. 46  In ruling on a motion directing the 
disbursement of funds acquired through an avoidance 
action in In re Cambria Clover Mercantile Co.,47 King 
Jr. J. noted that pre-petition security interest could 
extend to such recoveries depending on the security 
agreement and the non-bankruptcy law. The court did 
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43 Nancy Sanbom, ÒAvoidance Recoveries in Bankruptcy: For the Benefit of the 
Estate or the Secured Creditor?Ó (1990) 90 Columbia.Law Review 1376, 1399-
1400.  
44 As would be seen under UK law, a counter argument may be that this is merely 
a procedural matter. 
45 51 B.R. 983, 986 (Bankr.E.D.Penn.1985). 
46 74 B.R. 238 (S.D.Ga.1987). 
47 51 B.R. 983, 986 (Bankr.E.D.Penn.1985). 
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not however expatiate on this point. In addition, no 
reference was made to the scope of s. 552(a) with 
regards to preventing the attachment of a pre-petition 
perfected Article 9 security interest to such recoveries.  
 
In In re Lively48 the district court held that the 
trustee's recovery from a fraudulent transfer action 
was subject to pre-petition secured claims of a 
judgment lien-holder. It is arguable that this decision 
may have turned on the facts of the case as the court 
noted that the language of s. 552(a) is implicitly 
limited to Òliens resulting from any security 
agreementÓ and is not applicable to judicial liens.49 It 
is thus arguable that a contrary result would have been 
reached had the creditor's lien been consensual. 
Nevertheless, it is suggested that this approach does 
not entirely consonant with the language of s. 550(a) 
that indicates that the trustee's recovery is for the 
benefit of the estate. 
  
Under UK insolvency regime, recoveries 
pursuant to actions for preferences (and by analogy, 
transactions at an undervalue) are not available to 
satisfy a charge-holder. The leading authority is Re 
Yagerphone50 where monies repaid by a creditor, who 
had been improperly preferred, were held to be for the 
benefit of the creditors and not covered by a 
debenture charging all present and future assets of a 
company. Bennett J. held that the money did not 
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48 74 B.R. 238 (S.D. Ga.1987). 
49 ibid. at 239. 
50 [1935] Ch. 392. 
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become part of the general assets of the company, but 
was a sum of money received by the liquidators and 
impressed with a trust in favour of the companyÕs 
creditors.51 
 
On the face of the Yagerphone Ltd judgment, 
the timing of the crystallization of the charge was a 
compelling factor in Bennett J.Õs decision. Bennett J. 
noted that, 
ÒI propose to decide ... in favour of the liquidators on 
this ground--namely, that, at the time when the securities 
contained in the debenture ... crystallised, the 
(preferential payment) was not the property of 
Yagerphone Ltd, the company which issued the 
debenture.Ó52 
 
The reasoning of Bennett J. was that when the 
floating charge crystallised, its scope did not extend to 
recoveries from avoidance actions, but was restricted 
to assets in possession of the company at the time of 
the crystallization. This ground has been criticised on 
the ground that a floating charge will also catch assets 
that come into the company's ownership post-
crystallisation.53 Indeed there is authority to the effect 
that property acquired by a chargor after 
crystallisation is still capable of falling under an after-
acquired property clause.54 
 
Perhaps due to the weakness of the 
crystallization argument, subsequent cases have relied 
on the ground that the right of action only arises in 
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51 ibid. at 395. 
52 [1935] 1 Ch. 392, 395. 
53 Sally Wheeler, ÒSwelling the assets for distribution in corporate insolvencyÓ 
(1993) J.B.L. 256, 261-2. 
54 NW Robbie & Co Ltd v Witney Warehouse Co Ltd [1963] 1 W.L.R. 1324; 
Holroyd v Marshall [1962] 10 H.L. Cas. 191.  
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insolvency, as a basis for excluding recoveries from 
the scope of floating charges. For instance in NW 
Robbie & Co. Ltd v. Witney Warehouse Co. Ltd,55 
Russell L.J. referred to the Yagerphone decision with 
approval and noted that Òa statutory right in and only 
in the liquidator to make such a (fraudulent 
preference) claim could never have been property of 
the company subject to the charge.Ó56 
 
Similarly, in Re MC Bacon (No. 2)57 Millet J. 
observed that an application to set aside a voidable 
preference can only be made by a liquidator or 
administrator and in the absence of a liquidation or 
administration order, cannot be made at all. 
Accordingly, citing Re Yagerphone with approval, 
Millet J. reasoned that, 
ÒAny sum recovered from a creditor who has been 
wrongly preferred enures for the benefit of the general 
body of creditors, not for the benefit of the company or 
the holder of a floating charge. It does not become part 
of the company's assets but is received by the liquidator 
impressed with a trust in favour of those creditors 
amongst whom he has to distribute the assets of the 
company.Ó58 
 
This is in tandem with the reasoning of 
McPherson JA in the Australian case of Starky v 
Deputy Commissioner of Tmation59 where he noted 
that if a secured creditor could not initiate for his or 
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55 [1963] 1 W.L.R. 1324. 
56 ibid. at 1338. Re Asiatic Electric Co. Pty Ltd [1970] 92 WN (NSW) 361, 363-4 
per Street J. 
57 (No. 2) [1990] B.C.C. 430. at 434 
58 ibid. at 434. Significantly, Millett J. noted in his judgment that  Òthe actual 
ratio in that case (Yagerphone) was that the payment of a debt due to an 
unsecured creditor prior to the crystallisation of the floating charge bound the 
debenture holder.Ó Australian cases also hold that such recoveries are for the 
benefit of unsecured creditors Campbell v Michael Mount PPB (1996) 14 ACLC 
218, 226, and on appeal (1996) 14 ACLC 218; NA Kratzmann Pty Ltd v. Tucker  
(No 2) [1968] 123 CLR 295, 300.  
59 [1993] 11 ACLC 558. 
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her own benefit such avoidance proceedings, it 
follows logically that the secured creditor should not 
be able to claim the proceeds of such proceedings.60 
 
In Re Oasis Merchandising Ltd.61 Gibson L.J. 
drew a distinction between assets that are the property 
of the company at the commencement of liquidation 
and those recoverable by the liquidator post-petition 
pursuant to his statutory powers.62 He reasoned that 
while a misfeasance action was capable of being 
caught by a debenture because the right of action 
arose and was available pre-petition, recovery of a 
preference or for fraudulent or wrongful trading were 
not property of the company and so not caught by the 
debenture.63 According to Gibson L.J., 
ÒBennett J. held that a debenture charging all present 
and future assets of a company did not cover money 
recovered by the liquidators from fraudulently preferred 
creditors, because it never became part of the general 
assets of the company, but when received by the 
liquidators was impressed in their hands with a trust for 
those creditors among whom they had to distribute the 
assets of the company.Ó64 
 
Significantly, some commentators have argued 
that the vesting of the entitlement to bring avoidance 
action in a liquidator is merely a procedural matter.65 
Hence, McCormack has observed that the liquidator 
or administrator is not acting in their own individual 
rights but rather by virtue of the office they hold in 
relation to a particular company. In a broad sense the 
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60 ibid. at 566-567 . 
61 [1998] Ch. 170. 
62 ibid. at 181. 
63 ibid. 
64 ibid. 
65 Sally Wheeler, ÒSwelling the assets for distribution in corporate insolvencyÓ 
(1993) J.B.L. 256, 262; Fidelis Oditah, "Wrongful Trading" (1990) L.M.C.Q. 
205, 217; Dan Prentice, ÒCreditor's Interests and Director's DutiesÓ (1990) 10 
Oxford J. Legal Stud. 265, 271. 
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proceedings are brought on behalf of the company in 
question.66 
 
Notably, it would be observed in the earlier 
quotes from the judgments of Millett J. in MC Bacon 
Ltd (No. 2) and Gibson J in Re Oasis Merchandising 
Ltd above that emphasis was also placed in Bennett 
J.Õs holding that recoveries received by the liquidator 
were impressed with a trust in favour of unsecured 
creditors for distribution.67 Again the trust argument is 
not free from criticism. An application of the above 
position has the potential of expropriating property 
rights and effecting redistribution. This would be the 
case where there is a grant of two floating charges and 
a subsequent avoidance of the senior creditorÕs 
charge. An application of the above position will have 
the effect of transferring the liberated assets to 
unsecured creditors rather than a prior satisfaction of 
the junior secured creditorÕs claim. 
 
 The reasoning in the Re Yagerphone Ltd line of 
cases substantially accord with the reasoning in the 
earlier evaluated US cases of Integrated Testing 
Products Corp. 68  and Sun Island Foods. 69  As 
previously noted, this position favours the general 
body of unsecured creditors by ensuring that 
recoveries are not encumbered by floating charges or 
liens but are available for the benefit of the general 
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66 Gerard McCormack, ÒSwelling Corporate Assets: Changing What is on the 
MenuÓ (2006) 6(1) JCLS 39-69, 57. 
67 Re Yagerpbone Ltd [I935] 1 Ch. 392, 396; Re Quality Camera Co Pty Ltd 
[1965] 83 NSW 226, 229. 
68 69 B.R. 901 (D.C.N.J.1987). 
69 125 B.R. 615 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1991). 
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body of creditors. In consequence, the approach 
consonants with the asset-preservation and creditor-
protection objectives of the rules against fraudulent 
transfers and transactions at an undervalue.  
  
Notwithstanding its merits, it is germane to 
note that Yagerphone Ltd. was premised on s. 265 of 
the 1925 Companies Act which incorporates s. 44 of 
the Bankruptcy Act. Subsequently, it has been argued 
that the courtÕs powers might have been widened by s. 
239(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986, which provides 
that, 
ÒThe court shall ... make such order as it thinks fit for 
restoring the position to what it would have been if the 
company had not given the preference.Ó 
 
 
It is therefore arguable that the statutory language 
of s. 293(3) grants courts discretion to order, in 
appropriate circumstances, that recoveries be applied 
first to meet the claims of floating charge holders. 
This can be contrasted with s. 44 of the Bankruptcy 
Act 1914 which merely provided that a preference 
was void70 and did not empower courts to make such 
orders as it thought fit to restore the position to what it 
would have been in the absence of the vulnerable 
transaction.  
 
However, in Re MC Bacon Ltd (No 2)71 Millett 
J in ruling that the new statutory wording had 
empowered the court to earmark preference avoidance 
recoveries for the benefit of floating charge holders, 
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70 Subsequently interpreted to mean voidable. 
71 Re MC Bacon Ltd (No. 2) [1990] B.C.C. 430. 
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observed that the restorative powers were not 
intended to be exercised so as to enable a debenture 
holder to obtain the benefit of the proceedings 
brought by the liquidator. 72  However, Oditah and 
McCormack have rightly argued that s. 239(3) does 
not specify which parties should benefit from 
recoveries.73  McCormack has further observed that 
Millett J. paid insufficient attention to the precise 
wording of the provision. 74  Similarly, Parry has 
persuasively argued that given the broad and clear 
terms in which the courtÕs discretion is phrased under 
s. 239(3), if the court, in restoring the position to what 
it would have been, is required to exclude the floating 
charge holder, this would have been clearly stated.75  
 
Against this background, it is arguable that 
nothing precludes courts from ordering that such 
proceeds be applied to meet claims of floating charges 
in priority to claims of unsecured creditors. It is also 
arguable that a distribution of proceeds of recoveries 
to unsecured creditors does not accord with the 
restorative principle under s. 239(3). Given that a 
floating charge applied to the asset prior to the 
vulnerable transaction, applying the recoveries to the 
floating charge may actually be the true means of 
restoring the company to the position that it would 
have been if the transaction had not been entered into. 
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72 ibid. at 434. 
73 Gerard McCormack, ÒSwelling Corporate Assets: Changing What is on the 
MenuÓ (2006) 6(1) JCLS 39-69, 55-6; Fidelis Oditah, Legal Aspects of 
Receivables Financing (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1991) 215. 
74 Gerard McCormack, (fn. 55-56). 
75 Rebecca Parry, "The Destination of Proceeds of Insolvency Litigation" (2002) 
23 Company Lawyer 49, 52-53. 
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It is instructive to note that adopting the above 
position for the destination of recoveries will have a 
number of implications. Keay has argued that holding 
that charge-holders are entitled to any recoveries 
could cause ailing companies to be dismembered 
more quickly, as creditors are likely to be even more 
aggressive in seeking payments, particularly where 
companies appear to be insolvent and likely to end up 
in liquidation.76 
 
The destination of discoveries is also likely to 
influence an officeholderÕs decision on whether to 
pursue avoidance actions or not. It is arguable that 
where the proceeds of avoidance actions are subject to 
floating charges and liens, officeholders may not be 
inclined to dissipate resources from the insolvent 
estate in pursuit of such actions for the benefit of a 
single secured creditor. Conversely, it may be argued 
that the foregoing may not necessarily be the outcome 
of a finding that recoveries should be applied to 
floating charges or liens. There is a possibility that 
such secured claim holders, with the knowledge of the 
destination of such recoveries, may be willing to fund 
the avoidance actions. 
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76 Andrew Keay, The Effects of a successful action by a liquidator to avoid a pre-
liquidation transaction (1996) 15 (2) Univ. of Tasmania L. Rev. 236, 264; A 
Keay, 'An Exposition and Assessment of Unfair Preferences' (1994) 19 MULR 
545, 570. 
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4.3.     Significant elements of the rules 
 
The basic elements of the first limb of the CodeÕs 
fraudulent transfers and obligations provision will be 
comparatively evaluated with s. 423 of the Insolvency 
Act, while the elements of the second limb of the 
provision (which deals with transactions at an 
undervalue) will be comparatively evaluated with the 
Insolvency ActÕs rules against transactions at an 
undervalue. It is instructive to note that the absence of 
any of these elements will constitute a safe harbour or 
defence for a counterparty in an action for fraudulent 
conveyance under the Code or transaction at an 
undervalue under the Act. 
 
 
4.3.1.     Equivalence in the value of consideration 
 
The first limb of the CodeÕs fraudulent 
conveyance provision makes no reference to the 
proportionality of the value of consideration given 
and received by the debtor in a contract.77 It focuses 
squarely on the intention of the debtor to hinder, delay 
or defraud a creditor. In contrast, s. 423 of the 
Insolvency Act requires a valuation of the 
consideration which the debtor has given and a 
weighing of that value against what it has received.78 
This condition must be fulfilled alongside proving 
that the debtor entered into the transaction with the 
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77 s. 548((a)(1)(A) of the Code. 
78 The standard for weighing whether the consideration is one at an undervalue is 
the same used in determining transactions at an undervalue under s. 238. s. 
423(1)(a), (b) and (c). 
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requisite intention. 79  In spite of the fact that the 
CodeÕs provision does not expressly stipulate that the 
value of the consideration is a relevant factor, it is 
suggested that any evidence that a debtor received 
value which is significantly less than that which it 
gave, will be helpful in showing an intention to hinder 
or defraud the creditors. 
 
Under the second limb of the Bankruptcy CodeÕs 
fraudulent transfer provision, the trustee must show 
that the debtor received less than a Òreasonable 
equivalent valueÓ in exchange, coupled with evidence 
that the company was financially distressed pursuant 
to any of the standards for measuring that. This is an 
alternative means of establishing a fraudulent 
conveyance which obviates the trustee of the need to 
prove Òactual intentÓ to defraud under the first limb of 
the CodeÕs fraudulent conveyance and obligation 
provision.80 
 
The Insolvency Act provides two categories of 
transactions that will be vulnerable as transactions at 
an undervalue. These are: 
i. gifts or transfers with no corresponding receipt of 
consideration;81 and 
ii. consideration whose value is significantly less than 
that which the company has given, in money or 
moneyÕs worth.82 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
79 s. 423(3) Insolvency Act. 
80 s. 548 (a)(1)(B) Bankruptcy Code. This is often referred to as Òconstructive 
fraudulent transfer.Ó 
81 s. 238(4)(a); Re Barton Manufacturing Co. [1998] B.C.C. 827, 829. 
82 s. 238(4)(b) of the Act. 
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Vulnerable contracts are more likely to be in the 
context of the second category i.e. involving 
consideration that is not commensurate with the value 
of that which has been received. This discussion will 
therefore focus on this category of transactions at an 
undervalue. 
 
Notwithstanding the differences in their 
wordings, for a contract to be vulnerable as one at an 
undervalue, the value of the consideration received by 
the debtor-company must be measured against that 
which it has given out. In the UK case of Re MC 
Bacon Ltd (No. 1) Millet J. noted that, 
ÒIt requires a comparison to be made between the value 
obtained by the company for the transaction and the 
value of consideration provided by the company. Both 
values must be measurable in money or money's worth 
and both must be considered from the company's point 
of view.Ó 83 
 
In a similar vein, in the US case of Barber v Golden 
Seed Co. Inc.84 Bauer J. noted that, 
ÒTo prevail in a fraudulent conveyance action under s. 
548, the Trustee must prove that the debtor received less 
than reasonably equivalent value. The test used to 
determine reasonably equivalent value in the context of 
a fraudulent conveyance requires the court to determine 
the value of what was transferred and to compare it to 
what was received.Ó85 
 
This is plausible given that the avoidance rules 
are aimed at preventing the diminution of the net 
assets of the debtor. Accordingly, a contract that 
facilitates the transfer of assets of the company to a 
party without bringing equivalent value to the 
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83  [1990] 78, 92. 
84 129 F.3d 382, (7th Cir. 1997). 
85 ibid. at 387; Matter of Vitreous Steel Products Co. 911 F.2d 1223, 1234-35 
(7th Cir.1990); In re Bundles, 856 F.2d 815, 816-17 (7th Cir.1988). 
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company will be vulnerable.86  
  
The process of valuation has the potential to give 
rise to diverse considerations. For instance, in 
addition to the express benefits, there could be some 
indirect or incidental benefits or detriments emanating 
from contracts. The question has always been whether 
it is equitable for these to be taken into account (from 
the perspective of the debtor or the general body of 
creditors) in valuing consideration. In most cases, a 
counterparty may not be notified of the incidental 
detriments of the contract to the debtor at the time of 
entering into the transaction. This notwithstanding, in 
some cases, these indirect detriments may even 
outweigh the value the debtor has expressly given. 
 
An illustration of this is a contract by a debtor-
company (a bakery) for the sale of its only good oven. 
Although the counterparty may pay a price that is 
reasonably equivalent with the market value of the 
oven, this may not necessarily be an equivalent value 
from the perspective of the debtor and the general 
body of creditors. This may be the case when viewed 
against the background of the debtors existing debts 
and the importance of the oven to the debtorÕs 
business. The sale of the oven will result to the total 
grounding of the debtorÕs business. The detriment to 
the debtor and the creditors from the sale of the oven 
will be significantly higher than the value of the 
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86 David Baird, Elements of Bankruptcy (n 8) 141; Ian Fletcher, John Higham, 
Corporate Administrations and Rescue (2nd edn, Tottel Publishing 2004) 209: 
The critical question is not the value of what was given by the recipient; it is 
rather the value of what was received by the company. 
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counterpartyÕs consideration. 
 
Under UK law, the value of the consideration is 
examined from the standpoint of the debtor and not 
the benefitting counterparty. 87  In carrying out the 
valuation, courts will analyse the debtorÕs overall 
financial position prior to and after the performance 
of the contract to determine whether there has been 
any negative alteration that has a monetary value.88 
Only incidental benefits and detriments which the 
parties have acknowledged and have requested or 
bargained for are taken into consideration. 
Accordingly Goode has rightly pointed out that, 
ÒWhile an asset of the company may be disposed of for 
full value, the sale may still be a transaction at an 
undervalue if its effect is to reduce the value of the 
remaining assets held by the company and this effect 
was part of the bargain. Thus it includes the bargained-
for detriment it suffers to its remaining assets or 
business.Ó 89 
 
Hence, a debtorÕs asset may be disposed of in 
accordance with the market value but may 
nevertheless be a transaction at an undervalue if it has 
the effect of reducing the value of the remaining 
assets of the debtor and such detriment was not 
anticipated or acknowledged by the parties.90  
  
The Bankruptcy Code adopts a very similar 
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87 National Westminster Bank v Jones [2002] 1 B.C.L.C. 55, 61; Re MC Bacon 
Ltd (No. 1) [1990] B.C.C. 78, 92. 
88 In Stanley v TMK Finance [2011] Bus. L.R. D93, 95, 96 it was held that the 
court was entitled to use a sale on a later date to establish by inference the market 
value at the date the contract was agreed upon on an earlier date. This will 
however be subject to the conditions that there has not been any change in market 
conditions between the two dates and that the circumstances of the sale are such 
that it is reasonable to make the comparison and conclusion. 
89 Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
2011) 542. 
90 Agricultural Mortgage Corp Plc. v Woodward [1994] B.C.C. 688. Roy Goode, 
Principles of Corporate Insolvency (fn. 89) 542. 
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approach. As a general rule, value must be measured 
from the perspective of the creditors of the debtor.91 
The rationale is that constructive fraud is aimed at 
redressing a wrong against the creditors, namely, the 
removal of assets from the debtorÕs estate. This 
creditors-oriented approach is not materially different 
from that of the Insolvency Act, considering that the 
general body of creditors and the officeholders will 
often have the same interest, which will often be in 
conflict with that of a counterparty or single creditor.  
   
Under UK insolvency law, the consideration 
must be capable of being valued in monetary terms as 
the Act requires a comparison of the considerations in 
money or moneyÕs worth. 92  It appears that the 
requirement of monetary valuation of the 
consideration is aimed at avoiding difficulties that 
may arise when no monetary or economic value can 
be placed on a consideration that has been provided.93 
An example of this is where a company provides 
goods or services to a counterparty in exchange for 
payment which is not commensurate with the goods 
or services provided, in addition to the counterpartyÕs 
Ògoodwill.Ó Considering that goodwill is incapable of 
being monetarily evaluated, it may not constitute 
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91 Charles Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy (2nd edn, Foundation Press 2009) 578, 
593. 
92 Re M C Bacon Ltd (No. 1) [1990] B.C.C. 78, 92. Ian Fletcher, John Higham, 
Corporate Administrations and Rescue (2nd edn, Tottel Publishing 2004) 210.  
93 Ian Fletcher, John Higham, Corporate Administrations and Rescue (fn. 92) 
210: ÒThe requirement that the consideration should be capable of being valued 
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undervalue, because the loss of the company of the right to apply the assets 
otherwise than in payment of the secured debt is not capable of valuation in 
monetary terms.Ó 
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consideration for the purpose of the instant provision. 
 
There is no equivalent requirement for monetary 
evaluation under the Bankruptcy Code. It is generally 
agreed that value must be calculated by reference to 
an objective market determinant of value. 94  The 
debtor must therefore receive something with a 
measurably equivalent economic benefit. In deed, in 
contrast to the position under UK regime, US 
bankruptcy courts have held that indirect economic 
benefits to the debtor such as goodwill and expertise 
are capable of constituting consideration and value.95 
In Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Menin96 a debtor's goodwill 
was held to constitute property asset that may be sold 
in bankruptcy proceedings. Accordingly, in Mellon 
Bank v Metro Communications Inc.97 the court held 
that it is appropriate to take into account intangible 
assets not carried on the debtor's balance sheet, 
including good will. 98  It is suggested that the 
touchstone here is whether the transaction in issue has 
conferred any realizable commercial value on the 
debtor which is reasonably equivalent to the realizable 
commercial value of the assets transferred. 
  
There is no specification under the Insolvency 
Act as to where the consideration must emanate from; 
hence, it need not come directly from the 
counterparty. What is imperative is for the debtor 
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94 Charles Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy (2nd edn., Foundation Press 2009) 597. 
95 In re Da-Sota Elevator Co. 939 F.2d 654, 656 (8th Cir. 1991). 
96 115 F.2d 975, 977 (2d Cir.1940). 
97 945 F.2d 635 (3d Cir. 1991). 
98 ibid. at 646-647. 
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company to receive commensurate consideration 
under the contract.99 This is also the position under the 
Code where the courts have held that the value can 
come from a third party. 100  This position is 
commercially expedient in contractual arrangements 
involving multiple counterparties with cross-
obligations e.g. contracts of guarantee, issuance of 
letters of credit, contracts involving holding or 
subsidiary companies which belong to the same 
group. 
   
    
 
4.3.2.    The state of mind of parties 
  
The state of mind of the solvent parties and the 
debtor are relevant in varying ways in determining the 
vulnerability of transactions at an undervalue or 
fraudulent conveyances. This is plausible given the 
fact that the rules against fraudulent transfers and 
transactions at an undervalue are not strict liability 
rules. Taking cognizance of the motives or intentions 
of parties ensures that contracts that are prima facie 
vulnerable but were not entered into with the primary 
aim of withdrawing assets from the insolvent estate 
are exempted from the ambit of the rules. It also 
ensures that counterparties are not deterred from 
trading with marginally solvent companies due to the 
fear that such transactions may be reopened in the 
event of a formal insolvency proceeding. The next 
paragraphs will highlight the instances where the 
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99 Phillips v Brewin Dolphin Bell Lawrie [2001] B.C.C. 864, 870. 
100 Mellon Bank v Metro Communications Inc. 945 F.2d 635, 647 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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motives or intentions of parties are relevant in the 
application of the rules in the two jurisdictions. 
 
 
a.  Intention to hinder, delay, defraud or prejudice 
 
The CodeÕs fraudulent conveyance provision 
provides that a transfer of value or obligation in a 
contract will be voidable if the debtor made the 
transfer or incurred the obligation with the actual 
intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors.101 This 
makes the intention of the debtor the most vital 
element in this avoidance rule. The practical 
implication of this is that the debtor is not impliedly 
barred from engaging in transactions during the 
twilight period. Such transactions will only be 
vulnerable if it is proved that the debtor engaged in 
them with the requisite actual intention to hinder, 
delay or defraud creditors. this approach is plainly 
justifiable. 
 
As previously noted, an analogy can be drawn 
between the CodeÕs actual fraudulent transfer 
provision and s. 423 of the Insolvency Act which 
deals with rules against transactions at an undervalue 
with the purpose of defrauding creditors.102 Under the 
latter avoidance rule, in addition to the contractual 
arrangement being at an undervalue, it must be shown 
that it was done for the purpose of: 
i. Putting the assets beyond the reach of a current  
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101 s. 548(a)(1)(A) Bankruptcy Code. 
102 s. 423 Insolvency Act. 
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or prospective creditor;103 and/or 
ii. Prejudicing the interests of such a person in  
relation to a possible claim.104 
 
Accordingly, as is the case with the CodeÕs 
fraudulent transfer provision, it has to be shown that 
the motive of the debtor in contracting at an 
undervalue is to achieve the aims set out above, in 
other words, to prejudice or defraud the creditor. The 
foregoing provisions ensure that pre-petition 
transactions that are entered into in good faith and in 
the course of business during the twilight period are 
not reopened just because of the happenstance of 
insolvency of a party. Again, this is plainly justifiable. 
 
  
b. Intention to contract at an undervalue 
 
The CodeÕs constructive fraudulent conveyance 
provision obviates the need for prove of actual 
intention to defraud, delay or hinder a creditor. 
However, one of the standards for measuring the state 
of financial distress of the debtor reintroduces the 
element of motive into the rule against contracts at an 
undervalue. Under this limb, in addition to showing 
that the debtor received less than a reasonable 
equivalent value in exchange, it must also be proved 
that the debtor ÒintendedÓ to incur, or believed that it 
would incur debts which would be beyond its ability 
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to pay when due.105  
 
The above makes the state of mind of the debtor 
at the time of contracting a fundamentally relevant 
factor under the provision. As previously noted, this 
safeguards transactions which do not have as their 
primary purpose, the withdrawal of assets from the 
debtor without giving commensurate value in 
exchange. Under the Insolvency Act, the provisions 
against transactions at an undervalue do not require 
proof of intention to contract at an undervalue. The 
intention of the creditor or counterparty is also 
irrelevant to a large extent in the determination of the 
vulnerability of the contract. On the contrary, the 
good faith of the debtor is a relevant factor and this is 
analysed below.106 
 
 
c. The defence of good faith 
 
In the process of determining the validity or 
otherwise of a contract which prima facie violates the 
rules against transactions at an undervalue or 
fraudulent transfers, the good faith of parties is often a 
relevant consideration in a number of instances. For 
instance, under the Bankruptcy Code, an initial 
transferee who takes for value and in good faith will 
not be liable to the extent of the value that he has 
given.107 This provision grants the initial transferee or 
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105 s. 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(III) Bankruptcy Code. 
106 s. 238(5) Insolvency Act. 
107 s. 548(c) Bankruptcy Code. 
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obligee a lien over the asset it has received and the 
right to enforce an obligation incurred to the extent of 
the value of the consideration which it has furnished 
in good faith. In the absence of good faith, an initial 
transferee will forfeit this protection regardless of the 
fact that he gave value. 108  Again, based on the 
arguments made in the prefatory part, this is plainly 
justifiable. In addition, a subsequent transferee who 
receives from the initial transferee in good faith and 
for value is completely immune from recovery 
regardless of the disproportionality of the value of his 
consideration compared to the benefit received.109 
  
In contrast, under UK insolvency law the state of 
mind of a counterparty is irrelevant in determining 
whether a contract is one at an undervalue. Only the 
good faith of the contracting debtor is material.110 
Accordingly, plainly vulnerable contracts will not 
offend the present rule if the debtor acted in good 
faith and for the purpose of carrying on the business 
of the company and there were reasonable grounds for 
believing that the contract would benefit the debtor.111 
Here, the controlling mind of the company is viewed 
subjectively to ascertain whether there was absence of 
good faith. The second limb imports an objective test 
to determine whether there were reasonable grounds 
for believing that the contract would benefit the 
company. Significantly, as is the case under the Code, 
indirect transferees or recipients of benefits otherwise 
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108 Charles Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy (2nd edn., Foundation Press 2009) 628. 
109 s.550(b)(1) of the Code. 
110 s. 238(5)(a) Insolvency Act. 
111 s. 238(5)(b). 
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than from the debtor, who take in good faith and for 
value are also protected by the Act.112 
Exempting contracts that are plainly at an 
undervalue from the avoidance rules on the basis of 
the good faith of the debtor is aimed at giving effect 
to contracts which are ordinarily beneficial to the 
debtor company. Fletcher has used the fire-sale 
transaction to illustrate this point. 113  In fire-sale 
contracts, company stock is sold well below the cost 
price or market value with the aim of generating cash-
flow for the company. In transactions of this nature, 
purchasers will have to be assured that their contracts 
will not be impeachable in the event of insolvency. 
Section 238(5) will therefore save such bargains 
regardless of the fact that the contracts are plainly at 
an undervalue.  
 
The exemption is also aimed at encouraging and 
emboldening debtors to take reasonable steps to 
engage in such beneficial contracts even when a 
company is marginally solvent without fear of a 
potential avoidance at insolvency.114 The legislation 
therefore strikes a fair balance between encouraging 
reasonable and potentially profitable trading aimed at 
ensuring a continuation of business by a financially 
distressed company on one hand and the policy of the 
avoidance rules on the other. 
 
In contrast, the Bankruptcy Code does not 
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112 s. 241(2) of the Act. 
113 Ian Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2009) 831. 
114 Ibid. at 831. 
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expressly make the good faith of the debtor-company 
a defence or relevant factor in determining if a 
contract is one at an undervalue (constructive fraud). 
However, to establish constructive fraud, in addition 
to proving that the debtor received less than a 
reasonable equivalent value, it must also be shown 
that, 
i. the debtor was insolvent on the date of the 
transfer or became insolvent as a result of it;115 or 
ii. the remaining capital of the debtor, after the 
contract, was unreasonably small,116 or 
iii. the debtor company intended to incur debts that 
would be beyond the debtorÕs ability to pay such 
debts.117 
 
In the absence of these additional conditions, a 
contract will not be vulnerable notwithstanding that it 
is plainly at an undervalue. It is suggested that the fact 
that a debtor contracted at an undervalue, in addition 
to condition (c) above, demonstrates lack of good 
faith on the part of the debtor. Conversely, if the UK 
rule is applied in a case with condition (c), this will 
negative any assertion that the contract had been 
entered into in good faith and that there were 
reasonable grounds for believing that it will be 
beneficial to the debtor.  
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4.3.3.     Solvency of the debtor 
 
For a contract to be vulnerable as one at an 
undervalue under the Act, it must be shown that the 
debtor was either unable to pay its debts at the time of 
the contract or became insolvent as a consequence of 
it. 118  Although expressed differently, the state of 
solvency of the debtor is also fundamental in 
determining the vulnerability of a contract at an 
undervalue under the Code. In addition to the 
requirement that the debtor had received less than a 
reasonably equivalent value in exchange, at least one 
of the financial distress tests set out by the Code119 
must be fulfilled.  
 
Under the first of these tests,120 a contract will be 
vulnerable if the debtor was insolvent at the time of 
the contract or became insolvent by reason of the 
contract. The second test makes contracts vulnerable 
if the debtor engages in a business for which its 
remaining property is an unreasonably small 
capital.121 The third test is the cash flow insolvency 
test. Contractual transfers and obligations will be 
vulnerable if, at the time of contracting, the debtor is 
incapable of paying its debts as they fall due or 
becomes incapable of doing so as a result of the 
contract.122 
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121 s. 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(II) Bankruptcy Code. 
122 s. 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(III). 
  
304 
 
In light of the above, in terms of the financial 
state of the debtor, it is arguable that there will be no 
significant difference as to when the rules against 
contracts at an undervalue under the Insolvency Act 
and the Bankruptcy Code will be applicable. This is 
because in both jurisdictions, the debtor will be 
subjected to both the balance sheet and cash flow 
insolvency tests to establish its state of financial 
distress or otherwise at the time it entered into the 
contract. 
 
The state of solvency of the debtor is not material 
in determining contracts that are vulnerable for actual 
fraud under the Code. All that is required for contracts 
to be voidable is for the contract to be executed 
during the twilight period of two years prior to the 
commencement of insolvency. The solvency of the 
debtor is also immaterial in determining the 
voidability of contracts under s. 423 of the Insolvency 
Act. Significantly, and in contrast to the 
corresponding rule in the Code, there is no limitation 
as to the relevant time wherein a contract will be 
vulnerable under s. 423. 
 
  !
4.4.    Effects of avoidance on contracts 
 
4.4.1.     A general overview 
 
The Insolvency Act provides a catalogue of 
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orders that courts can make for contracts vulnerable as 
contracts at an undervalue. 123  In contrast, the 
Bankruptcy Code does not provide any list of possible 
orders for bankruptcy courts. UK insolvency law 
mandates courts to restore the position to what it 
would have been had the debtor not entered into the 
contract. 124  The objective of the adjustment of 
contracts at an undervalue is to protect the assets of 
the debtor from depletion. 125  In contrast, the 
Bankruptcy Code seems to adopt a narrower 
approach. On avoidance of fraudulent conveyances 
under the Bankruptcy Code, the contract is set aside 
and becomes ineffective. In cases where there has 
been transfer of assets, the trustee will subsequently 
take steps to recover such assets, as avoidance under 
the Code does not automatically result to a retransfer 
of property or value under a contract.  
 
The Code protects a counterparty that has given 
value for a benefit it received in a contract in good 
faith to the extent of the value that he has given in 
exchange under/pursuant to the contract. 126  To 
determine whether a recipient acted in good faith, 
bankruptcy courts look to what the recipient knew or 
should have known at the time of the transaction.127 
This approach can be contrasted with that of the 
Insolvency Act where the state of mind of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
123 s. 241 of the Act. 
124 s. 238(3) and s. 423(2) Insolvency Act. 
125 Lord v Sinai Securities [2004] B.C.C. 986, 991: Òthe Court's primary, and 
possibly only, concern under s. 238(3) is the restoration of the company's 
position.Ó 
126 s. 548(c).  
127 In re Sherman 67 F.3d 1348, 1354 (8th Cir. 1995). Considering what the 
counterparty should have known imports negligence.  
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benefitting counterparty is not relevant. It is arguable 
that the CodeÕs position is more commercially 
sensible given that it gives effect to the honest pre-
insolvency expectations of counterparties.128 This is 
capable of incentivizing counterparties to trade with 
marginally solvent companies. This notwithstanding, 
it is arguable that by virtue of its transaction adjusting 
or avoidance powers under s. 241 of the Act, UK 
courts can achieve a similar result as the CodeÕs 
provision. Accordingly, UK courts may order for a 
retransfer of a part of the value which the debtor has 
received no consideration for.  
 
UK courts adopt different approaches in applying 
the ActÕs restorative provisions to preferences and 
contracts at an undervalue. In relation to preference 
avoidance, the focus is usually on the effect of the 
preference and not necessarily the contract as a whole. 
Where the severance of the preferential element in the 
contract will suffice, courts will adjust the contracts 
(rather than avoid them) with the aim of reversing the 
effect of the preference. On the other hand, a 
restoration of a contract at an undervalue to the 
position of what would have been if the contract had 
not been entered into, prima facie presupposes an 
outright nullification of the contract.129  
 
However, the ÒpositionÓ envisaged in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
128 Here, cognisance is taken of the fact that the good faith of the debtor in 
addition to commercial justification of the transaction will save the transaction. s. 
238(5) of the Act. 
129 Whalley (liquidator of MDA Investment Management Ltd) v Doney [2005] 
B.C.C. 783 Park J. construed the section as demanding for a nullification of the 
whole contract. 
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provision is the Òfinancial positionÓ of the debtor. 
Hence contracts need not be out-rightly nullified in all 
cases.  This approach is justified by the fact that the 
avoidance provision requires a measurement of the 
value of consideration given and received by the 
company in money or moneyÕs worth. 
 
Furthermore, in some cases, attempting to restore 
the parties to the status quo ante the voidable 
transaction may produce absurd results that contradict 
the underlying policy rationale of the avoidance rule. 
For instance, in Whalley v Doney,130 the court declined 
to make an order to restore the position to what it 
would have been if the transaction had not been 
entered into on the ground that if the debtor had not 
entered into the contract it would have closed down 
its business, and would have been worse off. 
 
A commercially expedient construction of the 
present avoidance rule will therefore be to restrict 
ÒpositionÓ to the debtorÕs financial position. The 
underlying policy objective of the rule against 
contracts at an undervalue is to prevent the depletion 
of the debtorÕs assets for the benefit of unsecured 
creditors. If focus is to be placed on substance rather 
than form, then the aim of the court should be to 
reverse the harmful effect of the contract and not 
necessarily the contract itself. 
 
Nullifying the whole contract should be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
130 [2005] B.C.C. 783. 
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considered only if severance is impossible and the 
nullification will further the policy of the avoidance 
regime. The priority of courts should therefore be to 
place the debtor in the same financial position that it 
would have been if the vulnerable contract had not 
been entered into. The s. 241 catalogue of possible 
court orders supports this position. For instance the 
catalogue includes the possibility of the counterparty 
being ordered to make payment to the debtor -- 
presumably the difference between the value of the 
property transferred and the consideration the debtor 
actually received.131 
 
Both the Bankruptcy Code and the Insolvency 
Act make provisions for statutory defences for 
subsequent transferees or beneficiaries. For a 
transferee to be covered by this immunity, he must 
have received the value from a party other than the 
debtor and must have done so for value and in good 
faith.132  
 
 
4.4.2.     Leveraged buyouts in the twilight period 
 
A leveraged buyout (ÒLBOÓ) is a mode of 
acquisition of a company where the ÒacquirersÓ 
purchase (or Òbuy outÓ) shares from the shareholders 
of the company (the ÒtargetÓ) with (mostly) borrowed 
money (the ÒleverageÓ). The target is then made to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
131 s. 241(1)(d) Insolvency Act. 
132 s. 550(b)(1) of the Code, s. 241(2) of the Act. 
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guarantee the loan and its assets are used as security 
for the debt.133 A typical leveraged buyout will have 
adverse effects on the target company, although this 
may be short-term in some cases. Firstly the target 
receives no direct benefit from the transaction i.e. 
from guaranteeing the new shareholdersÕ debts and 
granting security in support of the guarantee.  
 
The target is saddled with substantial secured 
debt in addition to the interest on such debt.134 Selling 
shareholders obtain direct benefit as they are often 
Òcashed outÓ at a premium. The acquirers gain 
ownership of the company with money that is not 
theirs. Conversely, the targetÕs unsecured creditors 
face the prospect of incurring losses in the event of its 
insolvency, as the targetÕs unencumbered assets 
would have been pledged as security for repayment of 
the debt under the LBO.135 
 
In the light of the above, an LBO completed 
during an insolvency twilight period may be attacked 
on the ground that it constitutes a transaction at an 
undervalue under the Insolvency Act or an actual or 
constructive fraudulent transfer under the Bankruptcy 
Code. Before comparatively analysing the effects of 
insolvency avoidance rules on LBOs it is instructive 
to note that UK company law rules on financial 
assistance also place certain restrictions on LBOs. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
133 Six different ways in which LBOs can be structured are set out in David Gray 
Carlson, ÒLeveraged Buyout In BankruptcyÓ (1985) 20 Ga. L. Rev. 73, 80-83. 
134 Mellon Bank v Metro Communications Inc. 945 F.2d 635, 645-646 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
135 Charles Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy (2nd edn., Foundation Press 2009) 610. 
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This preliminary issue will be briefly examined before 
the comparative analysis. 
  
The 2006 Companies Act outlaws the giving of 
financial assistance by public companies or their 
subsidiaries, directly or indirectly, to acquirers of its 
shares for the purpose of the acquisition of the shares 
of the company.136 The rationale for the prohibition is 
to prevent the abuses that such transactions are likely 
to give rise to. This point was noted in the Jenkins 
Committee on the Reform of Company Law 1962 
thus, 
 ÒIf people who cannot provide the funds necessary to 
acquire control of a company from their own resources, 
or by borrowing on their own credit, gain control of a 
company with large assets on the understanding that 
they will use the funds of the company to pay for their 
shares it seems to us all too likely that in many cases the 
company will be made to part with its funds either on 
inadequate security or for an illusory consideration.Ó 137 
 
The common forms of LBOs involve the 
guaranteeing by a target of the borrowings of an 
acquirer of its shares, if the borrowing is for the 
purpose of acquiring the shares, or the grant of 
security over the targetÕs assets for the borrowing. 
These constitute financial assistance. 138  The ActÕs 
prohibition on financial assistance applies to public 
companies only and does not apply to private 
companies unless they are subsidiaries of public 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
136 s. 678 (1) of the Companies Act 2006. This provision will not apply if the 
principal purpose of the financial assistance is not the acquisition of the shares (s. 
678(2)(a)) or if the giving for that purpose is only an incidental part of some 
larger purpose of the company (s. 678(2)(b)), provided that the assistance is 
given in good faith and in the interest of the company. The general prohibition on 
the giving of financial assistance by public companies is required by the EC 2nd 
Company Law Directive (77/91/EEC). 
137 Report of The Company Law Amendment Committee (Cmnd 1749, 1962) 
para 173. See also In re V. G. M. Holdings Ltd. (1942) Ch. 235, 239. 
138  s. 677(1)(b)(i); Harlow v Loveday (2005) 1 B.C.L.C. 41. Eilis Ferran, 
Principles Of Corporate Finance Law (Oxford University Press, 2007) 281. 
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companies.139 The prohibition also applies to public 
companies that that are subsidiaries of a private 
company.140 
 
A contract that violates the law against financial 
assistance is illegal and unenforceable by either of the 
parties. 141  Hence obligations by the target/debtor 
arising from the grant of security, guarantee or other 
transactions that constitute financial assistance in an 
LBO are unenforceable.142 A target/debtor in an LBO 
commits an offence by participating in the transaction 
and is liable to a fine. 143  An individual who 
participates in the transaction commits an offence and 
is also liable to a jail term of up to two years or a fine 
or both.144  
 
A public company will have to be re-registered 
as a private company before it can grant financial 
assistance to an acquirer. 145  The couching of the 
financial assistance provisions creates an avenue for 
public companies that are engaged in refinancing 
contracts and restructuring such as LBOs to re-
register as private companies before the financial 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
139 s. 678(1) of the Companies Act. Under the predecessor Companies Act 1985, 
s. 151 prohibited both private and public companies from giving direct or indirect 
financial assistance for the acquisition of its shares. However the prohibition on 
private companies was more relaxed and could be circumvented with the 
cumbersome ÔwhitewashÕ procedure under the then ss.155-158. Len Sealy, Sarah 
Worthington, Cases and Materials in Company Law (9th edn, Oxford University 
Press, 2011) 490. 
140 s. 679 of the Companies Act 2006. Eilis Ferran, Principles Of Corporate 
Finance Law (Oxford University Press, 2007) 287, 288. 
141 Re Hill and Tyler Ltd (2005) 1 BCLC 41. Len Sealy, Sarah Worthington, 
Cases and Materials in Company Law (n 76) 501. 
142 Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock [1968] 2 All ER 1073, 1154; 
Brady v Brady [1989] AC 755. Eilis Ferran, Principles Of Corporate Finance 
Law (Oxford University Press, 2007) 303. 
143 s. 680 of the Companies Act. 
144 s. 680 (2) of the Companies Act. 
145 Provided that it is not a subsidiary of a public company.  
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assistance is given.146  
 
However, re-registering a public company may 
not always be an attractive option in view of the 
regulatory and procedural measures that must be 
complied with. The comparative advantages of public 
companies over private limited enterprise also make 
re-registration unattractive. Significantly the company 
will be delisted from the Stock Exchange. This may 
affect its ability to raise funds in future, as publicly 
traded companies are often able to raise capital 
through the sale of their securities in the markets. 
147Having dealt with the preliminary issue of the 
restriction on financial assistance as it relates to LBOs 
under UK law, it is germane to now consider the 
substantive issue of the effect of the US avoidance 
rules on LBOs completed during the twilight period 
or that result in the insolvency of the target.  
  
Under the UK regime, it has to be shown that the 
target/debtor either received no consideration or that 
the value that it received was significantly less than 
the value it gave in money or moneyÕs worth in the 
LBO. The requirement for monetary evaluation and 
comparison is capable of posing difficulties in cases 
where detriments or intangible incidental benefits are 
involved. It is suggested that the monetary evaluation 
requirement is aimed at eliminating considerations 
that would make evaluation more difficult. However, 
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146  s. 678(3) of the Companies Act. Eilis Ferran, Principles Of Corporate 
Finance Law (Oxford University Press, 2007) 287. 
147 s. 755-760 UK Companies Act 2006. 
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even if the debtor received benefits which were 
significantly less than what it gave, the LBO will not 
constitute a transaction at an undervalue if it is shown 
that the contract was done in good faith and for the 
purpose of carrying out the business of the company 
and that there were reasonable grounds to believe that 
it would be beneficial to the company.148 
 
Under the US regime, actual fraud requires a 
proof of an intent to Òhinder, delay, or defraudÓ a 
creditor.149 An adverse effect of an LBO is that assets 
of the target that would have otherwise been available 
to unsecured creditors are encumbered.  In appropriate 
cases, it can be argued that the elimination of the 
debtorÕs equity and the creation of a senior secured 
debt in its place was done with the intent to hinder or 
delay creditors.150 This argument will be plausible in 
the absence of proof that there were reasonable 
grounds for the debtor and the LBO lender to believe 
that the LBO had potential benefits for the debtor or 
the likelihood of transforming it into a more 
successful enterprise.151 Hence, in the absence of any 
financial benefit, the critical question would be what 
new value the new equity holders were bringing to the 
company. 
  
For an LBO to be vulnerable as constructive 
fraud under the second limb of the CodeÕs fraudulent 
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148 s. 238(5) of the Act. 
149 s. 548(a)(1)(A) of the Code. 
150 Charles Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy (2nd edn, Foundation Press 2009) 610. 
151 s. 548(c) of the Code. 
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transfer provision,152 first, it has to be shown that the 
target/debtor did not receive Òreasonably equivalent 
valueÓ in exchange for its consideration. In addition, 
any of the three conditions which demonstrate the 
state of financial distress of the target must be 
established, namely: that the debtor was insolvent at 
the time of the transfer or as a result of it; that the 
debtorÕs capital was unreasonably small in 
comparison to the nature of the transaction; or that the 
debtor intended to incur losses which it would be 
unable to repay.153 
   
The requirement that the debtor has not received 
a Òreasonable equivalent valueÓ or that the value it 
received is Òsignificantly less" than what it has given 
will often be readily satisfied in LBOs. This is 
because, while selling shareholders are cashed-out 
and the acquirers have the benefit of acquiring the 
debtor with money that is not theirs, the target/debtor 
literally receives nothing in return for giving the 
guarantee/granting security in addition to a detriment 
of its assets being encumbered by the grant of security. 
It seems if the acquirers make a contribution to the 
acquisition and such contribution amounts to a 
substantial part of the purchase price, it may be 
sufficient to meet the reasonable equivalent value 
requirement. For instance in Official Committee of 
unsecured creditors of Grand Eagle Cos. v. ASEA 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
152 s. 548(a)(1)(B) of the Code. 
153 Hechinger Investment Co. v Fleet Retail Finance Group 274 B.R. 71, 82 (D. 
Del. 2002): ÒLBOs will not be deemed fraudulent where the parties entering the 
transaction reasonably believed that the acquired would be solvent when it 
emerged or that it would have a fair chance to survive financially.Ó 
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Brown Boverie, 154  a contribution of 47% of the 
purchase price in the LBO by the acquirer was 
accepted by the court. This can be contrasted with the 
case of US v. Tabor Court Reality155 where 8% was 
viewed as not being sufficient.  
 
Under the US regime, any indirect economic 
benefit to the target/debtor is capable of constituting 
consideration and value.156 In other words, the court 
can consider intangible benefits that may be incapable 
of being registered in the debtorÕs balance sheet. This 
may include the expertise that the new management 
will bring into the target and the goodwill of the 
acquirer in the market and society.157 For example in 
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v Menin158 it was held that 
the debtorÕs goodwill is property asset which may be 
sold in bankruptcy proceedings. Hence, the 
touchstone is whether the transaction has actually 
conferred any value that is commercially realisable on 
the debtor, which is reasonably commensurate with 
the commercial value it has given.  
 
The difficulty with these indirect economic 
benefits is that due to their intangible character, their 
values are incapable of being precisely measured at 
the time of the transaction in order to carry out the 
comparison with the values given. In addition, such a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
154 313 B.R. 219, 230 (N.D. Ohio 2004). 
155 (N.D. Ohio 2004) 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986). 
156 Mellon Bank v Metro Communications Inc. 945 F.2d 635, 646-647 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
157 ibid. at 647. In Mutual Life Insurance Co. v Menin 115 F.2d 975, 977 (2d Cir. 
1940) it was held that the debtorÕs goodwill is property asset which may be sold 
in bankruptcy proceedings. See also In re Da-Sota Elevator Co. (fn. 35) 656. 
158 115 F.2d 975, 977 (2d Cir. 1940). 
  
316 
transaction may turn out to be a gamble that does not 
payoff, given that the intangible consideration has to 
be valued at the time the transaction is entered into 
rather than following the businessÕs failure. 
 
As previously noted, under UK insolvency law, 
an LBO will not constitute a transaction at an 
undervalue if the target/debtor can establish that it 
was done in good faith and there were reasonable 
grounds to believe that it would be beneficial to the 
target/debtor.159 Similarly, an LBO lender under the 
Code who acts in good faith will have a good defence 
against an action for fraudulent transfer, as there will 
be no intention to prejudice the interest of creditors.160 
However showing Ògood faithÓ in a failed LBO that 
was executed during the insolvency twilight period 
may be an uphill task considering that LBOs usually 
involve investing millions and courts will expect 
lenders to carry out careful background checks and 
due diligence to ascertain the financial state of the 
target/debtor.161  
  
Baird and Jackson have criticized the application 
of the Bankruptcy CodeÕs fraudulent conveyance 
provisions to LBOs on the ground that fraudulent 
conveyance statutes are traditionally aimed at 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
159 s. 238(5) of the Act. 
160 By virtue of s. 548(c) of the Code, even if it is proved that the LBO is a 
fraudulent transfer, the lender will not be vulnerable if it took its security interest 
in good faith and for value given to the debtor. However, the value in LBOs 
merely passes through the debtor to the acquirer, and as such is not given to the 
debtor. Charles Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy (2nd edn., Foundation Press 2009) 
613; David Gray Carlson, ÒLeveraged Buyout In BankruptcyÓ (1985) 20 Ga. L. 
Rev. 73, 86.   
161 Charles Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy (2nd edn., Foundation Press 2009) 613. 
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preventing collusive transfers between individual 
debtors and their families and friends, and thus should 
be construed narrowly and only extended to invalidate 
sham transactions and gratuitous transfers. 162  They 
argue that fraudulent conveyance statutes should not 
affect any "arms-lengthÓ transactions such as LBOs, 
even if such transactions injure creditors. According 
to Baird and Jackson,  
"A firm that incurs obligations in the course of a buyout 
does not seem at all like the Elizabethan deadbeat who 
sells his sheep to his brother for a pittance.Ó163 
 
With respect, a blanket exemption of all LBOs 
from the avoidance rules as proposed above would 
unjustifiably eviscerate the transaction avoidance rule. 
Given that LBOs can harm creditors in the same way 
as the fraudulent conveyance provisions are designed 
to prevent, it would be inappropriate for courts in 
determining the rights of creditors to turn a blind eye 
on sham transactions masked as LBOs.164 In addition, 
all LBOs are not automatically vulnerable 
transactions, and in any given case, either actual or 
constructive fraud must be established to make the 
LBO vulnerable. 
  
In LBOs involving publicly owned corporations, 
selling shareholders may be immune from a 
constructive fraud challenge by s. 546(e) of the 
Bankruptcy Code. However, actual fraud is expressly 
excluded from that safe harbour. The section prevents 
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162 Douglas Baird, Thomas Jackson, ÒFraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper 
DomainÓ (1985) 38 Vand. L. Rev. 829, 833-5, 840. 
163 Ibid. at 852. 
164 Crothers McCall Pattern Inc. v Lewis 129 B.R. 992, 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); In 
re Healthco IntÕl Inc. 195 B.R. 971, 979-980 and fn. 5 (Bankr.D.Mass. 1996). 
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a trustee from avoiding a Òsettlement paymentÓ that is 
made by or to a stockbroker, financial institution, 
financial participant or securities clearing agency.165 
This safe harbour is intended to reduce systemic risk 
to markets that may result from undoing transactions 
upon which counterparties have relied, hedged and 
reallocated profits. 
 
 
4.4.3.     Intra-corporate group guarantees 
  
Business activities of companies in a corporate 
group are often closely linked and functionally 
integrated regardless of the doctrine of corporate 
personality. This enables the companies to maximise 
the benefits that such synergy generates. 166  The 
consequence is that some contractual arrangements 
may involve the transfer of assets from one subsidiary 
to another without any reciprocal benefit to the 
transferor. Obligations may also be incurred by the 
parent company or one of the subsidiaries without 
receipt of any reciprocal benefit. Although these 
contractual arrangements may be commercially 
expedient, they may breach the rules against contracts 
at an undervalue or fraudulent transfers if they are 
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165 s. 546(e) of the Code. See also s. 101(51A) and s. 741(8) of the Code for 
definition of Òsettlement payment.Ó Kaiser Steel Corp. v Charles Schwab & Co 
913 F.2d 846, 848 (10th Cir. 1990); In re Kaiser Steel Corp. 952 F.2d 1230, 1237 
(CA-10 1991). However see Munford v Valuation Research Corp 98 F.3d 604 
(11th Cir. 1996) where it was held that s. 546(e) does not apply to selling 
shareholders. See also William Rand, ÒIn Re Kaiser Steel Corporation: Does 
Section 546(e) Of The Bankruptcy Code Apply To A Fraudulent Conveyance 
Made In The Form Of An LBO Payment?Ó (1992) Fordham Urb. L.J. 87, 109 
where it is suggested that s. 546(e) unjustly protects stockholders who have 
received leveraged buyout payments constituting fraudulent conveyances. See 
also Neil Garfinkel, ÒNo Way Out: Section 546(e) Is No Escape For The Public 
Shareholder Of A Failed LBOÓ (1991) Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 68-69. 
166 E.g. Tax advantages. 
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done during the insolvency twilight period of the 
group or a subsidiary. 
  
A common type of intra-corporate group contract 
that is capable of breaching the present contract 
avoidance rules is the intra-group guarantee contract. 
Some lenders may insist on the provision of sureties 
as a precondition for advancement of loans and may 
be unwilling to make advances to a company solely 
on the companyÕs promise to repay, provision of 
collateral or credit rating report. It is often easier for 
companies in a group to obtain guarantees from an 
affiliate company in the group or the parent company. 
A typical case will be where a parent company 
guarantees advances made to a subsidiary company (a 
ÒdownstreamÓ guarantee). In other scenarios, a 
subsidiary may guarantee advances made to the parent 
company (an ÒupstreamÓ guarantee) and a subsidiary 
company may guarantee advances made to a co-
subsidiary in the group (Òcross streamÓ guarantee).167 
The subsequent insolvency of the guarantor may give 
rise to an action for fraudulent conveyance or 
transaction at an undervalue if the guarantee was 
issued during the twilight period.  
 
There is a dearth of judicial authorities on this 
issue in both jurisdictions. This thesis will therefore 
draw on the analysis of Goode and Tabb on this 
subject in relation to UK insolvency law and US 
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167  Robert Rosenberg, ÒIntercorporate Guaranties and the law of Fraudulent 
Conveyances: Lender BewareÓ (1976) 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 235, 238. 
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bankruptcy law respectively. The first issue that will 
naturally arise in the application of fraudulent transfer 
law to guarantee contracts is the seeming absence of 
consideration to the guarantor. The insolvent surety 
who guarantees the advance normally receives 
nothing tangible in return. However, as a general rule 
in guarantee contracts, any advance made to the 
principal debtor is sufficient consideration to the 
surety.168 The fact that funds are made available to the 
principal debtor and not to the surety, does not in 
itself render the transaction one at an undervalue or a 
fraudulent transfer. As previously noted, the 
Bankruptcy Code also recognises indirect benefits in 
guarantee contracts.169 Similarly, it is settled under the 
fraudulent conveyance regime that an Òindirect 
economic benefitÓ is acceptable and can be evaluated 
in the absence of direct value.170 
 
It is therefore settled that a surety in a guarantee 
contract receives consideration. However, the fact that 
the surety has received value does not mean that the 
value received is reasonably equivalent to the 
obligation incurred or is not significantly less than the 
guarantee obligation. Hence the next inquiry will be 
on how to ascertain whether the ÒvalueÓ of 
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168  Rebecca Parry, Transaction Avoidance in Insolvencies (2nd edn, Oxford 
University Press, 2011) 89. 
169 Telefest Inc. v VU-TV Inc. 591 F. Supp 1368, 1378-1379 (D.N.J. 1984). 
170 Rubin v Manufacturers Hannover Trust Co. 661 F.2d 979, 991-992 (2nd Cir 
1981): Òif the consideration given to the third person has ultimately landed in the 
debtorÕs hands, or if the giving of the consideration to the third person otherwise 
confers an economic benefit upon the debtor, then the debtorÕs net worth has 
been preserved...provided, of course, that the value of benefit received by the 
debtor approximates the value of the property or obligation he has given up.Ó See 
also Mellon Bank v Metro Communications Inc. 945 F.2d 635, 646-647 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
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consideration received by the surety is reasonably 
equivalent with the value of the suretyÕs guarantee 
obligation. This is the most difficult aspect of 
applying the rules against fraudulent conveyance and 
transfers at an undervalue to guarantee contracts. 
 
As a matter of general principle, the relevant time 
for measuring values is the time of issue of the 
guarantee. 171  However, no payment or transfer is 
usually made or received by the surety at that time. 
The suretyÕs obligation is contingent in nature and he 
may never be called upon to fulfil it. In addition, the 
loan is usually passed to the principal debtor and the 
suretyÕs benefit from the contract can only be indirect 
or incidental. Furthermore, the value of a suretyÕs 
guarantee to the lender is difficult to gauge. These 
facts make the determination of indirect economic 
benefits and detriments to a surety a daunting task.172 
 
Tabb has observed that the only situation that 
should be relatively simple is the downstream 
guarantee, where a parent company guarantees the 
debt of a subsidiary.173 His observation is premised on 
the ground that the parent company will benefit 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
171 Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency (4th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 
2011) 548; Phillips v Brewin Dolphin Bell Lawrie [2001] B.C.C. 864, 870. The 
court will look at evidence of subsequent events to make its determination 
without applying a Ôhindsight testÕ. s. 6 (5) Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
172 Charles Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy (2nd edn., Foundation Press 2009) 615. 
Tabb observes that the fact that the surety may receive indirect economic benefits 
is what makes the application of fraudulent transfer law to inter-corporate 
guarantees tricky. 
173 See also Jack Williams, ÒThe Fallacies Of Contemporary Fraudulent Transfer 
Models As Applied In Intercorporate Guaranties: Fraudulent Transfer Law As A 
Fuzzy SystemÓ (1994) 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1403, 1419; Keneneth Carl, 
ÒFraudulent Transfer Attacks on Guaranties in Bankruptcy (1986) 60 AM. Bankr 
L.J. 109, 115: ÒDownstream guaranties do not pose special transfer problems 
since the guarantor owns the stock of the principal debtor.Ó 
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directly from the enhanced value of its subsidiary.174 
With respect, this may not always be the case. A 
financially distressed parent company that guarantees 
the debt of an equally hopelessly insolvent subsidiary 
stands to gain nothing from such a contract.175 In this 
case, the funds borrowed by the subsidiary will have 
to be applied first in satisfying the claims of creditors. 
It will therefore not necessarily increase the value of 
the parent's equity interest in the subsidiary in a 
manner equivalent to the assumed guarantee 
obligation. On the other hand, there is often a strong 
likelihood that upstream and cross-stream guaranties 
will be vulnerable to fraudulent transfer attacks. This 
is because only a portion or none of the total business 
benefits that result from the guarantee contract will be 
enjoyed or indirectly transferred to the guarantor.176 
 
Goode argues that to a lender/creditor, the 
ÒvalueÓ it receives from the guarantor will depend on 
the principal debtorÕs financial strength. 177  If the 
principal debtor is financially strong, the 
lender/creditorÕs dependence on the guarantee and its 
value to him is correspondingly reduced. On the other 
hand, if the principal debtor is financially weak or on 
the verge of insolvency, the value is high. The 
problem with this analysis is that the mere fact that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
174 Charles Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy (fn. 172) 615. 
175 General Electric Credit Corp. v. Murphy 895 F.2d 725 (11th Cir. 1990). Barry 
Zaretsky, ÒFraudulent Transfer Law As The Arbiter Of Unreasonable RiskÓ 
(1995) 46 S. C. L. Rev. 1165, 1196. 
176 Kenneth Carl, ÒFraudulent Transfer Attacks on Guaranties in BankruptcyÓ 
(1986) 60 AM. Bankr L.J. 109, 115. 
177 Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency (4th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 
2011) 548; Rebecca Parry, Transaction Avoidance in Insolvencies (2nd edn, 
Oxford University Press, 2011) 90-91. 
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the principal debtor is solvent at the time of the 
guarantee does not by itself mean that the guarantee is 
of no value, considering that the guarantee relates to 
the future and the prospect of insolvency. 
 
Goode admits that measuring value from the 
guarantorÕs perspective is a daunting task and argues 
that the state of solvency of the principal debtor will 
be critical in determining the value of the 
consideration to the surety. For instance where the 
principal debtor is already insolvent, there will be no 
value at all as the guarantee will be solely for the 
benefit of the principal debtor and this will almost 
certainly constitute a transaction at an undervalue.178 
On the other hand, where the principal debtorÕs 
business is financially sound and the infusion of funds 
will enable it to expand its activities and increase its 
profitability for the benefit of the group, it will not 
amount to a contract at a undervalue.  
 
GoodeÕs argument is plausible, given that in 
this latter case some value would be ascribable to the 
consideration given by the surety for its guarantee, 
provided that the value of the benefit is not 
significantly less than the burden that the guarantor 
will have to bear. Accordingly, it is suggested that an 
analysis of an alleged contract at an undervalue or 
fraudulent transfer in intra-corporate guarantee 
arrangements must be directed at what the debtor 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
178 Indeed the directors of the guarantor company may well be in breach of duty 
to the company in authorising the issue of the guarantee in the first place. Roy 
Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency (n 26) 551. 
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surrendered as well as what it received in the pre-
petition transaction, irrespective of what any third 
party may have gained or lost. However, the said 
benefit to the debtor need not be direct. In other 
words, it suffices for the debtor (i.e. guarantor) to 
indirectly derive value or economic benefit from the 
contract through benefit given directly to a third party 
i.e. the principal debtor e.g. a parent company, 
subsidiary or co-subsidiary. 
   
 
Conclusion  
  
This chapter has examined rules against 
contracts at an undervalue and fraudulent transfers 
under UK and US insolvency laws respectively. The 
rules have similar objectives and also operate in a 
substantially similar manner. The rules primarily 
protect assets of the debtor from depletion, ensuring 
that creditors are not deprived of their potential 
realisations prior to the commencement of formal 
insolvency proceedings. Accordingly, the rules aim to 
reverse advantages received by creditors in 
anticipation of formal insolvency. The justification for 
the reversal being that such advantages undermine the 
collective and mandatory nature of the insolvency law 
procedure by strategically albeit, unfairly, placing the 
party in an advantageous position in the procedure. 
 
The rules against transactions at an undervalue 
and fraudulent transfers present arguably the most 
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notable case of insolvency lawÕs interference with 
contracts, given that the rules apply to override 
contracts which would otherwise be unassailable 
under the non-insolvency law regime. As articulated 
in this chapter, the interference is underpinned by the 
fact that the debtor had received value which was 
significantly less than what it gave in the contract. 
This runs counter to the traditional contract law 
doctrine that consideration must be sufficient and not 
adequate and that courts will not enquire into the 
adequacy of consideration. For instance in Chappell 
& Co Ltd v Nestle Co Ltd179 Lord Somervell noted 
that, 
ÒA contracting party can stipulate for what consideration 
he chooses. A peppercorn does not cease to be good 
consideration if it is established that the promisee does 
not like pepper and will throw away the corn.Ó180 
 
This principle is also well established under US 
contract law181 where Judge Richard A. Posner has 
observed that, 
ÒTo ask whether there is consideration is simply to 
inquire whether the situation is one of exchange and a 
bargain has been struck. To go further and ask whether 
the consideration is adequate would require the court to 
do what É it is less well equipped to do than the 
partiesÑdecide whether the price (and other essential 
terms) specified in the contract are reasonable É courts 
do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration.Ó182 
 
Notwithstanding that the avoidance rules 
prima facie derogate from applicable non-solvency 
law, it is suggested that some aspects of the rules can 
be reconciled with non-insolvency law.  It is arguable 
that the first limb of the Bankruptcy CodeÕs 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
179 [1960] AC 87. 
180 ibid. at 114. See also Midland Lands Trust Co. Ltd v. Green [1981] AC 513.  
181 Hitchcock v. Coker (1937) 6 Adol. & Ell. 438.  
182 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, New York Aspen, 1973), 46.  
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fraudulent transfer provision (i.e. actual fraud) and s. 
423 of the Insolvency Act do not actually deviate 
from non-insolvency law. The analysis of these 
provisions in this chapter has noted that they owe 
their origins to the Fraudulent Conveyances Act 
1571 (the Statute of 13 Elizabeth). The provisions 
therefore embody longstanding principles of non-
insolvency fraudulent conveyance law.  Again, worth 
noting is the fact that s. 423 is equally applicable 
outside insolvency and can be instituted by any 
affected creditor. 
 
A further justification for s. 238 and the 
second limb of the CodeÕs fraudulent transfer 
provision (i.e. rules against transactions at an 
undervalue) is that they operate to return to the 
insolvent estate the value of assets that were 
wrongfully transferred from it or to the extent that 
insufficient value was received by the debtor in the 
pre-petition exchange. Again, the rules are by no 
means absolute, but attempt to exclude certain 
legitimate contracts from its ambit. As articulated in 
4.3.2(b), the good motive or intention of parties can 
remove a plainly vulnerable contract from the ambit 
of the rules.183 
 
In spite of the objectives of the rules, an issue 
that may require judicial consideration is the 
destination of recoveries from avoidance actions. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
183 For instance, s. 238(5) of the Insolvency Act excludes contracts entered into in 
good faith and for the purpose of carrying out the business of the debtor from the 
avoidance provision. It also excludes vulnerable contracts where there were 
reasonable grounds for believing that they would benefit the debtor. 
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Under the UK regime, this will be in the light of s. 
238(3) which mandates courts to restore the company 
to the position prior to the impugned transaction. 
Against this background, notwithstanding the merits 
of the prevalent approach, it may be the case that 
unsecured creditors may be receiving benefits which 
they are not entitled to, at the expense of charge 
holders. However, a review of the current position 
will have diverse implications as regards the efficacy 
of the stated asset-preservation and creditor-protection 
objectives of the rules. It may also influence decisions 
of officeholders whether to pursue avoidance actions 
or not. 
 
 
 
!
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CHAPTER FIVE 
POST-PETITION CONTRACTS 
    
    
5.0.    Introduction 
  
The commencement of formal insolvency 
proceedings does not deprive a company of its 
contractual capacity.1 There is often life after debt.  
As earlier noted in chapter three, the officeholder may 
choose to perform or assume some pre-insolvency 
contracts that are beneficial to the debtor or 
bankruptcy estate. 2  In addition to pre-petition 
contracts, the officeholder may engage in new (post-
commencement) contractual arrangements. In rescue 
procedures, engaging in these two categories of 
contracts is virtually inevitable. Given that the 
primary objective of a rescue procedure is to re-
organise the debtor into a profitable concern, the 
officeholder must of necessity continue trading.  
 
In appropriate cases, companies that are being 
wound up may perform or assume pre-petition 
contracts and also enter into some new essential 
contractual arrangements. Although the company will 
eventually be liquidated, engaging in those contracts 
may be commercially expedient to ensure that the 
losses incurred by unsecured creditors are minimised 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Ian Fletcher, John Higham, Corporate Administrations and Rescue Procedures 
(2nd edn, Tottel Publishing 2004) 153. 
2 Refer to Chapter 3 for analysis of disclaimer or rejection and assumption or 
performance of pre-insolvency contracts. 
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and realisations maximised. An example of this would 
be contracts for the supply of essential goods to the 
debtor to enable it carry out its operations. In other 
cases, it may be more beneficial (to unsecured 
creditors) for the debtor to complete certain contracts 
rather than default and face subsequent claims for 
damages for breach that will result in additional 
unsecured claims. 
  
This chapter evaluates the legal frameworks 
for post-petition and post-commencement contracts in 
the UK and the US. It examines how the jurisdictions 
treat and compensate post-insolvency creditors who 
defy inherent risks to contract with insolvent 
companies. This chapter further considers the impact 
of the special treatment conferred on these post-
insolvency creditors on existing creditors and how the 
law resolves the inevitable conflict of interests. 
 
The importance of post-petition financing 
contracts to rescue procedures cannot be 
overemphasised. A reorganisation procedure without 
adequate finance can be likened to a canoe without a 
paddle. Without the necessary funds, the rescue 
procedure might be impeded and the debtor might be 
forced into liquidation. This chapter comparatively 
evaluates the legal frameworks for corporate rescue 
financing contracts in the two jurisdictions. It further 
evaluates the statutory incentives for post-petition 
lenders and the effect of the inducements on the rights 
of other post-petition and pre-petition creditors.  
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5.1. Post-petition contracts  
!
5.1.1.      Preformed or assumed pre-insolvency contracts 
 
At the commencement of formal insolvency 
proceedings, 3  officeholders have the discretion to 
disclaim or reject executory contracts that have 
onerous obligations without corresponding benefits to 
the company or bankruptcy estate.4 On the other hand, 
the officeholder may wish to continue with executory 
contracts that are beneficial to the debtor and will aid 
in achieving the objectives of the procedure.5 If the 
officeholder opts not to disclaim a pre-petition 
executory contract or to assume it as required under 
the Code, the debtorÕs subsequent liabilities under the 
contract resulting from post-petition performance by 
the counterparty rank as expenses of the procedure 
ahead of pre-petition unsecured claims. 6 
 
Understandably, trade creditors may be 
reluctant to continue supplying goods and services to 
insolvent companies in exchange for a ranking 
alongside unsecured creditors. This would be akin to 
providing the goods and services to the debtor or the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Winding up procedure under the Insolvency Act and both the Chapters 7 and 11 
procedures under the Bankruptcy Code. As noted under chapter 3, under the 
Insolvency Act, Administrators are not expressly conferred with the powers to 
disclaim executory contracts. See a detailed analysis of disclaimer in Chapter 3. 
4 Refer to Chapter 3 for a detailed analysis of disclaimer. 
5  An administrator has no express power to disclaim or reject pre-petition 
executory contracts. He could decline performing such contracts but risks 
incurring liability for breach of contract and/or procurement of the breach of 
contract. 
6  David Reeder, ÒThe Administrative Expense Priority In Bankruptcy - A 
SurveyÓ (1987) 36 Drake L. Rev. 135, 144. Generally at insolvency all pre-
petition unsecured creditors are subject to the pari passu regime of asset 
distribution. Consequently, they are usually among the lowest ranked category of 
debts. 
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bankruptcy estate without payment or assurance of 
payment. Hence such post-petition liabilities under a 
pre-petition contract that arise due to post-petition 
performance by a creditor are ranked as expenses of 
the liquidation or administration.7 
  
Rental and lease expenses incurred after the 
commencement of the formal insolvency procedure 
are also accorded insolvency expense priority in the 
two jurisdictions. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the 
trustee or debtor-in-possession may assume leases 
which are beneficial to the estate. There are basically 
two consequences of a decision to assume the lease, 
namely: 
i. All defaults under the lease by the insolvent 
company must be promptly cured and the terms of 
the lease will be binding on the bankruptcy estate; 
and 
ii. Amounts due under the lease from the point of 
assumption will be entitled to priority as an 
administrative expense.8 
 
An administrative priority is also accorded to 
rent that accrues within the period between the time of 
filing of an insolvency petition and the time when the 
officeholder makes a decision to assume or reject the 
pre-petition lease. This administrative rent is assessed 
in terms of the debtorÕs use of the property.9 The 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7  r. 4.218 (3)(a)(ii) and r. 2.67.1(a) Insolvency Rules (for liquidators and 
administration respectively); s. 503(b) of the Code. 
8  David Reeder, ÒThe Administrative Expense Priority In Bankruptcy - A 
SurveyÓ (fn. 6) 139. 
9 ibid. at 140. 
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foregoing position is similar to that under English 
insolvency law. Leases and rents are payable as an 
administrative expense if the administrators retain or 
use the premises.10 
!
!
!
5.1.2.     New contracts 
  
As is the case with liabilities that arise from 
post-petition performance of pre-petition contracts, all 
liabilities arising in relation to new contracts entered 
into by the debtor or bankruptcy estate after the 
commencement of insolvency rank as expenses of the 
procedure. Under both jurisdictions, claims that are 
incidental to the operation of the companyÕs business 
during the period of reorganisation are given 
administrative expense priority.11  
  
The administrative expense priority serves as 
an incentive to encourage creditors to contract with 
financially ailing firms. It gives suppliers of goods 
and providers of services the assurance that the 
officeholder will be required to make priority 
payment for the goods and services that they have 
supplied in comparison to pre-petition unsecured 
debts.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 r. 2.67(1)(a) and (f) of Insolvency Rules. Re Game Station Ltd [2014] EWCA 
Civ. 180, [2014] W.L. 640371; Re Lundy Granite Co. (1871) L.R. 6 Ch. App. 
462, 466 (Sir W. M. James L.J): Òif the company for its own purposes, and with a 
view to the realisation of property to better advantage, remains in possession of 
the estate, which the lessor is therefore not able to obtain possession of, common 
sense and ordinary justice require the court to see that the landlord receives a full 
value of the property.Ó Goldacre (Offices) Ltd v Nortel Networks (UK) Ltd 
[2010] B.C.C. 299, 303-305. 
11  David Reeder, ÒThe Administrative Expense Priority In Bankruptcy - A 
SurveyÓ (fn. 6) 139 and 144. 
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This arrangement is fair and commercially 
justifiable, as the contrary would mean that post-
petition creditors would have to trade with the 
company without any assurance of payment. This 
would discourage prospective counterparties from 
doing business with companies undergoing rescue 
procedures thereby jeopardising the chances of the 
success of such procedures.  
 
  
5.2.    Restrictions on contracts 
 
Companies undergoing formal insolvency 
procedures may continue engaging in contracts. 
However, their contracts are subject to certain 
statutory restraints. These restrictions are aimed at 
enhancing insolvency lawÕs objectives of asset 
preservation, as well as the cardinal principles of 
collectivity and equality among similarly ranked 
creditors. The next paragraphs will evaluate these 
statutory provisions in the two jurisdictions as well as 
their efficacy in achieving their set objectives. 
 
 
5.2.1.     The UK regime 
 
As previously noted in chapter one, in 
compulsory winding up proceedings in the UK, s. 127 
of the Insolvency Act avoids any disposition of the 
property of the company, 12  transfer of shares and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12  Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (4th edn, Sweet & 
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alteration of the status of members of the company 
made after the commencement of the proceedings 
unless the court validates such contracts or 
dispositions. Fletcher has noted that the long-
established practice is for courts to validate such 
dispositions if made honestly and for the benefit of 
the company and in the ordinary course of business. 13 
Significantly, after the making of the winding up 
order, the winding up relates back to and commences 
at the time of the passing of the winding up 
resolution,14 or at the time of the presentation of the 
winding up petition.15  
 
The debtorÕs assets are often vulnerable to 
abuse or misuse during the period leading up to the 
making of the winding up order. Section 127 of the 
Insolvency Act preserves the assets of the company 
and prevents transactions that may result in asset 
diminution. In consequence, the provision also 
promotes the pari passu principle of asset distribution 
by frustrating attempts by creditors to gain a head 
start over similarly ranked creditors.16 The primary 
distinction between s. 127Õs restriction and the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Maxwell 2011) 613. Goode describes ÒdispositionÓ to include Òan agreement by 
which the company surrenders a lease or gives up its contractual rights, 
contractual set-off by which a debtor to the company is given and exercises the 
right to apply a cross claim of his own against the company in diminution of his 
indebtedness and arguably even the extension of further credit to the company 
during the post-petition period which leads to the exercise of the right of 
transaction set-off against the companyÕs credit balance.Ó 
13 Ian Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2009) 814; A. 
McGee, G. Scanlan, ÒSection 127 Insolvency Act 1986: Practical problems in its 
applicationÓ (2004) Comp. Law 102. 
14 In cases of voluntary winding up. s. 129(1) of the Act. 
15 s. 129(2) of the Act. Note that in Members voluntary winding up the time of 
the commencement of winding up relates back to the time when the resolution 
for winding up is passed. This involves a solvent liquidation and is therefore not 
very relevant to this work. 
16 Coutts & Co. v Stock [2000] 1 B.C.LC. 183, 187; Denney v John Hudson & 
Co. Ltd. [1992] B.C.C. 503, 504. 
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administration moratorium analysed in chapter two is 
that the former protects debtorÕs assets from the 
activities of company directors and other insiders, as 
opposed to creditors and counterparties.17 There is no 
provision which performs an identical role for the 
administration procedures. 
 
Section 127 of the Insolvency Act operates in 
a manner similar to the moratorium in that it has the 
sweeping effect of invalidating contracts which 
involve dispositions of the debtorÕs assets between the 
time of the presentation of a winding up petition and 
the moment an order for winding up is granted. 
Accordingly, in In re Gray's Inn Construction Co. Ltd 
Buckley L.J. noted that the provision, 
ÒEffectively paralyses the companyÕs business, for 
without the courtÕs leave not so much as a stitch of cloth 
can be disposed of, not one penny spent even to acquire 
an asset worth a pound and technically the company 
cannot even pay cash into its bank account.Ó 18 
 
The potential effect of this is that there is a 
total paralysis of the affairs of the debtor. 19  In 
consequence, it may have the unintended effect of 
invalidating dispositions or contracts which might be 
beneficial to the company.  
 
In practice, prospective application to courts 
for validation prior to contracting may not always be 
feasible. The debtor may be in urgent need of supplies 
or the counterparties may be oblivious of the fact that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 David Milman, ÒAdministration orders: the moratorium featureÓ (1992) 5(9) 
Insolv. Int. 73-75. 
18 [1980] 1 W.L.R. 711, 718 
19  Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (4th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2011) 612. 
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a winding up petition has been filed. To surmount this 
challenge, validation of contracts under s. 127 can be 
sought retrospectively after the completion of the 
contractual disposition. 20  However, a creditor who 
opts for this approach would have to do so at his own 
risk considering that there is no guarantee of a 
retrospective validation of the contract. 
 
 
5.2.2.     The US regime 
 
As is the case under UK insolvency law, in 
liquidation cases under the Bankruptcy Code, there is 
always an interval between the time a bankruptcy 
petition is filed and the time a trustee is appointed or 
takes over the bankruptcy estate. During this period, 
there is a possibility that a debtor might contract for 
the disposition of its assets, which are not in the best 
interest of the general body of creditors. Against this 
background, trustees are empowered to avoid and 
recover any unauthorised post-petition transfers of 
assets from the bankruptcy estate that do not fall 
within recognised statutory exceptions.21  
 
To a large extent, s. 549 of the Bankruptcy 
Code performs a similar objective as s. 127 of the 
Insolvency Act. It protects the assets of the 
bankruptcy estate from premature dismemberment by 
reason of the debtorÕs post-petition contracts or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Bank of Ireland v Hollicourt (Contracts) Ltd. [2000] B.C.C. 1210, 1214-1215. 
21 s. 549(a) of the Code. In re Delco Oil Inc.  599 F.3d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir. 
2010); Manuel v. Allen 217 B.R. 952, 955 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1998). 
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dispositions. The trustee is also empowered to avoid 
contracts that have the effect of breaching the 
fundamental insolvency law goals of collectivity and 
equality among similarly situated creditors.22  
 
A significant distinction between the two post-
petition invalidation provisions is that under s. 127 
unauthorised post-petition contracts are void and can 
only be validated by the courts. The reverse is the 
case under s. 549 of the Code - post-petition contracts 
that breach the bankruptcy law policy are merely 
voidable. It is incumbent on the trustee to take steps to 
avoid the contracts. There are arguably merits and 
demerits of these approaches. The demerit of the UK 
position as previously noted is the fact that it imposes 
a statutory paralysis on corporate activities. This 
affects both beneficial and detrimental dispositions. 
On the other hand, the approach of the US regime 
would suggest that in every case, the officeholder 
must have to take active steps to avoid such contracts. 
Apart from the time and resources which would be 
expended in avoiding such contracts, there is the 
danger that certain dispositions may slip from the 
trusteeÕs radar. 
 
As previously analysed in chapter two, the 
CodeÕs automatic stay provisions apply to both 
Chapter 7 winding-up procedures and the Chapter 11 
reorganisation procedures. Consequently, although 
asset transfers in vulnerable post-petition contracts 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Charles Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy (2nd edn, Foundation press 2009) 635. 
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will remain valid until avoided by the trustee, 
counterparties will be unable to enforce the contracts 
once the bankruptcy procedure commences due to the 
operation of the automatic stay.23 
 
The debate over the effect of a contravention 
of the automatic stay has been previously analysed in 
chapter two.24 The conflicting views of bankruptcy 
courts as to whether a transaction in contravention of 
the stay is void, voidable or invalid were evaluated, as 
well as their practical consequences.25 Adopting the 
ÒvoidnessÓ argument will have an adverse effect on 
the potency of s. 549. For instance, if contracts in 
violation of the automatic stay are regarded as being 
void, s. 549 (a) will be rendered superfluous, as there 
will be no post-petition contracts for a trustee to avoid 
under the provision. Accordingly, in Sikes v Global 
Marine Inc. 26 the court noted that, 
ÒIf everything done post-petition were void in the strict 
sense of the word, these provisions would either be 
meaningless or inconsistent with the specific mandate of 
s. 362(a).Ó 27 
 
In the leading case of In re Russell Schwartz28 
the court held that s. 549(a) has a purpose in 
bankruptcy beyond the potential overlap with the s. 
362 automatic stay provision. The court ruled that, 
regardless of the circumstances where there may be an 
overlap between s. 362 and s. 549(a), the automatic 
stay provision can void certain violations and still 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Refer to chapter 2 for the analysis of the automatic stay. 
24 ibid. 
25 ibid. 
26  881 F.2d 176, 179 (5th Cir.1989). 
27  ibid. at 179. 
28 954 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1992). 
  
340 
leave s. 549 with a valid and important role in 
bankruptcy. Accordingly, the court held that s. 549(a) 
applies to unauthorised transfers of the bankruptcy 
estateÕs assets that are not otherwise prohibited by the 
Code. 29  In other words, it applies to contractual 
transfers in which the estate is a willing participant or 
which it has voluntarily initiated.30  
   
With respect, the above reasoning does not 
accord with the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code. First, s. 101(54) defines transfers to which s. 
362 apply, as: 
ÒThe creation of a lien; the retention of title as a security 
interest; the foreclosure of a debtorÕs equity of 
redemption; or each mode, direct or indirect, absolute or 
conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing or 
parting with property or interest in property.Ó 
 
This clearly indicates that automatic stay 
provisions equally apply to voluntary transfers by the 
estate. As previously noted in 2.2.2., in In re 
Germansen Decorating Inc.31 a voluntary payment by 
a debtor was held to be in breach of the statutory stay. 
In delivering his judgment, Ginsberg J. had noted 
thus, 
ÒThis court will not sit idle and permit debtors to waive 
willy-nilly the automatic stay so that certain creditors 
may be preferred with impunity and the estate 
dismembered without reference to the Code É The 
automatic stay is meant to prevent one creditor from 
securing an advantage over its peers after a petition is 
filed by or against a debtor.  It makes no difference 
whether that creditor gets that advantage as a result of a 
voluntary or involuntary transfer.Ó32 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 ibid. at 574. 
30 In re R & L Cartage & Sons 118 B.R. 646, 650-655 (Bankr.N.D. Ind.1990); In 
re Garcia 109 B.R. 335, 339 (N.D. Illinois, 1989). 
31 149 B.R. 517, 521 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992). 
32 ibid. at 521-522. 
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The merits of this position have been 
extensively evaluated in 2.2.2. In addition, s. 
362(a)(3) stays Òall entitiesÓ (the debtor inclusive) 
from Òany act to obtain possession of property of the 
estate or of property from the estate or to exercise 
control over property of the estate.Ó33 
 
It is indeed difficult to interpret s. 362 and s. 
549(a) in a manner that does not allow for any overlap 
between the two provisions. The legislative history of 
the Code is not helpful, as very little analysis is given 
in respect of the latter provision. Clearly s. 549(a) 
constitutes an independent means for invalidating 
certain vulnerable post-petition contracts. However, 
most of the contracts that it is aimed at also violate the 
automatic stay, considering that all post-petition 
contractual transfers of the estate assets will be in 
violation of the automatic stay. Against this 
background, s. 549(a) may be a mere surplusage in 
many cases. 
  
In validating or avoiding post-petition 
contracts under the Insolvency Act and Bankruptcy 
Code, courts in the two jurisdictions often rely on 
very similar principles. This is not surprising, 
considering that s. 127 of the Act and s. 549(a) of the 
Code have similar underlying policy goals, namely, 
preservation of the debtorÕs assets to ensure that 
insolvency law policy is not undermined. Hence, in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 Kelly Culpin, ÒValidity Of Post-Petition Transfers Of Real Property: Who 
Does The Bankruptcy Code's Section 549(c) Protect?Ó (2005) 40 Real Prop. 
Prob. & Tr. J. 149, 178. 
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validating post-petition contractual dispositions, UK 
courts ensure that the interests of unsecured creditors 
are not prejudiced. The courts will be reluctant to 
validate contractual arrangements where a pre-
liquidation creditor would be paid in full to the 
detriment of other creditors who are given only 
dividends.34  
 
Post-petition contracts involving the transfer of 
assets, in good faith and in the ordinary course of 
business at the time when parties were oblivious of 
the pending winding up petition are often validated by 
UK courts. 35  The Code also exempts good faith 
purchasers who contract without knowledge that a 
winding up petition has been filed and who have 
furnished consideration that is equivalent to the 
present fair equivalent value. This exemption is 
however only limited to the transfer of interest in real 
property.36  
 
In addition, in involuntary cases, transfers 
made after the commencement of a case but before 
the order for relief, are exempted from the present rule 
to the extent of any value that is given after the 
commencement of the case in exchange for such 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Denney v John Hudson & Co Ltd [1992] B.C.C. 503, 504; Re Gray's Inn 
Construction Co Ltd (fn. 18) 718. Here it was suggested that special 
circumstances could warrant the validation in favour of pre-liquidation creditors. 
This could be in cases where it would be in the interests of the creditors generally 
that the company's business should be carried on, and this could only be achieved 
by paying for goods already supplied to the company when the petition is 
presented but not yet paid for. Ian Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency (4th end, 
Sweet & Maxwell 2009) 814. 
35 Denney v John Hudson & Co Ltd [1992] B.C.C. 503, 505; Re Gray's Inn 
Construction Co Ltd (fn. 18) 718. 
36 s. 549(c) of the Code; William Rochelle, Gwen Feder, ÒUnauthorized Sales of 
a Debtor's Property: The Rights of a Purchaser Under Section 549 of the 
Bankruptcy CodeÓ (1983) 57 Am. Bankr. L.J. 23, 23. 
  
343 
transfer. This is regardless of any notice or knowledge 
of the case that the transferee has.37 Section 127 has 
no application to post-petition creditors, i.e. creditors 
who contract or make supplies to the company for full 
market value after the presentation of the winding up 
petition.38 This is due to the fact that there is often no 
dissipation of the assets of the debtor or the value 
thereof.39 The Bankruptcy Code treats post-petition 
creditors and contracts of this nature in a similar 
manner. 
 
Finally, under the Insolvency Act, a post-
petition contract that effects a disposition that is not 
validated by the court remains void.40 Although the 
disposition is void and the transferee has no title to 
the assets, it may still be expedient to obtain an order 
for recovery from the court. This is also the practice 
under s. 549(a) of the Code notwithstanding that, 
under the provision, contractual transfers are merely 
voidable until avoided by the trustees. 41 Once the 
transfer has been avoided, the transferee will be 
required to return the transferred asset to the 
bankruptcy estate.42 
  
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 s. 549(b) of the Code. 
38 Denney v John Hudson & Co. Ltd. (fn. 35) 505; Re Gray's Inn Construction 
Co. Ltd. (fn. 18) 719. 
39 Re Tramway Building and Construction Co. Ltd. [1987] 3 B.C.C. 443, 449. 
40 Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (fn. 19) 619-620.  
41 Charles Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy (2nd edn., Foundation Press 2009) 634. 
42 s. 550(a) of the Code. 
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5.3.    Post-petition financing contracts 
 
The importance of adequate working capital in 
the reorganisation of insolvent companies cannot be 
overstated. Due to the risks involved, an officeholder 
will typically have an uphill task trying to negotiate 
and convince pre-insolvency and new financiers to 
lend to the debtor. This part of the chapter 
comparatively evaluates the legal framework for post-
petition financing in the two jurisdictions. It further 
analyses the hierarchy of incentives for post-petition 
financiers and examines how the conflict between the 
rights of existing creditors and post-petition lenders 
are managed. 
  
    
5.3.1.    Statutory frameworks 
 
One of the foremost challenges that an 
officeholder in both jurisdictions will encounter will 
be in sourcing funds to finance the rescue of the 
company or to trade for even a short time so as to 
maximise realisations. The officeholder will have a 
number of options at his disposal. He may opt to 
renegotiate and restructure existing pre-insolvency 
lending agreements or may enter into new contracts.  
 
A debtor will often stand a better chance of 
obtaining credit from a creditor with an existing 
relationship and knowledge of the affairs of the debtor 
than from a total stranger. It may be easier to 
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convince an existing creditor to lend to the debtor, as 
this may be the only viable way of saving the debtor 
from complete collapse and also preserving the value 
of the creditorÕs previous investment in the debtor. 
Hence, further financing of a distressed company or 
insolvent estate may be viewed as a vehicle to asset 
recovery rather than a risk-prone venture. Another 
merit of obtaining credit from existing pre-petition 
creditors is that the transaction will be expedited and 
bureaucratic procedures avoided purely because the 
insolvent company and the lender have an existing 
relationship.43 
 
Under the Bankruptcy Code, pre-petition 
financing contracts cannot be assumed.44 In the same 
vein, an agreement by the parties for the financing 
contract to continue after the filing of an insolvency 
petition will be of no effect.45 The Bankruptcy Code 
has a comprehensive and well-structured debtor-in-
possession (DIP) financing provision. 46  Under DIP 
financing, the Code aims to balance the interests of 
pre-petition creditors with that of the post-petition 
lender, taking into account the risks associated with 
post-petition lending. In response to the reluctance 
and skepticism of prospective lenders towards 
financing the rescue procedure of insolvent 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43The Insolvency Service, ÒEncouraging Company Rescue Ð A ConsultationÓ 
(2009) 18 par 51: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insol
vencyprofessionandlegislation/con_doc_register/compresc/compresc09.pdf 
(accessed on 6 October 2012). 
44 In re Sun Runner Marine Inc. 945 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1991). 
45 Charles Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy (2nd edn., Foundation Press 2009) 1074. 
46 s. 364 of the Code. 
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companies, s. 364 offers a progressive hierarchy of 
inducements to prospective lenders.47 
 
In contrast, UK insolvency law does not have 
specific provisions that regulate corporate rescue 
financing.48 As a matter of general principle, liabilities 
that arise from post-petition financing contracts rank 
in priority as expenses of the administration ahead of 
unsecured creditors (including the prescribed part) 
and floating charge-holders, but not in priority to 
fixed charges and quasi-security rights. 49  They 
however rank equally with other expenses of 
administration.50  
 
A significant point to note is that, in contrast 
to the CodeÕs DIP financing, a post-petition lender 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47  Craig Cooper, ÒThe Priority Of Post-petition Retainers, Carve-Outs, And 
Interim Compensation Under The Bankruptcy CodeÓ (1993) 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 
2337, 2347; Paul Baisier, David Epstein, ÒPost-petition Lending Under Section 
364: Issues Regarding The Gap Period And Financing For Pre-packaged PlansÓ 
(1992) 27 Wake Forest L. Rev. 103, 103. 
48 Stephen Davies, Insolvency and the Enterprise Act 2002 (Jordans 2003) 13-14, 
20-26. The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) review of company rescue 
mechanisms that preceded the UK Enterprise Act 2002 had suggested that new 
secured finance should only be available to support a rescue procedure where 
existing secured creditors agree or where there are unsecured assets or sufficient 
equity in unsecured assets. During the parliamentary debates, government 
resisted an amendment that would have created a statutory framework for super-
priority financing after the administration process was commenced. The basis for 
this opposition was to prevent creating a situation that would guarantee a return 
to lenders advancing funds on the basis of such priority irrespective of the 
commercial viability of the rescue proposals. GovernmentÕs position was that the 
issue of Òwhether to lend to a company in administration was a commercial one 
that was best left to the business judgment of the lending market.Ó See also Lijie 
Qi, ÒAvailability of continuing financing in corporate reorganisations: the UK 
and US perspectiveÓ (2008) Comp. Law. 162, 166; Gerard McCormack, ÒSuper-
priority new financing and corporate rescueÓ (2007) J.B.L. 701, 702. 
49 r. 2.67.1(a) Insolvency Rules. 
50 Although there is no express provision for rescue financing in the Insolvency 
Act, McCormack has argued that post-petition financing is authorised by 
implication. He argues that the relative provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986 
can be read in such a way as to permit new financing arrangements during 
administration that would take priority over both the administrator's remuneration 
and expenses and an existing floating charge. McCormack notes that a 
combination of para. 99(3) and (4) of Sch. B1 will have the effect of conferring 
contractual liabilities including loan obligations priority over the administrator's 
remuneration and expenses, which in turn are payable ahead of floating charge 
securities. Gerard McCormack, ÒSuper-priority new financing and corporate 
rescueÓ (2007) J.B.L. 701, 727-728. 
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under the Insolvency Act has no priority over secured 
creditors,51 except lenders secured by floating charges. 
In consequence, the chances of a company obtaining 
rescue finance may depend on its ownership of 
unencumbered assets or additional advances by pre-
petition secured creditors. 
 
In view of the importance of corporate rescue 
finance, the UK Insolvency Service has recommended 
the provision of a Òrange of increasingly enhanced 
securityÓ to providers of rescue finance to serve as an 
incentive for them to lend to companies in 
administration.52 Significantly, these incentives are to 
a large extent a transplant of the DIP financing 
provisions under s. 364 of the Bankruptcy Code. The 
next paragraphs will evaluate the hierarchy of 
incentives under the DIP financing and their effects 
on the rights of pre-petition and other post-petition 
creditors. This will be comparatively evaluated with 
the current approach of UK insolvency law alongside 
the recommendations of the UK Insolvency Service. 
  
The first incentive under s. 364 of the Code 
for a provider of DIP financing is priority as an 
expense of the reorganisation. Hence, if the post-
petition loan is given to the bankruptcy estate in the 
ordinary course of business, the creditorÕs claim will 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51  Rebecca Parry, ÒIs UK Insolvency Law Failing Struggling Companies?Ó 
(2009) 18 Nottingham L.J. 42, 51. 
52 The Insolvency Service, ÒEncouraging Company Rescue Ð A ConsultationÓ 
(2009) 18 par 54: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insol
vencyprofessionandlegislation/con_doc_register/compresc/compresc09.pdf 
(accessed on 6 October 2012). 
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be treated as an Òadministrative expense.Ó53 As noted 
previously, UK insolvency law generally grants 
administration-expense status to post-petition 
lenders. 54  However a distinction between the two 
regimes is that the Code has additional requirements 
where the loan was not given in the ordinary course of 
business. These additional requirements are, notice to 
creditors, a court hearing and approval. 55  These 
requirements are plainly justifiable. 
 
In certain instances, inducement by way of 
administrative expense priority may not be sufficient 
to encourage a lender to contract with the bankruptcy 
estate. This may be the case where the incentive is not 
viewed as being commensurate with the level of the 
potential risk. 56  Where the trustee or debtor in 
possession shows that he has unsuccessfully made 
reasonable attempts to obtain credit based on the 
above incentive, the Code permits credit to be 
obtained and secured by one of the varieties of special 
priorities.  
 
Accordingly, the following three special types 
of priorities can be conferred on a lender after notice 
to creditors and a court hearing: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 s. 364 (a) and (b) of the Code. 
54 r. 2.67.1(a) IR: ÒExpenses properly incurred by the administrator in performing 
his functions in the administration of the company.Ó 
55 s. 364 (b) Bankruptcy Code. In re Straightline Investment Inc. 525 F.3d 870 
(9th Cir 2008). Courts have adopted two tests for measuring Òordinary course of 
business.Ó First, the vertical dimension test focuses on the reasonable 
expectations of a hypothetical creditor. To pass the test, it must be a type of 
transaction that a creditor would expect the debtor in his business to enter into. 
Secondly, the horizontal dimension test considers the transaction in the context of 
the industry by comparing the debtorÕs business and transaction to businesses in 
the same industry. 
56 Charles Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy (2nd edn., Foundation Press 2009) 1077. 
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i. A super priority for the debt or credit, with 
priority over all administrative expenses;57 
ii. A lien on unencumbered estate property;58 or 
iii. A lien on the equity in property of the estate that 
is already subject to a lien.59 
 
Post-insolvency lenders under the UK regime 
are not entitled to any of the above three special 
priorities. Their incentive is limited to having priority 
as administration expense. In addition, the 
administration expense priority under r. 2.67 is not the 
preserve of post-petition lenders. Post-petition lenders 
will rank equally with other post-petition creditors 
whose claims fit the description.60 An agreement to 
confer a ÒsuperÓ administration expense priority or 
any of the special priorities on a lender in the UK 
regime will constitute an attempt to contract out of the 
mandatory insolvency distribution scheme 
considering that no such priority is recognised by the 
Insolvency Act. 
    
The range of increasingly enhanced security 
which the UK Insolvency Service has proposed as 
incentives to post-petition lenders in order to 
encourage the financing of corporate rescue are 
similar to the inducements under the Bankruptcy 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 s. 364(c)(1) Bankruptcy Code. 
58 s. 364(c)(2). 
59 s. 364(c)(3). 
60 r. 2.67(1)(f) IR: ÒAny necessary disbursements by the administrator in the 
course of the administration.Ó In Exeter City Council vs Bairstow [2007] B.C.C. 
236, 250-251, it was held that the expenses under r. 2.67(1)(a) i.e. Òexpenses 
properly incurred by the administrator in performing his functions in the 
administration of the company,Ó are limited to those for which the administrator 
made himself personally liable. 
  
350 
Code. For instance, as is the case under the Code, the 
Insolvency Service has recommended that, in 
appropriate cases, properly incurred rescue finance 
costs should rank ahead of other administrative 
expenses.61 The Insolvency Service rightly posits that 
granting greater priority to repayment of such funding 
will serve as a motivation to banks and lenders, giving 
them a greater assurance of repayment.  
 
As is the case under s. 364(c) of the Code, the 
UK Insolvency Service has recognised the fact that in 
certain instances, mere granting of priority ahead of 
administration expenses may not be sufficient to 
attract prospective lenders due to the increased risk. 
The Insolvency Service thus recommends other 
increased ranges of incentives. 62   For instance, in 
appropriate cases where the foregoing incentives are 
not commensurate with the potential risks which the 
post-petition lender may incur, the Insolvency Service 
has recommended that the post-petition finance can be 
secured, 
i. Against any property which is not already 
encumbered by fixed security; or 
ii. As an additional (subordinate) fixed charge on any 
property; or 
iii. Subject to the agreement of the existing fixed 
charge-holder(s) or the court, and only where 
there is no scope for new or subordinate fixed 
charges, as a first charge (ahead of other fixed 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 The Insolvency Service, ÒEncouraging Company Rescue Ð A ConsultationÓ (n 
41) 19 para. 61 proposal C. 
62 ibid. at 21 par 67; 19 para. 57. 
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charges) or an equal first charge on property 
already subject to a fixed charge.63 
 
Given that (iii) above entails overriding an 
existing (fixed) security interest, an attempt is made to 
limit the incursion into the rights of secured creditors 
by way of preconditions. Hence, before the priority is 
conferred, the officeholder must be satisfied that 
granting the security is necessary to obtain finance.  
The decision to grant the security must be in the 
interest of affected secured creditors who must also be 
adequately protected. In addition, this option must be 
in the best interest of creditors generally. 
 
The foregoing conditions for overriding 
security interests are consonant with those under the 
Bankruptcy Code.64  Under the Code, the court can 
approve secured financing wherein the lender will be 
secured by a senior or equal lien on a property of the 
insolvent estate that is already subject to a lien. This 
incentive can only be used as a last resort when the 
preceding incentives do not suffice. 65  The 
consequence of this is that the pre-existing senior lien 
will be subordinated in favour of a new lender and the 
latter will be granted the senior or first lien.66 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63 ibid. at 20 proposal D para. 65. 
64 s. 364(d) Bankruptcy Code. Mark Prager, ÒFinancing the Chapter 11 Debtor: 
The Lenders' PerspectiveÓ (1989) 45 Bus. Law 2127, 2135-2136; Daniel 
Goodsell, ÒExtending Post-Petition Credit to Reorganizing Debtors: 
Understanding the Tricks and Traps of Bankruptcy Code Section 364Ó (1990) 
Utah L. Rev. 93, 104. 
65 s. 364(d) Bankruptcy Code. 
66 Charles Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy (2nd edn., Foundation Press 2009) 1078-
1079: ÒThe new senior lien (the post-petition lender) is said to ÕprimeÕ the prior 
first lien, which now is relegated to the junior lien status.Ó 
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Finally, post-insolvency lenders under the 
Code are protected from being adversely affected by a 
subsequent modification or reversal by the order of 
court granting the super-priority or lien. 67  Some 
creditors would be reluctant to extend credit to 
reorganizing debtors if the court's order granting them 
protection could be overturned subsequently, leaving 
them without any protection. Accordingly, creditors 
who rely on a bankruptcy courtÕs order in good faith 
are adequately protected.68 
 
It has been argued that introducing a provision 
for leapfrogging finance to the Insolvency Act would 
be a bold step, and one that would likely be resisted 
by institutional lenders.69 This observation is plausible 
considering that such prime finance would inevitably 
render security interests uncertain and make lending 
riskier. On the other hand, priming finance will have 
the potential to encourage pre-insolvency secured 
creditors to advance further funds in order to avoid 
being bypassed in priority. Hence, it may make it 
easier for some corporate debtors to exit 
administration. 
 
Generally post-insolvency contractual 
liabilities of a debtor rank as expenses of the 
procedure ahead of pre-insolvency claims. However, 
the CodeÕs DIP financing regime sanctions the 
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67 s. 364(e) Bankruptcy Code. 
68 Daniel Goodsell, ÒExtending Post-Petition Credit to Reorganizing Debtors: 
Understanding the Tricks and Traps of Bankruptcy Code SectionÓ (1990) Utah L. 
Rev. 93, 104.108. 
69 Rebecca Parry, ÒIs UK Insolvency Law Failing Struggling Companies?Ó (fn. 
51) 51. 
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conferment of greater protection and privileges to 
creditors who are willing to finance a corporate 
rescue. The option of overriding existing security 
interests is by far the most significant and far-
reaching of the incentives offered to post-petition 
lenders.  
 
The special treatment accorded DIP financing 
creditors in comparison to other pre- and post-petition 
creditors can be justified on at least two grounds or 
circumstances. Firstly, it can be justified on the basis 
that unsecured creditors whose interests are being 
overridden will eventually benefit from the post-
insolvency financing contract and have their positions 
improved.70  
 
Secondly, it is a means of compensating post-
petition lenders for the risks they undertake in 
financing insolvent companies. In addition, the 
special treatment serves an inducement to prospective 
lenders in view of the commercially unattractive 
nature of DIP financing contracts. 
  
Notwithstanding the above, it is difficult to 
justify the erosion of the rights of secured creditors in 
favour of DIP financing creditors. From the 
perspective of secured creditors, this interference is 
unfair and untenable, as they do not stand to derive 
any benefit from such DIP financing contract unless 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
70 However, there is usually no guarantee that the rescue attempt will succeed. 
Hence in the case of failure, the post-insolvency financier is secured to the 
maximum extent but those junior creditors who have found themselves relegated 
by virtue of the Code, receive less than they originally would have received. 
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and to the extent that they are under-secured. Indeed 
rather than the prospects of their positions being 
improved, their security interests are being risked.71It 
is arguable that although the Code provides for 
adequate protection for secured creditors when their 
rights are interfered with, there is no absolute 
guarantee that they will always recover from their 
security interests. In practice, if the rescue attempt 
fails, secured creditors will be relegated to such an 
extent that the super-priority eats into the value of 
their security -- the post-insolvency lender can only 
recover by grabbing fixed charge assets. 
 
It is arguable that the intrusion into the rights 
of secured creditors has the potential to adversely 
affect the perception and attitude of creditors towards 
secured credit transactions generally. Considering that 
unsecured creditors and the business itself are the 
ultimate beneficiaries of post-insolvency financing 
contracts, it can be argued that in this case, the 
pendulum has been made to shift away from the 
protection of secured creditors towards the protection 
of the companyÕs business and the interests of 
unsecured creditors. 
 
It has been suggested that the conferment of a 
super-priority status on post-insolvency lenders has 
the potential to increase borrowing costs and to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71 Adequate protection can be deemed to have been provided where the debtor 
has a sizable equity cushion sufficient to cover both the original secured creditor 
and the post-insolvency lender. The condition could also be satisfied if the 
officeholder can convince the court that the loan it has received will enable the 
debtor enhance the value of its collateral so as to fully secure the original secured 
creditor and the post-insolvency lender. 
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effectively veto the company against entering into 
certain future contractual relationships. 72  This 
assertion is plausible give that counterparties may be 
reluctant to trade with the debtor, knowing fully well 
that their administrative expense status would be 
subject to a super-priority debt. However, a 
counterargument could be that this is indeed a price 
worth paying to keep the company alive. This is in 
view of the fact that there would be no future 
contracts if the company opted for liquidation rather 
than negotiating a post-insolvency financing contract. 
 
Finally, the protection offered by the so-called 
super-priority may not be so ÒsuperÓ in all 
circumstances. The status is not foolproof and may 
not always guarantee repayment. First, the bankruptcy 
estate must have enough assets to be able to repay the 
super-priority debts when due. If there are no funds, 
then repayment will not be feasible. Secondly, if the 
case is converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation procedure, 
there is the likelihood that the administrative expenses 
incurred in the superseding Chapter 7 case will have 
priority over the pre-conversion expenses including 
any super-priority interest therein.73 Hence in In re 
Vissionaire Corp. 74  where a Chapter 11 case was 
converted to Chapter 7, McDonald J. held that the 
Chapter 7 administrative expense claims had priority 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 Charles Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy (2nd edn., Foundation Press 2009) 1078. 
73 s. 726(b) of the Code.  
74 290 B.R. 348 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Mo. 2003). See also In re Sun Runner Marine, 134 
B.R. 4, 7 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1991); In re Summit Ventures, Inc. 135 B.R. 478, 483 
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1991). However in In re Energy Cooperative, Inc. 55 B.R. 957, 
963 n. 20 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985) Hertz J. noted in dicta that a pre-conversion 
super-priority administrative expense claim has priority over a post-conversion 
administrative priority claim.   
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over pre-conversion Chapter 11 administrative 
expense/super-priority claim of the post-petition 
lender. 75 
  
 
5.3.2.     Cross-collateralisation 
 
A common post-petition financing technique 
outside s. 364 of the Bankruptcy Code is cross-
collateralisation. Cross-collateralisation may entail 
granting a post-petition lender security on assets 
generated pre-petition to secure the lenderÕs loan. It 
may also entail granting a pre-petition creditor 
security on post-petition assets to secure the creditorÕs 
post-petition and pre-petition claims. 76  Cross-
collateralisation has been described as Òan extremely 
controversial form of Chapter 11 financingÓ which 
utilises an inducement-based approach.77  In deed, it is 
the character of the inducement it offers that makes 
the technique controversial to an extent. As is the case 
under s. 364 of the Code, the inducements are meant 
to incentivise existing and prospective lenders to 
provide new credit facilities to the debtor company.78 
 
There are two basic forms of cross-
collateralisation, namely, the forward cross-
collateralisation and the backward cross-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
75 ibid. at 352. Affirmed on appeal in 299 B.R. 530 (2002). 
76 Lawrence Oscar, ÒSaybrook Manufacturing: Is Cross-collateralisation Moot?Ó 
(1993) 2 J. Bankr. L & Prac. 163, 183. 
77 In the Matter of Saybrook 963 F.2d 1490, 1493 (11th Cir. 1992). 
78 Jeff Bohm, ÒLegal Justification for the Proper Use of Cross-collateralisation 
Clauses in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy CasesÓ (1985) 59 Am. Bankr. L. J. 289, 290. 
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collateralisation.79 A backward cross-collateralisation 
can only be carried out with a pre-petition 
lender/creditor. It involves a debtor extending security 
that it has granted to a lender for a post-petition loan 
to also secure outstanding unsecured pre-petition 
debts owed to the lender.80 This enables the lender to 
kill the proverbial two birds with one stone. 
 
A typical backward cross-collateralisation will 
take the following form: A lender, L, whom the 
debtor, D, owed the sum of $3 million prior to the 
formal insolvency proceedings (which was secured 
with collateral worth only $1.5 million) agrees to lend 
a post-petition secured loan of $1 million to D. D 
profitably invests the $1 million in the purchase of an 
asset worth $2 million and grants L security in the 
asset. In consequence, LÕs post-petition loan to D (i.e. 
$1 million) will be fully secured. In addition, due to 
the cross-collateralisation clause, the $1 million 
unsecured part of DÕs pre-insolvency debt to L (i.e. 
£1.5 million) will also become secured. 
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79 Most decisions in the late 80s and early 90s on cross-collateralisation did not 
make this distinction. In consequence, a number of such decisions only 
considered the workings of a backward cross-collateralisation and based their 
disapproval of the practice on that. See In the Matter of Saybrook (fn. 77) 1490; 
In re Roblin Ind. Inc. 52 B.R. 241 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Vanguard 
Diversified Inc. 31 B.R. 364 (Bankr. ED. N.Y. 1983). 
80 In re Antico Manufacturing Co. Inc. 31 BR 103, 105 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983). 
The backward cross-collateralisation can be distinguished from a Òcritical vendor 
orderÓ in that while the former grants a creditor security interest in collateral, 
critical vendor order empowers a creditor to exact actual, immediate payment on 
its pre-insolvency unsecured claims as a prerequisite for continuing to supply the 
business debtor in bankruptcy with often highly-specialized goods or services 
that it needs to operate. The critical vendor order is also antithetical to insolvency 
policyÕs principles of equality and collectivity. Craig Bucki, ÒCracking the Code: 
The Legal Authority Behind Extra-statutory Debtor-In-Possession Financing 
Mechanisms And Their Prospects For SurvivalÓ (2005) Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 357. 
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A variant of the backward cross-
collateralisation is the forward cross-collateralisation. 
This form of cross-collateralisation involves the 
debtor granting the lender a security interest in assets 
owned pre-petition to secure post-petition 
indebtedness. A number of judicial decisions suggest 
that bankruptcy courts will be more inclined to uphold 
forward cross-collateralisation arrangements as 
opposed to backward cross-collateralisation. This is 
because forward cross-collateralisation neither 
improves a lenderÕs pre-petition position nor does it 
alter insolvency lawÕs distribution scheme by 
converting a previously unsecured claim into a 
secured claim. It merely exacts as security for future 
advances a lien or interest in an asset which in some 
cases may be the debtorÕs only valuable asset and 
means of raising funds.81 
 
Forward cross collateralisation is not in 
conflict with any fundamental principle of insolvency 
law.82 Indeed there are substantial similarities between 
the incentives which forward cross-collateralisation 
grants post-petition lenders and the inducements 
under s. 364(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.  
 
Forward cross-collateralisation may have a 
detrimental effect on unsecured creditors as 
previously unencumbered assets may become 
encumbered.  However, it may be argued that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
81 In re Antico Manufacturing Co. Inc. 31 BR 103, 105 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983). 
82 s. 364(c) and (d) Bankruptcy Code. 
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unsecured creditors will stand to eventually benefit 
from the corporate rescue financing contract if the 
procedure succeeds. In addition, in permitting forward 
cross-collateralisation, courts have the responsibility 
of protecting rights of pre-insolvency creditors by 
ensuring that the officeholder fulfills the pre-
conditions which the Bankruptcy Code has set out for 
DIP financing. 83 
    
Backward cross-collateralisation works at 
cross-purposes with the well-established insolvency 
distribution scheme that favours equal treatment of 
similarly situated creditors.84 In addition to promoting 
inequality, the arrangement also infringes the rights of 
unsecured creditors. Assets that would otherwise have 
been available for distribution to unsecured creditors 
are encumbered in favour of the lender.85 Backward 
cross-collateralisation encourages opportunistic 
behaviour by previously unsecured creditors who are 
often allowed to use their leveraged position to 
strong-arm the debtor into granting security for past 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83 s. 364(d). See paragraph 6.4.1. In re Vanguard Diversified 31 B.R. 364, 366 
(Bankr. ED. N.Y. 1983). 
84  Charles Tabb, ÒA Critical Reappraisal Of Cross-Collateralisation in 
BankruptcyÓ (1986) 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 109, 175. Tabb has observed that cross-
collateralisation is an evil, but not a necessary or even a permissible evil. Thus, 
courts should always refuse to approve cross-collateralisation clauses if requested 
in a financing order. He stresses that a blanket rule against allowing cross-
collateralisation should not be relaxed even if procedural safeguards are 
followed. Although Tabb made no distinction between the two types of cross-
collateralisation, it is safe to assume that this statement was made in relation to 
the backward cross-collateralisation as the preceding arguments he has given 
against the financing technique all relate to the deficiencies of the backward 
cross-collateralisation. 
85  In re Texlon Corp. 596 F.2d 1092 (2nd Cir. 1979); In In re Vanguard 
Diversified 31 B.R. 364, 366 (Bankr. ED. N.Y. 1983): The court described 
backward cross-collateralisation as a Òdisfavored means of financing which may 
only be authorized after its necessity has been established at a hearing held on 
notice to creditors.Ó Mark Prager, ÒFinancing the Chapter 11 Debtor: The 
Lenders' Perspective (1989) 45 Bus. Law 2127, 2146. 
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debts.86  
 
Section 364 outlines the methods of post-
petition financing as well as the circumstances under 
which the rights of creditors can be interfered with. 
The section also provides safeguards for the interests 
of pre-petition creditors. 87  Backward cross-
collateralisation has the tendency to create loopholes 
in the safety net for pre-petition creditors under s. 
364.  
 
Cross-collateralisation is alien to UK 
insolvency law. Granting collateral to a lender for a 
post-petition advance is perfectly justifiable. 
However, extending the security to cover pre-petition 
claims which were previously unsecured clearly 
violates the pari passu principle.88 Hence backward 
cross-collateralisation as a corporate rescue financing 
technique is antithetical to UK insolvency law policy.  
 
In addition, it is germane to note that the 
Insolvency Act prohibits suppliers of essential 
supplies (gas, water, electricity and communications 
services) from demanding payment of pre-insolvency 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
86 In The Matter Of Saybrook Manufacturing Co. Inc. (fn. 77) 1495: Ò(The) 
bankruptcy court has the ability to deviate from the rules of priority and 
distribution set forth in the Code in the interest of justice and equity. The Court 
cannot use this flexibility, however, merely to establish a ranking of priorities 
within priorities. Furthermore, absent the existence of some type of inequitable 
conduct on the part of the claimant, which results in injury to the creditors of the 
bankrupt or an unfair advantage to the claimant, the court cannot subordinate a 
claim to claims within the same class.Ó Donald Jordan, ÒCross Collateralisation 
In Chapter 11: Protecting The Small BusinessÓ (1993) 40 Wayne L. Rev. 219, 
228-229. 
87 s. 364(d) and (e) Bankruptcy Code. 
88 s. 107 of the Act; rule 4.181(1) of IR; Re Smith, Knight & Co, ex p Ashbury 
(1868) LR 5 Eq 223, 226. 
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debts as a condition for further supply.89 Such utility 
suppliers may only seek personal guarantee from the 
officeholder as a condition for making future 
supplies.90 The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 
2013 gives the UK Government the power to create 
regulations extending to IT supplies the protections 
available to insolvent companies in relation to 
"essential supplies" (water, gas, electricity and 
communications).91   
 
On the other hand, it is suggested that UK 
courts will be inclined to recognising and enforcing 
forward cross-collateralisation agreements. This is 
because the financing arrangement neither effects a 
redistribution of pre-petition entitlements nor does it 
alter insolvency lawÕs ranking of unsecured creditors. 
Accordingly, the lenderÕs position in relation to his 
pre-petition unsecured or under-secured claim is not 
improved by the lending arrangement. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
The commencement of formal insolvency does 
not strip a corporate debtor of its capacity to engage 
in contracts. A company in liquidation may continue 
trading until its eventual liquidation so as to maximize 
realizations for the general body of creditors. In 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89 s. 233(2)(b) Insolvency Act. 
90 s. 233(2)(a) Insolvency Act. 
91 s. 92(a) of Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013. The rationale of this 
provision is to allow debtor-companies to continue to operate for sufficiently 
long time to allow all or part of them to be saved, or sold through some form of 
effective insolvency administration.  
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rescue procedures where the central objective is the 
rehabilitation of the debtor, the corporate debtor will 
of necessity continue transacting. The capacity to 
contract post-petition in liquidation procedures in 
both jurisdictions is however subject to limitations, 
which again are aimed at achieving asset-preservation 
and value-maximisation for the benefit of unsecured 
creditors.  
 
The imperative of post-petition financing in 
rescue procedures cannot be overstated. The 
Bankruptcy Code has a comprehensive legal 
framework for debtor-in-possession financing 
alongside the hierarchy of inducements aimed at 
incentivizing prospective lenders to finance rescue 
procedures. There is no similar legal framework in the 
UK. 92 However, the yet-to-be adopted 
recommendations from UK Insolvency Service as 
regards post-petition financing alongside a hierarchy 
of inducements is substantially similar to the CodeÕs 
DIP financing regime. 
 
A significant feature of the post-petition 
financing framework is the super-priority which is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
92 This position can be compared to the debtor-in-possession financing in Canada 
where in the absence of express statutory authority, Canadian courts usually 
invoke their Òinherent jurisdictionÓ to create super-priority charges, giving DIP 
lenders a super-priority first ranking security interest. This allows the DIP lender 
to stand at the front of the line in terms of priority of payment if the restructuring 
fails and the process shifts into a liquidation and winding up proceeding. In 
granting DIP financing the court considers if all or substantially all existing 
secured creditors consent or if it can be demonstrated that the existing secured 
creditors whose interests are being primed or subordinated will not be materially 
prejudiced by the DIP financing. Re Sky Dome (1998) 16 C.B.R. (4th) 118 (Ont. 
Gen. Div.). Janis Sarra, ÒDebtor in possession (DIP) financing: The jurisdiction 
of courts to grant super-priority financingÓ (2003) 21 Dalhousie Law Journal 
337; Michael Rotsztain, ÒDebtor-in-Possession Financing: Current Law and a 
Preferred ApproachÓ (2000) 33 Can. Bus. L.J. 283, 284. 
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conferred on post-petition lenders in certain 
circumstances to incentivize and/or compensate them. 
Special priority for rescue financing is globally 
recognised as a feature of insolvency law reform. It is 
listed as one of European Bank for Reconstruction 
and DevelopmentÕs (EBRD) ten core principles. 93 
Similarly the United Nations Commission for 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) also 
recognises the relevance of post commencement 
financing with super-priority status.94 Nevertheless, it 
is difficult to justify the erosion of pre-petition 
security interests in the course of trying to induce or 
compensate post-petition lenders. It is arguable that 
this amounts to the use of insolvency law for effecting 
redistribution, considering that the secured creditors 
stand to gain nothing from such rescue finance 
contracts. 95 The ultimate beneficiaries of any 
successful rescue are unsecured creditors. 
!
!
!
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93 http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/legal/insolvency/principle.pdf (accessed 7 
May 2013). 
94 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/orderly/ (accessed 7 May 2013). 
95 The Code provides for Òadequate protectionÓ for secured creditors when their 
rights are interfered with. 
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